* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration
BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.
Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
→ drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.
Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
(TABLE je unconditionally enabled)
API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)
Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
(admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()
CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
(back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)
Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
(can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
(drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated
Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)
Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.
Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): cut 0.27.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
5.8 KiB
Google OAuth — operator gotchas
The Google OAuth provider (app/auth/providers/google.py) reads GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET straight from environment variables. If either is empty, is_available() returns False and the login page falls back to email / password auth without complaint.
Env vars
| Var | Required for Google | Notes |
|---|---|---|
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID |
yes | From Google Cloud Console OAuth 2.0 Client ID (Web application). |
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET |
yes | From the same client. Rotate via "Reset secret" on the client; old value is invalidated immediately. |
SESSION_SECRET |
yes | Used by Starlette SessionMiddleware to stash OAuth state/nonce between /auth/google/login and /auth/google/callback. Auto-generated to data/state/.session_secret if unset, but for multi-replica or VM-rebuild scenarios pin it explicitly. |
JWT_SECRET_KEY |
yes | Signs the access-token cookie. Same auto-generate-and-persist pattern as SESSION_SECRET. |
FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS |
only when behind a reverse proxy | Default 127.0.0.1 — uvicorn ignores X-Forwarded-Proto/Host from any other client IP, which means callbacks come back as http://localhost:8000/... instead of https://your-host/.... Set to * (or the proxy's IP) when terminating TLS at Caddy / nginx / Cloudflare Tunnel. The compose command: already passes --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips='*' — this env var is the override. |
DOMAIN |
recommended behind TLS | Public hostname (data.example.com). Gates the Secure flag on the access-token cookie in google_callback() — when set, the cookie is only sent over HTTPS, when empty the cookie works over plain HTTP so local dev is unbroken. Also consumed by the Caddy profile. |
SERVER_URL |
optional | Absolute base URL (https://data.example.com) used to build OAuth callback URLs and other external links. Set it when you don't trust the incoming Host header (e.g. a misconfigured proxy), so the callback URL is deterministic regardless of what the reverse proxy forwards. Must match the redirect URI registered on the Google OAuth client. |
SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL |
recommended on first boot | App startup (app/main.py) creates this user and adds them to the Admin system group if missing. Combined with Google OAuth, the first time the matching email signs in, repo.get_by_email() finds the seeded record and the user lands as admin. |
instance.yaml requirements that affect auth
config/loader.py:_validate_config requires:
instance.nameauth.allowed_domain(CSV — e.g."example.com, partner.org"; empty allows any verified Google account)auth.webapp_secret_key(typically"${SESSION_SECRET}")server.hostserver.hostname
If any are missing, app/instance_config.py catches the ValueError, logs Could not load instance.yaml: ... Using defaults, and the app keeps running with empty instance config. That means get_allowed_domains() returns [] and every verified Google account is allowed. Always grep your runtime log for Could not load instance.yaml after a config change — silent fallback is by design (resilience over strictness) but easy to miss.
OAuth client setup (Google Cloud Console)
- APIs & Services → Credentials → "Create Credentials" → "OAuth client ID" → "Web application".
- Authorized redirect URIs — one per public hostname:
Addhttps://<hostname>/auth/google/callbackhttp://localhost:8000/auth/google/callbackfor local dev. - The Client ID and Client Secret go into
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID/GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET.
Common failure modes
| Symptom | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
Error 400: redirect_uri_mismatch |
Either the URI isn't registered on the OAuth client, or the app generated http://localhost:8000/... because FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS wasn't set (or SERVER_URL isn't defined and the proxy's Host header is missing / wrong). |
Add the URI in Console; verify FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=* reaches the container; pin SERVER_URL=https://<host> to bypass Host-header reliance. |
| Login works but the user keeps getting re-prompted on the next request | Access-token cookie lost between requests. Common cause: DOMAIN unset → Secure=False but the browser hit the app over https:// via a proxy and dropped the cookie for another reason; or DOMAIN set but the browser hit http://. |
Set DOMAIN=<hostname> to match the terminator's hostname, and always serve over HTTPS to the browser. |
/login?error=google_not_configured |
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID or GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET empty in container env. |
Inspect docker compose exec app env | grep GOOGLE. |
/login?error=domain_not_allowed |
User's email domain isn't in auth.allowed_domain. |
Add the domain (CSV) and reload — note that allowed_domain only takes effect when instance.yaml validates (see above). |
Login succeeds but /admin/* returns 403 |
New user is not in the Admin system group. |
Set SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL BEFORE first login, or promote via da admin break-glass grant-admin <email> (requires shell access to the host — see below). |
Admin promotion (when SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL was missed)
Use the break-glass CLI command. It writes directly to system.duckdb without HTTP/auth (the whole point is recovery for the case where the running server's authorization layer cannot help). The DuckDB file must not be locked by a running app process — stop the app first:
cd <install-dir>
docker compose stop app scheduler
da admin break-glass grant-admin me@example.com
docker compose start app scheduler
The promoted user must sign out and sign back in — JWTs are issued at login time. Authorization at request time reads from user_group_members directly, so the new Admin membership takes effect on the next request without re-issuing the token.