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agnes-the-ai-analyst/docs/architecture.md
minasarustamyan d4ac84dd46
feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150) 
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00

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# Architecture — Detailed Reference
Comprehensive architectural overview of the AI Data Analyst platform (v2).
## Top-Level Module Map
```
ai-data-analyst/
├── src/ Core engine (db, orchestrator, rbac, profiler, repositories)
├── connectors/ Pluggable data connectors (keboola, bigquery, jira, llm, openmetadata)
├── app/ FastAPI application (API + web UI)
│ ├── api/ REST API routers
│ ├── auth/ Auth providers (JWT, Google OAuth, email magic link, password)
│ └── web/ HTML dashboard routes
├── services/ Standalone background services (scheduler, telegram_bot, ws_gateway, …)
├── cli/ CLI tool (da sync, da query, da admin)
├── scripts/ Utility and migration scripts
├── config/ Instance configuration templates
├── tests/ Test suite
└── docs/ User-facing documentation
```
## System Overview
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ EXTERNAL DATA SOURCES │
│ Keboola Storage │ BigQuery │ Jira Cloud │ CSV/files │
└──────────┬────────┴─────┬──────┴──────┬────────┴────────────────┘
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CONNECTORS (connectors/) │
│ extractor.py per source → extract.duckdb contract │
└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
│ /data/extracts/{source}/extract.duckdb
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SYNC ORCHESTRATOR (src/orchestrator.py) │
│ Scans extracts/, ATTACHes each extract.duckdb, │
│ creates master views in analytics.duckdb (atomic swap) │
└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌────────────┼────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────────┐ ┌────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│ FastAPI app │ │ CLI │ │ Scheduler │
│ port 8000 │ │ `da` │ │ sidecar │
└──────────────┘ └────────┘ └──────────────┘
│
┌─────────┴──────────┐
▼ ▼
system.duckdb analytics.duckdb
(state/registry) (master views)
```
**Deployment:** Docker Compose. The `app` service runs Uvicorn. The `scheduler` sidecar triggers
sync jobs via the app's REST API. Optional `full` profile adds telegram-bot, ws-gateway,
corporate-memory, session-collector.
```bash
docker compose up # app + scheduler
docker compose --profile full up # all services
docker compose --profile extract run extract # one-shot extraction
```
---
## extract.duckdb Contract
Every connector writes to the same directory layout:
```
/data/extracts/{source_name}/
├── extract.duckdb ← _meta table + views over parquet files
└── data/ ← parquet files (local connectors only)
├── table_a.parquet
└── table_b.parquet
```
### _meta table
Required in every `extract.duckdb`:
```sql
CREATE TABLE _meta (
table_name VARCHAR NOT NULL,
description TEXT,
rows BIGINT,
size_bytes BIGINT,
extracted_at TIMESTAMP,
query_mode VARCHAR -- 'local' or 'remote'
);
```
The orchestrator reads `_meta` to know which tables exist and creates a corresponding
view in `analytics.duckdb` for each row.
### _remote_attach table (optional)
Connectors whose views reference an external DuckDB extension (e.g. Keboola, BigQuery)
must include this table so the orchestrator can re-ATTACH the external source at rebuild time:
```sql
CREATE TABLE _remote_attach (
alias VARCHAR, -- DuckDB alias for the attached source, e.g. 'kbc'
extension VARCHAR, -- Extension name, e.g. 'keboola'
url VARCHAR, -- Connection URL
token_env VARCHAR -- Name of the env var holding the auth token
);
```
The orchestrator installs/loads the extension, reads the token from the environment, and
ATTACHes the external source so remote views resolve correctly. This mechanism is generic —
any connector can use it. Auth credentials are never stored in `extract.duckdb`.
---
## SyncOrchestrator
`src/orchestrator.py` — thread-safe via `_rebuild_lock`.
