agnes-the-ai-analyst/tests/test_audit_gap_phase_e.py
ZdenekSrotyr b4d3c576af
Activity Center: audit log + telemetry + sessions + agnes_* tables (#278)
* docs(spec): admin observability spec + Activity Center MVP plan

Parent spec (480 lines) + executable plan (2295 lines, 14 TDD tasks).
Covers Activity Center rebuild (/admin/activity), with /admin/sessions
and /admin/feedback deferred to follow-up plans.

Already incorporates reviewer-pass revisions across three angles
(security, production resilience, code architecture):
- _get_db import path corrected to app.auth.dependencies
- Test fixtures aligned with seeded_app / admin_user / get_system_db
- All new audit writes wrapped in try/except + logger.exception
- Filename sanitization on session uploads
- DuckDB DESC index behavior documented; upgrade window flagged
- Migration idempotency + evolved-DB test cases
- reveal_raw + shared-cache multi-worker explicitly deferred

Targets schema v40 (audit_log gains params_before, client_ip,
client_kind, correlation_id + 3 indices).

* feat(db): schema v40 — audit_log gains params_before, client_ip, client_kind, correlation_id + 3 indices

* chore(test): clean up Task 1 — drop unused import, rename stale test

* feat(audit): AuditRepository.log() accepts params_before/client_ip/client_kind/correlation_id

* test(audit): strengthen params_before assertion to round-trip JSON content

* feat(audit): AuditRepository.query() rich filters + keyset cursor pagination

* feat(sync): SyncStateRepository.list_recent() cross-table feed

* feat(audit): POST /api/sync/trigger writes audit_log row

* feat(audit): POST /api/scripts/run-due writes audit_log row

* feat(audit): POST /api/upload/sessions writes audit_log row + sanitizes filename

* feat(audit): GET /api/data/{table_id}/download writes audit_log row

* feat(activity): /api/admin/activity timeline + /health + /sync endpoints

* feat(ui): /admin/activity rebuilt — health pulse, timeline, sync grid; /activity-center → 308 redirect

BREAKING: removed demo executive-pulse / maturity-roadmap content from activity_center.html.
The page now reflects real audit_log + sync_history data.

* feat(ui): admin nav + dashboard widget point at /admin/activity

* feat(activity): recursive-audit suppression for AC read endpoints (60s window per actor+filter)

* feat(activity): emit PostHog events when integration enabled (no-op default)

* fix(audit): move v40 indices out of _SYSTEM_SCHEMA + update test_repositories to unpack query() tuple

_SYSTEM_SCHEMA CREATE INDEX on audit_log(timestamp) failed when migration
tests hand-roll a bare audit_log (id, action) without the timestamp column.
Fix: remove indices from _SYSTEM_SCHEMA; add ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS guards
for timestamp and other pre-v40 columns in _v39_to_v40() so the upgrade path
is safe on any hand-rolled schema; call _v39_to_v40 explicitly in the
fresh-install (current==0) path to restore index creation there.

Also unpack the (rows, next_cursor) tuple from AuditRepository.query() in
the three TestAuditRepository tests that still treated it as a list.

* docs: CHANGELOG entry for Activity Center MVP

* chore: refresh stale module docstring in app/api/activity.py

* feat(cli): agnes admin activity — terminal access to Activity Center (timeline + health + sync)

* fix(db): _v39_to_v40 — add IF NOT EXISTS guard for 'action' column

The v39→v40 ladder step adds defensive ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS for
every audit_log column so a hand-rolled bare audit_log (id only) is
safe through the ladder. 'action' was missing from the guard list,
causing CREATE INDEX idx_audit_action_time to fail on tests that
stub audit_log with only an id column (tests/test_e2e_extract.py::
TestSchemaMigration::test_migration_preserves_and_extends).

Local 6/6 schema tests + the previously-failing CI test pass.

* docs(spec): platform telemetry epic — Boss directive + Activity Monitoring plan rebased onto v40 (stacked on zs/spec-activity-center)

* feat(db): schema v41 — 7 usage_* tables for telemetry (events, summary, rollups, attribution)

* chore(db): tighten v41 — usage_session_summary.session_id NOT NULL + upgrade test asserts all 7 tables

* feat(usage): UsageAttributionRepository — replace/delete/lookup over usage_attribution_* tables

* refactor(marketplace): extract list_inner_skills/agents/commands to src/marketplace_listing.py for reuse

* feat(usage): explode plugin attribution on marketplace sync + store entity write; backfill script

* refactor(marketplace): finish src/marketplace_listing.py extraction — drop duplicate _list_inner_* + _parse_frontmatter from app/api/marketplace.py

* feat(usage): promote attribution helpers to src/usage_attribution_helpers.py; hook update_entity rename + bundle-swap; clarify best-effort semantics

* feat(usage): UsageProcessor real extraction + rollup rebuild + 10 fixture-driven tests

* fix(usage): include tool_id in event hash + executemany + rollup transaction (critical multi-tool-turn drop fix)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(marketplace): popularity stats — invocations_30d + trend + sort=most_used|trending + Most Popular section

* feat(admin): /admin/users/<id> Sessions section — list + single-file + bulk-zip downloads (audit-logged)

* feat(usage): admin export endpoint + CLI — csv/json/parquet streaming, filters, audit-logged

* feat(usage): agnes admin ask — LLM Text-to-SQL over usage_events with SELECT-only validator (audit-logged)

* feat(usage): reprocess + prune endpoints + scheduler daily prune job + CLI

* docs: PLATFORM_SETUP.md operator playbook + HOWTO/ cookbook (5 guides + index)

Adds docs/PLATFORM_SETUP.md as a consolidated operator playbook covering
bootstrap, TLS, marketplaces (curated + flea), scheduler env vars, telemetry
extraction/export/ask/prune, privacy posture, and daily routine.

Adds docs/HOWTO/ with 5 analyst cookbook guides: first query, snapshots for
remote tables, private sessions, feedback + admin ask, and customizing skills.

Existing setup docs (QUICKSTART, DEPLOYMENT, ONBOARDING, HEADLESS_USAGE)
get a one-line cross-reference at the top pointing to PLATFORM_SETUP.md.

