* fix(security): gate Script-API /run on admin role (#44) The AST + string-blocklist sandbox in `_execute_script` is defense-in-depth, not a primary trust boundary. It does not block `vars()`, `type()`, or `__class__.__bases__` introspection chains, and the string blocklist is trivially evadable via concatenation/dunder encoding. Treat the role gate as the actual barrier: only admin can run scripts. - `POST /api/scripts/run` and `POST /api/scripts/{id}/run` now require admin. - `POST /api/scripts/deploy` stays analyst-accessible (storing != executing). - Existing /run tests retargeted to admin_token; added regression tests asserting analyst → 403 on both endpoints. - CHANGELOG: BREAKING (security) bullet under Unreleased/Changed. Closes #44. * fix(security): admin-gate /deploy + harden sandbox blocklist (review #92) Reviewer of PR #92 flagged three MUST-FIXes that #44 wasn't fully closed: 1. /api/scripts/deploy still accepted analyst → planted-script attack path (analyst plants malicious source, waits for admin to /run). Now: /deploy also requires admin; the entire Script API is admin-only. 2. The "Minimum (same-day)" blocklist mitigations from issue #44 weren't applied. Added the introspection-chain dunders that the issue PoC pivots through: __subclasses__, __globals__, __class__, __base__, __bases__, __mro__, __dict__, __code__, __builtins__. Plus `vars` in BLOCKED_FUNCTIONS. Deliberately NOT adding __init__ / __getattribute__ (substring match would flag every legit `def __init__`) nor `type`/`dir` (frequent in legitimate admin scripts). Documented the trade-off inline. 3. Tests didn't cover the actual PoC payload nor non-analyst non-admin roles. Added test_run_pwn_payload_blocked parametrized over the issue's own PoC + two equivalent variants (lambda+__globals__, __mro__ traversal); these stay green only as long as the dunder list does. test_*_requires_admin tests now parametrize over (analyst, viewer, km_admin) so all three non-admin core roles are pinned at 403. Conftest extension: seeded_app now exposes viewer_token and km_admin_token as siblings to admin_token / analyst_token. CHANGELOG bullet updated to reflect /deploy gate change and new internal regression tests. 35/35 scripts tests pass locally. Refs review of #92. * fix(tests): test_security TestScriptSandbox needs admin token after #44 hardening CI failure on PR #92 caught a missed test file. tests/test_security.py seeded only an analyst user and used the analyst token to drive sandbox tests. After the #44 admin-gate (deploy + run both admin-only), every sandbox test got 403 from the role gate before the AST/string check could run, so 'blocks os.system' / 'blocks eval' / etc. all failed. Fix: extend the fixture to also seed an admin user and return the admin token. Sandbox tests now reach the sandbox layer; access-control tests further down in the module continue to use the analyst that was kept around. 41/41 test_security.py tests pass locally. * fix(security): #92 round-3 — gate GET /api/scripts on admin role Devin Review caught: GET /api/scripts (app/api/scripts.py:44-51) was left on Depends(get_current_user) when the rest of the API moved to admin-only. ScriptRepository.list_all() does SELECT * FROM script_registry which returns ALL columns including 'source' (the full script body). So any authenticated user (viewer / analyst / km_admin) could read admin-deployed scripts — leak of code that may contain credentials, business logic, or admin-only operational details. CHANGELOG already says 'The entire Script API is now admin-only', which was true for /deploy, /run, /{id}/run, DELETE — just not for GET. Now consistent: every Script endpoint requires admin. Tests: - New parametrized test_list_scripts_requires_admin over (analyst, viewer, km_admin) tokens — all assert 403. - Updated test_list_scripts_empty in both test_scripts_api.py and test_api_scripts.py to use admin_token. 79 tests pass. Refs Devin Review of #92. * fix: cleanup unused imports, stale docstrings, and incomplete CHANGELOG - Remove unused imports: Path, List, get_current_user (ruff F401) - Trim docstrings to describe current behavior, not change history - CHANGELOG now lists GET /api/scripts among admin-gated endpoints - Remove diff-commenting inline comments from tests Co-Authored-By: zdenek.srotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com> * fix: merge duplicate Changed sections into one per CLAUDE.md convention Co-Authored-By: zdenek.srotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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ZdenekSrotyr
GitHub
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commit
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6 changed files with 224 additions and 97 deletions
121
CHANGELOG.md
121
CHANGELOG.md
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@ -13,6 +13,65 @@ CalVer image tags (`stable-YYYY.MM.N`, `dev-YYYY.MM.N`) are produced for every C
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<!-- Add bullets here. Group: Added / Changed / Fixed / Removed / Internal.
