* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
7.1 KiB
Local Development
Single source of truth for working on Agnes against localhost. Covers the dev-mode auth bypass, mocked Google Workspace groups, what isn't mocked, and the safety rails that keep the dev shortcuts off production.
TL;DR
make local-dev
Then open http://localhost:8000. You land on /dashboard already logged in as dev@localhost (role admin) and your /profile shows two mocked Workspace groups. No login screen, no .env file, no SMTP, no GCP project — just code.
What make local-dev actually does:
- Stacks three Compose files:
docker-compose.yml(base) +docker-compose.dev.yml(hot-reload + source bind mount) +docker-compose.local-dev.yml(LOCAL_DEV_MODE overlay). - Seeds
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPSwith a sensible default (engineers + admins onexample.com) so/profileis non-empty on first boot. - Touches an empty
.envif missing — Compose validatesenv_file:paths even for services that never start, and the local-dev overlay drops the env-file requirement for the services that do.
make local-dev-down stops the stack; make local-dev-logs tails it.
What LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1 actually bypasses
The local-dev overlay sets LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1, which flips four switches:
- Auth bypass.
app/auth/dependencies.py::get_current_usershort-circuits to a seeded admin user (dev@localhostby default; override viaLOCAL_DEV_USER_EMAIL) before any token check runs. Every protected route — REST and HTML — auto-authenticates. - Magic-link emails skip SMTP. When the email-link auth provider is exercised in dev, the link is logged to stderr and returned in the response body instead of sent over wire. No mail server, no inbox.
- Secrets self-seed.
JWT_SECRET_KEYandSESSION_SECRETauto-generate into/data/state/on first boot if not provided. You don't need to manage them manually. - No
.envrequirement. The overlay declaresenv_file: []on the affected services, so the project-level.envdoesn't need to exist. Everything dev-relevant is inline indocker-compose.local-dev.yml.
A loud warning banner is logged at startup when LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1:
============================================================
LOCAL_DEV_MODE is ON — authentication is bypassed.
All requests auto-authenticate as: dev@localhost
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS: mocking 2 group(s) into session: local-dev-engineers@example.com, local-dev-admins@example.com
NEVER enable this in a deployment reachable from the internet.
============================================================
If you don't see that banner at boot, dev mode isn't on — check LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1 made it into the container's env.
Mocking Google Workspace groups
/profile and any future group-aware code path read session.google_groups. In production that field gets populated by the OAuth callback (app/auth/providers/google.py) from a Cloud Identity searchTransitiveGroups call. In dev there's no OAuth round-trip, so the field stays empty unless we mock it.
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS is a JSON array of objects matching the production shape:
export LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS='[{"id":"engineers@example.com","name":"Engineering"},{"id":"admins@example.com","name":"Admins"}]'
The values flow into session.google_groups on every dev-bypass request, so group-aware code sees something realistic. Same {id, name} shape the OAuth callback writes.
How make local-dev seeds it
scripts/run-local-dev.sh sets a default if you haven't already (engineers + admins on example.com), so first-boot is non-empty. Three ways to control it:
make local-dev # default mock — engineers + admins
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS='[{"id":"qa@x.com","name":"QA"}]' make local-dev # custom mock
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS= make local-dev # empty — exercise the no-groups path
Verifying the mock
Two checks:
-
Boot banner logs the parsed group IDs (or warns loudly if the JSON is malformed):
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS: mocking 2 group(s) into session: local-dev-engineers@example.com, local-dev-admins@example.comA typo (e.g. unbalanced bracket) shows up here — not silently on the first authenticated request.
-
/profilerenders the mocked groups in a list. If you setLOCAL_DEV_GROUPS=(empty), you'll see "No Google groups available".
Edge case: clearing stale groups mid-session
If you previously had LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS set, then unset it and made a request, the dev-bypass path now writes [] into the session — same semantics as the production OAuth callback, which always rewrites session.google_groups on each login. You won't get stuck looking at stale mocked groups after toggling the env var.
What's NOT mocked
LOCAL_DEV_MODE is intentionally narrow. These still need real configuration if you exercise them:
- Cloud Identity API. No real call ever fires in dev.
LOCAL_DEV_GROUPSpopulatessession.google_groupsdirectly without going through_fetch_google_groups. To debug the actual API call, usescripts/debug/probe_google_groups.pyagainst a real OAuth token. - Real OAuth round-trip. Google login button is hidden / no-op in dev mode. To test the full OAuth flow, follow
docs/auth-google-oauth.mdand unsetLOCAL_DEV_MODE. - Admin Workspace permissions. The mocked groups are not authoritative — they live only in your browser session. They don't grant any real access to anything outside Agnes; they let you exercise group-aware code paths inside the app.
- PAT (Personal Access Token) flow. PATs work normally in dev mode; the dev bypass only short-circuits cookie/session auth. Token-bearer requests still hit the JWT validation path.
Security model
LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1 is a footgun by design — every protected route auto-authenticates as admin without any check. The codebase has these rails to keep it from leaking into prod:
docker-compose.local-dev.ymlis a separate overlay, never stacked intodocker-compose.prod.yml. Production deployments never see it.- The startup banner is loud and unmissable —
WARNINGlevel, repeated 60-character separator. Anyone reading container logs at startup will spot it immediately. is_local_dev_mode()readsos.environfresh on every call — no startup-time cache that could be poisoned.LOCAL_DEV_GROUPSis honored only inside theif is_local_dev_mode():block inget_current_user. Setting it withoutLOCAL_DEV_MODE=1does nothing.
If you ever see the dev banner in a real deployment's logs, treat it as a P0 incident: the auth boundary is gone.
Cross-links
docs/auth-groups.md— production Google Workspace groups: GCP setup checklist, thesecuritylabel gotcha, debugging the real Cloud Identity call.docs/auth-google-oauth.md— full Google OAuth setup for non-dev environments (client ID, scopes, redirect URIs).docs/QUICKSTART.md— first-time setup for a real (non-dev) instance.CLAUDE.md— repo-wide engineering conventions (changelog discipline, vendor-agnostic OSS rules, project structure).