* docs(changelog): platform telemetry epic — usage_* foundation + surfaces + admin access + docs

Comprehensive [Unreleased] entry covering: usage_events/session_summary/
tool_daily/plugin_daily tables (v41), attribution lookup tables, backfill
script, marketplace Most Popular + invocation chips + sort, admin Sessions
section, export/ask/reprocess/prune endpoints + CLI mirrors, Activity Center
(v40), PLATFORM_SETUP.md + HOWTO/ docs, and operations notes for v41 upgrade.

* fix(security): block DuckDB read_*/http_*/glob functions in usage_ask validator + symlink escape guard in session zip + clarify mark-private semantics

* fix(admin): parquet export tempfile cleanup on COPY failure + correct processed-first sort on /admin/users/<id>/sessions

* feat(audit): close 8 production audit gaps — query (local/remote/hybrid), catalog/schema/sample, snapshot estimate/create, check-access

* feat(ui): /admin/usage summary dashboard + per-user activity tab on /admin/users/<id>

* fix(audit): cap error messages at 200 chars + audit user_activity reads + recursion guard on usage.summary

* fix(audit): catalog.list audits on error path + clean up deferred json import

* fix(ux): client_kind=cli for PAT auth + timeline empty state + email-instead-of-uuid + nav reorder + help text + loading indicators + ask doc

* feat(observability): unify /admin/activity into single page with saved views

- KPI cards (events, users, error rate, p95) clickable as quick-filters
- Faceted filter dropdowns populated from audit_log in the current window
- Sortable audit table, cursor pagination, per-row JSON side panel
- Saved views (schema v43: user_observability_views) — per-user state
- Top bar: window selector + 30s Live toggle + saved views dropdown
- /admin/scheduler-runs → 308 redirect (source=scheduler filter)
- New endpoints: /api/admin/observability/{facets,kpis,views}

* test: update activity + scheduler-runs tests for unified page

- test_admin_activity_page_renders asserts new structural anchors
- test_admin_scheduler_runs_page_admin_only asserts 308 redirect

* fix(observability): respect [hidden] on modal + side panel

CSS `display: flex` on .obs-modal beat the [hidden] attribute's UA
display:none, so the save-view modal rendered on page load and Cancel
clicks couldn't dismiss it. Gate the modal's flex layout on
:not([hidden]); add the same display:none guard prophylactically to
.obs-panel and .obs-views-panel.

* feat(observability): user enrichment in audit + interactive /admin/usage

Activity:
- /api/admin/activity now joins users for user_email + user_name per row
- User column renders "name (id-prefix)" or "email (id-prefix)" instead
  of an opaque truncated UUID; falls back to id when the user record is
  missing

Usage:
- /admin/usage rewritten as the same filter/group-by/search pattern as
  /admin/activity. Faceted dropdowns (User / Tool / Source / Event type)
  populated from usage_events; debounced free-text search across
  tool_name / skill_name / subagent_type / command_name
- New endpoints /api/admin/usage/{facets,kpis,query}; the query endpoint
  supports group_by in {day, username, tool_name, source, ref_id} with
  sort + offset pagination, plus an ungrouped raw-events mode
- 4 KPI cards (events, distinct users, distinct tools, error rate) are
  clickable quick-filters; clicking a grouped row applies the bucket as
  a filter
- Old static `?window=7d|30d|all` server preload removed; all state is
  client-side via since_minutes + group_by + filters in the URL

* fix(observability): clearer labels, all-column sort, drop saved views UI

- Rename page titles: "Activity" → "Server activity", "Usage" → "Tool usage"
  with a one-line subtitle on each explaining what the page covers and
  linking the other one. The two pages source different data (audit_log
  vs usage_events) and the previous labels conflated them.
- Drop the saved-views dropdown + save modal from /admin/activity. The
  modal pop-open bug was the trigger; the value wasn't there yet. The
  /api/admin/observability/views CRUD + DuckDB table stay in place.
- Rename "Live (30s)" to "Auto-refresh (30s)" with a tooltip clarifying
  that it's the re-fetch rate, not the time range. Time range now
  labeled "Time range" instead of "Window".
- All audit-table columns are sortable (User, Source, Action, Resource,
  Result added); sort is page-local with a Jinja comment explaining the
  trade-off. Same for raw usage rows.
- Fix duplicate sort-arrow bug — the literal "▼" in the Time th HTML was
  rendering alongside the CSS ::before arrow. Removed the literal; CSS
  is the single source of truth.

* feat(observability): global Sessions browser + transcript viewer + CLI

Web:
- /admin/sessions — list every collected session JSONL across all users
  with time-range, user, model, errors-only and free-text filters. Default
  sort surfaces error-heavy sessions first. KPI cards (sessions, distinct
  users, sessions w/ errors, tool error rate) clickable as quick-filters.
- /admin/sessions/<username>/<file> — transcript viewer rendering the
  JSONL chronologically: user prompts, assistant text, tool calls (with
  JSON input) and tool results (with flattened output). Errors get a red
  border + chip and a "Next error" navigation button at the top.
- Admin dropdown gains a "Sessions" link.

API:
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{list,kpis,facets} — filtered cross-user reads
  off usage_session_summary
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{username}/{file}/transcript — parses JSONL via
  the existing services.session_pipeline.lib, returns chronological events
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{username}/{file}/download — JSONL stream, same
  path-safety guards as the per-user endpoint, audit-logged

CLI:
- `agnes admin sessions list [--user X] [--errors] [--since 7d]` — table
  output with `!` prefix on rows that hit a tool error
- `agnes admin sessions show <username> <file>` — transcript dump, with
  `--errors` to print only the failed tool_result blocks
- `agnes admin sessions download <username> <file> [-o path]`
- `agnes admin sessions kpis` — top-level numbers

* feat(internal): expose telemetry tables to agnes query with row-level RBAC

Three new registered tables backed by system.duckdb, queryable through
the same /api/query plumbing analysts use for Keboola / BigQuery /
local sources:

  agnes_sessions  → usage_session_summary  (filter: username)
  agnes_usage     → usage_events           (filter: username)
  agnes_audit     → audit_log              (filter: user_id)

RBAC is per-row, not per-table: admins see every user's rows; non-admins
see only their own. The filter is built server-side from the auth user
dict; non-admin filter values are regex-validated before SQL interpolation.

