* feat(store): flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue
Adds an end-to-end guardrails pipeline for store uploads (manifest +
static-security + LLM review), persists blocked bundles for forensics,
introduces soft-delete (Archive) semantics, consolidates the legacy
/store/{id} surface into /marketplace/flea/{id}, and reworks the admin
queue so lifecycle filters read live entity visibility via LEFT JOIN
rather than a denormalized submission column.
Schema v29 → v35:
* v29 store_submissions table + store_entities.visibility_status
* v30 file_size, bundle_sha256, bundle_purged_at on submissions
* v31 reshape store_submissions (drop legacy unique on entity_id)
* v32 store_entities.archived_at/by + 'archived' visibility value
* v33 drop store_submissions.retry_count (unused)
* v34 ensure idx_store_submissions_entity exists post column-drop
* v35 broaden visibility_status enum + JOIN architecture cutover
Pipeline (src/store_guardrails/):
* Inline checks: manifest_check, static_scan, quality_check
* LLM review configurable haiku|sonnet|opus (default haiku)
* BackgroundTasks-driven async path with structured-output JSON
* Per-submitter daily quota (default 50)
* 30-day TTL purge job (POST /api/admin/run-blocked-purge)
* Bundle SHA256 + size persisted; sha256 survives purge for forensics
Visibility model:
* pending | approved | hidden | archived
* _enforce_visibility returns 404 (no leak) for non-owner non-admin
* Owner sees own non-approved entries via include_owner_id widening
* Install refused with 409 entity_not_approved when not approved
Soft-delete (DELETE /api/store/entities/{id}):
* Default = soft (visibility_status='archived'); existing installs
keep getting served the bundle so users don't lose the plugin
* ?hard=true admin-only: drops bundle + cascades user_store_installs
* Hard-delete preserves entity_id on submission as tombstone so
audit_log linkage survives for the activity timeline
Admin queue lifecycle (the JOIN refactor):
* Verdict (store_submissions.status) is immutable forensic record
* Lifecycle (store_entities.visibility_status) is live state
* /admin/store/submissions Archived chip translates to
`e.visibility_status='archived'` via LEFT JOIN — any path that
flips visibility surfaces in the queue immediately
* Detail page renders Status (verdict) and Entity lifecycle side by
side so admins see "approved at review, now archived" at a glance
URL consolidation:
* /store/{id} deleted (no redirect, stale bookmarks 404)
* /marketplace/flea/{id} is the canonical detail surface
* Three in-tree callers (upload-success, my-stack card, store
listing card) updated to point at the new URL
* Quarantine banner extracted to _quarantine_banner.html partial,
self-guarded, included from both flea detail templates
* Banner JS auto-refreshes when the verdict lands by polling
/api/marketplace/flea/{id}/detail (visibility_status +
submission_status — the latter is needed because blocked_llm
keeps the entity at visibility_status='pending')
Audit log resource format:
* runner.py emits prefixed `store_submission:{id}` (post-fix)
* Detail-page timeline query handles three patterns: prefixed
submission, helper-emitted `store_entity:{sub_id}`, and bare-id
legacy rows — all surface in the activity timeline
UX fixes:
* Owner sees Under review / Quarantined / Hidden banner with status
* Install button gray-disabled (not blue) when non-approved
* Owner cannot delete quarantined entries (403); admin can
* Admin queue: filter chips, sortable columns, paging, page-size
* Auto-refresh queue every 5s while pending rows are visible
* Store upload page file picker no longer opens twice (label →
input default action collided with explicit JS handler)
Tests: 168 passed across the guardrails suites (admin submissions,
store API, inline / LLM / purge guardrails, store repositories,
marketplace filter, schema version). New regression coverage
includes: archive surfaces via JOIN even when API path is bypassed;
deleted submission renders activity timeline (tombstone); flea
detail surfaces submission_status only for owner/admin; detail page
renders Entity lifecycle row; audit log resource format covers both
helper and runner paths.
* fix(store-guardrails): PR #233 follow-up — prompt injection, atomic PUT, BG race, schema, reaper, sort whitelist
Addresses 9 of the 23 findings from the PR #233 review (spec at
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-09-pr233-guardrails-fixes-spec.md).
