Five hottest BQ-touching endpoints were `async def` but invoked synchronous DuckDB / BQ-extension calls inside the body. Under uvicorn's single event loop that meant a single heavy `agnes query --remote` (waiting up to ~200 s for BQ's jobs.query) froze EVERY other request — /api/health, dashboard, auth, even another query — for the full BQ wait. Operators saw "VM idle, app frozen" during PR #188's testing. Convert to plain `def` so FastAPI auto-offloads the body to the anyio thread pool. Event loop stays free for non-BQ requests. - app/api/query.py:execute_query - app/api/v2_scan.py:scan_estimate_endpoint, scan_endpoint - app/api/v2_sample.py:sample - app/api/v2_schema.py:schema Audit: 0 `await` statements in any converted handler (verified file-by- file), so the rename is safe. Tests in tests/test_v2_*.py called the handlers via `asyncio.run(...)` which now fails on a non-coroutine return; swapped for direct calls (asyncio.run( -> ( ) — keeps paren balance). Plus AGNES_THREADPOOL_SIZE env var (default 200, was anyio's stock 40) in app/main.py:lifespan. Set via anyio.to_thread.current_default_thread_limiter().total_tokens. 200 is comfortable headroom for <50 concurrent analysts; bump for more. 480/480 impacted tests pass (the 2 remaining errors are a pre-existing fixture setup issue in test_reader_smoke_matrix.py unrelated to this change).
131 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
131 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
"""GET /api/v2/sample/{table_id}?n=5 — sample rows (spec §3.3)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
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import duckdb
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from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user, _get_db
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from src.rbac import can_access_table
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from src.repositories.table_registry import TableRegistryRepository
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from app.api.v2_cache import TTLCache
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from connectors.bigquery.access import BqAccess, BqAccessError, get_bq_access
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v2", tags=["v2"])
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_sample_cache = TTLCache(maxsize=512, ttl_seconds=3600)
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_MAX_N = 100
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def _fetch_bq_sample(bq, dataset: str, table: str, n: int) -> list[dict]:
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"""Fetch up to `n` sample rows from a BQ table via the DuckDB BQ extension.
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`bq.duckdb_session()` provides a DuckDB conn with the bigquery extension
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loaded + auth secret installed. SQL here is server-constructed (validated
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identifiers + LIMIT n) — a BQ BadRequest means registry corruption, not
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user fault, so it surfaces as `bq_upstream_error` (HTTP 502).
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"""
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from connectors.bigquery.access import translate_bq_error
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from src.identifier_validation import validate_quoted_identifier
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# Surface "BQ not configured" as the structured 500 BqAccessError(not_configured)
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# with hint pointing at instance.yaml, NOT as the misleading 400 unsafe_identifier
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# the empty-string sentinel BqAccess would otherwise trigger from
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# validate_quoted_identifier below. Devin BUG_0002 on PR #138.
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if not bq.projects.data:
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bq.client() # raises BqAccessError(not_configured); endpoint catches it
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# Defense in depth: registry already validates these, but the v2 API
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# endpoints are downstream of admin REST writes that might bypass that
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# gate. A `source_table` containing a backtick would otherwise break
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# out of the `…` quoted identifier and execute arbitrary BQ SQL.
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if not (validate_quoted_identifier(bq.projects.data, "BQ project")
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and validate_quoted_identifier(dataset, "BQ dataset")
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and validate_quoted_identifier(table, "BQ source_table")):
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raise ValueError("unsafe BQ identifier in registry — refusing to query")
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bq_sql = f"SELECT * FROM `{bq.projects.data}.{dataset}.{table}` LIMIT {int(n)}"
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with bq.duckdb_session() as conn:
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try:
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df = conn.execute(
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"SELECT * FROM bigquery_query(?, ?)",
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[bq.projects.billing, bq_sql],
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).fetchdf()
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return df.to_dict(orient="records")
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except Exception as e:
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raise translate_bq_error(e, bq.projects, bad_request_status="upstream_error")
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def build_sample(
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection,
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user: dict,
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table_id: str,
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*,
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n: int,
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bq: BqAccess,
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) -> dict:
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n = max(1, min(int(n), _MAX_N))
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# RBAC + existence check MUST run before cache lookup — otherwise an
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# unauthorized user can read cached sample rows fetched by an authorized one.
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repo = TableRegistryRepository(conn)
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row = repo.get(table_id)
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if not row:
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raise FileNotFoundError(table_id)
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if not can_access_table(user, table_id, conn):
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raise PermissionError(table_id)
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cache_key = f"{table_id}|{n}"
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cached = _sample_cache.get(cache_key)
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if cached is not None:
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return cached
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source_type = row.get("source_type") or ""
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if source_type == "bigquery":
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rows = _fetch_bq_sample(bq, row.get("bucket") or "", row.get("source_table") or table_id, n)
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else:
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from app.utils import get_data_dir
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parquet = get_data_dir() / "extracts" / source_type / "data" / f"{table_id}.parquet"
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c = duckdb.connect(":memory:")
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try:
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df = c.execute(
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f"SELECT * FROM read_parquet(?) LIMIT {n}",
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[str(parquet)],
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).fetchdf()
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rows = df.to_dict(orient="records")
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finally:
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c.close()
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payload = {"table_id": table_id, "rows": rows, "source": source_type}
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_sample_cache.set(cache_key, payload)
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return payload
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@router.get("/sample/{table_id}")
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def sample(
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table_id: str,
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n: int = Query(default=5, ge=1, le=_MAX_N),
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user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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bq: BqAccess = Depends(get_bq_access),
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):
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# Plain ``def`` — opens a `bq.duckdb_session()` and runs sync queries
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# through the BQ extension. See PR #188 Tier 1 entry.
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try:
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return build_sample(conn, user, table_id, n=n, bq=bq)
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except FileNotFoundError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"table {table_id!r} not found")
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except PermissionError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="not authorized for this table")
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except ValueError as e:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail={"error": "unsafe_identifier", "message": str(e), "details": {}},
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)
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except BqAccessError as e:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=BqAccessError.HTTP_STATUS.get(e.kind, 500),
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detail={"error": e.kind, "message": e.message, "details": e.details},
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)
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