agnes-the-ai-analyst/scripts/smoke-test.sh
ZdenekSrotyr 5f6bb7a4b2
fix(security+ops) + release(0.12.1): #82 #85 #87 hardening + cut 0.12.1 (#104)
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture

Security and operational hardening across three issue groups:

- M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun)
- C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile)
- M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler
- M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server)
- M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING)
- M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs

- C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download
- M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename

- C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response
- C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible)
- M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
- M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch)

Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90)

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety

Review fixes:
- Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was
  missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints
- Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex
- M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with
  warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after
  successful token consumption
- Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak

Address Devin Review findings on PR #104:

1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution +
   ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only
   matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like
   `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the
   hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against
   ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast.

2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`,
   `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old
   format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call
   /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback
   to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured).

3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open
   NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to
   prevent FD leaks until GC.

Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local,
multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split

Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104:

1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download
   endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow
   dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders
   contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots
   and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \)
   and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs.

2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health
   checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints
   (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed)
   and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint
   with a PAT.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening

* fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up)

Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify
got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but
password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using
read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset
token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write-
wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker
would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the
asymmetry was a polish gap.

Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write
unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then
SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears
the marker and applies the password change.

New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in
tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two
ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same
token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with
'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both
POSTs got 302 (race confirmed).

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 19:57:30 +02:00

107 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
Executable file

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Agnes smoke test — verifies a running instance is functional.
# Usage: ./scripts/smoke-test.sh [host:port]
# Default: http://localhost:8000
set -euo pipefail
HOST="${1:-http://localhost:8000}"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
TOKEN=""
check() {
local name="$1" ok="$2"
if [ "$ok" = "true" ]; then
echo " PASS $name"
PASS=$((PASS + 1))
else
echo " FAIL $name"
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi
}
echo "Smoke test: $HOST"
echo "---"
# 1. Health check (minimal, unauthenticated)
HEALTH=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
if [ "$HEALTH" = "unreachable" ]; then
echo " FATAL: health=$HEALTH"
exit 1
fi
check "health ($HEALTH)" "true"
# 2. Health detailed has version fields (requires auth, checked after bootstrap)
# 3. Bootstrap (only works on fresh DB; 403 means users exist)
BOOT_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/smoke_boot.json -w "%{http_code}" -X POST "$HOST/auth/bootstrap" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"smoke@test.local","name":"Smoke Test","password":"SmokeTest123!"}' 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
if [ "$BOOT_HTTP" = "200" ]; then
TOKEN=$(python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('/tmp/smoke_boot.json'))['access_token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
check "bootstrap (new admin)" "true"
elif [ "$BOOT_HTTP" = "403" ]; then
TOKEN="${SMOKE_TOKEN:-}"
echo " SKIP bootstrap (users exist)"
else
check "bootstrap (HTTP $BOOT_HTTP)" "false"
fi
# 2b. Health detailed (authenticated) — version fields
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
HAS_VERSION=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health/detailed" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
print('true' if 'version' in d and 'channel' in d and 'schema_version' in d else 'false')
" 2>/dev/null || echo "false")
check "health detailed version fields" "$HAS_VERSION"
fi
# 4. Query SELECT 1 (requires auth)
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
QUERY_OK=$(curl -sf -X POST "$HOST/api/query" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"sql":"SELECT 1 as test"}' | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
print('true' if len(d.get('rows',[])) > 0 else 'false')
" 2>/dev/null || echo "false")
check "query SELECT 1" "$QUERY_OK"
else
echo " SKIP query (no token)"
fi
# 5. Sync trigger
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
SYNC_HTTP=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST "$HOST/api/sync/trigger" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 2>/dev/null || echo "000")
if [[ "$SYNC_HTTP" =~ ^(200|202)$ ]]; then
check "sync trigger" "true"
else
check "sync trigger (HTTP $SYNC_HTTP)" "false"
fi
else
echo " SKIP sync (no token)"
fi
# 6. Post-sync health (wait briefly)
sleep 5
if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then
HEALTH2=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health/detailed" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
else
HEALTH2=$(curl -sf "$HOST/api/health" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['status'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "unreachable")
fi
if [ "$HEALTH2" = "unhealthy" ] || [ "$HEALTH2" = "unreachable" ]; then
check "post-sync health ($HEALTH2)" "false"
else
check "post-sync health ($HEALTH2)" "true"
fi
# Results
echo ""
echo "Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed"
[ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ] || exit 1