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Mark breaking changes with **BREAKING** at the start of the bullet. -->
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### Changed
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- **BREAKING (security)**: The entire Script API is now **admin-only** (issue #44).
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`GET /api/scripts`, `POST /api/scripts/deploy`, `POST /api/scripts/run`, and
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`POST /api/scripts/{id}/run` all require the admin role; previously the list
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endpoint was open to any authenticated user and deploy/run were analyst-accessible.
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Two reasons: (1) the AST + string-blocklist sandbox in `_execute_script` is
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defense-in-depth and known to be bypassable through introspection chains
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(`__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()`, `__globals__['__builtins__']`,
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`__mro__` traversal — the dunder pattern list was tightened in this PR but
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the policy is "the role gate is the trust boundary, not the blocklist");
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(2) gating only `/run` left a planted-script attack open — an analyst could
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deploy a malicious script and wait for an admin to run it. Operators who
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need scripted workflows for non-admin users should run them on the user's
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behalf or expose the relevant data via the read-only `/api/data` surface
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instead.
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- **BREAKING (ops)**: Generic ops scripts moved out of the customer-named
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`scripts/grpn/` directory into `scripts/ops/` as part of the OSS
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vendor-neutralization (issue #88):
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- `scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh` → `scripts/ops/agnes-tls-rotate.sh`
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- `scripts/grpn/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh` → `scripts/ops/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh`
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Downstream consumer infra repos that copy these scripts onto VMs (e.g. via
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their own `startup.sh`) must update the source path. The OSS-shipped
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`infra/modules/customer-instance/` Terraform module is unaffected — it
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embeds equivalent logic inline via heredoc and does not source-by-path
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from `scripts/`. Script behaviour and env vars are unchanged. Cross-refs
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in `README.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md`, `Caddyfile`, and
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`docker-compose.yml` were updated.
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- **OSS neutralization (wave 2 — code, tests, planning docs)**. Customer
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identifiers replaced with placeholders across the codebase to ready the
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repo for public release (issue #88):
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- **Code docstrings**: `connectors/openmetadata/{client,transformer,enricher}.py`,
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`src/catalog_export.py`, `scripts/duckdb_manager.py` — `prj-grp-…` →
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`my-bq-project` / `prj-example-1234`, `AIAgent.FoundryAI` →
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`AIAgent.MyAgent` (in docstrings) / `AIAgent.Example` (in test fixtures),
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`FoundryAIDataModel` → `AnalyticsDataModel`.
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- **Test fixtures** in `tests/test_openmetadata_enricher.py`,
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`tests/test_duckdb_manager.py`, `tests/test_catalog_export.py`,
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`tests/test_openmetadata_transformer.py` — same set of replacements,
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behaviour-preserving (157 tests still green).
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- **Terraform module** `infra/modules/customer-instance/variables.tf`:
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`customer_name` description rewritten in English, examples switched
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from `keboola, grpn` to `acme, example`.
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- **Workflow** `.github/workflows/keboola-deploy.yml`: comment "Groupon-side
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dev VMs" → generic "per-developer dev VMs".
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- **Caddyfile**: TLS-rotation cross-ref updated to `scripts/ops/…` and
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Keboola-specific aside removed.
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- **Auth docs** `docs/auth-groups.md` and the OAuth probe in
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`scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py`: GCP project name `kids-ai-data-analysis`
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replaced with placeholder `acme-internal-prod`.
