* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Deployment Guide
Agnes supports two deployment paths. Pick the one that matches your use case.
1. Terraform — managed, multi-customer (recommended)
For Keboola-operated deployments and anyone running Agnes for multiple customers on GCP.
Follow: ONBOARDING.md
Highlights:
- Per-customer GCP project + private infra repo cloned from
keboola/agnes-infra-template - Reusable Terraform module
infra/modules/customer-instance(versioned —infra-vX.Y.Ztags) - Prod + optional branch-aware dev VMs
- Persistent SSD data disk with daily snapshots
- Secret Manager for tokens (no plaintext in VM metadata)
- OS Login for SSH, dedicated VM service account with scoped
secretAccessor - Cron-based auto-upgrade (pulls
:stableimage digest every 5 min) - Caddy TLS with corporate-CA or self-managed certs mounted from
/data/state/certs; daily auto-rotation from a URL (TLS_FULLCHAIN_URL) with zero-downtimeSIGUSR1reload - Uptime check + alert policy per VM (wire a notification channel to be paged)
- CI/CD in the private repo: PR →
terraform plan, merge to main →apply-devauto,apply-prodgated by reviewer - First-boot bootstrap via
POST /auth/bootstrap
Target onboarding time: < 1 hour per customer.
2. Docker Compose — OSS self-host
For running Agnes on your own VM / bare metal without Terraform. You're responsible for provisioning and maintenance.
Prerequisites
- Ubuntu 24.04 (or any Linux with Docker)
- 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM, 30 GB SSD minimum
- Docker Engine + Compose plugin
- Public IP with ports 80/443 (if using Caddy TLS) or 8000 (plain HTTP) open
- Data-source credentials (e.g., Keboola Storage token)
Steps
-
Clone the Agnes repository:
git clone https://github.com/keboola/agnes-the-ai-analyst.git /opt/agnes cd /opt/agnes -
Create
.env:cat > .env <<'EOF' JWT_SECRET_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32) DATA_DIR=/data DATA_SOURCE=keboola KEBOOLA_STORAGE_TOKEN=<your-token> KEBOOLA_STACK_URL=<your-stack-url> SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL=<your-email> LOG_LEVEL=info AGNES_TAG=stable EOF chmod 600 .env -
Mount a persistent disk at
/data(optional but recommended — survives host rebuild). If you do, use the overlay:docker compose \ -f docker-compose.yml \ -f docker-compose.prod.yml \ -f docker-compose.host-mount.yml \ up -dWithout a persistent disk (data on Docker named volume, tied to boot disk):
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d -
Bootstrap your admin password via
POST /auth/bootstrap:curl -X POST http://<host>:8000/auth/bootstrap \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"<your-email>","password":"<strong-password>"}' -
Open
http://<host>:8000/loginand sign in.
TLS (optional)
Caddy runs as the TLS terminator. It reads certs from /data/state/certs/{fullchain,privkey}.pem bind-mounted into the container. Two provisioning modes:
A. Public internet (Let's Encrypt) — for this path, override the Caddyfile to drop the tls directive (so Caddy auto-issues) and skip steps below. Not covered here anymore; see git history prior to the feat(tls) change if you need the ACME flow.
B. Corporate CA / self-managed certs (recommended, and what the infra repo ships):
Two bring-up flows, picked by whether TLS_PRIVKEY_URL is set in .env:
- On-VM gen (preferred for new deployments): leave
TLS_PRIVKEY_URLempty. On first run,agnes-tls-rotate.shgenerates an RSA-2048 key + CSR directly into/data/state/certs/using the subject string fromTLS_CSR_SUBJECT. The key never leaves the host; the CSR (/data/state/certs/cert.csr) is what you submit to your corporate PKI. Until the CA signs and publishes, rotate falls back to a 30-day self-signed cert against the same key so Caddy can serve :443. - Pre-provisioned key (legacy / VM-replace-resilient): set
TLS_PRIVKEY_URL=sm://<secret>(or any supported scheme). Seed the key out-of-band before first rotate. Same real-cert fetch + self-signed fallback applies.
Both modes converge: once the CA publishes the signed chain at TLS_FULLCHAIN_URL, the daily rotate tick atomically swaps the fullchain in place and SIGUSR1-reloads Caddy. Zero key churn, zero downtime, no reload when the URL content hasn't moved.
