* feat(store): flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue
Adds an end-to-end guardrails pipeline for store uploads (manifest +
static-security + LLM review), persists blocked bundles for forensics,
introduces soft-delete (Archive) semantics, consolidates the legacy
/store/{id} surface into /marketplace/flea/{id}, and reworks the admin
queue so lifecycle filters read live entity visibility via LEFT JOIN
rather than a denormalized submission column.
Schema v29 → v35:
* v29 store_submissions table + store_entities.visibility_status
* v30 file_size, bundle_sha256, bundle_purged_at on submissions
* v31 reshape store_submissions (drop legacy unique on entity_id)
* v32 store_entities.archived_at/by + 'archived' visibility value
* v33 drop store_submissions.retry_count (unused)
* v34 ensure idx_store_submissions_entity exists post column-drop
* v35 broaden visibility_status enum + JOIN architecture cutover
Pipeline (src/store_guardrails/):
* Inline checks: manifest_check, static_scan, quality_check
* LLM review configurable haiku|sonnet|opus (default haiku)
* BackgroundTasks-driven async path with structured-output JSON
* Per-submitter daily quota (default 50)
* 30-day TTL purge job (POST /api/admin/run-blocked-purge)
* Bundle SHA256 + size persisted; sha256 survives purge for forensics
Visibility model:
* pending | approved | hidden | archived
* _enforce_visibility returns 404 (no leak) for non-owner non-admin
* Owner sees own non-approved entries via include_owner_id widening
* Install refused with 409 entity_not_approved when not approved
Soft-delete (DELETE /api/store/entities/{id}):
* Default = soft (visibility_status='archived'); existing installs
keep getting served the bundle so users don't lose the plugin
* ?hard=true admin-only: drops bundle + cascades user_store_installs
* Hard-delete preserves entity_id on submission as tombstone so
audit_log linkage survives for the activity timeline
Admin queue lifecycle (the JOIN refactor):
* Verdict (store_submissions.status) is immutable forensic record
* Lifecycle (store_entities.visibility_status) is live state
* /admin/store/submissions Archived chip translates to
`e.visibility_status='archived'` via LEFT JOIN — any path that
flips visibility surfaces in the queue immediately
* Detail page renders Status (verdict) and Entity lifecycle side by
side so admins see "approved at review, now archived" at a glance
URL consolidation:
* /store/{id} deleted (no redirect, stale bookmarks 404)
* /marketplace/flea/{id} is the canonical detail surface
* Three in-tree callers (upload-success, my-stack card, store
listing card) updated to point at the new URL
* Quarantine banner extracted to _quarantine_banner.html partial,
self-guarded, included from both flea detail templates
* Banner JS auto-refreshes when the verdict lands by polling
/api/marketplace/flea/{id}/detail (visibility_status +
submission_status — the latter is needed because blocked_llm
keeps the entity at visibility_status='pending')
Audit log resource format:
* runner.py emits prefixed `store_submission:{id}` (post-fix)
* Detail-page timeline query handles three patterns: prefixed
submission, helper-emitted `store_entity:{sub_id}`, and bare-id
legacy rows — all surface in the activity timeline
UX fixes:
* Owner sees Under review / Quarantined / Hidden banner with status
* Install button gray-disabled (not blue) when non-approved
* Owner cannot delete quarantined entries (403); admin can
* Admin queue: filter chips, sortable columns, paging, page-size
* Auto-refresh queue every 5s while pending rows are visible
* Store upload page file picker no longer opens twice (label →
input default action collided with explicit JS handler)
Tests: 168 passed across the guardrails suites (admin submissions,
store API, inline / LLM / purge guardrails, store repositories,
marketplace filter, schema version). New regression coverage
includes: archive surfaces via JOIN even when API path is bypassed;
deleted submission renders activity timeline (tombstone); flea
detail surfaces submission_status only for owner/admin; detail page
renders Entity lifecycle row; audit log resource format covers both
helper and runner paths.
* fix(store-guardrails): PR #233 follow-up — prompt injection, atomic PUT, BG race, schema, reaper, sort whitelist
Addresses 9 of the 23 findings from the PR #233 review (spec at
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-09-pr233-guardrails-fixes-spec.md).
Merge-gate items #1-#6 plus high-value mediums #7, #9-#12, #23.
Architectural items (#8 enum split, #14 factory) and pure
maintainability (#15-#22) deferred to follow-ups.
Security:
* #1 prompt injection — SYSTEM_PROMPT now passed via the SDK's
dedicated system= parameter; bundle wrapped in <bundle>...</bundle>
sentinels declared data-only by the system prompt; literal
sentinel strings in user content are escaped so an adversarial
README can't forge a close tag.
* #6 static scan honesty — module docstring + admin copy + docs
declare static scan as signal not gate; .md/.txt/.rst/.html/.json/
.yaml/.yml/.toml skipped to avoid false positives on prose.
AST mode for Python deferred (separate flag, FP comparison work).
