Task 0.5 of clean-analyst-bootstrap. Greenfield rewrite — no fallback, no aliases. Existing dev environments lose their cached PAT and must re-authenticate. Env var renames (hard cutover): - DA_CONFIG_DIR -> AGNES_CONFIG_DIR - DA_SERVER -> AGNES_SERVER - DA_SERVER_URL -> AGNES_SERVER_URL (test-only stale ref, not in spec) - DA_NO_UPDATE_CHECK -> AGNES_NO_UPDATE_CHECK - DA_LOCAL_DIR -> AGNES_LOCAL_DIR - DA_TOKEN -> AGNES_TOKEN - DA_STREAM_RETRIES -> AGNES_STREAM_RETRIES Config dir rename: ~/.config/da/ -> ~/.config/agnes/ (across code, comments, docstrings, error messages, install templates, dev scripts). Stale `da X` references in CLI source (and adjacent app/, tests/): swept docstrings, comments, help text, and error messages where the verb survives the rewrite (init, pull, push, catalog, status, diagnose, auth, admin, skills, query, schema, describe, explore, disk-info, snapshot, login, logout, whoami, server, setup) and replaced `da X` with `agnes X`. Intentionally kept `da sync`, `da fetch`, `da analyst`, `da metrics` — those verbs are removed in later tasks; the legacy strings will be detected by `_LEGACY_STRINGS` (added in Task 2). Test fixes: - TestCLIVersion now asserts output starts with `agnes ` (was `da `). Test results: 2675 passed, 25 skipped (full pytest run, excluding 9 pre-existing test_db.py / test_user_management.py / test_e2e_extract.py / test_cli_binary_rename.py failures unrelated to this rename).
63 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security — RBAC, permissions, and audit
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## Access control (v19+)
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Two layers, no role hierarchy:
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- **`Admin` system group** — god-mode for app-level actions. Members can do anything.
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- **`resource_grants(group, resource_type, resource_id)`** — per-group grants on individual resources (tables, marketplace plugins, memory domains).
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Every non-admin access requires an explicit grant. There is no `is_public` shortcut and no implicit Everyone fallback — admins curate access by minting grants on groups the user belongs to.
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## Managing users
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```bash
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agnes admin add-user user@company.com # creates a non-admin user
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agnes admin list-users
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agnes admin remove-user <user-id>
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```
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Admin promotion is a separate action — there is no `--role admin` flag. Add the user to the `Admin` system group:
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```bash
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agnes admin group list # find the Admin group id
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agnes admin group add-member <admin-group-id> user@company.com
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```
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Removed in v19: `agnes admin set-role` (use group memberships instead). Old call sites hard-fail with a replacement command in the error message.
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## Granting table access
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```bash
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agnes admin grant resource-types # see registered resource types
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agnes admin grant create --group <id> --type table --id <table-id>
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agnes admin grant list
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agnes admin grant delete <grant-id>
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```
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The web UI at `/admin/access` shows the same model: groups on the left, grantable resources on the right, per-row checkboxes plus per-block "Grant all" / "Revoke all" bulk actions.
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## Audit trail
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Every API mutation is logged:
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```bash
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agnes query "SELECT * FROM system.audit_log ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 20" --remote
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```
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## Script sandboxing
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User scripts run in an isolated subprocess with:
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- Limited environment (no access to secrets)
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- Timeout (default 5 min)
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- Blocked imports (subprocess, shutil, ctypes)
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- Stdout/stderr size cap (64KB)
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## JWT tokens
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- Session tokens: issued on interactive login (`agnes login`), valid 24 hours.
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- For long-lived CLI / CI use, create a Personal Access Token via the UI (`/tokens` → New token) or CLI (`agnes auth token create`).
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- PATs are revocable and auditable; session tokens are not.
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- Claims: `sub` (user_id), `email`, `typ`, `exp`, `jti`. **No `role` claim** — admin status derives from `user_group_members` at request time via `app.auth.access.is_user_admin`.
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- Set `JWT_SECRET_KEY` in `.env` (min 32 chars).
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