- Set the required env vars in
.env:DOMAIN=agnes.example.com TLS_FULLCHAIN_URL=https://your-ca.example.com/agnes/fullchain.pem TLS_PRIVKEY_URL= # empty → on-VM gen; or sm://<secret> TLS_CSR_SUBJECT=/C=…/ST=…/L=…/O=…/CN=agnes.example.com - Start with the
tlsprofile + overlay (docker-compose.tls.ymlcloses host:8000so all traffic enters via:443):docker compose \ -f docker-compose.yml \ -f docker-compose.prod.yml \ -f docker-compose.tls.yml \ --profile tls up -d - Grab the CSR if you used on-VM gen:
Submit to your corporate PKI. While waiting, Caddy is already up on :443 with the self-signed fallback.sudo cat /data/state/certs/cert.csr
Automatic rotation
scripts/ops/agnes-tls-rotate.sh is the single entry point — it handles fetch, self-signed fallback, auto-generation on missing key, atomic cert swap, and Caddy reload. Env vars it reads:
| Var | Required | Schemes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
DOMAIN |
yes | — | The hostname Caddy serves + the CN in auto-generated CSRs. |
TLS_FULLCHAIN_URL |
yes | https://, sm://<secret>, gs://<obj>, file:// |
Polled daily; rotate only reloads Caddy when the bytes change. |
TLS_PRIVKEY_URL |
optional | same | Empty activates on-VM gen. Set to pre-provisioned scheme (e.g. sm://) for VM-replace resilience. |
TLS_CSR_SUBJECT |
optional | — | Stamped on auto-generated CSRs. Defaults to /CN=<DOMAIN> if unset. Example: /C=US/ST=Illinois/L=Chicago/O=Your Org/CN=agnes.example.com. |
scripts/tls-fetch.sh at /usr/local/bin/tls-fetch.sh is required (generic URL fetcher used by rotate). On infra-repo-managed VMs, both scripts are installed by startup.sh and fired via a daily systemd timer; for manual compose deployments, copy them under /usr/local/bin/ and wire a systemd timer (OnBootSec=10min, OnUnitActiveSec=24h, Persistent=true).
Upgrades (manual)
cd /opt/agnes
git pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml pull
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
Or set up a cron job — see infra/modules/customer-instance/startup-script.sh.tpl for the reference implementation.
Health checks & external monitoring
Two health endpoints serve different audiences:
| Endpoint | Auth | Response | Use for |
|---|---|---|---|
GET /api/health |
None | {"status": "ok"} |
Load balancers, Docker healthcheck, uptime pings |
GET /api/health/detailed |
Bearer token | {"status", "version", "services": {...}} |
Dashboards, alerting rules, da diagnose/da status CLI |
The Docker Compose healthcheck uses the minimal endpoint (curl -sf http://localhost:8000/api/health). For external monitoring tools (Datadog, Prometheus, UptimeRobot, etc.) that need service-level detail (DuckDB status, sync freshness, user count), point them at /api/health/detailed with an Authorization: Bearer <token> header. Any authenticated user can call it; a personal access token (da admin create-pat) works well for service accounts.
Which path should I pick?
| Terraform | Docker Compose | |
|---|---|---|
| Setup time | ~45 min first customer, ~15 min each subsequent | ~30 min |
| Infra-as-Code | Full (all resources in git) | Partial (compose.yml only) |
| Secret storage | GCP Secret Manager | .env file on host |
| Upgrades | Auto via cron, gated prod apply | Manual docker compose pull |
| Backups | Daily GCP snapshots, 30-day retention | You set up yourself |
| Monitoring / alerts | GCP Uptime Checks + alert policy | You set up yourself |
| TLS | Caddy + corp cert, auto-rotated from URL | Caddy + corp cert, manual or user-scripted rotation |
| Best for | Multi-tenant SaaS, production | Single-instance self-host, learning |
Related documentation
ONBOARDING.md— end-to-end Terraform onboarding checklistCONFIGURATION.md—instance.yaml, env vars, per-instance configarchitecture.md— internal architecture (orchestrator, extractors, DB layout)QUICKSTART.md— local development setupsuperpowers/specs/2026-04-21-multi-customer-deployment-spec.md— design rationale for the multi-customer model