### rebuild()
1. Open a **temporary** DuckDB file (`analytics.duckdb.tmp`).
2. Scan `/data/extracts/*/extract.duckdb` (sorted, skips non-directories and missing files).
3. Validate each directory name as a safe SQL identifier (`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`).
4. For each source: `ATTACH '{db_file}' AS {source_name} (READ_ONLY)`.
5. Handle `_remote_attach` — install extension, read token from env, ATTACH external source.
6. Read `_meta`, validate each `table_name` identifier, create `CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW`.
7. Update `sync_state` in `system.duckdb` (mtime-based hash, no full file read).
8. `CHECKPOINT` and close the temp connection.
9. **Atomic swap**: `shutil.move(tmp_path, target_path)` — replaces `analytics.duckdb` in-place.
### rebuild_source(source_name)
Convenience wrapper that calls `rebuild()` in full (partial rebuild is not possible because
`analytics.duckdb` is written fresh from scratch each time). Used after Jira webhooks.
### Identifier validation
Both `source_name` and `table_name` are checked against `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`
before being interpolated into SQL. Invalid names are skipped with a warning.
---
## Data Sources
### Keboola — Batch Pull
`connectors/keboola/extractor.py`
- Uses the DuckDB Keboola community extension to download tables directly to parquet.
- Fallback path: `connectors/keboola/client.py` (Keboola Storage API wrapper).
- Sync strategies: `full_refresh`, `incremental`, `partitioned`.
- Writes `extract.duckdb` + `data/*.parquet` under `/data/extracts/keboola/`.
- For tables with `query_mode='remote'`, populates `_remote_attach` so views proxy queries
to Keboola rather than downloading data locally.
Sync trigger flow:
```
POST /api/sync/trigger (admin)
→ BackgroundTask: _run_sync()
→ Read table_registry from system.duckdb (main process)
→ Serialize configs as JSON, spawn subprocess (no DuckDB lock conflict)
→ Subprocess: connectors/keboola/extractor.run() → extract.duckdb
→ SyncOrchestrator().rebuild() → analytics.duckdb
→ Profiler: profile each synced parquet → table_profiles
```
### BigQuery — Remote Attach
`connectors/bigquery/extractor.py`
- Uses the DuckDB BigQuery community extension.
- No data download — views proxy all queries directly to BigQuery.
- Auth via `GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS` (service account JSON) or ADC.
- Populates `_remote_attach` with `extension='bigquery'` and no `token_env` (env-based auth).
### Jira — Real-Time Push
`connectors/jira/webhook.py` → `incremental_transform.py` → `extract_init.py`
```
Jira Cloud webhook (issue created/updated/deleted)
→ POST /api/jira/webhook (HMAC-SHA256 verification)
→ connectors/jira/webhook.py (validate, persist raw JSON)
→ connectors/jira/incremental_transform.py (update monthly parquet shards)
→ extract_init.py (update _meta)
→ SyncOrchestrator().rebuild_source('jira')
```
Output tables (6): `issues`, `comments`, `attachments`, `changelog`, `issuelinks`, `remote_links`.
Background supplements:
- `jira-sla-poll` — refreshes SLA fields for open tickets every 5 min.
- `jira-consistency` — detects and backfills missing issues every 6 h.
Files NOT to modify: `connectors/jira/file_lock.py`, `connectors/jira/transform.py`.
---
## DuckDB Schema
### system.duckdb — `{DATA_DIR}/state/system.duckdb`
Current schema version: **19** (auto-migrated from any earlier version on startup — see `src/db.py`).