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- **Planning docs** under `docs/superpowers/plans/` and `…/specs/`: the
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five hackathon-era documents (`2026-04-21-deployment-log.md`,
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`…-multi-customer-deployment.md`, `…-issues-14-and-10.md`,
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`…-hackathon-dry-run.md`, the spec) had `34.77.94.14` / `34.77.102.61`
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replaced with `<dev-vm-ip>` / `<prod-vm-ip>`, `Groupon`/`GRPN`/`grpn`
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with `Acme`/`another-customer`, and `prj-grp-…` with `prj-example-…`.
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### Fixed
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- **BREAKING (security CRITICAL)**: Jira webhook handler is now
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@ -46,52 +105,6 @@ CalVer image tags (`stable-YYYY.MM.N`, `dev-YYYY.MM.N`) are produced for every C
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clips length to 64 chars, and routes the final filename through
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`safe_join_under`.
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### Changed
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- **BREAKING (ops)**: Generic ops scripts moved out of the customer-named
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`scripts/grpn/` directory into `scripts/ops/` as part of the OSS
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vendor-neutralization (issue #88):
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- `scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh` → `scripts/ops/agnes-tls-rotate.sh`
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- `scripts/grpn/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh` → `scripts/ops/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh`
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Downstream consumer infra repos that copy these scripts onto VMs (e.g. via
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their own `startup.sh`) must update the source path. The OSS-shipped
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`infra/modules/customer-instance/` Terraform module is unaffected — it
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embeds equivalent logic inline via heredoc and does not source-by-path
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from `scripts/`. Script behaviour and env vars are unchanged. Cross-refs
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in `README.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md`, `Caddyfile`, and
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`docker-compose.yml` were updated.
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- **OSS neutralization (wave 2 — code, tests, planning docs)**. Customer
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identifiers replaced with placeholders across the codebase to ready the
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repo for public release (issue #88):
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- **Code docstrings**: `connectors/openmetadata/{client,transformer,enricher}.py`,
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`src/catalog_export.py`, `scripts/duckdb_manager.py` — `prj-grp-…` →
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`my-bq-project` / `prj-example-1234`, `AIAgent.FoundryAI` →
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`AIAgent.MyAgent` (in docstrings) / `AIAgent.Example` (in test fixtures),
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`FoundryAIDataModel` → `AnalyticsDataModel`.
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- **Test fixtures** in `tests/test_openmetadata_enricher.py`,
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`tests/test_duckdb_manager.py`, `tests/test_catalog_export.py`,
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`tests/test_openmetadata_transformer.py` — same set of replacements,
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behaviour-preserving (157 tests still green).
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- **Terraform module** `infra/modules/customer-instance/variables.tf`:
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`customer_name` description rewritten in English, examples switched
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from `keboola, grpn` to `acme, example`.
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- **Workflow** `.github/workflows/keboola-deploy.yml`: comment "Groupon-side
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dev VMs" → generic "per-developer dev VMs".
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- **Caddyfile**: TLS-rotation cross-ref updated to `scripts/ops/…` and
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Keboola-specific aside removed.
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- **Auth docs** `docs/auth-groups.md` and the OAuth probe in
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`scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py`: GCP project name `kids-ai-data-analysis`
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replaced with placeholder `acme-internal-prod`.
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- **Planning docs** under `docs/superpowers/plans/` and `…/specs/`: the
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five hackathon-era documents (`2026-04-21-deployment-log.md`,
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`…-multi-customer-deployment.md`, `…-issues-14-and-10.md`,
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`…-hackathon-dry-run.md`, the spec) had `34.77.94.14` / `34.77.102.61`
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replaced with `<dev-vm-ip>` / `<prod-vm-ip>`, `Groupon`/`GRPN`/`grpn`
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with `Acme`/`another-customer`, and `prj-grp-…` with `prj-example-…`.