Correctness:
* #2 PUT atomicity — bundles bake into plugin.staging-<rand>/
alongside live, atomic-rename on success; failed checks leave
live tree byte-for-byte intact.
* #3 BG-task race — set_visibility_if_pending guards verdict flips
to the (pending, hidden) review window; admin archives during
review survive; skipped flips audit-logged.
* #4 v35 NOT NULL/DEFAULT — schema v35→v36 re-applies them on
store_entities.visibility_status. CHECK constraint enforced
application-side (DuckDB ADD CHECK on existing column unsupported).
* #7 stuck-review reaper — reap_stuck_llm_reviews flips pending_llm
rows older than guardrails.stuck_review_grace_seconds (default
1800) to review_error. Scheduler runs every 15 min via new
/api/admin/run-reap-stuck-reviews. Set knob to 0 to disable.
* #9 quota counter — count_blocked_for_submitter_since now counts
blocked_inline + blocked_llm + review_error so a submitter
triggering only LLM-blocked verdicts is bounded.
* #10 missing risk_level — surfaces as review_error with
error='missing_risk_level' instead of silently defaulting to
'medium' (which looked like a model-decided block).
* #11 archived_at clear — set_visibility nulls archived_at +
archived_by when transitioning out of 'archived' so a future
read doesn't show stale archive forensics on an approved row.
Maintainability:
* #12 FSM doc comment — accurate insert/transition/lifecycle
description in src/db.py near store_submissions schema.
* #23 sort-key whitelist — admin queue rejects unknown sort keys
with 400 invalid_sort_key; substring-replace footgun removed.
Deferred (separate PRs):
* #5 quota race — proper fix requires asyncio.Lock spanning the
full pipeline; threading.Lock blocks event loop, DuckDB MVCC
doesn't help. API-level slowapi bounds worst case for now.
* #6 part 3 (AST static scan), #8 (enum split), #13 (import
bundle docs), #14 (factory consolidation), #15-#22 (maint).
Tests:
* New: tests/test_store_guardrails_prompt_injection.py (corpus +
trust-boundary invariants), tests/test_store_put_atomic.py,
tests/test_store_guardrails_reaper.py.
* Extended: test_store_guardrails_llm.py (system param, missing
risk_level, BG race), test_admin_store_submissions.py (quota
counter widening, sort whitelist 400), test_store_repositories.py
(un-archive metadata clear), test_db_schema_version.py (v36).
* Full suite: 3738 passed; 17 pre-existing baseline failures
unchanged (db migration tests, cli binary rename, catalog export,
user mgmt v5 backfill — confirmed by stash + rerun on clean tree).
* Extract session pipeline framework, refactor verification, add UsageProcessor skeleton
Pluggable framework under services/session_pipeline/ (contract + lib + per-processor
runner) so multiple processors can read /data/user_sessions/<key>/*.jsonl on their
own cadence with full failure isolation. Verification flow becomes the first plugin;
a no-op UsageProcessor reserves the second slot pending a separate brainstorm on
extraction logic + storage shape.
Schema v28→v29: rename session_extraction_state → session_processor_state with
composite PK (processor_name, session_file). Existing rows copied over with
processor_name='verification'; legacy table dropped. Migration is idempotent and
no-ops the copy step on fresh installs that came up at the new schema.
Endpoint: /api/admin/run-verification-detector replaced by parametrized
/api/admin/run-session-processor?processor=<name>. Audit action format follows.
Scheduler JOBS: verification-detector entry split into session-processor:verification
+ session-processor:usage. SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL retained for
operator compatibility (drives both cadence and health-check grace window);
SCHEDULER_USAGE_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL added.
* Address PR #232 review: scan dead branch + per-processor lock
- `SessionProcessorStateRepository.scan_unprocessed_for` dead else: both
branches surfaced every jsonl, the SELECT was unused, runner MD5-rehashed
every stable session per tick. Replaced with an mtime precheck — stable
sessions (mtime <= processed_at) are filtered at scan; modified files
still surface for the runner's authoritative `file_hash` invalidation.
Naive-local comparison matches the existing health-check idiom (DuckDB
TIMESTAMP strips tz on storage).
- Per-processor advisory lock around `_run_processor` in
`/api/admin/run-session-processor`. Scheduler tick + manual admin POST
could otherwise both run, both call create_evidence on overlapping
detections, and accumulate duplicate verification_evidence rows (the
dedup short-circuit only covers create+contradiction, not evidence per
ADR Decision 3). Non-blocking acquire → 409 Conflict on concurrent
invocation; release in finally so a runner exception doesn't wedge the
processor.
Tests: two new scan unit tests (mtime filter + post-mark mtime bump), 409
endpoint test, lock-released-on-exception test. Two existing tests updated
for the new "filtered at scan" stat shape (previously asserted skipped == 1,
now scanned == 0).