| Table | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
| `schema_version` | Tracks applied migration version |
| `users` | Registered users: id, email, name, password_hash, setup/reset tokens, active flag |
| `user_groups` | Named groups (`Admin`, `Everyone` seeded as `is_system=TRUE`; admin-managed and Google-synced groups) |
| `user_group_members` | `(user_id, group_id, source)` — `source ∈ {admin, google_sync, system_seed}` |
| `resource_grants` | Generic per-`(group, resource_type, resource_id)` grants (replaces `dataset_permissions` + `plugin_access`) |
| `sync_state` | Per-table sync status: last_sync, rows, file_size_bytes, hash, status |
| `sync_history` | Historical sync runs with duration and error |
| `user_sync_settings` | Per-user dataset enable/disable preferences |
| `table_registry` | Registered tables: source_type, bucket, source_table, query_mode, sync_schedule |
| `table_profiles` | JSON data profiles (stats, nulls, cardinality) per table |
| `knowledge_items` | Corporate memory knowledge entries (V1 columns: `confidence`, `domain`, `entities`, `source_type`, `source_ref`, `valid_from`/`valid_until`, `supersedes`, `sensitivity`, `is_personal`) |
| `knowledge_votes` | Up/down votes on knowledge items |
| `knowledge_contradictions` | Pairs of items the LLM judge flagged as contradictory; carries `severity` and `suggested_resolution` (JSON-encoded structured action — see ADR Decision 4) |
| `verification_evidence` | One row per detected verification — persists `user_quote`, `detection_type`, and `source_ref` so future Bayesian re-calibration has raw signal (ADR Decision 3) |
| `session_extraction_state` | Tracks which `/data/user_sessions/*.jsonl` files have been processed by the verification detector |
| `audit_log` | API action log: user, action, resource, duration |
| `telegram_links` | Telegram chat_id linked to user_id |
| `pending_codes` | Telegram link confirmation codes |
| `script_registry` | Deployed Python notification scripts |
Connections: `get_system_db()` returns a cursor on a **single shared connection** per
`DATA_DIR` (protected by `threading.Lock`). Callers `close()` the cursor, not the
underlying connection. This avoids DuckDB write-lock conflicts in the multi-threaded
FastAPI process.
### analytics.duckdb — `{DATA_DIR}/analytics/server.duckdb`
Read-only views over all ATTACHed `extract.duckdb` sources. Rebuilt atomically by
`SyncOrchestrator.rebuild()`. Query endpoints open this file via `get_analytics_db_readonly()`
which ATTACHes all `extract.duckdb` files in read-only mode so remote views resolve correctly.
---
## Authentication
All auth flows issue a **JWT** (`app/auth/jwt.py`) stored as a cookie (`access_token`) or
passed as a `Bearer` token in the `Authorization` header. The `get_current_user` dependency
validates the JWT and loads the user from `users` in `system.duckdb`.
### Providers (`app/auth/providers/`)
| Provider | Available when | Flow |
|----------|---------------|------|
| `google.py` | `GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID` + `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET` set | Google OAuth 2.0 / OIDC (Authlib). Domain restriction via `allowed_domains` in `instance.yaml`. Callback issues JWT cookie. |
| `email.py` | `SMTP_HOST` or `SENDGRID_API_KEY` set | Magic link: `POST /auth/email/send-link` generates a token stored in `users.setup_token`; `POST /auth/email/verify` exchanges it for a JWT. |
| `password.py` | Always registered | Email + password with hashed credentials. |
### RBAC
Two layers, no role hierarchy (see `docs/RBAC.md` for the full reference):
- **App-level access**: membership in the `Admin` system group. The
`require_admin` FastAPI dependency in `app.auth.access` gates admin
endpoints (admin UI, user management, settings, …).
- **Resource-level access**: per-(group, resource_type, resource_id)
grants in `resource_grants`. The `require_resource_access(rt,
path_template)` dependency factory gates entity-scoped endpoints.
Table access (`src/rbac.py:can_access_table`) is a thin wrapper over
`app.auth.access.can_access(user_id, "table", table_id, conn)`. Admin
group members short-circuit; everyone else needs an explicit
`resource_grants(group, "table", table_id)` row via any group they
belong to. There is no `is_public` shortcut and no implicit "Everyone
can read" fallback — the legacy `dataset_permissions` + `is_public`
mechanism was dropped in v19.
---
## API Layer
All routes are FastAPI `APIRouter` instances registered in `app/main.py`.
