d4ac84dd46
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration
BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.
Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
→ drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.
Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
(TABLE je unconditionally enabled)
API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)
Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
(admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()
CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
(back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)
Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
(can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
(drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated
Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)
Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.
Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): cut 0.27.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
63 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security — RBAC, permissions, and audit
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## Access control (v19+)
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Two layers, no role hierarchy:
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- **`Admin` system group** — god-mode for app-level actions. Members can do anything.
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- **`resource_grants(group, resource_type, resource_id)`** — per-group grants on individual resources (tables, marketplace plugins, memory domains).
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Every non-admin access requires an explicit grant. There is no `is_public` shortcut and no implicit Everyone fallback — admins curate access by minting grants on groups the user belongs to.
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## Managing users
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```bash
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da admin add-user user@company.com # creates a non-admin user
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da admin list-users
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da admin remove-user <user-id>
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```
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Admin promotion is a separate action — there is no `--role admin` flag. Add the user to the `Admin` system group:
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```bash
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da admin group list # find the Admin group id
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da admin group add-member <admin-group-id> user@company.com
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```
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Removed in v19: `da admin set-role` (use group memberships instead). Old call sites hard-fail with a replacement command in the error message.
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## Granting table access
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```bash
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da admin grant resource-types # see registered resource types
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da admin grant create --group <id> --type table --id <table-id>
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da admin grant list
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da admin grant delete <grant-id>
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```
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The web UI at `/admin/access` shows the same model: groups on the left, grantable resources on the right, per-row checkboxes plus per-block "Grant all" / "Revoke all" bulk actions.
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## Audit trail
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Every API mutation is logged:
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```bash
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da query "SELECT * FROM system.audit_log ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 20" --remote
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```
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## Script sandboxing
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User scripts run in an isolated subprocess with:
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- Limited environment (no access to secrets)
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- Timeout (default 5 min)
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- Blocked imports (subprocess, shutil, ctypes)
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- Stdout/stderr size cap (64KB)
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## JWT tokens
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- Session tokens: issued on interactive login (`da login`), valid 24 hours.
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- For long-lived CLI / CI use, create a Personal Access Token via the UI (`/tokens` → New token) or CLI (`da auth token create`).
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- PATs are revocable and auditable; session tokens are not.
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- Claims: `sub` (user_id), `email`, `typ`, `exp`, `jti`. **No `role` claim** — admin status derives from `user_group_members` at request time via `app.auth.access.is_user_admin`.
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- Set `JWT_SECRET_KEY` in `.env` (min 32 chars).
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