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### Removed
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- Customer-specific manual-deploy helper `scripts/grpn/Makefile` and its
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@ -105,6 +118,22 @@ CalVer image tags (`stable-YYYY.MM.N`, `dev-YYYY.MM.N`) are produced for every C
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`gcloud compute ssh <vm> --command "sed -i …/.env && sudo /usr/local/bin/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh"`
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with their own VM details.
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### Internal
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- Sandbox blocklist now flags introspection-chain dunders explicitly:
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`__subclasses__`, `__globals__`, `__class__`, `__base__`, `__bases__`,
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`__mro__`, `__dict__`, `__code__`, `__builtins__`. `__init__` and
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`__getattribute__` are intentionally **not** in the list — substring match
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would flag every legitimate `def __init__(self):`. The chain breaks at
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the next link anyway.
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- New regression test `test_run_pwn_payload_blocked` parametrized over the
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exact PoC from issue #44 plus two equivalent variants (lambda+`__globals__`,
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`__mro__` traversal). If the dunder list is silently weakened in a future
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refactor, the test fails. New `test_*_requires_admin` tests parametrized
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over all three non-admin core roles (analyst, viewer, km_admin).
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- `tests/conftest.py::seeded_app` extended with `viewer_token` and
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`km_admin_token` so role-gating tests cover all four core roles.
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## [0.11.5] — 2026-04-27
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Follow-up release for PR #73: addresses four rounds of Devin AI review on the role-management-complete branch. No new public-API surface; the user-visible payoff is that v8→v9-migrated installations now work end-to-end (login flows, user list, admin nav, privilege revocation), and `make local-dev` startup is finally quiet.
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@ -5,15 +5,13 @@ import subprocess
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import uuid
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from pathlib import Path
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from typing import Optional, List
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from typing import Optional
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import duckdb
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from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user, require_role, _get_db
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from app.auth.dependencies import require_role, _get_db
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from src.rbac import Role
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from src.repositories.notifications import ScriptRepository
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@ -43,9 +41,10 @@ class ScriptResponse(BaseModel):
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@router.get("")
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async def list_scripts(
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user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ADMIN)),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""List deployed scripts. Admin-only."""
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repo = ScriptRepository(conn)
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scripts = repo.list_all()
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return {"scripts": scripts, "count": len(scripts)}
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@ -54,10 +53,10 @@ async def list_scripts(
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@router.post("/deploy", status_code=201)
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async def deploy_script(
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request: DeployScriptRequest,
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ANALYST)),
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ADMIN)),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Deploy a Python script to be run on the server (optionally on schedule)."""
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"""Deploy a Python script to be run on the server (optionally on schedule). Admin-only."""
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repo = ScriptRepository(conn)
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script_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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repo.deploy(
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@ -76,10 +75,10 @@ async def deploy_script(
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@router.post("/{script_id}/run")
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async def run_deployed_script(
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script_id: str,
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ANALYST)),
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ADMIN)),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Run a deployed script by ID."""
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"""Run a deployed script by ID. Admin-only."""
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repo = ScriptRepository(conn)
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script = repo.get(script_id)
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if not script:
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@ -90,9 +89,9 @@ async def run_deployed_script(
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@router.post("/run")
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async def run_adhoc_script(
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request: RunScriptRequest,
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ANALYST)),
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user: dict = Depends(require_role(Role.ADMIN)),
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):
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"""Run an ad-hoc Python script (not deployed)."""
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"""Run an ad-hoc Python script (not deployed). Admin-only."""
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if not request.source:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Script source required")
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return _execute_script(request.source, request.name or "adhoc")
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@ -111,7 +110,11 @@ async def undeploy_script(
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def _execute_script(source: str, name: str) -> dict:
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"""Execute a Python script in a sandboxed subprocess."""
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"""Execute a Python script in a sandboxed subprocess.
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The blocklist below is defense-in-depth, not a primary trust boundary.
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The role gate on the route (admin-only) is the actual boundary; the
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blocklist catches obvious mistakes, not a hostile admin."""