Implementation:
- new connector connectors/internal/ with access (filter+exec) + registry
  (idempotent table_registry seed at startup)
- /api/query detects internal table refs and short-circuits to a CTE
  wrapper that prepends "WITH agnes_x AS (SELECT * FROM <src> WHERE …),
  …" then "SELECT * FROM (<user_sql>) AS _q". DuckDB cursor on the
  shared system.duckdb handle — opening parallel handles / ATTACH on the
  same file is blocked process-wide.
- mixing internal + BQ / registered local tables in one SELECT is
  rejected (v1 limitation)
- src.rbac.can_access_table waves internal tables through for all
  authenticated users; row scoping is the actual security control
- /api/v2/schema and /api/v2/sample gained internal branches; sample
  intentionally skips its cache because rows are RBAC-scoped per caller
- audit row written as action='query.internal' with is_admin flag

Tests: connectors/internal/access — RBAC, filter clause, schema, CTE
wrapper coexistence with user-supplied aggregations, unsafe-username
rejection. 16/16 passing.

Motivating queries this enables:
  SELECT tool_name, COUNT(*) FROM agnes_usage
   WHERE is_error GROUP BY 1 ORDER BY 2 DESC
   -- analyst self-introspection: which tools fail for me?

  SELECT user_id, COUNT(*) FROM agnes_audit
   WHERE action = 'session.transcript_view' GROUP BY 1
   -- admin: who's been looking at whose session transcripts?

* feat(admin): group dropdown into 5 named sections + internal tables in /catalog

Admin dropdown gains section headers so admins can land on the right
page without re-reading the full menu:

  Activity Center      Server activity / Tool usage / Sessions
  Users & Access       Users / Groups / Resource access / Tokens
  Data                 Tables
  Agent Experience     Curated Marketplaces / Flea Submissions /
                       Agent Setup Prompt / Agent Workspace Prompt
  Server               Server config

"Agent Experience" frames the curated content + prompts as one cluster
— it's all admin-controlled material that shapes what an analyst's AI
agent encounters. "Configuration" → "Server" since only one item lives
there now.

Renamed the section's first two items:
  "Activity" → "Server activity" (matches page H1)
  "Usage"    → "Tool usage"

Also fixes /catalog visibility of the internal tables (agnes_sessions /
_usage / _audit) for non-admin users: ``app.auth.access.can_access``
short-circuits to True for resource_type='table' + an internal-table id.
Without this, non-admins saw the tables in /api/v2/catalog (which uses
the same RBAC bypass) but not on the /catalog HTML page (which calls
can_access directly, requiring a resource_grants row internal tables
don't have).

CSS for `.app-nav-menu-section`: small caps, muted, non-clickable; first
section trims top padding so the panel doesn't open with an awkward gap.

* refactor(admin): move corporate memory into Admin > Agent Experience

Memory link was the only admin-only entry in the primary nav (gated by
session.user.is_admin). Moves it into the Admin dropdown under Agent
Experience, alongside Curated Marketplaces / Flea Submissions / Prompts
— all admin-curated content that shapes what an analyst's AI agent
encounters.

Renamed the nav label to "Shared Knowledge" to match what the page
actually is (admin-curated organisational knowledge from session
verification, surfaced to agents). URL stays at /corporate-memory; the
route still gates on require_admin per the existing comment.

Side effect: primary nav (Home / Marketplace / Data Packages) is now
uniform for every authenticated user — no conditional admin-only entry.

* ui: rename admin entries to Curated Knowledge / Init Prompt / Workspace Prompt

- "Shared Knowledge" → "Curated Knowledge" (parallel with "Curated
  Marketplaces" in the same Agent Experience section; "curated" tells
  the admin what they do there — review + approve)
- "Agent Setup Prompt" → "Init Prompt" (matches the `agnes init` flow
  it actually drives)
- "Agent Workspace Prompt" → "Workspace Prompt" (the "Agent" prefix
  was redundant — every item in the section is agent-facing)

Renames page titles + H1s on /admin/agent-prompt and
/admin/workspace-prompt to match.

* refactor: rename Usage → Telemetry across user-facing surfaces

External surfaces all switch; internal Python module / file names and the
physical DB tables (usage_events, usage_session_summary, usage_tool_daily,
usage_plugin_daily) stay — renaming them would force a schema migration
+ a redo of the LLM Text-to-SQL prompt for no analyst-visible win.

Changes:
- Admin dropdown: "Tool usage" → "Telemetry"
- Page H1 / <title>: same
- URL: /admin/usage → /admin/telemetry; old URL 308-redirects
- API prefix: /api/admin/usage/* → /api/admin/telemetry/*
- CLI: primary command `agnes admin telemetry …`; `agnes admin usage` kept
  as a deprecated alias so existing operator scripts keep working
- Internal data-source table id: agnes_usage → agnes_telemetry. The
  registry seed now evicts any stale internal-source row whose id no
  longer matches INTERNAL_TABLES, so the old `agnes_usage` row is
  removed from table_registry on next app boot
- All tests + JS endpoint paths updated

* test(rbac): include auto-appended internal tables in expectations

get_accessible_tables now appends agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry /
agnes_audit to every authenticated user's accessible-tables list so the
internal data source shows up in /catalog. The two existing rbac tests
asserted hardcoded list shapes that pre-dated the change.

Rewritten to assert "granted tables + the canonical internal-table set"
instead of literal lists, so the test stays correct if the internal
table roster changes again later.

* ui: visual dividers between admin-dropdown sections

Adds a 1px top border + 6px top margin to every section header except
the first, so the five named groups (Activity Center, Users & Access,
Data, Agent Experience, Server) read as visually separated clusters.
The header itself stays small-caps + muted as before — the border is
additive.

* ui(memory): match obs-topbar visual on /corporate-memory

The Curated Knowledge page (linked from the admin dropdown's Agent
Experience section) opened straight into the stats bar — no title,
no subtitle, no shared chrome with the other admin pages. Adds an
obs-topbar-style header at the top of .container-memory:

  - H1 "Curated Knowledge"
  - subtitle explaining what the page is + how AI agents pull from it

The `.ck-*` class set duplicates the inline obs-* styles from
/admin/activity etc. for this one page; promoting the obs-* class set
to style-custom.css for shared reuse is the obvious next step (4 pages
already inline the same CSS), tracked as a follow-up.

