agnes-the-ai-analyst/app/api/v2_sample.py
minasarustamyan d4ac84dd46
feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150)
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00

129 lines
5 KiB
Python

"""GET /api/v2/sample/{table_id}?n=5 — sample rows (spec §3.3)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
import duckdb
from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user, _get_db
from src.rbac import can_access_table
from src.repositories.table_registry import TableRegistryRepository
from app.api.v2_cache import TTLCache
from connectors.bigquery.access import BqAccess, BqAccessError, get_bq_access
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v2", tags=["v2"])
_sample_cache = TTLCache(maxsize=512, ttl_seconds=3600)
_MAX_N = 100
def _fetch_bq_sample(bq, dataset: str, table: str, n: int) -> list[dict]:
"""Fetch up to `n` sample rows from a BQ table via the DuckDB BQ extension.
`bq.duckdb_session()` provides a DuckDB conn with the bigquery extension
loaded + auth secret installed. SQL here is server-constructed (validated
identifiers + LIMIT n) — a BQ BadRequest means registry corruption, not
user fault, so it surfaces as `bq_upstream_error` (HTTP 502).
"""
from connectors.bigquery.access import translate_bq_error
from src.identifier_validation import validate_quoted_identifier
# Surface "BQ not configured" as the structured 500 BqAccessError(not_configured)
# with hint pointing at instance.yaml, NOT as the misleading 400 unsafe_identifier
# the empty-string sentinel BqAccess would otherwise trigger from
# validate_quoted_identifier below. Devin BUG_0002 on PR #138.
if not bq.projects.data:
bq.client() # raises BqAccessError(not_configured); endpoint catches it
# Defense in depth: registry already validates these, but the v2 API
# endpoints are downstream of admin REST writes that might bypass that
# gate. A `source_table` containing a backtick would otherwise break
# out of the `…` quoted identifier and execute arbitrary BQ SQL.
if not (validate_quoted_identifier(bq.projects.data, "BQ project")
and validate_quoted_identifier(dataset, "BQ dataset")
and validate_quoted_identifier(table, "BQ source_table")):
raise ValueError("unsafe BQ identifier in registry — refusing to query")
bq_sql = f"SELECT * FROM `{bq.projects.data}.{dataset}.{table}` LIMIT {int(n)}"
with bq.duckdb_session() as conn:
try:
df = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM bigquery_query(?, ?)",
[bq.projects.billing, bq_sql],
).fetchdf()
return df.to_dict(orient="records")
except Exception as e:
raise translate_bq_error(e, bq.projects, bad_request_status="upstream_error")
def build_sample(
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection,
user: dict,
table_id: str,
*,
n: int,
bq: BqAccess,
) -> dict:
n = max(1, min(int(n), _MAX_N))
# RBAC + existence check MUST run before cache lookup — otherwise an
# unauthorized user can read cached sample rows fetched by an authorized one.
repo = TableRegistryRepository(conn)
row = repo.get(table_id)
if not row:
raise FileNotFoundError(table_id)
if not can_access_table(user, table_id, conn):
raise PermissionError(table_id)
cache_key = f"{table_id}|{n}"
cached = _sample_cache.get(cache_key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
source_type = row.get("source_type") or ""
if source_type == "bigquery":
rows = _fetch_bq_sample(bq, row.get("bucket") or "", row.get("source_table") or table_id, n)
else:
from app.utils import get_data_dir
parquet = get_data_dir() / "extracts" / source_type / "data" / f"{table_id}.parquet"
c = duckdb.connect(":memory:")
try:
df = c.execute(
f"SELECT * FROM read_parquet(?) LIMIT {n}",
[str(parquet)],
).fetchdf()
rows = df.to_dict(orient="records")
finally:
c.close()
payload = {"table_id": table_id, "rows": rows, "source": source_type}
_sample_cache.set(cache_key, payload)
return payload
@router.get("/sample/{table_id}")
async def sample(
table_id: str,
n: int = Query(default=5, ge=1, le=_MAX_N),
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
bq: BqAccess = Depends(get_bq_access),
):
try:
return build_sample(conn, user, table_id, n=n, bq=bq)
except FileNotFoundError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"table {table_id!r} not found")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="not authorized for this table")
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail={"error": "unsafe_identifier", "message": str(e), "details": {}},
)
except BqAccessError as e:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=BqAccessError.HTTP_STATUS.get(e.kind, 500),
detail={"error": e.kind, "message": e.message, "details": e.details},
)