* Address PR #232 review #2: parallel scheduler tick + last_run on terminal state
Two pre-existing scaffold bugs in services/scheduler/__main__.py amplified
by adding more session-pipeline jobs:
1. Serial for-loop over jobs with synchronous httpx.post(timeout=900) — a
10-minute verification run blocked every other job (data-refresh,
health-check, usage, corporate-memory) for the whole window. The PR's
stated isolation guarantee held inside the runner but broke at the
scheduler dispatch layer.
2. last_run advanced only when _call_api returned True. Permanent-failure
jobs hot-looped on every tick (30s) instead of cadence (15min).
Fix: ThreadPoolExecutor.submit per due job + per-job in_flight set so a
long-running job can't be re-launched on subsequent ticks. last_run
advances unconditionally in finally; errors still surface via _call_api
logging + audit_log on the receiving side.
_run_job extracted to module-level for unit testing. New tests:
- TestRunJobBookkeeping: advances on success / failure / unhandled raise
- TestRunLoopParallelism: in_flight protection prevents duplicate
launches across ticks for a single slow job
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
* feat(observability): optional PostHog integration (errors, LLM traces, replay, flags)
Off by default. Activates when POSTHOG_API_KEY is set in env. Defaults
to PostHog Cloud EU; override host for US Cloud or self-hosted.
Coverage:
- FastAPI 500 handler captures unhandled exceptions
- src/orchestrator.py rebuild + rebuild_source failures
- services/scheduler/ HTTP-job failures
- cli/main.py uncaught CLI errors (Typer.Exit/SystemExit/KeyboardInterrupt
skipped; flushes before re-raise so short-lived CLI invocations don't
drop events)
- connectors/llm/anthropic_provider.py + openai_compat.py emit
$ai_generation events with provider, model, latency, token counts
(prompt/completion bodies stay off unless POSTHOG_LLM_PAYLOADS=1
because LLM prompts here routinely include customer SQL/data)
- Browser snippet injected into every text/html response by
PosthogInjectionMiddleware — registered inside the GZip layer so it
sees uncompressed HTML before compression. Many templates are
standalone (their own DOCTYPE) and never extend base.html, so a
per-template include would miss them.
- Frontend: $pageview, $pageleave, JS error capture via window.error
and unhandledrejection handlers, masked session replay
(maskAllInputs: true plus CSS-selector mask for known data surfaces),
feature flags (browser posthog.isFeatureEnabled + server-side
feature_enabled with fallback for older SDKs).
Identification mode operator-configurable: none / id / email / full.
Default email ships user.id + email but never name. CLI entry point
moves from cli.main:app to cli.main:main (Typer wrapper).
Files:
- src/observability/posthog_client.py — lazy singleton, no network
when disabled, single-process flush on shutdown
- src/observability/llm_tracing.py — trace_generation context manager
- app/middleware/posthog_inject.py — HTML rewrite middleware
- app/web/templates/_posthog.html — browser snippet template
- docs/observability.md — operator guide
- config/.env.template — documented POSTHOG_* knobs
- tests/test_posthog_disabled.py + tests/test_posthog_client.py +
tests/test_llm_tracing.py — 18 tests covering disabled state,
identify-mode payloads, $ai_generation shape, error variant.
CHANGELOG entry under [Unreleased] Added.
* feat(observability): tag every PostHog event with environment + release
Splits PostHog dashboards cleanly between localhost / dev / staging /
production without manual tagging on every capture call.
- POSTHOG_ENVIRONMENT explicit override; auto-resolves to "local" when
LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1, else RELEASE_CHANNEL, else AGNES_DEPLOYMENT_ENV,
else "unknown".
- AGNES_VERSION → RELEASE_CHANNEL fallback feeds the `release` property
for "is this error new in this release?" cohorting.
- Backend gets both via the PostHog SDK's super_properties constructor
arg (every captured event picks them up automatically).
- Browser snippet calls posthog.register({environment, release}) inside
the loaded callback so $pageview, $exception, autocapture, etc. all
carry the same labels.
- request.state.user now populated by auth dependencies so the snippet
can actually call posthog.identify(user_id, {email}) for logged-in
users (previously the user block always resolved to None because
nothing wrote to request.state.user).
4 new tests cover env resolution: explicit > LOCAL_DEV_MODE > channel
> unknown, plus super-properties forwarding into the SDK constructor.
* feat(observability): inline user attrs on every PostHog event + debug throw route
PostHog's UI shows person properties on the Person profile page, not
inline on each event — so a reviewer triaging an exception couldn't tell
which user hit the bug without clicking through. Fix it on both sides.
- Backend capture_exception merges user_id / user_email / user_name into
the event properties (gated by POSTHOG_IDENTIFY_PII: none/id/email/full).
Backed by a new _user_props_for_event helper on PosthogClient.
- Browser snippet registers user_id + user_email + user_name as super-
properties via posthog.register({...}) so every $exception, $pageview,
and custom event coming from posthog.captureException() carries them
inline. Mirrors the backend so cross-referencing client/server events
doesn't require a person-profile lookup.
- /api/debug/throw — debug-only endpoint gated by DEBUG=1 (404 in prod).