Page <title> also renamed from "Corporate Memory" → "Curated Knowledge".

* ui(tables): list Agnes internal tables in /admin/tables + group in /catalog

/admin/tables previously rendered three per-source-type listings
(BQ / Keboola / Jira) and dropped any row whose source_type didn't
match — so the agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry / agnes_audit rows
seeded into table_registry were invisible. Adds a fourth read-only
section "Agnes internal tables" that filters source_type === 'internal'
and renders the same registry-table layout the other sections use,
with two changes:

  - no Register button (these rows are seeded on every app boot from
    connectors/internal/registry.py)
  - Edit + Delete actions hidden (any change would be reverted on the
    next start). Manage access stays so admins can still inspect.

Mode badge picks up a new mode-internal CSS class (teal accent) so the
display doesn't lie and call it "local".

In /catalog, internal tables now group under an "agnes" accordion
section (bucket="agnes" on seed) instead of falling into the catch-all
"default". Single source of truth for which tables exist; admins find
them where they expect.

* ui(tables): Agnes internal as a 4th tab next to BQ/Keboola/Jira

Previous iteration mounted the internal-table listing as a separate
standalone card under the tab strip. Reshapes it to a proper
tab-content section so admins switch between data sources via one
consistent nav (BigQuery / Keboola / Jira / Agnes internal).

- New tab button "Agnes internal" in the tab-nav.
- The listing card becomes <section id="tab-content-internal"
  class="tab-content">; switchTab() already routes by id so no JS
  change beyond extending the hash allowlist for direct #internal
  links.
- Tab content keeps the read-only treatment from the previous commit
  (no Register button, no Edit / Delete in renderRegistryListing).

* ui: rename Curated Knowledge → Curated Memory

Settles the naming back on "Curated Memory" — parallel structure with
"Curated Marketplaces" in the same Agent Experience section, and zero
rename ripple: URL (/corporate-memory), API (/api/memory/*), CLI
(agnes admin memory), and Python modules all stay on "memory" so the
admin label finally lines up with the underlying surfaces.

The "Curated" prefix still tells admins what they do on the page
(review pending → approve / mandate / reject) and reads as a sibling
of "Curated Marketplaces" right next to it in the dropdown.

Touches: admin dropdown label, page <title>, page H1. DB tables stay
on knowledge_* (already the canonical naming for the data shape).

* ui: rename "Server activity" → "Audit log"

"Audit log" is what the page actually is — server-side audit_log table
rendered with KPI cards + filter bar + sortable table. The "Server
activity" label confused the term with Claude Code session telemetry
(Telemetry page) and didn't make the source/concept clear.

Touches:
- Admin dropdown nav label
- /admin/activity page H1 + subtitle
- /admin/telemetry subtitle cross-link
- test_activity_api page-renders assertion

URL (/admin/activity) and API (/api/admin/activity/*) stay — the
"activity" name has stuck at the route layer for a year; rerouting
those would churn dashboards/bookmarks for zero analyst-visible win.

* ui(admin-nav): gray band on each section header for clearer separation

Previous iteration used a 1px top border between section labels — the
labels still blended into the items above/below at a glance. Switches
to a light gray background band per section header, extended edge-to-
edge inside the panel via negative horizontal margins. Bolder
font-weight (700) reinforces the separation; bumping the font color
isn't needed because the band itself does the work.

First section's header tucks into the panel's top border-radius so the
band reaches the corners without a gap.

* ui(catalog): rename internal-table category to "Agnes Internal"

`bucket` is what /catalog renders as the accordion category header
verbatim — "agnes" lowercase didn't read as a real category name and
got confused with a system identifier. Bumps to "Agnes Internal".
Seed re-applies on every app boot so existing rows pick up the new
bucket value via `ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE`.

* ui(catalog): split Agnes Internal into its own card on /catalog

Previously the three internal tables landed inside the "Core Business
Data" card under an "Agnes Internal" accordion alongside Keboola / BQ
buckets — readers conflated system telemetry with business datasets,
and the data_stats header counter ("3 tables · ~X rows total") only
ever counted synced rows so internal tables looked invisible.

Split the catalog page into two cards:
- Core Business Data: only non-internal source_types (Keboola, BQ,
  Jira). Accordions group by bucket as before. Stats counter reflects
  this card's tables.
- Agnes Internal: a dedicated card with its own visual treatment
  (teal accent matching the mode-internal badge in /admin/tables).
  Flat list (no accordion — only 3 rows, never grows here), each
  row carries the canonical `agnes query` snippet. Read-only — no
  profiler click, no In-stack toggle, no sync metadata.

Route adds `internal_card` context object; template renders the new
card only when it's non-None.

* fix(rbac): hide internal tables from /admin/access + drop "my" framing

Two related cleanups for the Agnes-internal tables:

1. /admin/access (resource grants) no longer lists them. The
   `can_access` check has a hardcoded internal-table bypass — security
   is row-level (per-request view filter), so a table-grain
   `resource_grants` row would do nothing. Surfacing them in the UI
   let admins set up grants that silently no-op. Filter at the
   `_table_blocks` projection so the UI tree never sees them.

2. Display names drop the analyst-perspective "my" framing:
     "Agnes — my sessions"          → "Agnes sessions"
     "Agnes — my telemetry events"  → "Agnes telemetry events"
     "Agnes — my audit log"         → "Agnes audit log"
   The "my" only makes sense from the querying analyst's seat
   (`SELECT … FROM agnes_sessions` returns *their* rows); on /admin/*
   pages where admin sees / configures them across users, the
   pronoun was misleading. Description text now spells out the
   row-level RBAC contract explicitly.

Display names update via TableRegistryRepository.register's ON CONFLICT
UPDATE on next app boot; no manual cleanup needed.

* ui: subtitle notes about agnes_* tables on each Activity Center page

The recursive observability story — Agnes serves its own audit /
telemetry / session data through the same `agnes query` plumbing
analysts use for business data — wasn't surfaced anywhere on the
admin pages that show that data. Three pages get a one-liner with
the canonical `agnes query` snippet + the RBAC contract (analysts
see their own rows, admin sees all):

- /admin/activity (Audit log)   → agnes_audit
- /admin/telemetry (Tool usage) → agnes_telemetry
- /admin/sessions               → agnes_sessions

Sets up the discovery moment for admins: they're reading the page,
they see "you can query this from Claude Code", they remember it
when an analyst asks "how do I find my own failed tool calls?".