### REST API (`app/api/`)
| Router | Prefix | Key endpoints |
|--------|--------|---------------|
| `sync` | `/api/sync` | `GET /manifest` (hash manifest, per-user filtered), `POST /trigger` (admin), `GET/POST /settings`, `GET/POST /table-subscriptions` |
| `data` | `/api/data` | Download parquet files for synced tables |
| `query` | `/api/query` | `POST /` — execute a SELECT against `analytics.duckdb` (sandbox enforced) |
| `admin` | `/api/admin` | `GET /discover-tables`, `GET /registry`, `POST /register-table`, `PUT /registry/{id}`, `DELETE /registry/{id}` |
| `catalog` | `/api/catalog` | Data catalog: table list, profiles, metric definitions |
| `users` | `/api/users` | User CRUD (admin), self-service profile |
| `permissions` | `/api/permissions` | Dataset permission grants (admin) |
| `access_requests` | `/api/access-requests` | Request + review workflow |
| `scripts` | `/api/scripts` | Deploy, list, run, delete Python notification scripts |
| `settings` | `/api/settings` | Instance and user settings |
| `memory` | `/api/memory` | Corporate memory CRUD and voting |
| `upload` | `/api/upload` | File upload (CSV, parquet) |
| `telegram` | `/api/telegram` | Telegram account link/unlink |
| `jira_webhooks` | `/api/jira` | Jira webhook receiver (HMAC-SHA256 verified) |
| `health` | `/api/health` | Service health, sync status, disk |
### Auth routes (`app/auth/`)
`POST /auth/token`, `GET /auth/me`, `POST /auth/logout`,
`GET /auth/google/login`, `GET /auth/google/callback`,
`POST /auth/email/send-link`, `POST /auth/email/verify`,
`POST /auth/password/login`
### Web UI (`app/web/`)
HTML dashboard routes served by Jinja2 templates. Registered last (catch-all).
---
## Services
Each service is a self-contained Python package (`services/<name>/__main__.py`) run as a
Docker Compose service.
| Service | Profile | Schedule / Mode | Description |
|---------|---------|-----------------|-------------|
| `scheduler` | default | Always-on; polls every N seconds | Lightweight sidecar that triggers jobs via the app's REST API (`POST /api/sync/trigger` every 15 min, `GET /api/health` every 5 min). Auth via `SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN` or auto-fetch from `/auth/token`. |
| `telegram_bot` | `full` | Always-on (long-poll) | Telegram bot: polling + HTTP dispatch, `/status` command, notification script execution. |
| `ws_gateway` | `full` | Always-on | WebSocket gateway (TCP 8765) + HTTP dispatch socket. JWT auth. Per-user connection limit (5). Heartbeat ping/pong. |
| `corporate_memory` | `full` | Periodic (every 30 min) | Scans `CLAUDE.local.md` files, extracts knowledge via LLM (Claude Haiku), writes to `knowledge_items` in system.duckdb. Inline contradiction detection runs after each new item: one batched Haiku structured-output call returns judgments + structured resolution suggestions for every same-domain candidate (no SQL keyword pre-filter — see [ADR Decision 4](ADR-corporate-memory-v1.md)). |
| `verification_detector` | `full` (run via `corporate_memory`) | On each `corporate_memory` tick | Scans unprocessed analyst session JSONLs, extracts corrections / confirmations / unprompted definitions via Haiku structured outputs. Confidence is computed in code from `(source_type, detection_type)` — never trusted from the LLM. Each verification persists a `verification_evidence` row carrying `user_quote` + `detection_type` ([ADR Decision 3](ADR-corporate-memory-v1.md)). |
| `session_collector` | `full` | Periodic (every 6 h) | Copies Claude Code `.jsonl` session transcripts to central storage. |
Files NOT to modify: `services/ws_gateway/` (stable WebSocket infrastructure).
### Corporate-memory privacy boundary
`is_personal` on `knowledge_items` is enforced as an authorization rule at every read site, not a UI hint:
- `GET /api/memory` and `GET /api/memory?search=…` silently coerce `exclude_personal=True` for any caller whose role is below `km_admin`.
- `GET /api/memory/{id}/provenance` and `POST /api/memory/{id}/vote` use the shared `_can_view_item(user, item)` helper (`not is_personal OR contributor OR km_admin/admin`) and return **404** (not 403) on denial to avoid existence-leak.
- Contributors reach their own personal items via `/api/memory/my-contributions`.
