* fix(security+ops): #82#85#87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture
Security and operational hardening across three issue groups:
- M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun)
- C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile)
- M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler
- M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server)
- M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING)
- M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs
- C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download
- M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename
- C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response
- C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible)
- M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
- M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch)
Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90)
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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety
Review fixes:
- Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was
missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints
- Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex
- M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with
warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after
successful token consumption
- Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection
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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak
Address Devin Review findings on PR #104:
1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution +
ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only
matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like
`fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the
hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against
ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast.
2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`,
`da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old
format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call
/api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback
to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured).
3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open
NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to
prevent FD leaks until GC.
Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local,
multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence.
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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split
Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104:
1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download
endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow
dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders
contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots
and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \)
and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs.
2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health
checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints
(minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed)
and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint
with a PAT.
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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening
* fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up)
Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify
got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but
password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using
read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset
token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write-
wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker
would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the
asymmetry was a polish gap.
Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write
unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then
SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears
the marker and applies the password change.
New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in
tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two
ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same
token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with
'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both
POSTs got 302 (race confirmed).
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
- smoke-test.sh: replace ((PASS++)) with PASS=$((PASS + 1)) to avoid
set -e abort when counter is 0 (bash returns exit 1 for ((0)))
- CalVer: use max(N) from existing tags instead of count, safe when
tags are deleted (e.g. deprecated version cleanup)
- CLAUDE.md: update schema version from v2 to v3
663 tests pass.