* ui(tables): explain "Show log" empty-state on /admin/tables

Cache warmup log <pre> renders with a dark background and is only
populated by the SSE stream during a Re-warm all run. Opening the
page cold + clicking Show log just revealed a black bar with no
context — admins couldn't tell what they were looking at.

Adds an inline paragraph above the <pre> explaining what the log is,
the row format, when it fills in, and where to find the historical
audit trail (/admin/activity). The actual <pre> stays empty until
SSE events arrive, but the surrounding copy carries the meaning.

* ui(tables): auto-open cache-warmup log on Re-warm all click

A Re-warm all run takes ~24s per remote BQ row. With the <details>
collapsed by default, operators saw the button disable, watched a
quiet ~24s pass, and assumed nothing had happened — the streaming
log was hidden behind a closed disclosure.

Two small JS tweaks:
- cacheWarmupRun() opens the details on click, so streamed lines
  appear without an extra interaction
- cacheWarmupOnStart() hides the inline hint paragraph the moment
  real log content lands, so the dark log block isn't competing
  with redundant context

Hint paragraph also clarifies that only `query_mode='remote'` BQ
rows are warmed — operators with only materialized/internal tables
would see total=0 and the page would "do nothing" by spec.

* ui: trim Agnes internal copy across surfaces

Descriptions had grown to explain the extraction pipeline ("parsed
out of session JSONLs"), the underlying table ("Backed by
usage_session_summary"), the RBAC mechanic ("row-level RBAC at query
time — analysts see their own; admin sees all"), and the SQL snippet.
Every implementation detail meant another rewrite on the next iter.

Strips to one stable line per surface: what the data is, plus
"Also available locally for analysis". Mechanics live in code +
docs; the page copy says what the user needs to know.

Touched:
- connectors/internal/access.py: INTERNAL_TABLES descriptions
- activity_center.html / admin_usage.html / admin_sessions.html
  subtitles
- catalog.html Agnes Internal card description + row strip
- admin_tables.html "Agnes internal" tab hint

* fix(internal): is_user_admin arity bugs + + saved-view payload cap

Round-1 code review (PR #278) caught two blocking bugs and three nits.

Blocking — both `is_user_admin(user)` (single dict arg) calls raised
TypeError. is_user_admin signature is `(user_id, conn)`. Affected:

- app/api/query.py:_run_internal_query — every POST /api/query that
  references agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry / agnes_audit blew up
  with a 500. The headline analyst-facing feature of this PR was
  unusable through the API.
- app/api/v2_sample.py — same shape; `GET /api/v2/sample/agnes_*`
  returned 500.

Both fixed to call `is_user_admin(user.get("id"), conn)`. Added two
FastAPI-level tests in test_internal_data_source.py that go through
the TestClient — the existing unit tests on `execute_internal_query`
and `build_filter_clause` skipped the request-handler layer where the
bugs lived, which is why this landed.

Nits also closed:
- connectors/internal/access.py: `+` allowed in _USERNAME_RE /
  _USER_ID_RE so RFC 5321 email local-parts (alice+test@x) resolve
  correctly without hitting InternalAccessError.
- app/api/observability.py: saved-view payload capped at 64 KiB to
  prevent an admin from bloating system.duckdb with a malformed save.

* fix(security): close non-admin data-leak via underlying-table refs

PR #278 R2 review surfaced a non-admin-exploitable bypass: SQL whose
string literal contains 'agnes_sessions' routed into the privileged
internal-query path, then queried the underlying physical table
(usage_session_summary / usage_events / audit_log) directly, escaping
the CTE wrapper's row filter. Two reinforcing defenses:

1. find_internal_refs() now strips single-quoted string literals
   before scanning for alias names — a literal alone no longer
   routes the request into the privileged code path.

2. execute_internal_query() rejects non-admin SQL that references
   the underlying physical tables (usage_*, audit_log). The CTE
   wrapper only scopes the agnes_* aliases; a direct FROM on the
   base table — or a shadowing inner WITH that still has to read
   the base table — bypasses RBAC. Block before execution with an
   actionable error pointing to the agnes_* alias. Admins are
   unaffected (god-mode short-circuit on the filter clause).

3. tests/test_internal_data_source.py — three new negative tests
   covering literal-only matches, direct-table refs, and CTE
   shadow attempts.

Also tightens usage_ask.py's SELECT-only validator: pragma_table_info,
pragma_storage_info, pragma_database_*, and duckdb_tables / columns /
views / indexes / schemas are reflection functions that leak metadata
the analyst question shouldn't reach. \bPRAGMA\b in _FORBIDDEN never
matched the function-call form (word-boundary between `A` and `_`).

* fix(security): dynamic denylist for non-admin internal queries

R3 review (PR #278) caught a wider data-leak than R2: the underlying-
physical-table guard listed only the 7 usage_* + audit_log tables,
but system.duckdb has 30+ other sensitive tables — users (emails +
ids), personal_access_tokens, resource_grants, user_groups,
user_observability_views, store_*, marketplace_*, knowledge_*, etc.
A non-admin SQL like

    SELECT * FROM agnes_sessions
    UNION ALL SELECT email, id, … FROM users LIMIT 1

would leak every user's row.

Replaces the hardcoded denylist with a **dynamic allowlist** —
non-admin SQL may reference ONLY the registered agnes_* aliases.
Every other table in `information_schema.tables` (main schema) is
rejected. Future migrations that add a new sensitive table are
automatically covered without re-editing this module.

Also strips SQL comments (`/* */` and `--`) before the identifier
scan so a comment-wrapped table name (`/**/users/**/`) can't slip
past the regex.

Four new negative tests pin: `users`, `personal_access_tokens`,
block-comment wrap, line-comment wrap.

Plus: per-user view-count cap (100) on /api/admin/observability/views
so an admin can't fill system.duckdb with thousands of saved views.