Merge-gate items #1-#6 plus high-value mediums #7, #9-#12, #23.
Architectural items (#8 enum split, #14 factory) and pure
maintainability (#15-#22) deferred to follow-ups.
Security:
* #1 prompt injection — SYSTEM_PROMPT now passed via the SDK's
dedicated system= parameter; bundle wrapped in <bundle>...</bundle>
sentinels declared data-only by the system prompt; literal
sentinel strings in user content are escaped so an adversarial
README can't forge a close tag.
* #6 static scan honesty — module docstring + admin copy + docs
declare static scan as signal not gate; .md/.txt/.rst/.html/.json/
.yaml/.yml/.toml skipped to avoid false positives on prose.
AST mode for Python deferred (separate flag, FP comparison work).
Correctness:
* #2 PUT atomicity — bundles bake into plugin.staging-<rand>/
alongside live, atomic-rename on success; failed checks leave
live tree byte-for-byte intact.
* #3 BG-task race — set_visibility_if_pending guards verdict flips
to the (pending, hidden) review window; admin archives during
review survive; skipped flips audit-logged.
* #4 v35 NOT NULL/DEFAULT — schema v35→v36 re-applies them on
store_entities.visibility_status. CHECK constraint enforced
application-side (DuckDB ADD CHECK on existing column unsupported).
* #7 stuck-review reaper — reap_stuck_llm_reviews flips pending_llm
rows older than guardrails.stuck_review_grace_seconds (default
1800) to review_error. Scheduler runs every 15 min via new
/api/admin/run-reap-stuck-reviews. Set knob to 0 to disable.
* #9 quota counter — count_blocked_for_submitter_since now counts
blocked_inline + blocked_llm + review_error so a submitter
triggering only LLM-blocked verdicts is bounded.
* #10 missing risk_level — surfaces as review_error with
error='missing_risk_level' instead of silently defaulting to
'medium' (which looked like a model-decided block).
* #11 archived_at clear — set_visibility nulls archived_at +
archived_by when transitioning out of 'archived' so a future
read doesn't show stale archive forensics on an approved row.
Maintainability:
* #12 FSM doc comment — accurate insert/transition/lifecycle
description in src/db.py near store_submissions schema.
* #23 sort-key whitelist — admin queue rejects unknown sort keys
with 400 invalid_sort_key; substring-replace footgun removed.
Deferred (separate PRs):
* #5 quota race — proper fix requires asyncio.Lock spanning the
full pipeline; threading.Lock blocks event loop, DuckDB MVCC
doesn't help. API-level slowapi bounds worst case for now.
* #6 part 3 (AST static scan), #8 (enum split), #13 (import
bundle docs), #14 (factory consolidation), #15-#22 (maint).
Tests:
* New: tests/test_store_guardrails_prompt_injection.py (corpus +
trust-boundary invariants), tests/test_store_put_atomic.py,
tests/test_store_guardrails_reaper.py.
* Extended: test_store_guardrails_llm.py (system param, missing
risk_level, BG race), test_admin_store_submissions.py (quota
counter widening, sort whitelist 400), test_store_repositories.py
(un-archive metadata clear), test_db_schema_version.py (v36).
* Full suite: 3738 passed; 17 pre-existing baseline failures
unchanged (db migration tests, cli binary rename, catalog export,
user mgmt v5 backfill — confirmed by stash + rerun on clean tree).
316 lines
14 KiB
Python
316 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""Scheduler service — replaces systemd timers.
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Lightweight sidecar that fires scheduled jobs over HTTP against the main
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app. Authenticates with ``SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN`` (shared-secret synthetic
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admin — see ``app.auth.scheduler_token``); falls back to no-auth in
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LOCAL_DEV_MODE.
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Schedules are strings parsed by ``src.scheduler.is_table_due`` — accepts
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"every 15m", "every 1h", "daily 03:00", "daily 07:00,13:00".