See [ADR Decision 1](ADR-corporate-memory-v1.md) for the full reasoning.
---
## Security
### Query Sandbox (`app/api/query.py`)
The `/api/query` endpoint enforces a strict SQL allowlist:
- Only `SELECT` and `WITH` queries accepted.
- Blocklist of ~30 keywords/functions: `DROP`, `DELETE`, `INSERT`, `UPDATE`, `ALTER`,
`CREATE`, `ATTACH`, `DETACH`, `LOAD`, `INSTALL`, `COPY`, `PRAGMA`, file functions
(`read_parquet`, `read_csv`, `glob`, etc.), URL schemes (`s3://`, `gcs://`, `http://`),
and multi-statement separator (`;`).
- Table-level RBAC: forbidden views are detected by word-boundary regex match against
the SQL text. Query is rejected if user lacks access to any referenced table.
- Analytics DB opened in `read_only=True` mode per request.
### Script Sandbox (`app/api/scripts.py`)
Deployed and ad-hoc Python scripts are checked against a pattern blocklist before execution:
- Blocked: `subprocess`, `shutil`, `ctypes`, `importlib`, `socket`, `requests`, `httpx`,
`urllib`, `os`, `sys`, `signal`, `open(`, `pathlib`, `exec(`, `eval(`, `compile(`,
`__import__`, and others.
- Scripts run in a subprocess with a configurable timeout (`SCRIPT_TIMEOUT`, default 300 s)
and capped output (`SCRIPT_MAX_OUTPUT`, default 64 KB).
### Identifier Validation (`src/orchestrator.py`, `src/db.py`)
All dynamic SQL identifiers (source names, table names, extension aliases) are validated
against `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}$` before interpolation. Invalid identifiers are
skipped with a log warning, never executed.
### Authentication Layers
| Layer | Mechanism |
|-------|-----------|
| Web UI / API | JWT Bearer token or `access_token` cookie |
| Google OAuth | Authlib OIDC + domain allowlist |
| Email magic link | `secrets.token_urlsafe(32)` stored in `users.setup_token`, 1-hour expiry |
| Jira webhook | HMAC-SHA256 signature verification |
| Inter-service (scheduler) | `SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN` env var or auto-fetched JWT |
---
## Configuration
```
config/instance.yaml (instance-specific, not committed)
│ loaded by config/loader.py
│ ${ENV_VAR} references resolved from .env
▼
app/instance_config.py (exposes get_data_source_type(), get_allowed_domains(), get_value())
▼
FastAPI dependency injection (passed to API routers as needed)
```
Table configuration lives in `table_registry` inside `system.duckdb`, not in static files.
Use `POST /api/admin/register-table` or the web UI admin panel to register tables.
Required env vars: `DATA_DIR`, `JWT_SECRET_KEY`. Source-specific vars (`KEBOOLA_STORAGE_TOKEN`,
`GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID`, `GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET`, `SMTP_HOST` / `SENDGRID_API_KEY`, etc.) are
optional and gate the relevant connectors/providers.
---
## Data Filesystem Layout
```
/data/
├── state/
│ └── system.duckdb user registry, sync state, table_registry, audit log
├── analytics/
│ └── server.duckdb master analytics DB (views over all extracts)
└── extracts/
├── keboola/
│ ├── extract.duckdb _meta + views
│ └── data/*.parquet
├── bigquery/
│ └── extract.duckdb _meta + _remote_attach + remote views
└── jira/
├── extract.duckdb _meta + views
└── data/*.parquet
```
---
## Extending the Platform
### New Data Source
1. Create `connectors/<name>/extractor.py`.
2. Write `extract.duckdb` with `_meta` table and views/tables.
3. Add `data/*.parquet` for local sources.
4. Add `_remote_attach` row if views reference an external DuckDB extension.
5. `SyncOrchestrator` picks it up automatically on next `rebuild()`.
### New Auth Provider
1. Add `app/auth/providers/<name>.py` exporting a FastAPI `APIRouter`.
2. Register the router in `app/main.py`.
3. All providers must issue a JWT and set the `access_token` cookie on success.
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