* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
107 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
Executable file
107 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
# Agnes smoke test — verifies a running instance is functional.
|
|
# Usage: ./scripts/smoke-test.sh [host:port]
|
|
# Default: http://localhost:8000
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
|
|
HOST="${1:-http://localhost:8000}"
|
|
PASS=0
|
|
FAIL=0
|
|
TOKEN=""
|
|
|
|
check() {
|
|
local name="$1" ok="$2"
|
|
if [ "$ok" = "true" ]; then
|
|
echo " PASS $name"
|
|
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
|
|
else
|
|
echo " FAIL $name"
|
|
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
echo "Smoke test: $HOST"
|
|
echo "---"
|
|
|
|
# 1. Health check (minimal, unauthenticated)
|
|
HEALTH=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
|
|
if [ "$HEALTH" = "unreachable" ]; then
|
|
echo " FATAL: health=$HEALTH"
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
check "health ($HEALTH)" "true"
|
|
|
|
# 2. Health detailed has version fields (requires auth, checked after bootstrap)
|
|
|
|
# 3. Bootstrap (only works on fresh DB; 403 means users exist)
|
|
BOOT_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/smoke_boot.json -w "%{http_code}" -X POST "$HOST/auth/bootstrap" \
|
|
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
-d '{"email":"smoke@test.local","name":"Smoke Test","password":"SmokeTest123!"}' 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
|
|
|
|
if [ "$BOOT_HTTP" = "200" ]; then
|
|
TOKEN=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('/tmp/smoke_boot.json'))['access_token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
|
|
check "bootstrap (new admin)" "true"
|
|
elif [ "$BOOT_HTTP" = "403" ]; then
|
|
TOKEN="${SMOKE_TOKEN:-}"
|
|
echo " SKIP bootstrap (users exist)"
|
|
else
|
|
check "bootstrap (HTTP $BOOT_HTTP)" "false"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# 2b. Health detailed (authenticated) — version fields
|
|
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
|
|
HAS_VERSION=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health/detailed" \
|
|
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python3 -c "
|
|
import sys,json
|
|
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
print('true' if 'version' in d and 'channel' in d and 'schema_version' in d else 'false')
|
|
" 2>/dev/null || echo "false")
|
|
check "health detailed version fields" "$HAS_VERSION"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# 4. Query SELECT 1 (requires auth)
|
|
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
|
|
QUERY_OK=$(curl -sf -X POST "$HOST/api/query" \
|
|
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
|
|
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
|
|
-d '{"sql":"SELECT 1 as test"}' | python3 -c "
|
|
import sys,json
|
|
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
|
|
print('true' if len(d.get('rows',[])) > 0 else 'false')
|
|
" 2>/dev/null || echo "false")
|
|
check "query SELECT 1" "$QUERY_OK"
|
|
else
|
|
echo " SKIP query (no token)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# 5. Sync trigger
|
|
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
|
|
SYNC_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST "$HOST/api/sync/trigger" \
|
|
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
|
|
if [[ "$SYNC_HTTP" =~ ^(200|202)$ ]]; then
|
|
check "sync trigger" "true"
|
|
else
|
|
check "sync trigger (HTTP $SYNC_HTTP)" "false"
|
|
fi
|
|
else
|
|
echo " SKIP sync (no token)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# 6. Post-sync health (wait briefly)
|
|
sleep 5
|
|
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
|
|
HEALTH2=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health/detailed" \
|
|
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
|
|
else
|
|
HEALTH2=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
|
|
fi
|
|
if [ "$HEALTH2" = "unhealthy" ] || [ "$HEALTH2" = "unreachable" ]; then
|
|
check "post-sync health ($HEALTH2)" "false"
|
|
else
|
|
check "post-sync health ($HEALTH2)" "true"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
# Results
|
|
echo ""
|
|
echo "Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
|
|
[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ] || exit 1
|