minasarustamyan d4ac84dd46

feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150 )

* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>

2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00

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Security — RBAC, permissions, and audit

Access control (v19+)

Two layers, no role hierarchy:

Admin system group — god-mode for app-level actions. Members can do anything.
resource_grants(group, resource_type, resource_id) — per-group grants on individual resources (tables, marketplace plugins, memory domains).

Every non-admin access requires an explicit grant. There is no is_public shortcut and no implicit Everyone fallback — admins curate access by minting grants on groups the user belongs to.

Managing users

da admin add-user user@company.com           # creates a non-admin user
da admin list-users
da admin remove-user <user-id>

Admin promotion is a separate action — there is no --role admin flag. Add the user to the Admin system group:

da admin group list                          # find the Admin group id
da admin group add-member <admin-group-id> user@company.com

Removed in v19: da admin set-role (use group memberships instead). Old call sites hard-fail with a replacement command in the error message.

Granting table access

da admin grant resource-types                # see registered resource types
da admin grant create --group <id> --type table --id <table-id>
da admin grant list
da admin grant delete <grant-id>

The web UI at /admin/access shows the same model: groups on the left, grantable resources on the right, per-row checkboxes plus per-block "Grant all" / "Revoke all" bulk actions.

Audit trail

Every API mutation is logged:

da query "SELECT * FROM system.audit_log ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 20" --remote

Script sandboxing

User scripts run in an isolated subprocess with:

Limited environment (no access to secrets)
Timeout (default 5 min)
Blocked imports (subprocess, shutil, ctypes)
Stdout/stderr size cap (64KB)

JWT tokens

Session tokens: issued on interactive login (da login), valid 24 hours.
For long-lived CLI / CI use, create a Personal Access Token via the UI (/tokens → New token) or CLI (da auth token create).
PATs are revocable and auditable; session tokens are not.
Claims: sub (user_id), email, typ, exp, jti. No role claim — admin status derives from user_group_members at request time via app.auth.access.is_user_admin.
Set JWT_SECRET_KEY in .env (min 32 chars).

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