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# Comprehensive safety checks — block dangerous patterns
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blocked_patterns = [
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# Direct imports of dangerous modules
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@ -145,13 +148,26 @@ def _execute_script(source: str, name: str) -> dict:
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"setattr(",
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"delattr(",
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"breakpoint(",
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# Introspection-chain dunders that can pivot to RCE.
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# `__init__`/`__getattribute__` deliberately omitted: substring
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# match would flag every `def __init__(self):`.
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"__subclasses__",
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"__globals__",
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"__class__",
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"__base__",
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"__bases__",
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"__mro__",
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"__dict__",
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"__code__",
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"__builtins__",
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]
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import ast
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BLOCKED_MODULES = {"os", "sys", "subprocess", "shutil", "ctypes", "importlib", "socket",
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"requests", "httpx", "urllib", "http", "signal", "pathlib", "builtins"}
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BLOCKED_FUNCTIONS = {"exec", "eval", "compile", "open", "globals", "locals",
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"getattr", "setattr", "delattr", "breakpoint", "__import__"}
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"getattr", "setattr", "delattr", "breakpoint", "__import__",
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"vars"}
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try:
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tree = ast.parse(source)
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@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ def write_test_parquet(path: str, data: list[dict]):
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@pytest.fixture
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def seeded_app(e2e_env):
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"""FastAPI TestClient with seeded admin + analyst users, JWT tokens."""
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"""FastAPI TestClient with all four core role tokens (admin, km_admin,
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analyst, viewer). Use the role-specific token in role-gating tests."""
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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@ -115,18 +116,24 @@ def seeded_app(e2e_env):
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conn = get_system_db()
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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repo.create(id="admin1", email="admin@test.com", name="Admin", role="admin")
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repo.create(id="km_admin1", email="km@test.com", name="KM Admin", role="km_admin")
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repo.create(id="analyst1", email="analyst@test.com", name="Analyst", role="analyst")
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repo.create(id="viewer1", email="viewer@test.com", name="Viewer", role="viewer")
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conn.close()
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app = create_app()
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client = TestClient(app)
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admin_token = create_access_token("admin1", "admin@test.com", "admin")
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km_admin_token = create_access_token("km_admin1", "km@test.com", "km_admin")
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analyst_token = create_access_token("analyst1", "analyst@test.com", "analyst")
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viewer_token = create_access_token("viewer1", "viewer@test.com", "viewer")
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return {
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"client": client,
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"admin_token": admin_token,
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"km_admin_token": km_admin_token,
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"analyst_token": analyst_token,
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"viewer_token": viewer_token,
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"env": e2e_env,
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}
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@ -37,14 +37,14 @@ def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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class TestScriptsAPI:
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def test_list_scripts_empty(self, client):
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c, _, analyst_token = client
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resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"})
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c, admin_token, _ = client
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resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"})
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assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert resp.json()["count"] == 0
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deploy_and_list(self, client):
|
||||
c, _, analyst_token = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
|
||||
c, admin_token, _ = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
|
||||
|
||||
resp = c.post("/api/scripts/deploy", json={
|
||||
"name": "hello", "source": "print('hello world')",
|
||||
|
|
@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ class TestScriptsAPI:
|
|||