Runs Depends(get_current_user) first so request.state.user is set when
the unhandled-exception handler captures the event. Lets operators
exercise the full observability path end-to-end without hand-rolling
a TestClient script. Configurable via ?kind=ValueError&msg=...
7 new tests cover: backend user-attr merge across identify modes,
anonymous request fall-through, browser snippet super-prop emission for
logged-in / anonymous / id-only / full-name cases.
* fix(observability): address minasarustamyan PR #231 review
Two bugs caught in review.
1. PosthogInjectionMiddleware dropped Response.background on every
return path. BaseHTTPMiddleware materialises the body and asks
subclasses to return a fresh Response — three paths in dispatch()
omitted background=, silently cancelling any BackgroundTask /
BackgroundTasks the route attached (audit logging, async webhooks,
email sends) with no log line. Fix: route every return through a
_passthrough() helper that forwards background.
Also adds a _MAX_BUFFER_BYTES (4 MB) cap so a streamed-HTML response
can't balloon RSS during buffering. Bigger bodies short-circuit
through with a warning rather than being injected.
Regression tests in tests/test_posthog_inject_middleware.py exercise
four return paths (snippet present, render-fail, double-injection
guard, non-HTML passthrough) plus the streaming-guard short-circuit.
2. $ai_input / $ai_output_choices were emitted without truncation, so
POSTHOG_LLM_PAYLOADS=1 silently dropped events past PostHog's ~32 KB
per-event ingest limit — exactly the calls (large prompts with
schemas / sample rows / SQL) an operator would want to inspect.
Fix: clip both at POSTHOG_LLM_PAYLOAD_MAX_CHARS (default 30000) with
an explicit "…[truncated N chars]" marker so readers don't mistake
truncated captures for complete ones. Metadata (provider, model,
tokens, latency, error) flows regardless. Three new tests cover
default-cap clipping, env-override, and pass-through under the cap.
37 PostHog tests pass.
Devin NOTABLE: SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL was already
read by app/api/health.py to compute the staleness grace window, but
the actual scheduler cadence was hardcoded to 'every 15m'. The env
var name implied it controlled the cadence — it didn't. An operator
throttling the detector via the env was silently ignored by the
scheduler while the health grace silently widened.
Wired the env var into both ends. Same pattern applied to the other
two LLM-pipeline jobs:
- SCHEDULER_SESSION_COLLECTOR_INTERVAL (default 600s = 10m)
- SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL (default 900s = 15m)
- SCHEDULER_CORPORATE_MEMORY_INTERVAL (default 1020s = 17m)
Defaults preserve the existing 10m / 15m / 17m coprime offset so the
three jobs don't fire on the same tick.
build_jobs() now reads all three through _read_positive_int (matching
the existing pattern for data-refresh / health-check / script-runner)
and feeds them to _seconds_to_schedule. The smallest-interval check
includes the new variables so an operator can't accidentally set a
tick larger than any LLM cadence.
New tests in tests/test_scheduler.py:
- TestLLMPipelineCadenceEnvVars: env override changes the schedule
string at scheduler-init time, with parametrized invalid-value
rejection.
- TestVerificationDetectorGraceFollowsCadence: pinning the
single-source-of-truth contract — same env var moves both the
scheduler cadence and the health-check grace.
The session-collector, verification-detector, and corporate-memory
services now run on the same scheduler-v2 model that already drives
data-refresh, health-check, script-runner, and marketplaces:
- New admin endpoints in app/api/admin.py:
POST /api/admin/run-session-collector
POST /api/admin/run-verification-detector
POST /api/admin/run-corporate-memory
All admin-gated, sync-def (FastAPI thread pool), with one audit row
per invocation. Same single-writer-of-system.duckdb pattern as the
existing /api/marketplaces/sync-all job.
- services/scheduler/__main__.py JOBS gains three entries with offset
cadences (10m / 15m / 17m, all coprime modulo the 30s tick) so the
three LLM-backed jobs don't fire on the same tick and stack their
API + DB load.
- The verification-detector endpoint surfaces the LLM factory's
fail-fast ValueError as HTTP 500 with the actionable message,
preserving the no-silent-skip contract from the previous commit.
Tests:
- tests/test_admin_run_endpoints.py covers admin gating + scheduler
registration + endpoint contract.
- tests/test_scheduler_sidecar.py existing tests continue to pass.
* fix(scheduler): HTTP marketplaces job + SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN shared secret
Two scheduler-reliability bugs surfaced after the v0.12.1 USER-agnes flip:
1. The marketplaces job called src.marketplace.sync_marketplaces() in-process
from the scheduler container, racing the app's long-lived system.duckdb
handle. DuckDB rejects cross-process writers — every cron tick 500-ed on
"Could not set lock on file ... PID 0".
2. The data-refresh + new marketplaces jobs both 401-ed on the API because
SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN was never propagated by the Terraform startup script.
The scheduler had no credential to authenticate with.
Fix:
- New POST /api/marketplaces/sync-all (admin-only) drives the nightly refresh
through the app process so it inherits the existing DB connection.
