agnes-the-ai-analyst/tests/test_v2_schema.py
minasarustamyan d4ac84dd46
feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150)
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00

333 lines
14 KiB
Python

# tests/test_v2_schema.py
import asyncio
import importlib
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
import pytest
from fastapi import HTTPException
@pytest.fixture
def reload_db(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path))
import src.db as db_module
importlib.reload(db_module)
yield db_module
def _seed_bq_table(conn):
_ensure_admin1(conn)
from src.repositories.table_registry import TableRegistryRepository
TableRegistryRepository(conn).register(
id="bq_view", name="bq_view", source_type="bigquery",
bucket="ds", source_table="bq_view", query_mode="remote",
)
def _ensure_admin1(conn):
"""Seed an admin user with id='admin1' + Admin group membership so
{"id": "admin1", ...} dicts pass the can_access admin shortcut."""
from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
if UserRepository(conn).get_by_id('admin1') is None:
UserRepository(conn).create(id='admin1', email='admin1@test.com', name='Admin')
admin_gid = conn.execute(
'SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?', [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
).fetchone()
if admin_gid:
UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
'admin1', admin_gid[0], source='system_seed',
)
def _bq(billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj"):
"""Build a BqAccess wired to default factories. For tests that monkeypatch
`_fetch_bq_schema` / `_fetch_bq_table_options` whole, the inner factories
are never called."""
from connectors.bigquery.access import BqAccess, BqProjects
return BqAccess(BqProjects(billing=billing, data=data))
class TestSchemaEndpoint:
def test_bq_table_returns_columns_and_dialect_hints(self, reload_db, monkeypatch):
from app.api import v2_schema
# Stub the BQ schema fetch to avoid hitting real BQ
monkeypatch.setattr(
v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_schema",
lambda bq, dataset, table: [
{"name": "event_date", "type": "DATE", "nullable": False, "description": ""},
{"name": "country_code", "type": "STRING", "nullable": True, "description": ""},
],
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_table_options",
lambda bq, dataset, table: {"partition_by": "event_date", "clustered_by": []},
)
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
data = v2_schema.build_schema(conn, user, "bq_view", bq=_bq())
finally:
conn.close()
assert data["table_id"] == "bq_view"
assert data["sql_flavor"] == "bigquery"
assert {c["name"] for c in data["columns"]} == {"event_date", "country_code"}
assert "where_dialect_hints" in data
assert data["partition_by"] == "event_date"
def test_unknown_table_raises_404(self, reload_db):
from app.api.v2_schema import build_schema, NotFound
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
with pytest.raises(NotFound):
build_schema(conn, user, "missing", bq=_bq())
finally:
conn.close()
def test_rbac_check_runs_before_cache(self, reload_db, monkeypatch):
"""Regression: cache lookup used to happen before the RBAC check, and the
cache key had no user component — so an unauthorized user could read
cached schema fetched by an authorized one. The fix moves RBAC ahead."""
from app.api import v2_schema
monkeypatch.setattr(
v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_schema",
lambda *a, **kw: [{"name": "x", "type": "STRING", "nullable": True, "description": ""}],
)
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_table_options", lambda *a, **kw: {})
# Stub can_access_table — admin1 always allowed (warms cache),
# everyone else denied (must hit RBAC check, not cached payload).
monkeypatch.setattr(
"app.api.v2_schema.can_access_table",
lambda user, tid, conn: user.get("id") == "admin1",
)
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
# Admin warms the cache.
admin = {"id": "admin1", "email": "admin@x.com"}
v2_schema.build_schema(conn, admin, "bq_view", bq=_bq())
# Non-admin must hit RBAC denial — cache must NOT short-circuit.
other = {"id": "viewer1", "email": "viewer@x.com"}
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
v2_schema.build_schema(conn, other, "bq_view", bq=_bq())
finally:
conn.close()
class TestBqAccessErrors:
"""Issue #134: structured 502 translation on BQ errors in the strict /schema path.
These tests exercise the REAL translation path through `BqAccess` +
`translate_bq_error` by injecting a duckdb_session whose execute() raises
the Google API exception. That's the production path — Phase 1
monkeypatches of `_fetch_bq_schema` whole would skip the translation logic
and only test the outer wrap (which has been removed in Phase 2).
`/schema` differs from `/scan` and `/scan/estimate`: the SQL is
server-constructed (queries `INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS` with validated
identifiers, no user-derived fragments), so `BadRequest` → 502
(`bq_upstream_error`) rather than 400. Same as `/sample`.
"""
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _clear_schema_cache(self):
# Prevent payloads from earlier tests from short-circuiting the fetch.
from app.api import v2_schema
v2_schema._schema_cache.clear()
yield
v2_schema._schema_cache.clear()
def test_schema_returns_502_on_bq_forbidden_serviceusage(self, reload_db, bq_access):
"""When the BQ extension raises Forbidden mentioning serviceusage, the
endpoint must translate to HTTP 502 with `cross_project_forbidden`
and a hint that mentions billing_project."""
from app.api import v2_schema
from google.api_core.exceptions import Forbidden
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.execute.side_effect = Forbidden(
"Permission denied: serviceusage.services.use on project foo"
)
bq = bq_access(duckdb_conn=mock_conn, billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj")
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
# Endpoint is async — drive it directly. dependency_overrides only
# fires through TestClient/HTTP, so pass `bq=bq` explicitly.
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
asyncio.run(v2_schema.schema(
table_id="bq_view", user=user, conn=conn, bq=bq,
))
finally:
conn.close()
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502
detail = exc_info.value.detail
assert isinstance(detail, dict)
assert detail["error"] == "cross_project_forbidden"
assert "hint" in detail["details"]
assert "billing_project" in detail["details"]["hint"].lower()
def test_schema_returns_502_on_bq_forbidden_non_serviceusage(self, reload_db, bq_access):
"""A Forbidden that is NOT about serviceusage (e.g. dataset-level ACL)
still becomes a 502, but with `bq_forbidden`."""
