* fix(security): gate Script-API /run on admin role (#44) The AST + string-blocklist sandbox in `_execute_script` is defense-in-depth, not a primary trust boundary. It does not block `vars()`, `type()`, or `__class__.__bases__` introspection chains, and the string blocklist is trivially evadable via concatenation/dunder encoding. Treat the role gate as the actual barrier: only admin can run scripts. - `POST /api/scripts/run` and `POST /api/scripts/{id}/run` now require admin. - `POST /api/scripts/deploy` stays analyst-accessible (storing != executing). - Existing /run tests retargeted to admin_token; added regression tests asserting analyst → 403 on both endpoints. - CHANGELOG: BREAKING (security) bullet under Unreleased/Changed. Closes #44. * fix(security): admin-gate /deploy + harden sandbox blocklist (review #92) Reviewer of PR #92 flagged three MUST-FIXes that #44 wasn't fully closed: 1. /api/scripts/deploy still accepted analyst → planted-script attack path (analyst plants malicious source, waits for admin to /run). Now: /deploy also requires admin; the entire Script API is admin-only. 2. The "Minimum (same-day)" blocklist mitigations from issue #44 weren't applied. Added the introspection-chain dunders that the issue PoC pivots through: __subclasses__, __globals__, __class__, __base__, __bases__, __mro__, __dict__, __code__, __builtins__. Plus `vars` in BLOCKED_FUNCTIONS. Deliberately NOT adding __init__ / __getattribute__ (substring match would flag every legit `def __init__`) nor `type`/`dir` (frequent in legitimate admin scripts). Documented the trade-off inline. 3. Tests didn't cover the actual PoC payload nor non-analyst non-admin roles. Added test_run_pwn_payload_blocked parametrized over the issue's own PoC + two equivalent variants (lambda+__globals__, __mro__ traversal); these stay green only as long as the dunder list does. test_*_requires_admin tests now parametrize over (analyst, viewer, km_admin) so all three non-admin core roles are pinned at 403. Conftest extension: seeded_app now exposes viewer_token and km_admin_token as siblings to admin_token / analyst_token. CHANGELOG bullet updated to reflect /deploy gate change and new internal regression tests. 35/35 scripts tests pass locally. Refs review of #92. * fix(tests): test_security TestScriptSandbox needs admin token after #44 hardening CI failure on PR #92 caught a missed test file. tests/test_security.py seeded only an analyst user and used the analyst token to drive sandbox tests. After the #44 admin-gate (deploy + run both admin-only), every sandbox test got 403 from the role gate before the AST/string check could run, so 'blocks os.system' / 'blocks eval' / etc. all failed. Fix: extend the fixture to also seed an admin user and return the admin token. Sandbox tests now reach the sandbox layer; access-control tests further down in the module continue to use the analyst that was kept around. 41/41 test_security.py tests pass locally. * fix(security): #92 round-3 — gate GET /api/scripts on admin role Devin Review caught: GET /api/scripts (app/api/scripts.py:44-51) was left on Depends(get_current_user) when the rest of the API moved to admin-only. ScriptRepository.list_all() does SELECT * FROM script_registry which returns ALL columns including 'source' (the full script body). So any authenticated user (viewer / analyst / km_admin) could read admin-deployed scripts — leak of code that may contain credentials, business logic, or admin-only operational details. CHANGELOG already says 'The entire Script API is now admin-only', which was true for /deploy, /run, /{id}/run, DELETE — just not for GET. Now consistent: every Script endpoint requires admin. Tests: - New parametrized test_list_scripts_requires_admin over (analyst, viewer, km_admin) tokens — all assert 403. - Updated test_list_scripts_empty in both test_scripts_api.py and test_api_scripts.py to use admin_token. 79 tests pass. Refs Devin Review of #92. * fix: cleanup unused imports, stale docstrings, and incomplete CHANGELOG - Remove unused imports: Path, List, get_current_user (ruff F401) - Trim docstrings to describe current behavior, not change history - CHANGELOG now lists GET /api/scripts among admin-gated endpoints - Remove diff-commenting inline comments from tests Co-Authored-By: zdenek.srotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com> * fix: merge duplicate Changed sections into one per CLAUDE.md convention Co-Authored-By: zdenek.srotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
125 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
125 lines
4.5 KiB
Python
"""Tests for scripts and settings API endpoints."""
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import os
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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@pytest.fixture
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def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path))
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monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-secret-32chars-minimum!!!!!")
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monkeypatch.setenv("SCRIPT_TIMEOUT", "10")
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from app.main import create_app
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.sync_settings import DatasetPermissionRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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conn = get_system_db()
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user_repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user_repo.create(id="admin1", email="admin@acme.com", name="Admin", role="admin")
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user_repo.create(id="analyst1", email="analyst@acme.com", name="Analyst", role="analyst")
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perm_repo = DatasetPermissionRepository(conn)
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perm_repo.grant("analyst1", "sales", "read")
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perm_repo.grant("analyst1", "support", "read")
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conn.close()
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app = create_app()
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test_client = TestClient(app)
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admin_token = create_access_token("admin1", "admin@acme.com", "admin")
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analyst_token = create_access_token("analyst1", "analyst@acme.com", "analyst")
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return test_client, admin_token, analyst_token
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class TestScriptsAPI:
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def test_list_scripts_empty(self, client):
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"})
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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assert resp.json()["count"] == 0
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def test_deploy_and_list(self, client):
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
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resp = c.post("/api/scripts/deploy", json={
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"name": "hello", "source": "print('hello world')",
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}, headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 201
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script_id = resp.json()["id"]
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resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers=headers)
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assert resp.json()["count"] == 1
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def test_run_script(self, client):
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
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resp = c.post("/api/scripts/run", json={
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"source": "print('hello from script')", "name": "test",
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}, headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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data = resp.json()
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assert data["exit_code"] == 0
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assert "hello from script" in data["stdout"]
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def test_run_blocked_import(self, client):
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
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resp = c.post("/api/scripts/run", json={
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"source": "import subprocess; subprocess.run(['ls'])", "name": "bad",
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}, headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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detail = resp.json()["detail"]
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assert "disallowed" in detail or "Blocked" in detail
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def test_deploy_run_undeploy(self, client):
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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admin_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
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resp = c.post("/api/scripts/deploy", json={
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"name": "calc", "source": "print(2+2)", "schedule": "0 8 * * MON",
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}, headers=admin_headers)
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script_id = resp.json()["id"]
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resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=admin_headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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assert "4" in resp.json()["stdout"]
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# Undeploy (requires admin)
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resp = c.delete(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}", headers=admin_headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 204
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class TestSettingsAPI:
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def test_get_settings(self, client):
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c, _, analyst_token = client
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resp = c.get("/api/settings", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"})
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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data = resp.json()
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assert data["user_id"] == "analyst1"
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assert len(data["permissions"]) == 2
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def test_enable_dataset(self, client):
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c, _, analyst_token = client
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
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resp = c.put("/api/settings/dataset", json={
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"dataset": "sales", "enabled": True,
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}, headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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assert resp.json()["enabled"] is True
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def test_enable_unauthorized_dataset(self, client):
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c, _, analyst_token = client
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
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resp = c.put("/api/settings/dataset", json={
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"dataset": "hr_secret", "enabled": True,
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}, headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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