- Scheduler swaps fn->http for marketplaces; all jobs are now plain HTTP and
the scheduler is reduced to a cron clock.
- New app/auth/scheduler_token.py adds a shared-secret auth path. The
startup script generates a 256-bit secret on first boot, persists it
across reboots, and writes it to /opt/agnes/.env. Both containers source
the same .env. The app validates incoming Bearer tokens against the env
var (constant-time, length-floored) and resolves matches to a synthetic
scheduler@system.local user that's a member of the Admin system group.
Audit-log entries from the scheduler are attributed to this user.
- app/main.py seeds the synthetic user at startup so the first cron tick
has a valid actor; lazy seed in get_scheduler_user covers token rotation
before the next app restart.
Tests: 5 new in tests/test_auth_scheduler_token.py covering empty/short
secret rejection, exact-match comparison, idempotent user seeding, and
lazy provisioning. 142 marketplace + scheduler tests + 96 auth tests
remain green.
Existing VMs with .env from before this change need a one-time
re-provisioning (re-run startup-script or rotate via openssl rand);
documented in CHANGELOG.
* fix(audit): use '_all' sentinel for bulk marketplace sync — Devin review #127
Avoids the literal string 'marketplace:None' in the audit_log resource
column when the bulk sync endpoint writes its summary row.
* fix(scheduler): unblock event loop + per-job timeouts — Devin review #127
Two findings from Devin re-review on commit 5fbad15:
1. BUG: trigger_sync_all was async def, so FastAPI ran it on the asyncio
event loop. sync_marketplaces() does blocking I/O (subprocess git
clones up to GIT_TIMEOUT_SEC=300 each, threading.Lock, DuckDB writes)
and would freeze every concurrent request for the duration of a bulk
sync. Switched to plain def so FastAPI auto-routes to the thread pool.
2. ANALYSIS: scheduler used a fixed 120s httpx timeout for every POST.
Bulk marketplace sync iterates the registry under a single lock with
up to 300s per repo — easily exceeds 120s on 2-3 slow repos. The
scheduler then sees a timeout, doesn't update last_run, and re-fires
on the next 30s tick, queueing redundant work. Per-job timeout
override added to the JOBS tuple; marketplaces gets 900s (15 min),
data-refresh keeps 120s, health-check 30s.
* fix(auth): require_session_token rejects scheduler shared secret — Devin review #127
require_session_token gates /auth/tokens (PAT minting). Pre-fix it only
rejected JWTs with typ=pat — but the scheduler shared secret is an opaque
string, so verify_token() returns None, payload becomes {}, and the
PAT-claim check silently passed. A caller bearing SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN
could mint persistent PATs that survive a secret rotation.
Added explicit is_scheduler_token() check before the PAT-claim check;
new regression test in tests/test_auth_scheduler_token.py.
Devin's other note (pre-existing async def trigger_sync at marketplaces.py:392
also calls blocking sync_one) — Devin flagged it as out-of-scope for this PR
and I agree; tracking separately.
* release(0.17.0): cut + clean up CHANGELOG duplicates
Cuts 0.17.0 (minor: scheduler shared-secret auth + sync-all endpoint
plus the deploy-shape fixes that landed since the last release tag).
Bumps pyproject from 0.15.0 — also corrects the missed bump from PR #120
(v0.16.0 was tagged on GitHub and shipped as :stable, but pyproject
stayed at 0.15.0, so /api/version, /cli/latest, and `da --version` had
been under-reporting the running release).
Removes the long-form duplicate entries for 0.13.0 / 0.14.0 / 0.15.0
above [0.16.0] — the canonical short summaries (with GitHub-release
links) already exist below 0.16.0, the long forms were leftover state
from before those versions were cut and have been silently shadowed
ever since.
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.
== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
require_admin — Admin-group god-mode
require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
/admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
`da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
(migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).
== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).
== #81#83#44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
+ path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
sandbox-bypass risk closed).
== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.
== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
(project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
update the path.
== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
from Czech to English for codebase consistency.
Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
* feat(auth): v9 schema — unified role management foundation (WIP)
Tasks 1-5, 10 of the role-management-complete plan. Foundation only,
follow-up commits add REST API, CLI, UI, and tests.
Schema v9:
- user_role_grants table: direct user → internal_role mapping
(complementary to group_mappings). Drives PAT/headless auth and
persists across sessions. Source field tracks 'direct' vs auto-seed.
- internal_roles.implies (JSON): transitive role hierarchy. core.admin
implies core.km_admin → core.analyst → core.viewer. Resolver does BFS
expand at lookup time.
- internal_roles.is_core (BOOL): distinguishes seeded core.* hierarchy
from module-registered roles. UI renders them differently.
- v8→v9 migration: ADD COLUMN, CREATE TABLE, _seed_core_roles +
_backfill_users_role_to_grants, then NULL legacy users.role values.
DuckDB FK constraint blocks DROP COLUMN — sloupec zůstává jako
deprecated artifact (UserRepository ignoruje), fyzický drop deferred.