* release: 0.54.0 — Activity Center + Telemetry + Sessions + internal datasource

Cuts the work shipped across this PR (Activity Center build, recursive
internal data source) into a versioned release. Bumps pyproject.toml
to 0.54.0; renames the top of CHANGELOG.md from [Unreleased] to
[0.54.0] — 2026-05-12 with a header summary; opens a fresh
[Unreleased] section for the next round.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-12 22:41:19 +02:00

731 lines
31 KiB
Python

"""Phase E audit gap tests: verify all 8 new audit_log writers fire correctly.
Covered:
- query.local (POST /api/query — local DuckDB table)
- query.remote (POST /api/query — BQ-remote table, smoke only: no live BQ)
- query.hybrid (POST /api/query/hybrid — admin-only BQ+local join)
- catalog.list (GET /api/v2/catalog)
- catalog.schema (GET /api/v2/schema/{table_id})
- catalog.sample (GET /api/v2/sample/{table_id})
- snapshot.estimate (POST /api/v2/scan/estimate)
- snapshot.create (POST /api/v2/scan)
- data.access_check (GET /api/data/{table_id}/check-access)
Each success-path test asserts:
1. Endpoint returns expected HTTP status.
2. An audit_log row appears with correct action + resource + non-null user_id.
Each audit-failure test monkeypatches AuditRepository.log to raise and asserts
the endpoint still returns the normal success status (audit failure is invisible
to caller).
"""
import importlib
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
import pyarrow as pa
from src.db import get_system_db
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Shared helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _grant_table(conn, user_id: str, table_id: str) -> None:
"""Grant user_id read access to table_id via a dedicated group."""
from src.repositories.user_groups import UserGroupsRepository
from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
from src.repositories.resource_grants import ResourceGrantsRepository
grp_name = f"audit-e-{user_id}-{table_id}"[:60]
grp = UserGroupsRepository(conn).get_by_name(grp_name)
if not grp:
grp = UserGroupsRepository(conn).create(
name=grp_name, description="audit-e-test", created_by="test",
)
members = UserGroupMembersRepository(conn)
if not members.has_membership(user_id, grp["id"]):
members.add_member(user_id, grp["id"], source="admin", added_by="test")
grants = ResourceGrantsRepository(conn)
if not grants.has_grant([grp["id"]], "table", table_id):
grants.create(
group_id=grp["id"], resource_type="table", resource_id=table_id,
assigned_by="test",
)
def _register_table(client, admin_hdrs, table_id, source_type="keboola", query_mode="local"):
resp = client.post(
"/api/admin/register-table",
json={"name": table_id, "source_type": source_type, "query_mode": query_mode},
headers=admin_hdrs,
)
assert resp.status_code in (200, 201), resp.text
return resp
def _count_audit_rows(action):
conn = get_system_db()
try:
return conn.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE action = ?", [action]
).fetchone()[0]
finally:
conn.close()
def _last_audit_row(action):
conn = get_system_db()
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT user_id, action, resource, result, client_kind "
"FROM audit_log WHERE action = ? ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 1",
[action],
).fetchone()
return row
finally:
conn.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# catalog.list
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCatalogListAudit:
def test_catalog_list_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, analyst_user, mock_extract_factory):
"""GET /api/v2/catalog writes catalog.list audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.list")
resp = c.get("/api/v2/catalog", headers=analyst_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.list")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("catalog.list")
assert row[0] == "analyst1"
assert row[1] == "catalog.list"
assert row[2] == "catalog"
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_catalog_list_audit_failure_invisible_to_caller(self, seeded_app, analyst_user, monkeypatch):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx the endpoint."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("db gone")))
c = seeded_app["client"]
resp = c.get("/api/v2/catalog", headers=analyst_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_catalog_list_error_path_has_audit(self):
"""Source-level verification: catalog.list error path has audit logging."""
import inspect
from app.api.v2_catalog import catalog
src = inspect.getsource(catalog)
# Verify outer except clause for error path audit
assert "except Exception as exc:" in src
assert "error" in src.lower()
# Verify error audit is logged with error message
assert 'str(exc)[:200]' in src or "str(exc)" in src
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# catalog.schema
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCatalogSchemaAudit:
def test_catalog_schema_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory):
"""GET /api/v2/schema/{table_id} writes catalog.schema audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "schema_audit_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"x": "1"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
resp = c.get(f"/api/v2/schema/{table_id}", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("catalog.schema")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "catalog.schema"
assert f"table:{table_id}" in row[2]
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_catalog_schema_audit_failure_invisible_to_caller(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx the endpoint."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "schema_audit_tbl2"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"x": "1"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("db gone")))
resp = c.get(f"/api/v2/schema/{table_id}", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_catalog_schema_error_path_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""404 on unknown table must write an error audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
resp = c.get("/api/v2/schema/nonexistent_xyz_table", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("catalog.schema")
assert row[3].startswith("error.")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# catalog.sample
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCatalogSampleAudit:
def test_catalog_sample_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory):
"""GET /api/v2/sample/{table_id} writes catalog.sample audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "sample_audit_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"a": "1"}, {"a": "2"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
resp = c.get(f"/api/v2/sample/{table_id}", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("catalog.sample")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "catalog.sample"
assert f"table:{table_id}" in row[2]
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_catalog_sample_audit_failure_invisible_to_caller(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx the endpoint."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "sample_audit_tbl2"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"a": "1"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
resp = c.get(f"/api/v2/sample/{table_id}", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_catalog_sample_error_path_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""404 on unknown table must write an error audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
resp = c.get("/api/v2/sample/nonexistent_xyz_table", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("catalog.sample")
assert row[3].startswith("error.")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# data.access_check
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDataAccessCheckAudit:
def _setup_table(self, seeded_app, mock_extract_factory, table_id):
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"v": "1"}]}])
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_grant_table(conn, "analyst1", table_id)
finally:
conn.close()
def test_access_check_granted_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, analyst_user, mock_extract_factory):
"""204 check-access must write data.access_check audit row with granted=True."""
