5f6bb7a4b2
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
72 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
72 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
"""J1 — Bootstrap & Auth journey tests.
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Verifies that authentication works end-to-end: JWT access, redirect for
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unauthenticated requests, role enforcement, and the no-auth health endpoint.
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"""
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import pytest
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def _auth(token: str) -> dict:
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
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@pytest.mark.journey
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class TestBootstrapAuth:
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def test_dashboard_accessible_with_admin_jwt(self, seeded_app):
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"""Admin with valid JWT can reach the dashboard (200 or 302 redirect)."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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t = seeded_app["admin_token"]
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resp = c.get("/dashboard", headers=_auth(t), follow_redirects=False)
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assert resp.status_code in (200, 302)
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def test_dashboard_blocked_without_auth(self, seeded_app):
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"""Unauthenticated request to dashboard is rejected (401 or 302 to login)."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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resp = c.get("/dashboard", follow_redirects=False)
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# Either 401 from API middleware or redirect to /login
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assert resp.status_code in (401, 302)
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def test_admin_can_list_registry(self, seeded_app, admin_user):
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"""Admin JWT gives access to /api/admin/registry."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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# First register a table so there's something to list
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c.post(
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"/api/admin/register-table",
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json={"name": "journey_table", "source_type": "keboola", "query_mode": "local"},
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headers=admin_user,
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)
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resp = c.get("/api/admin/registry", headers=admin_user)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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data = resp.json()
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assert "tables" in data
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names = {t["name"] for t in data["tables"]}
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assert "journey_table" in names
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def test_analyst_cannot_access_admin_endpoints(self, seeded_app):
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"""Analyst JWT is forbidden from admin-only endpoints."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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analyst_headers = _auth(seeded_app["analyst_token"])
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resp = c.get("/api/admin/registry", headers=analyst_headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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resp = c.post(
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"/api/admin/register-table",
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json={"name": "hack_table"},
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headers=analyst_headers,
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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def test_health_endpoint_requires_no_auth(self, seeded_app):
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"""Minimal health check is always accessible without any token."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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resp = c.get("/api/health")
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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body = resp.json()
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assert body["status"] == "ok"
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