Resolver:
- Regex extended to allow dotted namespace (core.admin,
context_engineering.admin), max 64 chars total.
- expand_implies(role_keys, conn): BFS over implies JSON column.
- resolve_internal_roles signature gains optional user_id parameter;
unions group-mapping resolution with user_role_grants direct grants
before implies expansion.
require_internal_role:
- Two-path resolution: session cache (OAuth) → DB grants (PAT/headless
fallback). PAT clients now legitimately satisfy gates without the
OAuth round-trip, fixing the v8 limitation where every PAT-callable
admin endpoint needed require_role(Role.ADMIN) instead of
require_internal_role(...).
Backward-compat:
- require_role(Role.X) and require_admin become thin wrappers over
require_internal_role(f"core.{role}"). Implies hierarchy preserves the
legacy "at least this level" semantics automatically — no per-level
comparison code needed.
- src/rbac.py helpers (is_admin, has_role, get_user_role,
set_user_role, can_access_table, get_accessible_tables) all read from
the resolver via _get_internal_role_keys.
- UserRepository.create() and update() now mirror role changes into
user_role_grants via _grant_core_role helper. Preserves API while
making the new table the source of truth.
- UserRepository.delete() pre-deletes user_role_grants rows
(FK cascade — DuckDB doesn't auto-cascade).
- count_admins() reads user_role_grants ⨝ internal_roles instead of the
now-NULL users.role column.
First consumer:
- app/api/admin.py module-level docstring documents the v9 pattern for
future module authors. Existing require_role(Role.ADMIN) callsites
flow through the wrapper; no behavior change for OAuth callers, and
PAT callers gain access via direct grants.
Tests: full suite green (1396 passed, 6 skipped). Existing tests
exercise the new pathway transparently because UserRepository.create
auto-grants. New test_pat_caller_with_direct_grant_passes pins the
PAT-aware contract.
Schema: v9 (was v8). pyproject.toml + CHANGELOG bump deferred to the
final PR-prep commit.
* feat(auth): role management complete — REST API + CLI + UI + docs (v0.11.4)
Sjednocuje legacy users.role enum s v8 internal-roles foundation pod jeden
model s implies hierarchií, dodává admin UI + REST API + CLI pro správu
group mappings i přímých user grants, a dělá require_internal_role
PAT-aware tak, aby admin endpointy fungovaly uniformly napříč OAuth
i headless callery.
REST API (app/api/role_management.py, +496 LOC):
- 8 endpointů pod /api/admin: internal-roles list, group-mappings CRUD,
users/{id}/role-grants CRUD, users/{id}/effective-roles debug.
- Všechny gated require_internal_role("core.admin"). Audit-log na každé
mutaci (role_mapping.created/deleted, role_grant.created/deleted).
- Last-admin protection: refuse to delete the final core.admin grant
(mirrors users.py:count_admins protection).
- Nový UserRoleGrantsRepository v src/repositories/user_role_grants.py.
CLI (cli/commands/admin.py extension, +258 LOC):
- da admin role list / show <key>
- da admin mapping list / create <group-id> <role-key> / delete <id>
- da admin grant-role <email> <role-key>
- da admin revoke-role <email> <role-key>
- da admin effective-roles <email>
- Všechno přes typer + PAT auth, --json flag, response-shape tolerantní.
UI (admin_role_mapping.html + admin_user_detail.html + nav + user list):
- Nová stránka /admin/role-mapping: internal_roles read-only table +
group_mappings table with create/delete forms.
- Nová stránka /admin/users/{id}: core role single-select + capabilities
multi-checkbox + effective-roles debug (direct + group + expanded).
- Existing user list dostává "Detail" link na novou stránku.
- Nav link na /admin/role-mapping.
Tests: +85 nových testů přes 4 nové soubory:
- test_schema_v9_migration.py (8) — fresh install + v8→v9 backfill +
legacy column NULL semantics + unknown-role fallback + invariants.
- test_api_role_management.py (33) — všech 8 endpointů, happy + error
paths, audit-log assertions, last-admin protection.
- test_cli_admin_role.py (25 + 1 conditional) — typer subcommands,
text + json output, PAT integration smoke.
- test_admin_role_mapping_ui.py (9) + test_admin_user_capabilities_ui.py (10)
— page rendering, auth gating, form contracts, JS hooks.
Full suite: 1482 passed, 6 skipped (was 1396 → +86, žádné regrese).
Docs:
- docs/internal-roles.md kompletní rewrite — odstranil "no UI yet",
přidal hierarchy diagram, dual-path resolution, dotted-namespace
convention, admin workflow přes UI/CLI/REST, refresh semantics
for group mappings vs direct grants, migration notes.
- CLAUDE.md schema v8 → v9.
- CHANGELOG.md [0.11.4] s BREAKING marker pro users.role NULL
semantics + complete Added/Changed/Removed/Internal sekce.
- pyproject.toml: 0.11.3 → 0.11.4.