table_id = "check_access_granted_tbl"
self._setup_table(seeded_app, mock_extract_factory, table_id)
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("data.access_check")
resp = c.get(f"/api/data/{table_id}/check-access", headers=analyst_user)
assert resp.status_code == 204
after = _count_audit_rows("data.access_check")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("data.access_check")
assert row[0] == "analyst1"
assert row[1] == "data.access_check"
assert f"table:{table_id}" in row[2]
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_access_check_denied_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, analyst_user, mock_extract_factory):
"""403 check-access must write data.access_check audit row with granted=False."""
# Register a table but do NOT grant analyst access
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "check_access_denied_tbl"
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
before = _count_audit_rows("data.access_check")
resp = c.get(f"/api/data/{table_id}/check-access", headers=analyst_user)
assert resp.status_code == 403
after = _count_audit_rows("data.access_check")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("data.access_check")
assert row[3] == "error.403"
def test_access_check_audit_failure_invisible_to_caller(
self, seeded_app, analyst_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx the endpoint."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
table_id = "check_access_audit_fail_tbl"
self._setup_table(seeded_app, mock_extract_factory, table_id)
c = seeded_app["client"]
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
resp = c.get(f"/api/data/{table_id}/check-access", headers=analyst_user)
assert resp.status_code == 204
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# query.local
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestQueryLocalAudit:
def _setup_local_table(self, seeded_app, mock_extract_factory, table_id="qlocal_tbl"):
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"n": "1"}, {"n": "2"}]}])
# Rebuild analytics DB so master view is visible
resp = c.post("/api/sync/trigger", headers=admin_hdrs)
# sync may fail if orchestrator is not available, ignore
return table_id
def test_query_local_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch):
"""POST /api/query on a local table must write query.local audit row."""
# Monkeypatch get_analytics_db_readonly to return a fresh in-memory DuckDB
# with the table so we don't need a full orchestrator rebuild.
import duckdb as _duckdb
from app.api import query as query_mod
table_id = "qlocal_audit_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"n": "1"}]}])
mem_conn = _duckdb.connect(":memory:")
mem_conn.execute(f"CREATE TABLE {table_id} (n VARCHAR)")
mem_conn.execute(f"INSERT INTO {table_id} VALUES ('1')")
monkeypatch.setattr(query_mod, "get_analytics_db_readonly", lambda: mem_conn)
# No BQ path — ensure _bq_guardrail_inputs returns empty sets
monkeypatch.setattr(query_mod, "_bq_guardrail_inputs",
lambda *a, **kw: ([], [], None))
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("query.local")
resp = c.post(
"/api/query",
json={"sql": f"SELECT * FROM {table_id}", "limit": 10},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
after = _count_audit_rows("query.local")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("query.local")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "query.local"
assert row[3] == "success"
mem_conn.close()
def test_query_local_audit_failure_invisible(self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx POST /api/query."""
import duckdb as _duckdb
from app.api import query as query_mod
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
table_id = "qlocal_audit_fail_tbl"
mem_conn = _duckdb.connect(":memory:")
mem_conn.execute(f"CREATE TABLE {table_id} (n VARCHAR)")
monkeypatch.setattr(query_mod, "get_analytics_db_readonly", lambda: mem_conn)
monkeypatch.setattr(query_mod, "_bq_guardrail_inputs",
lambda *a, **kw: ([], [], None))
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
c = seeded_app["client"]
resp = c.post(
"/api/query",
json={"sql": f"SELECT * FROM {table_id}", "limit": 5},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
mem_conn.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# query.hybrid
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestQueryHybridAudit:
def test_query_hybrid_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user, monkeypatch):
"""POST /api/query/hybrid must write query.hybrid audit row on success."""
from src.remote_query import RemoteQueryEngine
mock_engine = MagicMock()
mock_engine.execute.return_value = {"columns": ["a"], "rows": [["1"]]}
monkeypatch.setattr(
"app.api.query_hybrid.RemoteQueryEngine",
lambda *a, **kw: mock_engine,
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"app.api.query_hybrid.load_config",
lambda: {},
)
import duckdb as _duckdb
mem_conn = _duckdb.connect(":memory:")
monkeypatch.setattr(
"app.api.query_hybrid.get_analytics_db_readonly",
lambda: mem_conn,
)
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("query.hybrid")
resp = c.post(
"/api/query/hybrid",
json={"sql": "SELECT a FROM some_table", "register_bq": {}},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
after = _count_audit_rows("query.hybrid")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("query.hybrid")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "query.hybrid"
assert row[3] == "success"
mem_conn.close()
def test_query_hybrid_audit_failure_invisible(self, seeded_app, admin_user, monkeypatch):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx POST /api/query/hybrid."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
mock_engine = MagicMock()
mock_engine.execute.return_value = {"columns": [], "rows": []}
monkeypatch.setattr("app.api.query_hybrid.RemoteQueryEngine", lambda *a, **kw: mock_engine)
monkeypatch.setattr("app.api.query_hybrid.load_config", lambda: {})
import duckdb as _duckdb
mem_conn = _duckdb.connect(":memory:")
monkeypatch.setattr("app.api.query_hybrid.get_analytics_db_readonly", lambda: mem_conn)
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
c = seeded_app["client"]
resp = c.post(
"/api/query/hybrid",
json={"sql": "SELECT 1", "register_bq": {}},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
mem_conn.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# snapshot.estimate (POST /api/v2/scan/estimate)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestSnapshotEstimateAudit:
def test_snapshot_estimate_local_writes_audit_log(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""POST /api/v2/scan/estimate on a local table must write snapshot.estimate audit row."""
import importlib
from app.api import v2_scan, v2_schema
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "est_audit_local_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"col": "x"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
# Stub build_schema so we don't need a real analytics DB
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_scan, "_resolve_schema",
lambda *a, **kw: {"col": "STRING"})
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan/estimate",
json={"table_id": table_id},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("snapshot.estimate")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "snapshot.estimate"
assert f"table:{table_id}" in row[2]
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_snapshot_estimate_audit_failure_invisible(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx POST /api/v2/scan/estimate."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
from app.api import v2_scan
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "est_audit_fail_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"col": "x"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_scan, "_resolve_schema",
lambda *a, **kw: {"col": "STRING"})
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan/estimate",
json={"table_id": table_id},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_snapshot_estimate_error_path_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""404 on unknown table must write snapshot.estimate error audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan/estimate",