assert resp.json()["count"] == 1
|
||||
|
||||
def test_run_script(self, client):
|
||||
c, _, analyst_token = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
|
||||
c, admin_token, _ = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
|
||||
|
||||
resp = c.post("/api/scripts/run", json={
|
||||
"source": "print('hello from script')", "name": "test",
|
||||
|
|
@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ class TestScriptsAPI:
|
|||
assert "hello from script" in data["stdout"]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_run_blocked_import(self, client):
|
||||
c, _, analyst_token = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
|
||||
c, admin_token, _ = client
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
|
||||
|
||||
resp = c.post("/api/scripts/run", json={
|
||||
"source": "import subprocess; subprocess.run(['ls'])", "name": "bad",
|
||||
|
|
@ -79,18 +79,15 @@ class TestScriptsAPI:
|
|||
assert "disallowed" in detail or "Blocked" in detail
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deploy_run_undeploy(self, client):
|
||||
c, admin_token, analyst_token = client
|
||||
analyst_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_token}"}
|
||||
c, admin_token, _ = client
|
||||
admin_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
|
||||
|
||||
# Deploy
|
||||
resp = c.post("/api/scripts/deploy", json={
|
||||
"name": "calc", "source": "print(2+2)", "schedule": "0 8 * * MON",
|
||||
}, headers=analyst_headers)
|
||||
}, headers=admin_headers)
|
||||
script_id = resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Run
|
||||
resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=analyst_headers)
|
||||
resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=admin_headers)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert "4" in resp.json()["stdout"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,11 +22,22 @@ class TestScriptsList:
|
|||
resp = c.get("/api/scripts")
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role_token", ["analyst_token", "viewer_token", "km_admin_token"])
|
||||
def test_list_scripts_requires_admin(self, seeded_app, role_token):
|
||||
"""Non-admin roles must not reach list_all() (returns source code)."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
resp = c.get(
|
||||
"/api/scripts", headers=_auth(seeded_app[role_token])
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 403, (
|
||||
f"role {role_token} should be denied list, got {resp.status_code}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestScriptsDeploy:
|
||||
def test_deploy_safe_script(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "hello", "source": "print('hello world')"},
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,7 +50,7 @@ class TestScriptsDeploy:
|
|||
|
||||
def test_deploy_with_schedule(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "scheduled", "source": "print('scheduled')", "schedule": "0 8 * * MON"},
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,18 +63,16 @@ class TestScriptsDeploy:
|
|||
def test_deploy_script_with_blocked_import_deploys_ok_but_run_fails(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
"""Deploy stores scripts as-is; safety validation happens at run time, not deploy time."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
# Deploy succeeds (no pre-validation at deploy time)
|
||||
admin_token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
deploy_resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "bad_import", "source": "import os; print(os.getcwd())"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(token),
|
||||
headers=_auth(admin_token),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert deploy_resp.status_code == 201
|
||||
script_id = deploy_resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Running it should fail with 400 due to blocked import
|
||||
run_resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=_auth(token))
|
||||
run_resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=_auth(admin_token))
|
||||
assert run_resp.status_code == 400
|
||||
assert "Blocked" in run_resp.json()["detail"] or "disallowed" in run_resp.json()["detail"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -75,15 +84,28 @@ class TestScriptsDeploy:
|
|||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role_token", ["analyst_token", "viewer_token", "km_admin_token"])
|
||||
def test_deploy_requires_admin(self, seeded_app, role_token):
|
||||
"""Only admin can deploy scripts."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "blocked", "source": "print('x')"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(seeded_app[role_token]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 403, (
|
||||
f"role {role_token} should be denied deploy, got {resp.status_code}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deploy_appears_in_list(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
admin_token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "listed_script", "source": "x = 1"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(token),
|
||||
headers=_auth(admin_token),
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers=_auth(token))
|
||||
resp = c.get("/api/scripts", headers=_auth(admin_token))
|
||||
assert resp.json()["count"] >= 1
|
||||
names = [s["name"] for s in resp.json()["scripts"]]
|
||||
assert "listed_script" in names
|
||||
|
|
@ -92,7 +114,7 @@ class TestScriptsDeploy:
|
|||
class TestScriptsRun:
|
||||
def test_run_adhoc_safe_script(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/run",
|
||||
json={"source": "print('hello from adhoc')", "name": "adhoc_test"},
|
||||
|
|
@ -105,7 +127,7 @@ class TestScriptsRun:
|
|||
|
||||
def test_run_adhoc_blocked_os_module(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/run",
|
||||
json={"source": "import sys; print(sys.path)", "name": "bad"},
|
||||
|
|
@ -121,9 +143,50 @@ class TestScriptsRun:
|
|||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role_token", ["analyst_token", "viewer_token", "km_admin_token"])
|
||||
def test_run_adhoc_requires_admin(self, seeded_app, role_token):
|
||||
"""Only admin can run ad-hoc scripts."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/run",
|
||||
json={"source": "print('x')", "name": "should_be_blocked"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(seeded_app[role_token]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 403, (
|
||||
f"role {role_token} should be denied /run, got {resp.status_code}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||||
