agnes-the-ai-analyst/app/api/upload.py
ZdenekSrotyr 5f6bb7a4b2
fix(security+ops) + release(0.12.1): #82 #85 #87 hardening + cut 0.12.1 (#104)
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture

Security and operational hardening across three issue groups:

- M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun)
- C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile)
- M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler
- M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server)
- M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING)
- M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs

- C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download
- M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename

- C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response
- C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible)
- M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
- M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch)

Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90)

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety

Review fixes:
- Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was
  missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints
- Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex
- M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with
  warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after
  successful token consumption
- Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak

Address Devin Review findings on PR #104:

1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution +
   ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only
   matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like
   `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the
   hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against
   ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast.

2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`,
   `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old
   format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call
   /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback
   to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured).

3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open
   NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to
   prevent FD leaks until GC.

Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local,
multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence.

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split

Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104:

1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download
   endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow
   dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders
   contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots
   and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \)
   and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs.

2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health
   checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints
   (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed)
   and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint
   with a PAT.

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening

* fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up)

Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify
got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but
password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using
read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset
token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write-
wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker
would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the
asymmetry was a polish gap.

Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write
unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then
SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears
the marker and applies the password change.

New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in
tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two
ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same
token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with
'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both
POSTs got 302 (race confirmed).

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 19:57:30 +02:00

129 lines
4.1 KiB
Python

"""Upload endpoints — sessions, artifacts, CLAUDE.local.md."""
import hashlib
import shutil
import tempfile
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, UploadFile, File
from pydantic import BaseModel
from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user
from app.utils import get_data_dir as _get_data_dir
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/upload", tags=["upload"])
MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024 # 50 MB
_CHUNK_SIZE = 64 * 1024 # 64 KB read chunks for streaming size check
async def _stream_to_temp(file: UploadFile) -> tuple[tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile, int]:
"""Stream-upload with cumulative size check. Returns (tempfile, size).
Aborts once total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE — avoids buffering the entire
body in memory before the size cap rejects it (OOM prevention).
"""
tmp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix=".tmp")
total = 0
try:
while True:
chunk = await file.read(_CHUNK_SIZE)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
tmp.close()
Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=413,
detail=f"File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE // 1024 // 1024}MB)",
)
tmp.write(chunk)
tmp.flush()
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
tmp.close()
Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
tmp.seek(0)
return tmp, total
@router.post("/sessions")
async def upload_session(
file: UploadFile = File(...),
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
):
"""Upload a Claude session transcript (JSONL)."""
user_id = user["id"]
sessions_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_sessions" / user_id
sessions_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
raw_name = file.filename or f"session_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}.jsonl"
filename = Path(raw_name).name # Strips directory traversal components
if not filename or filename.startswith("."):
filename = f"upload_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
target = sessions_dir / filename
tmp, size = await _stream_to_temp(file)
try:
tmp.close()
shutil.move(tmp.name, str(target))
except Exception:
Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
return {"status": "ok", "filename": filename, "size": size}
@router.post("/artifacts")
async def upload_artifact(
file: UploadFile = File(...),
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
):
"""Upload an artifact (HTML report, PNG chart, etc.)."""
user_id = user["id"]
artifacts_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_artifacts" / user_id
artifacts_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
raw_name = file.filename or f"artifact_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
filename = Path(raw_name).name # Strips directory traversal components
if not filename or filename.startswith("."):
filename = f"upload_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
target = artifacts_dir / filename
tmp, size = await _stream_to_temp(file)
try:
tmp.close()
shutil.move(tmp.name, str(target))
except Exception:
Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise
return {"status": "ok", "filename": filename, "size": size}
class LocalMdRequest(BaseModel):
content: str
@router.post("/local-md")
async def upload_local_md(
request: LocalMdRequest,
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
):
"""Upload CLAUDE.local.md content for corporate memory processing."""
user_email = user["email"]
md_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_local_md"
md_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Hashed filename — stable per user, no charset surprises from email
safe_name = hashlib.sha256(user_email.encode()).hexdigest()[:24] + ".md"
target = md_dir / safe_name
target.write_text(request.content, encoding="utf-8")
return {
"status": "ok",
"user": user_email,
"size": len(request.content),
}