json={"table_id": "nonexistent_xyz_estimate"},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("snapshot.estimate")
assert row[3].startswith("error.")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# snapshot.create (POST /api/v2/scan)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestSnapshotCreateAudit:
def test_snapshot_create_local_writes_audit_log(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""POST /api/v2/scan on a local table must write snapshot.create audit row."""
from app.api import v2_scan
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "scan_audit_local_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"n": "1"}, {"n": "2"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_scan, "_resolve_schema",
lambda *a, **kw: {"n": "STRING"})
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan",
json={"table_id": table_id},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("snapshot.create")
assert row[0] == "admin1"
assert row[1] == "snapshot.create"
assert f"table:{table_id}" in row[2]
assert row[3] == "success"
def test_snapshot_create_audit_failure_invisible(
self, seeded_app, admin_user, mock_extract_factory, monkeypatch
):
"""Audit write failure must not 5xx POST /api/v2/scan."""
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
from app.api import v2_scan
c = seeded_app["client"]
admin_hdrs = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
table_id = "scan_audit_fail_tbl"
mock_extract_factory("keboola", [{"name": table_id, "data": [{"n": "1"}]}])
_register_table(c, admin_hdrs, table_id)
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_scan, "_resolve_schema",
lambda *a, **kw: {"n": "STRING"})
monkeypatch.setattr(AuditRepository, "log", lambda *a, **kw: (_ for _ in ()).throw(RuntimeError("gone")))
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan",
json={"table_id": table_id},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_snapshot_create_error_path_writes_audit_log(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""404 on unknown table must write snapshot.create error audit row."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
resp = c.post(
"/api/v2/scan",
json={"table_id": "nonexistent_xyz_scan"},
headers=admin_user,
)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
assert after == before + 1
row = _last_audit_row("snapshot.create")
assert row[3].startswith("error.")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Error message capping (Fix 1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _get_last_audit_params(action: str) -> dict:
"""Fetch params dict from the latest audit row matching action."""
import json
conn = get_system_db()
try:
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT params FROM audit_log WHERE action = ? ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 1",
[action],
).fetchone()
if row:
params_str = row[0]
if isinstance(params_str, str):
return json.loads(params_str) or {}
return params_str or {}
return {}
finally:
conn.close()
class TestErrorMessageCapping:
"""Verify that audit error paths cap error messages at 200 chars.
Rather than monkeypatching to force errors, we trigger 404 errors
(table not found) which emit audit rows with error messages.
The error message from FileNotFoundError (the exception) is capped
by the fix in each endpoint's error handler.
"""
def test_v2_schema_error_message_is_capped(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""v2/schema error path caps error message at 200 chars."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
# Request a nonexistent table to trigger FileNotFoundError
resp = c.get("/api/v2/schema/nonexistent_xyz_123456789", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.schema")
assert after == before + 1
params = _get_last_audit_params("catalog.schema")
error_msg = params.get("error", "")
assert len(error_msg) <= 200, f"error message length {len(error_msg)} exceeds 200"
def test_v2_sample_error_message_is_capped(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""v2/sample error path caps error message at 200 chars."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
resp = c.get("/api/v2/sample/nonexistent_xyz_sample123", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("catalog.sample")
assert after == before + 1
params = _get_last_audit_params("catalog.sample")
error_msg = params.get("error", "")
assert len(error_msg) <= 200, f"error message length {len(error_msg)} exceeds 200"
def test_v2_scan_estimate_error_message_is_capped(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""v2/scan/estimate error path caps error message at 200 chars."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
resp = c.post("/api/v2/scan/estimate", json={"table_id": "nonexistent_xyz_estimate"}, headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.estimate")
assert after == before + 1
params = _get_last_audit_params("snapshot.estimate")
error_msg = params.get("error", "")
assert len(error_msg) <= 200, f"error message length {len(error_msg)} exceeds 200"
def test_v2_scan_error_message_is_capped(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""v2/scan error path caps error message at 200 chars."""
c = seeded_app["client"]
before = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
resp = c.post("/api/v2/scan", json={"table_id": "nonexistent_xyz_scan123"}, headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code == 404
after = _count_audit_rows("snapshot.create")
assert after == before + 1
params = _get_last_audit_params("snapshot.create")
error_msg = params.get("error", "")
assert len(error_msg) <= 200, f"error message length {len(error_msg)} exceeds 200"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# client_kind detection: PAT auth → 'cli', session JWT → 'web'
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestClientKindDetection:
"""PAT-authenticated requests must produce client_kind='cli' in audit_log;
interactive session JWTs must produce 'web'."""
def _mint_pat_for_admin(self, seeded_app) -> str:
"""Return a PAT bearer token for admin1 by creating a DB record + JWT directly."""
import hashlib
import uuid
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
from src.db import get_system_db
jti = uuid.uuid4().hex
raw_jwt = create_access_token(
user_id="admin1", email="admin@test.com", typ="pat", token_id=jti, omit_exp=True
)
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(raw_jwt.encode()).hexdigest()
conn = get_system_db()
conn.execute(
"""INSERT INTO personal_access_tokens
(id, user_id, name, prefix, token_hash, created_at, revoked_at, expires_at, last_used_at, last_used_ip)
VALUES (?, 'admin1', 'test-pat', 'tst_', ?, now(), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)""",
[jti, token_hash],
)
conn.close()
return raw_jwt
def test_pat_auth_sets_client_kind_cli(self, seeded_app):
"""Sync trigger via PAT → client_kind='cli' in audit_log."""
pat_token = self._mint_pat_for_admin(seeded_app)
pat_headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat_token}"}
conn = get_system_db()
conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE action='sync.trigger'")
conn.close()
resp = seeded_app["client"].post("/api/sync/trigger", headers=pat_headers)
assert resp.status_code in (200, 202, 409)
conn = get_system_db()
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT client_kind FROM audit_log WHERE action='sync.trigger' ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 1"
).fetchone()
conn.close()
assert row is not None, "audit_log row was not written"
assert row[0] == "cli", f"expected client_kind='cli', got {row[0]!r}"
def test_session_jwt_sets_client_kind_web(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
"""Sync trigger via session JWT → client_kind='web' in audit_log."""
conn = get_system_db()
conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE action='sync.trigger'")
conn.close()
resp = seeded_app["client"].post("/api/sync/trigger", headers=admin_user)
assert resp.status_code in (200, 202, 409)
conn = get_system_db()
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT client_kind FROM audit_log WHERE action='sync.trigger' ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 1"
).fetchone()
conn.close()
assert row is not None, "audit_log row was not written"
assert row[0] == "web", f"expected client_kind='web', got {row[0]!r}"