Sequencing: po mergi tohoto PR Pabu rebasuje pabu/local-dev (PR #72)
na main, jeho schema migrations se posouvají z v9/v10/v11 na v10/v11/v12.
Implementation breakdown:
- Sequential (já): foundation tasks — schema v9, resolver, PAT-aware
require_internal_role, backward-compat wrappers, rbac refactor,
UserRepository auto-grant.
- Parallel sub-agents (3 worktrees, ~10 min): REST API, CLI, UI.
- Sequential (já): integrace, docs/CHANGELOG/version, schema tests,
fullsuite verification.
* fix(auth): address Devin review on PR #73 — three regressions
Three concrete bugs caught in Devin's PR review, all fixed in this commit.
1. **users.role hydration on read** (the big one):
v8→v9 migration NULLs users.role for every existing user, but a long
tail of read sites still inspect user["role"] directly:
- app/web/templates/_app_header.html:15 — admin nav gate
- app/web/templates/_app_header.html:36-37 — role badge in dropdown
- app/web/router.py:319-321 — UserInfo.is_admin/is_analyst/is_privileged
- app/web/router.py:489 — corporate memory is_km_admin
- app/api/catalog.py:54 — admin "see all tables" bypass
- app/api/sync.py:215 — admin "see all sync states" bypass
Without a fix, every existing admin loses the entire admin nav (and
API admin bypasses) immediately after upgrade — a serious regression.
Fix: new helper _hydrate_legacy_role() in app/auth/dependencies.py
maps the highest-level core.* grant back into user["role"] as the
legacy enum string. Called from get_current_user() on both auth paths
(LOCAL_DEV_MODE + JWT/PAT). Idempotent — skips when role is already
populated. Net effect: every pre-v9 callsite keeps working transparently
for both OAuth and PAT callers, with one extra DB round-trip per
authenticated request (same cost as the existing PAT-aware
require_internal_role fallback).
3 regression tests in tests/test_schema_v9_migration.py:
- test_hydration_recovers_role_from_user_role_grants
- test_hydration_returns_highest_grant (multi-grant → highest wins)
- test_hydration_falls_back_to_viewer_when_no_grants (safe fallback)
2. **CLI effective-roles TypeError**:
API returns direct/group as List[Dict] (RoleGrantResponse-shaped),
but the CLI did ', '.join(direct) which raises TypeError on dicts.
Tests masked it because mocks used bare string lists. Replaced
raw .join() with a _names() helper that extracts role_key from
each item, falling back to str() for legacy mock shapes.
3. **UI template field-name mismatch**:
admin_user_detail.html JS reads data.groups but the API serializes
the field as group (singular, per EffectiveRolesResponse pydantic).
Currently benign because the API always returns group:[], but the
field would silently disappear once the group-derived view is wired
up. Added data.group as the primary lookup, kept the legacy aliases
for shape-drift tolerance.
Full suite: 1485 passed (was 1482, +3 hydration tests), 6 skipped, no
regressions.
* fix(auth): Devin review #2 + UX self-service + RBAC docs rename
Three threads landed in one commit because they share the same
auth/role surface and CHANGELOG entry.
Devin review #73 second round (2 actionable findings):
- _hydrate_legacy_role no longer short-circuits on truthy users.role.
The role-management endpoints (POST/DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/
role-grants + the changeCoreRole UI flow) only mutate
user_role_grants — they don't update the legacy column. The early
return trusted that stale value, so a user downgraded via the new
REST/UI kept role="admin" in their dict on subsequent requests,
which fooled _is_admin_user_dict (src/rbac.py) and the catalog/sync
admin-bypass short-circuits into retaining elevated table access
even though require_internal_role correctly denied the API gates.
Always re-resolves now, making user_role_grants the single source
of truth on every authenticated request. Cost: one DB round-trip
per request — same as the existing PAT-aware fallback. Pinned by
test_hydration_ignores_stale_legacy_role_after_grant_revoke.
- Dev-bypass (app/auth/dependencies.py) and OAuth callback
(app/auth/providers/google.py) now pass user_id to
resolve_internal_roles so direct grants land in
session["internal_roles"] alongside group-mapped roles. Pre-fix,
every admin-gated request fell through to the per-request DB
fallback inside require_internal_role and the dev-bypass log line
read "resolved 0 internal role(s)" for an obviously-admin user.
test_session_internal_roles_populated updated to assert union.
User-visible UX (also addresses local-test feedback):
- HTTP 500 on /admin/users post-v8→v9 migration — UserResponse.role
is required str, but legacy users.role was NULL-ed by the
migration. _to_response in app/api/users.py now routes every dict
through _hydrate_legacy_role; same fix lifts the silent no-op of
last-admin protection in update_user/delete_user (the role-equality
short-circuits would skip the count_admins guard for migrated
admins). Three regression tests under TestAPIUsersPostMigration.