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Why every job is HTTP and nothing runs in-process: the scheduler container
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shares ``/data/state/system.duckdb`` with the app container, but DuckDB
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permits only one writer per file across processes. An in-process call
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from the scheduler raced the app's long-lived handle and 500-ed on
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``Could not set lock on file``. Going through HTTP makes the app the sole
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writer; the scheduler is reduced to a pure cron clock.
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Usage: python -m services.scheduler
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"""
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import logging
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import os
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import signal
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import threading
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import time
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from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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import httpx
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from app.logging_config import setup_logging
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from src.scheduler import is_table_due
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setup_logging(__name__)
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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API_URL = os.environ.get("API_URL", "http://localhost:8000")
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SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN = os.environ.get("SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN", "")
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_token_warning_emitted = False
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def _get_auth_token() -> str:
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"""Return the bearer token for API calls.
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Production: ``SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN`` is a shared secret generated by the
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Terraform startup script and written to ``/opt/agnes/.env``. Both the
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``app`` and ``scheduler`` containers source the same .env via Docker
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Compose ``env_file:``, so the secret is symmetric. The app validates
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incoming Bearer tokens against this env var (constant-time compare in
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``app.auth.scheduler_token``) and resolves matches to a synthetic
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``scheduler@system.local`` user that is a member of the Admin group.
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Dev / LOCAL_DEV_MODE: leave it unset. The scheduler returns the empty
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string and calls the API without an ``Authorization`` header — the
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API's dev-bypass auto-authenticates the request as the dev user.
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"""
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global _token_warning_emitted
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if SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN:
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return SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN
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if not _token_warning_emitted:
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logger.warning(
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"SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN is not set — calling the API without "
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"Authorization. Required in production; in LOCAL_DEV_MODE "
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"the dev-bypass auto-authenticates and this is fine."
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)
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_token_warning_emitted = True
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return ""
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# --- Env parsing ------------------------------------------------------------
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_DEFAULTS = {
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"SCHEDULER_DATA_REFRESH_INTERVAL": 15 * 60, # seconds
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"SCHEDULER_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL": 5 * 60,
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"SCHEDULER_SCRIPT_RUN_INTERVAL": 1 * 60,
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"SCHEDULER_TICK_SECONDS": 30,
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# LLM pipeline cadences (#176, #179 review). Defaults preserve the
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# 10m / 15m / 17m coprime offset so the three jobs don't fire on the
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# same tick and stack their API + DB load. The verification-detector
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# default (900s) is also the source of truth for the health-check
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# staleness grace window in app/api/health.py — single env var drives
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# both, so an operator changing the cadence moves both.
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"SCHEDULER_SESSION_COLLECTOR_INTERVAL": 10 * 60,
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# Drives the verification session-processor cadence AND the
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# health-check staleness grace window in app/api/health.py
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# (single env var → both, so an operator changing the cadence moves
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# both). Name retained post session-pipeline refactor for operator
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# compatibility — existing docker-compose env files keep working.
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"SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL": 15 * 60,
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"SCHEDULER_USAGE_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL": 10 * 60,
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"SCHEDULER_CORPORATE_MEMORY_INTERVAL": 17 * 60,
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}
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def _read_positive_int(name: str) -> int:
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"""Read an env var as a positive integer or fall back to the default.
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Treats unset env (``None``) as "use default". Treats explicitly empty
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string (``""``) as an operator typo and raises — silently defaulting
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on a literal ``FOO=`` in the env_file would mask configuration bugs.
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"""
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raw = os.environ.get(name)
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if raw is None:
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if name not in _DEFAULTS:
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raise ValueError(f"Unknown scheduler env var: {name}")
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return _DEFAULTS[name]
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if raw == "":
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raise ValueError(f"{name}='' must be a positive integer (seconds)")
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try:
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value = int(raw)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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raise ValueError(f"{name}={raw!r} must be a positive integer (seconds)")
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if value <= 0:
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raise ValueError(f"{name}={value} must be > 0 (seconds)")
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return value
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def _seconds_to_schedule(seconds: int) -> str:
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"""Convert a seconds value to the closest 'every Nm' / 'every Nh' string.
