* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration
BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.
Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
→ drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.
Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
(TABLE je unconditionally enabled)
API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)
Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
(admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()
CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
(back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)
Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
(can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
(drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated
Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)
Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.
Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): cut 0.27.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
158 lines
6 KiB
Python
158 lines
6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for src/rbac.py — table access via resource_grants (v19+).
|
|
|
|
``can_access_table`` and ``get_accessible_tables`` are thin wrappers over
|
|
``app.auth.access.can_access`` / ``is_user_admin``. Admin group members see
|
|
everything; non-admin users see only tables with a matching
|
|
``resource_grants(group, "table", id)`` row via any of their groups.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import uuid
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.fixture
|
|
def setup_db(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(tmp_path))
|
|
from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
|
|
from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
|
|
from src.repositories.user_groups import UserGroupsRepository
|
|
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
|
|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id="admin1", email="admin@test.com", name="Admin")
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id="user1", email="user@test.com", name="User")
|
|
|
|
admin_gid = conn.execute(
|
|
"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
|
|
).fetchone()[0]
|
|
UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member("admin1", admin_gid, source="system_seed")
|
|
|
|
# Custom group + grant: user1 ∈ analysts, analysts can see "orders"
|
|
analysts = UserGroupsRepository(conn).create(
|
|
name="analysts", description="test group", created_by="test",
|
|
)
|
|
UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
|
|
"user1", analysts["id"], source="admin", added_by="test",
|
|
)
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT INTO table_registry (id, name) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
|
["orders", "orders"],
|
|
)
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT INTO table_registry (id, name) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
|
["salaries", "salaries"],
|
|
)
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"""INSERT INTO resource_grants (id, group_id, resource_type, resource_id)
|
|
VALUES (?, ?, 'table', 'orders')""",
|
|
[str(uuid.uuid4()), analysts["id"]],
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
yield
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestCanAccessTable:
|
|
"""Admin shortcut + per-(group, table) grants. No is_public, no
|
|
dataset_permissions, no bucket wildcards — explicit grants only."""
|
|
|
|
def test_admin_sees_every_table(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import can_access_table
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
admin = {"id": "admin1"}
|
|
assert can_access_table(admin, "orders", conn) is True
|
|
assert can_access_table(admin, "salaries", conn) is True
|
|
# Admin can even ask about tables that don't exist.
|
|
assert can_access_table(admin, "nonexistent", conn) is True
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
def test_non_admin_sees_only_granted_tables(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import can_access_table
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
user = {"id": "user1"}
|
|
# user1's group "analysts" was granted resource_id='orders'
|
|
assert can_access_table(user, "orders", conn) is True
|
|
# No grant for 'salaries' → denied
|
|
assert can_access_table(user, "salaries", conn) is False
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
def test_no_implicit_public_access(self, setup_db):
|
|
"""Pre-v19 a freshly registered table was implicitly public via
|
|
``is_public DEFAULT true``. v19 removes the column — every
|
|
non-admin access requires an explicit grant. Verify by
|
|
registering a fresh table and asserting denial."""
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import can_access_table
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
conn.execute(
|
|
"INSERT INTO table_registry (id, name) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
|
["fresh_table", "fresh_table"],
|
|
)
|
|
user = {"id": "user1"}
|
|
assert can_access_table(user, "fresh_table", conn) is False
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
def test_unknown_user_id_denied(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import can_access_table
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
assert can_access_table({"id": "ghost"}, "orders", conn) is False
|
|
# No id at all → denied (defensive default).
|
|
assert can_access_table({}, "orders", conn) is False
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestGetAccessibleTables:
|
|
"""Admin returns None (= "all"); non-admin returns the grant list."""
|
|
|
|
def test_admin_returns_none(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import get_accessible_tables
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
assert get_accessible_tables({"id": "admin1"}, conn) is None
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
def test_non_admin_returns_grant_list(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db
|
|
from src.rbac import get_accessible_tables
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
tables = get_accessible_tables({"id": "user1"}, conn)
|
|
assert tables == ["orders"]
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
|
|
def test_user_with_no_grants_returns_empty(self, setup_db):
|
|
from src.db import SYSTEM_EVERYONE_GROUP, get_system_db
|
|
from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
|
|
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
|
|
from src.rbac import get_accessible_tables
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id="loner", email="loner@test.com", name="L")
|
|
# Membership in Everyone alone (no grants on it) → empty list.
|
|
everyone = conn.execute(
|
|
"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_EVERYONE_GROUP]
|
|
).fetchone()
|
|
if everyone:
|
|
UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
|
|
"loner", everyone[0], source="system_seed",
|
|
)
|
|
assert get_accessible_tables({"id": "loner"}, conn) == []
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|