from app.api import v2_schema
from google.api_core.exceptions import Forbidden
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.execute.side_effect = Forbidden(
"Access Denied: Dataset foo.bar: User does not have permission"
)
bq = bq_access(duckdb_conn=mock_conn, billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj")
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
asyncio.run(v2_schema.schema(
table_id="bq_view", user=user, conn=conn, bq=bq,
))
finally:
conn.close()
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502
assert exc_info.value.detail["error"] == "bq_forbidden"
def test_schema_returns_502_on_bq_bad_request(self, reload_db, bq_access):
"""`/schema` SQL is server-constructed (INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS with
validated identifiers); a BadRequest here means registry corruption →
upstream error, not user fault. Translate to HTTP 502 (`bq_upstream_error`),
same as `/sample`, opposite of `/scan*`."""
from app.api import v2_schema
from google.api_core.exceptions import BadRequest
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.execute.side_effect = BadRequest("Syntax error at line 1, column 5")
bq = bq_access(duckdb_conn=mock_conn, billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj")
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
asyncio.run(v2_schema.schema(
table_id="bq_view", user=user, conn=conn, bq=bq,
))
finally:
conn.close()
assert exc_info.value.status_code == 502
detail = exc_info.value.detail
assert isinstance(detail, dict)
assert detail["error"] == "bq_upstream_error"
assert "Syntax error" in detail["message"]
def test_schema_returns_200_with_empty_partition_on_table_options_failure(
self, reload_db, monkeypatch,
):
"""REGRESSION GUARD: `_fetch_bq_table_options` is best-effort
(`try/except Exception → return {}` with a logger.warning). On internal
failure the helper returns `{}`; the endpoint MUST still return 200 with
the column list and `partition_by=None, clustered_by=[]`.
Phase 2 preserved the swallow-all contract — this test verifies it
end-to-end with the helper patched to return the empty dict it would
yield on failure, AND a Phase-2-specific regression guard that exercises
the real helper raising an upstream error and confirms it's swallowed
(not surfaced as 502)."""
from app.api import v2_schema
# Strict path returns real schema.
monkeypatch.setattr(
v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_schema",
lambda bq, dataset, table: [
{"name": "event_date", "type": "DATE", "nullable": False, "description": ""},
{"name": "country_code", "type": "STRING", "nullable": True, "description": ""},
],
)
# Best-effort path returns `{}` (the documented swallow-all output).
monkeypatch.setattr(v2_schema, "_fetch_bq_table_options", lambda bq, dataset, table: {})
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
data = asyncio.run(v2_schema.schema(
table_id="bq_view", user=user, conn=conn, bq=_bq(),
))
finally:
conn.close()
# Endpoint returns 200 (no HTTPException raised) with columns present.
assert data["table_id"] == "bq_view"
assert {c["name"] for c in data["columns"]} == {"event_date", "country_code"}
# Partition info absent or None (the swallow-all returns {} on failure).
assert data.get("partition_by") is None
assert data.get("clustered_by") == []
def test_table_options_swallows_bq_errors_returns_empty_dict(self, reload_db, bq_access):
"""REGRESSION GUARD (Phase 2 production path): `_fetch_bq_table_options`
must swallow ANY exception from BQ and return `{}`. Calling it directly
with a bq whose duckdb_session().execute() raises Forbidden / BadRequest /
unknown — all must produce `{}`, NOT a BqAccessError that the endpoint
would 502 on. This is the load-bearing contract for `/schema` to keep
returning 200 on permissioned tables / cross-project misconfigurations."""
from app.api import v2_schema
from google.api_core.exceptions import Forbidden, BadRequest
for exc in [
Forbidden("Permission denied: serviceusage.services.use on project foo"),
Forbidden("Access Denied: Dataset foo.bar"),
BadRequest("Syntax error"),
RuntimeError("totally unexpected"),
]:
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.execute.side_effect = exc
bq = bq_access(duckdb_conn=mock_conn, billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj")
assert v2_schema._fetch_bq_table_options(bq, "ds", "bq_view") == {}, (
f"swallow-all contract violated for {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
)
def test_schema_passes_billing_project_to_bigquery_query(self, reload_db, bq_access):
"""Regression guard: bq.projects.billing must be passed to bigquery_query()
as the billing project (positional arg 0), and the FROM clause must
reference bq.projects.data (NOT billing). Verifies the migration didn't
regress the cross-project bug fix from Phase 1."""
from app.api import v2_schema
captured = {}
def _fake_execute(sql, params):
if "bigquery_query" in sql:
# _fetch_bq_schema executes first; capture once.
if "bq_sql" not in captured:
captured["billing_project"] = params[0]
captured["bq_sql"] = params[1]
result = MagicMock()
result.fetchall.return_value = []
return result
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.execute.side_effect = _fake_execute
bq = bq_access(duckdb_conn=mock_conn, billing="billing-proj", data="data-proj")
conn = reload_db.get_system_db()
try:
_seed_bq_table(conn)
user = {"id": "admin1", "email": "a@x.com"}
asyncio.run(v2_schema.schema(
table_id="bq_view", user=user, conn=conn, bq=bq,
))
finally:
conn.close()
assert captured["billing_project"] == "billing-proj"
# FROM clause uses data project (where INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS lives)
assert "`data-proj.ds.INFORMATION_SCHEMA.COLUMNS`" in captured["bq_sql"]