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Uses ceiling division so a non-multiple-of-60 input never produces a
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schedule that fires MORE often than the operator configured (90s →
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'every 2m', not 'every 1m'). Sub-minute inputs clamp to 'every 1m'
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because the schedule grammar has minute-level resolution.
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"""
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if seconds % 3600 == 0 and seconds >= 3600:
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return f"every {seconds // 3600}h"
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# Ceiling division: -(-x // y) is the standard trick.
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minutes = max(1, -(-seconds // 60))
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return f"every {minutes}m"
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def resolved_tick_seconds() -> int:
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"""Read + validate SCHEDULER_TICK_SECONDS in isolation (test helper)."""
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return _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_TICK_SECONDS")
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def build_jobs() -> list[tuple[str, str, str, str, int]]:
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"""Build the JOBS list from env, applying defaults and validation.
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Tuple shape: (name, schedule_string, endpoint, method, http_timeout_sec).
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Marketplaces stays hardcoded — promoting it to env is out of #77 scope.
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"""
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refresh = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_DATA_REFRESH_INTERVAL")
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health = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_HEALTH_CHECK_INTERVAL")
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scripts = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_SCRIPT_RUN_INTERVAL")
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sess = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_SESSION_COLLECTOR_INTERVAL")
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verify = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL")
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usage = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_USAGE_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL")
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corpmem = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_CORPORATE_MEMORY_INTERVAL")
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tick = _read_positive_int("SCHEDULER_TICK_SECONDS")
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smallest = min(refresh, health, scripts, sess, verify, usage, corpmem)
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if tick > smallest:
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raise ValueError(
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f"SCHEDULER_TICK_SECONDS={tick} must be <= the smallest job "
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f"interval ({smallest}s) so jobs don't consistently miss their "
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f"cadence by up to one tick"
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)
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return [
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("data-refresh", _seconds_to_schedule(refresh), "/api/sync/trigger", "POST", 120),
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("health-check", _seconds_to_schedule(health), "/api/health", "GET", 30),
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("script-runner", _seconds_to_schedule(scripts), "/api/scripts/run-due", "POST", 600),
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("marketplaces", "daily 03:00", "/api/marketplaces/sync-all", "POST", 900),
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# LLM pipeline (#176, #179 review). Cadences are deliberately offset
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# (10m / 15m / 17m by default — all coprime modulo the 30s tick) so
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# the three LLM-driven jobs don't fire on the same tick and stack
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# their API + DB load. Driven by env so an operator can throttle
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# without a code change; the verification-detector cadence is the
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# single source of truth for the health-check staleness grace
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# window in app/api/health.py (which uses 2x the cadence).
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("session-collector", _seconds_to_schedule(sess), "/api/admin/run-session-collector", "POST", 300),
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# session-pipeline processors — independent loops, each invoked on
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# its own cadence via the parametrized run-session-processor endpoint.
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# Adding a third processor in the future is one line here + one entry
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# in services/session_processors/__init__.py registry.
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("session-processor:verification", _seconds_to_schedule(verify),
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"/api/admin/run-session-processor?processor=verification", "POST", 900),
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("session-processor:usage", _seconds_to_schedule(usage),
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"/api/admin/run-session-processor?processor=usage", "POST", 300),
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("corporate-memory", _seconds_to_schedule(corpmem), "/api/admin/run-corporate-memory", "POST", 900),
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# v30: TTL purge of blocked-bundle bytes. Cheap (just rmtree
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# + UPDATE), runs once daily at 04:00 UTC so the spike is
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# visible in audit_log without competing with the marketplaces
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# job at 03:00. Endpoint reads guardrails.blocked_bundle_ttl_days
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# from instance.yaml and short-circuits when set to 0.
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("store-blocked-purge", "daily 04:00", "/api/admin/run-blocked-purge", "POST", 600),
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# Stuck-review reaper (#7). A submission stays at
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# status='pending_llm' until the BackgroundTasks worker writes
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# a verdict. If the worker crashes, the row sits forever. Run
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# every 15 minutes; reap_stuck_llm_reviews flips rows older
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# than guardrails.stuck_review_grace_seconds (default 1800)
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# to review_error so admin can retry. Cheap (one indexed
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# SELECT + N small UPDATEs); short timeout sufficient.
