d55c8a3c33
Consolidates the scattered per-analyst pages into /me/activity (usage analytics) and /me/profile (account hub). /me/stats and /profile/sessions 301-redirect; /profile, /me/debug, /tokens are removed with every internal link repointed. Includes an XSS fix in the /me/activity page hero, the user_id-keyed session-lookup alignment, and the v0.54.15 release cut. Co-developed by @ZdenekSrotyr and @cvrysanek.
63 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security — RBAC, permissions, and audit
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## Access control (v19+)
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Two layers, no role hierarchy:
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- **`Admin` system group** — god-mode for app-level actions. Members can do anything.
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- **`resource_grants(group, resource_type, resource_id)`** — per-group grants on individual resources (tables, marketplace plugins, memory domains).
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Every non-admin access requires an explicit grant. There is no `is_public` shortcut and no implicit Everyone fallback — admins curate access by minting grants on groups the user belongs to.
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## Managing users
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```bash
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agnes admin add-user user@company.com # creates a non-admin user
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agnes admin list-users
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agnes admin remove-user <user-id>
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```
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Admin promotion is a separate action — there is no `--role admin` flag. Add the user to the `Admin` system group:
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```bash
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agnes admin group list # find the Admin group id
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agnes admin group add-member <admin-group-id> user@company.com
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```
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Removed in v19: `agnes admin set-role` (use group memberships instead). Old call sites hard-fail with a replacement command in the error message.
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## Granting table access
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```bash
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agnes admin grant resource-types # see registered resource types
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agnes admin grant create --group <id> --type table --id <table-id>
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agnes admin grant list
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agnes admin grant delete <grant-id>
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```
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The web UI at `/admin/access` shows the same model: groups on the left, grantable resources on the right, per-row checkboxes plus per-block "Grant all" / "Revoke all" bulk actions.
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## Audit trail
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Every API mutation is logged:
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```bash
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agnes query "SELECT * FROM system.audit_log ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 20" --remote
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```
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## Script sandboxing
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User scripts run in an isolated subprocess with:
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- Limited environment (no access to secrets)
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- Timeout (default 5 min)
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- Blocked imports (subprocess, shutil, ctypes)
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- Stdout/stderr size cap (64KB)
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## JWT tokens
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- Session tokens: issued on interactive login (`agnes login`), valid 24 hours.
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- For long-lived CLI / CI use, create a Personal Access Token via the UI (`/me/profile` → New token) or CLI (`agnes auth token create`).
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- PATs are revocable and auditable; session tokens are not.
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- Claims: `sub` (user_id), `email`, `typ`, `exp`, `jti`. **No `role` claim** — admin status derives from `user_group_members` at request time via `app.auth.access.is_user_admin`.
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- Set `JWT_SECRET_KEY` in `.env` (min 32 chars).
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