"pwn_payload",
|
||||
[
|
||||
# Exact PoC from issue #44 — pivot through __class__ chain to
|
||||
# subprocess.Popen. After the role gate is in place, this returns
|
||||
# 403 (admin-only). If the gate is ever lowered, the blocklist
|
||||
# must catch the dunder pattern and return 400 — never 200.
|
||||
"[c for c in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() "
|
||||
"if c.__name__ == 'Popen'][0](['id'], stdout=-1).communicate()",
|
||||
# Variant: reach __builtins__ via frame globals.
|
||||
"(lambda: None).__globals__['__builtins__'].__import__('os').system('id')",
|
||||
# Variant: __mro__ traversal.
|
||||
"type(()).__mro__[-1].__subclasses__()",
|
||||
],
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_run_pwn_payload_blocked(self, seeded_app, pwn_payload):
|
||||
"""Dunder-chain PoC payloads must be rejected by the sandbox blocklist."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/run",
|
||||
json={"source": pwn_payload, "name": "pwn"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(seeded_app["admin_token"]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 400, (
|
||||
f"PoC payload {pwn_payload!r} should be blocked at sandbox layer, "
|
||||
f"got {resp.status_code} body={resp.json()}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_run_adhoc_no_source_returns_400(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/run",
|
||||
json={"name": "no_source"},
|
||||
|
|
@ -133,24 +196,38 @@ class TestScriptsRun:
|
|||
|
||||
def test_run_deployed_script(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
# Deploy first
|
||||
admin_token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
deploy_resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "calc", "source": "print(2+2)"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(token),
|
||||
headers=_auth(admin_token),
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert deploy_resp.status_code == 201
|
||||
script_id = deploy_resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Run deployed script
|
||||
resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=_auth(token))
|
||||
resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=_auth(admin_token))
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert "4" in resp.json()["stdout"]
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.mark.parametrize("role_token", ["analyst_token", "viewer_token", "km_admin_token"])
|
||||
def test_run_deployed_requires_admin(self, seeded_app, role_token):
|
||||
"""Only admin can run a deployed script."""
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
admin_token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
deploy_resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "blocked_run", "source": "print('hi')"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(admin_token),
|
||||
)
|
||||
script_id = deploy_resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
resp = c.post(f"/api/scripts/{script_id}/run", headers=_auth(seeded_app[role_token]))
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 403, (
|
||||
f"role {role_token} should be denied /run, got {resp.status_code}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_run_nonexistent_script_returns_404(self, seeded_app):
|
||||
c = seeded_app["client"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
resp = c.post("/api/scripts/nonexistent-id/run", headers=_auth(token))
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 404
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -162,11 +239,10 @@ class TestScriptsDelete:
|
|||
admin_token = seeded_app["admin_token"]
|
||||
analyst_token = seeded_app["analyst_token"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Deploy as analyst
|
||||
deploy_resp = c.post(
|
||||
"/api/scripts/deploy",
|
||||
json={"name": "to_delete", "source": "print('bye')"},
|
||||
headers=_auth(analyst_token),
|
||||
headers=_auth(admin_token),
|
||||
)
|
||||
script_id = deploy_resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ def client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|||
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
|
||||
|
||||
conn = get_system_db()
|
||||
UserRepository(conn).create(id="u1", email="user@test.com", name="User", role="analyst")
|
||||
repo = UserRepository(conn)
|
||||
repo.create(id="admin1", email="admin@test.com", name="Admin", role="admin")
|
||||
repo.create(id="u1", email="user@test.com", name="User", role="analyst")
|
||||
conn.close()
|
||||
|
||||
app = create_app()
|
||||
c = TestClient(app)
|
||||
token = create_access_token("u1", "user@test.com", "analyst")
|
||||
token = create_access_token("admin1", "admin@test.com", "admin")
|
||||
return c, token
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue