agnes-the-ai-analyst/tests/test_store_guardrails_llm.py
Vojtech d6ad08f107
Flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue (#233)
* feat(store): flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue

Adds an end-to-end guardrails pipeline for store uploads (manifest +
static-security + LLM review), persists blocked bundles for forensics,
introduces soft-delete (Archive) semantics, consolidates the legacy
/store/{id} surface into /marketplace/flea/{id}, and reworks the admin
queue so lifecycle filters read live entity visibility via LEFT JOIN
rather than a denormalized submission column.

Schema v29 → v35:
  * v29 store_submissions table + store_entities.visibility_status
  * v30 file_size, bundle_sha256, bundle_purged_at on submissions
  * v31 reshape store_submissions (drop legacy unique on entity_id)
  * v32 store_entities.archived_at/by + 'archived' visibility value
  * v33 drop store_submissions.retry_count (unused)
  * v34 ensure idx_store_submissions_entity exists post column-drop
  * v35 broaden visibility_status enum + JOIN architecture cutover

Pipeline (src/store_guardrails/):
  * Inline checks: manifest_check, static_scan, quality_check
  * LLM review configurable haiku|sonnet|opus (default haiku)
  * BackgroundTasks-driven async path with structured-output JSON
  * Per-submitter daily quota (default 50)
  * 30-day TTL purge job (POST /api/admin/run-blocked-purge)
  * Bundle SHA256 + size persisted; sha256 survives purge for forensics

Visibility model:
  * pending | approved | hidden | archived
  * _enforce_visibility returns 404 (no leak) for non-owner non-admin
  * Owner sees own non-approved entries via include_owner_id widening
  * Install refused with 409 entity_not_approved when not approved

Soft-delete (DELETE /api/store/entities/{id}):
  * Default = soft (visibility_status='archived'); existing installs
    keep getting served the bundle so users don't lose the plugin
  * ?hard=true admin-only: drops bundle + cascades user_store_installs
  * Hard-delete preserves entity_id on submission as tombstone so
    audit_log linkage survives for the activity timeline

Admin queue lifecycle (the JOIN refactor):
  * Verdict (store_submissions.status) is immutable forensic record
  * Lifecycle (store_entities.visibility_status) is live state
  * /admin/store/submissions Archived chip translates to
    `e.visibility_status='archived'` via LEFT JOIN — any path that
    flips visibility surfaces in the queue immediately
  * Detail page renders Status (verdict) and Entity lifecycle side by
    side so admins see "approved at review, now archived" at a glance

URL consolidation:
  * /store/{id} deleted (no redirect, stale bookmarks 404)
  * /marketplace/flea/{id} is the canonical detail surface
  * Three in-tree callers (upload-success, my-stack card, store
    listing card) updated to point at the new URL
  * Quarantine banner extracted to _quarantine_banner.html partial,
    self-guarded, included from both flea detail templates
  * Banner JS auto-refreshes when the verdict lands by polling
    /api/marketplace/flea/{id}/detail (visibility_status +
    submission_status — the latter is needed because blocked_llm
    keeps the entity at visibility_status='pending')

Audit log resource format:
  * runner.py emits prefixed `store_submission:{id}` (post-fix)
  * Detail-page timeline query handles three patterns: prefixed
    submission, helper-emitted `store_entity:{sub_id}`, and bare-id
    legacy rows — all surface in the activity timeline

UX fixes:
  * Owner sees Under review / Quarantined / Hidden banner with status
  * Install button gray-disabled (not blue) when non-approved
  * Owner cannot delete quarantined entries (403); admin can
  * Admin queue: filter chips, sortable columns, paging, page-size
  * Auto-refresh queue every 5s while pending rows are visible
  * Store upload page file picker no longer opens twice (label →
    input default action collided with explicit JS handler)

Tests: 168 passed across the guardrails suites (admin submissions,
store API, inline / LLM / purge guardrails, store repositories,
marketplace filter, schema version). New regression coverage
includes: archive surfaces via JOIN even when API path is bypassed;
deleted submission renders activity timeline (tombstone); flea
detail surfaces submission_status only for owner/admin; detail page
renders Entity lifecycle row; audit log resource format covers both
helper and runner paths.

* fix(store-guardrails): PR #233 follow-up — prompt injection, atomic PUT, BG race, schema, reaper, sort whitelist

Addresses 9 of the 23 findings from the PR #233 review (spec at
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-09-pr233-guardrails-fixes-spec.md).
Merge-gate items #1-#6 plus high-value mediums #7, #9-#12, #23.
Architectural items (#8 enum split, #14 factory) and pure
maintainability (#15-#22) deferred to follow-ups.

Security:
* #1 prompt injection — SYSTEM_PROMPT now passed via the SDK's
  dedicated system= parameter; bundle wrapped in <bundle>...</bundle>
  sentinels declared data-only by the system prompt; literal
  sentinel strings in user content are escaped so an adversarial
  README can't forge a close tag.
* #6 static scan honesty — module docstring + admin copy + docs
  declare static scan as signal not gate; .md/.txt/.rst/.html/.json/
  .yaml/.yml/.toml skipped to avoid false positives on prose.
  AST mode for Python deferred (separate flag, FP comparison work).

Correctness:
* #2 PUT atomicity — bundles bake into plugin.staging-<rand>/
  alongside live, atomic-rename on success; failed checks leave
  live tree byte-for-byte intact.
* #3 BG-task race — set_visibility_if_pending guards verdict flips
  to the (pending, hidden) review window; admin archives during
  review survive; skipped flips audit-logged.
* #4 v35 NOT NULL/DEFAULT — schema v35→v36 re-applies them on
  store_entities.visibility_status. CHECK constraint enforced
  application-side (DuckDB ADD CHECK on existing column unsupported).
* #7 stuck-review reaper — reap_stuck_llm_reviews flips pending_llm
  rows older than guardrails.stuck_review_grace_seconds (default
  1800) to review_error. Scheduler runs every 15 min via new
  /api/admin/run-reap-stuck-reviews. Set knob to 0 to disable.
* #9 quota counter — count_blocked_for_submitter_since now counts
  blocked_inline + blocked_llm + review_error so a submitter
  triggering only LLM-blocked verdicts is bounded.
* #10 missing risk_level — surfaces as review_error with
  error='missing_risk_level' instead of silently defaulting to
  'medium' (which looked like a model-decided block).
* #11 archived_at clear — set_visibility nulls archived_at +
  archived_by when transitioning out of 'archived' so a future
  read doesn't show stale archive forensics on an approved row.

Maintainability:
* #12 FSM doc comment — accurate insert/transition/lifecycle
  description in src/db.py near store_submissions schema.
* #23 sort-key whitelist — admin queue rejects unknown sort keys
  with 400 invalid_sort_key; substring-replace footgun removed.

Deferred (separate PRs):
* #5 quota race — proper fix requires asyncio.Lock spanning the
  full pipeline; threading.Lock blocks event loop, DuckDB MVCC
  doesn't help. API-level slowapi bounds worst case for now.
* #6 part 3 (AST static scan), #8 (enum split), #13 (import
  bundle docs), #14 (factory consolidation), #15-#22 (maint).

Tests:
* New: tests/test_store_guardrails_prompt_injection.py (corpus +
  trust-boundary invariants), tests/test_store_put_atomic.py,
  tests/test_store_guardrails_reaper.py.
* Extended: test_store_guardrails_llm.py (system param, missing
  risk_level, BG race), test_admin_store_submissions.py (quota
  counter widening, sort whitelist 400), test_store_repositories.py
  (un-archive metadata clear), test_db_schema_version.py (v36).
* Full suite: 3738 passed; 17 pre-existing baseline failures
  unchanged (db migration tests, cli binary rename, catalog export,
  user mgmt v5 backfill — confirmed by stash + rerun on clean tree).
2026-05-09 17:32:53 +04:00

383 lines
15 KiB
Python

"""LLM-review wiring tests — Anthropic call mocked.
These tests cover the runner's persistence behavior on each verdict
shape (safe / risky / error). The actual prompt engineering lives in
``src/store_guardrails/prompts.py`` and is exercised at integration
time, not here.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import shutil
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
import duckdb
import pytest
from connectors.llm.exceptions import LLMTimeoutError
from src import db as src_db
from src.repositories.store_entities import StoreEntitiesRepository
from src.repositories.store_submissions import StoreSubmissionsRepository
from src.store_guardrails.runner import LlmResult, run_llm_review
@pytest.fixture
def conn(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path))
src_db._system_db_conn = None
src_db._system_db_path = None
c = src_db.get_system_db()
yield c
c.close()
@pytest.fixture
def plugin_dir():
d = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="agnes_llm_test_"))
(d / "SKILL.md").write_text("# Test\nbody " * 30)
yield d
shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors=True)
def _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Stage a store_entities row + a pending_llm submission.
Returns ``(entity_id, submission_id)`` so the test can assert against
final state.
"""
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
UserRepository(conn).create(id="u1", email="alice@x.com", name="alice")
ents = StoreEntitiesRepository(conn)
ents.create(
id="e1", owner_user_id="u1", owner_username="alice",
type="skill", name="probe", description="probe skill",
category=None, version="1.0.0", file_size=10,
visibility_status="pending",
)
subs = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn)
sub_id = subs.create(
submitter_id="u1", submitter_email="alice@x.com",
type="skill", name="probe", version="1.0.0",
status="pending_llm", entity_id="e1",
inline_checks={"manifest": {"status": "pass"}},
)
return "e1", sub_id
# The runner closes its own cursor in `finally`. Hand it a *fresh* cursor
# each call (mirrors the production `get_system_db` behavior) so closing
# it doesn't poison the test's primary cursor used for assertions.
def _conn_factory(_unused):
def _f():
return src_db.get_system_db()
return _f
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# run_llm_review outcomes
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLlmReviewRunner:
def test_safe_verdict_approves_entity(self, conn, plugin_dir):
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
verdict = {
"risk_level": "safe", "summary": "OK", "findings": [],
"template_placeholders_found": 0, "reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": None,
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
result = run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
assert isinstance(result, LlmResult)
assert result.passed
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "approved"
ent = StoreEntitiesRepository(conn).get(eid)
assert ent["visibility_status"] == "approved"
def test_high_risk_verdict_blocks(self, conn, plugin_dir):
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
verdict = {
"risk_level": "high", "summary": "exfil",
"findings": [{
"severity": "high", "category": "exfiltration",
"file": "run.py", "explanation": "ships token to remote",
"fix_hint": "remove the POST",
}],
"template_placeholders_found": 0, "reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": None,
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "blocked_llm"
ent = StoreEntitiesRepository(conn).get(eid)
# Entity stays pending — not visible until override.
assert ent["visibility_status"] == "pending"
def test_low_risk_with_high_finding_blocks(self, conn, plugin_dir):
"""Pass condition requires BOTH risk_level<=low AND no high findings.
A 'low' verdict with a high finding still blocks."""
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
verdict = {
"risk_level": "low", "summary": "mostly ok",
"findings": [{
"severity": "high", "category": "credentials",
"file": "creds.py", "explanation": "key in source",
}],
"template_placeholders_found": 0, "reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": None,
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "blocked_llm"
def test_medium_finding_with_safe_risk_passes(self, conn, plugin_dir):
"""Medium findings shouldn't block when overall risk is safe — that's
the 'noise but no exploit' band the operator opted into when picking
Haiku as the tier. Operators who want stricter pin Sonnet/Opus."""
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
verdict = {
"risk_level": "safe", "summary": "noise",
"findings": [{
"severity": "medium", "category": "code_quality",
"file": "x.py", "explanation": "could be cleaner",
}],
"template_placeholders_found": 1, "reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": None,
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "approved"
def test_review_error_keeps_pending(self, conn, plugin_dir):
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
# llm_review.review_bundle catches LLMError and returns a dict with
# error set; the runner records review_error.
verdict = {
"risk_level": None, "summary": None, "findings": [],
"template_placeholders_found": 0, "reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": "LLMTimeoutError: Anthropic connection error",
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "review_error"
ent = StoreEntitiesRepository(conn).get(eid)
assert ent["visibility_status"] == "pending"
def test_missing_plugin_dir_records_review_error(self, conn, tmp_path):
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, tmp_path / "exists")
# Point at a path that doesn't exist.
ghost = tmp_path / "ghost-plugin-dir"
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle"
) as m:
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=ghost,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
m.assert_not_called()
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "review_error"
def test_safe_verdict_skipped_when_admin_archived_during_review(self, conn, plugin_dir):
"""#3 — BG-task race: admin archives entity while LLM review is
in flight. Pre-fix the verdict's set_visibility('approved')
clobbered the archive. Post-fix the guarded variant refuses
and audit-logs the skip."""
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
# Admin archives BEFORE the LLM verdict lands.
StoreEntitiesRepository(conn).archive(eid, by_user_id="admin")
verdict = {
"risk_level": "safe", "summary": "OK", "findings": [],
"template_placeholders_found": 0,
"reviewed_by_model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"error": None,
}
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.runner.llm_review.review_bundle",
return_value=verdict,
):
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=lambda: "sk-test",
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
ent = StoreEntitiesRepository(conn).get(eid)
assert ent["visibility_status"] == "archived", (
"BG verdict must NOT clobber an admin archive"
)
# Submission still flips to 'approved' (verdict is forensic
# record); the lifecycle stays archived because the admin won.
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "approved"
# And we wrote an audit row explaining the skip.
audits = conn.execute(
"SELECT action, params FROM audit_log "
"WHERE resource = ? AND action = ?",
[f"store_submission:{sub_id}",
"store.submission.bg_verdict_skipped"],
).fetchall()
assert audits, "missing skip audit row"
def test_config_loader_failure_records_review_error(self, conn, plugin_dir):
eid, sub_id = _seed_pending_submission(conn, plugin_dir)
def boom():
raise RuntimeError("no api key")
run_llm_review(
sub_id, plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
conn_factory=_conn_factory(conn),
api_key_loader=boom,
model_loader=lambda: "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
sub = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).get(sub_id)
assert sub["status"] == "review_error"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# llm_review.review_bundle — single-shot transport-error path
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestReviewBundleErrorTransport:
def test_anthropic_timeout_returns_error_dict(self, plugin_dir):
from src.store_guardrails import llm_review
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.llm_review.AnthropicExtractor"
) as MockEx:
inst = MockEx.return_value
inst.extract_json.side_effect = LLMTimeoutError("connection error")
result = llm_review.review_bundle(
plugin_dir, type_="skill", name="x", version="1.0.0",
description="x" * 30,
api_key="sk-test", model="claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
assert result["error"]
assert result["risk_level"] is None
assert result["reviewed_by_model"] == "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"
def test_missing_risk_level_surfaces_as_review_error(self, plugin_dir):
"""#10 — model returns a structured response with no/empty
risk_level. Pre-fix this defaulted to 'medium' and looked like a
model-decided block. Post-fix it surfaces as
``error='missing_risk_level'`` so the runner persists
``status='review_error'`` (admin gets the retry button)."""
from src.store_guardrails import llm_review
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.llm_review.AnthropicExtractor"
) as MockEx:
inst = MockEx.return_value
inst.extract_json.return_value = {
"summary": "model didn't fill risk_level",
"findings": [],
"template_placeholders_found": 0,
}
result = llm_review.review_bundle(
plugin_dir, type_="skill", name="x", version="1.0.0",
description="x" * 30,
api_key="sk-test", model="claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
assert result["risk_level"] is None
assert result["error"] == "missing_risk_level"
def test_system_prompt_passed_via_dedicated_parameter(self, plugin_dir):
"""#1 — the system prompt MUST be passed via the SDK's separate
``system=`` parameter, not concatenated into user content. This
is the trust boundary that keeps a crafted README inside the
bundle from overriding the reviewer rules."""
from src.store_guardrails import llm_review
from src.store_guardrails.prompts import SYSTEM_PROMPT
with patch(
"src.store_guardrails.llm_review.AnthropicExtractor"
) as MockEx:
inst = MockEx.return_value
inst.extract_json.return_value = {
"risk_level": "safe", "summary": "ok", "findings": [],
"template_placeholders_found": 0,
}
llm_review.review_bundle(
plugin_dir, type_="skill", name="x", version="1.0.0",
description="x" * 30,
api_key="sk-test", model="claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
)
call = inst.extract_json.call_args
assert call.kwargs.get("system") == SYSTEM_PROMPT, (
"SYSTEM_PROMPT must be passed via system= so it lands "
"in the SDK's system role — not in user content"
)
user_payload = call.kwargs.get("prompt") or ""
assert "<bundle>" in user_payload and "</bundle>" in user_payload, (
"user payload must wrap the bundle files in trust-boundary "
"sentinel tags"
)
assert SYSTEM_PROMPT not in user_payload, (
"SYSTEM_PROMPT must NOT be inlined into user content"
)