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("store-reap-stuck-reviews", "every 15m", "/api/admin/run-reap-stuck-reviews", "POST", 60),
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]
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_running = True
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def _signal_handler(sig, frame):
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global _running
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logger.info(f"Received signal {sig}, shutting down...")
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_running = False
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def _call_api(endpoint: str, method: str, timeout_sec: int) -> bool:
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"""Call the main app API. Returns True on success."""
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url = f"{API_URL}{endpoint}"
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headers = {}
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token = _get_auth_token()
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if token:
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headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
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try:
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if method == "POST":
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resp = httpx.post(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout_sec)
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else:
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resp = httpx.get(url, headers=headers, timeout=timeout_sec)
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if resp.status_code < 400:
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logger.info(f"Job {endpoint}: {resp.status_code}")
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return True
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else:
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logger.warning(f"Job {endpoint}: HTTP {resp.status_code} - {resp.text[:200]}")
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return False
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Job {endpoint} failed: {e}")
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try:
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from src.observability import get_posthog
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get_posthog().capture_exception(
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e,
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distinct_id="system",
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properties={"job": endpoint, "method": method, "component": "scheduler"},
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)
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("PostHog capture_exception failed in scheduler")
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return False
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def run():
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signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, _signal_handler)
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signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, _signal_handler)
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jobs = build_jobs()
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tick = resolved_tick_seconds()
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logger.info(
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"Scheduler started. API_URL=%s, %d jobs, tick=%ds. Schedules: %s",
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API_URL, len(jobs), tick,
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{name: schedule for name, schedule, *_ in jobs},
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)
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last_run: dict[str, str | None] = {name: None for name, *_ in jobs}
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# Per-tick concurrency: one thread per job slot, so a 900s verification
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# run can't block the 60s health-check or the 30s data-refresh from
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# firing on their own cadences (PR #232 review fix). Pure I/O workload
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# (httpx) — GIL is irrelevant. `in_flight` prevents the same job being
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# re-launched on a subsequent tick while the previous invocation is
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# still running; otherwise a 10-min run during which 20 ticks fire
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# would queue 20 duplicate POSTs against the same processor (the
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# admin endpoint's per-processor lock would 409 most of them, but
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# they'd still be wasted requests + audit-log noise).
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in_flight: set[str] = set()
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in_flight_lock = threading.Lock()
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executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max(4, len(jobs)))
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while _running:
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now_iso = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
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for name, schedule, endpoint, method, timeout_sec in jobs:
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if not is_table_due(schedule, last_run[name]):
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continue
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with in_flight_lock:
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if name in in_flight:
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# Previous tick's invocation hasn't returned yet; skip.
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continue
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in_flight.add(name)
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logger.info("Running job: %s (%s)", name, schedule)
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executor.submit(
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_run_job, name, endpoint, method, timeout_sec, now_iso,
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last_run, in_flight, in_flight_lock,
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)
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time.sleep(tick)
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logger.info("Scheduler stopping; waiting for in-flight jobs.")
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executor.shutdown(wait=True)
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logger.info("Scheduler stopped.")
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def _run_job(
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name: str,
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endpoint: str,
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method: str,
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timeout: int,
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now_iso: str,
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last_run: dict[str, "str | None"],
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in_flight: set[str],
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in_flight_lock: threading.Lock,
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) -> None:
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"""Execute one scheduled job + bookkeeping. Lifted out of run() so it's
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unit-testable.
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Advances last_run on terminal state (success OR failure) so a permanently
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failing job retries on its cadence (e.g. 15 min), not on every scheduler
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tick (default 30s). Pre-fix behavior caused a hot-loop on persistent 5xx —
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30× more requests + LLM tokens than the operator configured. Errors still
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surface via _call_api's logging + audit_log on the receiving side.
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"""
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try:
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_call_api(endpoint, method, timeout)
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finally:
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last_run[name] = now_iso
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with in_flight_lock:
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in_flight.discard(name)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||
run()
|