- /profile is now a real self-service detail page for *every*
signed-in user (not just admins). Three new server-side sections:
Effective roles (resolver output as chip cloud), Direct grants
(rows in user_role_grants with source label), Roles via groups
(which Cloud Identity / dev group grants which role for the
current user). Non-admins finally see *why* a feature is or isn't
accessible. Admins additionally see a deep-link to
/admin/users/{id} for editing their own grants.
- /admin/role-mapping group-id picker. New "Known groups" panel
above the create form: clickable chips for the calling admin's
own session.google_groups (tagged "your group") merged with
external_group_ids already used in existing mappings (tagged
"already mapped"). Click a chip → fills the form. Empty-state
copy points operators at LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS / Google sign-in
instead of leaving them to guess Cloud Identity opaque IDs from
memory.
Operational fixes:
- Scheduler log-noise: every cron tick produced a
POST /auth/token 401 because the auto-fetch fallback called the
endpoint with just an email (no password) and silently fell
through. Removed the broken path entirely. Operators set
SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN (long-lived PAT) in production; in
LOCAL_DEV_MODE the dev-bypass auto-authenticates the un-tokenized
request, so jobs continue to work.
Docs:
- docs/internal-roles.md → docs/RBAC.md (git mv preserves history).
Standard industry term, more discoverable for engineers grepping
for RBAC in a new repo. Restructured: Quickstart-by-role
(operator / end-user / module author), step-by-step
Module-author workflow with code examples (register key, gate
endpoint, declare implies, write contract test), naming pitfalls,
refresh semantics. CLAUDE.md gets a new
"Extensibility → RBAC" section pointing contributors at the doc
before they add gated endpoints. Cross-refs in app/api/admin.py
+ tests/test_role_resolver.py updated.
Tests: 293 in the auth/role/scheduler/UI test set passed, 0 regressions.
* fix(auth): Devin review #3 — login flows + RBAC docs
Two new findings on commit 7d1c048, both real and addressed.
Finding 1 (BUG, HTTP 500): every auth login flow loaded users via
UserRepository.get_by_email and passed user["role"] straight to
create_access_token, Pydantic response models, and _set_login_cookie
without going through _hydrate_legacy_role. Post-v9 the legacy column
is NULL for migrated users, and TokenResponse.role is a required str —
so POST /auth/token raised ValidationError → HTTP 500 for any v8-admin
trying to log in via password. Same root cause produced non-crashing
but semantically wrong JWTs (role: null) from Google OAuth, password
web flows, and email magic-link verification.
Fix: hydrate inline in every login flow before reading user["role"]:
- app/auth/router.py — POST /auth/token (the crash site)
- app/auth/providers/google.py — OAuth callback (was just stale JWT)
- app/auth/providers/password.py — 5 flows: JSON login, web login,
JSON setup, web reset confirm, web setup confirm
- app/auth/providers/email.py — centralized in _consume_token,
covers both /verify endpoints
New regression class TestAuthLoginFlowsPostMigration pins both the
no-crash and the correct-role contracts for all four legacy levels
(viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin) on POST /auth/token.
Finding 2 (DOCS): docs/RBAC.md showed register_internal_role() being
called with implies=[...], but the function signature is (key, *,
display_name, description, owner_module). A module author copying the
example would TypeError at import time. The implies field on
internal_roles IS honored at runtime by expand_implies, but the
registry-side write path (register_internal_role + InternalRoleSpec +
sync_registered_roles_to_db) doesn't exist yet — implies is currently
seeded only for the core.* hierarchy via _seed_core_roles in src/db.py.
Rewrote the Implies hierarchy and Module-author workflow sections to
document what's actually supported in 0.11.4 and what a future change
would need to add. The "for cross-module hierarchies, register each
level + grant both" pattern works today.
Tests: 322 in the auth/role/scheduler/UI/password test set passed,
0 regressions.
* fix(db): _seed_core_roles actually runs on every connect (Devin review #4)
Devin flagged that the docstring on `_seed_core_roles` promised per-connect
execution as a safety net for accidental DELETEs and in-code seed changes,
but the only call sites lived inside `if current < SCHEMA_VERSION:` — so
once a DB was on v9 the function never ran again, and the docstring lied.
Picked option (b) from the review (actually call it on every startup) over
option (a) (fix the docstring) because the safety net is genuinely useful:
- recovery from accidental admin DELETE on internal_roles,
- in-code _CORE_ROLES_SEED tweaks (display_name/description/implies)
ship without a manual SQL deploy,
- fresh installs and migrations stop needing their own seed call sites.
Tail call gated by `get_schema_version(conn) <= SCHEMA_VERSION` so the
future-version-is-noop rollback contract still holds — a v9 binary won't
touch a DB that's been upgraded past v9.
Test coverage: new TestSeedCoreRolesSafetyNet class (3 tests) pins the
three contracts — deleted row re-seeds, mutated display_name re-syncs
from in-code seed, applied_at on schema_version doesn't churn on
already-current DBs. Existing TestMigrationSafety::test_future_version_is_noop
still passes (verified against the gating logic).
Vojtech