* fix(api): harden API surface before Swagger — 9 findings from issue #336 ADV-001: POST /api/sync/table-subscriptions now checks can_access() per table entry, matching the gate already on POST /api/sync/settings. ADV-002: GET /webhooks/jira/health gated behind require_admin; jira_domain removed from response to prevent anonymous info disclosure. ADV-003: GET /api/version no longer exposes commit_sha or schema_version. ADV-005: /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json now require a valid session via custom FastAPI routes (docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None). ADV-006: /cli/ and /webhooks/ added to _API_PATH_PREFIXES so future auth-gated routes there return JSON 401 not an HTML redirect. ADV-007: GET /api/catalog/tables wired to CatalogTablesResponse model. ADV-008: TableSubscriptionUpdate.tables capped at max_length=500. ADV-009: GET /api/users and GET /auth/admin/tokens accept limit/offset (default 1000, max 10000); repositories updated accordingly. Tests: 11 new regression tests in TestApiHardening336; test_jira_webhooks fixture updated with seeded admin user; OpenAPI snapshot regenerated. * fix(test): update test_journey_jira health check to use admin auth after ADV-002 gate * fix(security): close /auth/bootstrap auth-bypass + BREAKING markers on ADV-002/003/005 Reviewer-flagged regression introduced by ADV-009's pagination on UserRepository.list_all(): the silent default LIMIT 1000 broke the bootstrap check at app/auth/router.py and the startup no-password warning at app/main.py — both call list_all() with no args and depend on exhaustive enumeration. On an instance with >1000 users where no password-holder lands in the email-sorted first page, [u for u in list_all() if u.get('password_hash')] becomes empty → bootstrap re-opens → an unauthenticated caller can claim admin via /auth/bootstrap. Real auth-bypass on a security-sensitive boot path. Fix: - src/repositories/users.py: list_all() restored to no-arg, returns EVERY row (no LIMIT). Comment explicitly warns against re-adding pagination here. API-surface pagination moved to a new list_paginated(limit, offset) method with its own docstring. - app/api/users.py: GET /api/users now calls list_paginated(). Existing query-param validation (limit <= 10000) preserved. Regression guards in tests/test_security.py::TestApiHardening336: - test_users_list_all_returns_every_row_no_silent_limit asserts list_all() takes no params other than self (via inspect.signature) so a future cleanup can't accidentally re-add limit/offset. - test_users_list_paginated_is_separate_method asserts the paginated variant is a distinct method, not an overload. CHANGELOG: added **BREAKING** markers per CLAUDE.md release discipline to three pre-existing ADV bullets that are observable breaking changes for external consumers: - ADV-002 (webhook health going from anonymous to admin-only) - ADV-003 (/api/version dropping commit_sha + schema_version) - ADV-005 (/docs, /redoc, /openapi.json going from anonymous to session-required) * release: 0.54.25 — API hardening before Swagger (ADV-001..009) + bootstrap-bypass regression fix --------- Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
539 lines
19 KiB
Python
539 lines
19 KiB
Python
"""Tests for Jira webhook FastAPI router."""
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import os
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import tempfile
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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def _sign(payload: bytes, secret: str) -> str:
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"""Compute sha256=<HMAC hex> for a given payload and secret."""
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mac = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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return f"sha256={mac}"
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@pytest.fixture()
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def webhook_client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Create a TestClient with required env vars, dirs, and a seeded admin user."""
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data_dir = tmp_path / "data"
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data_dir.mkdir()
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(data_dir / "issues").mkdir()
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state_dir = tmp_path / "state"
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state_dir.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(data_dir))
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monkeypatch.setenv("STATE_DIR", str(state_dir))
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monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-jwt-secret")
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monkeypatch.setenv("JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
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monkeypatch.setenv("JIRA_DATA_DIR", str(data_dir))
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# Re-read env into Config (class attrs read os.environ at import time)
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from connectors.jira import service as svc
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monkeypatch.setattr(svc.Config, "JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "test-webhook-secret")
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monkeypatch.setattr(svc.Config, "JIRA_DATA_DIR", data_dir)
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# Reset singleton so it picks up fresh Config values
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svc._jira_service = None
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
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from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import create_app
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conn = get_system_db()
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UserRepository(conn).create(id="wh_admin", email="whadmin@test.com", name="WH Admin")
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member("wh_admin", admin_gid, source="system_seed")
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conn.close()
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app = create_app()
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admin_token = create_access_token("wh_admin", "whadmin@test.com")
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return {"client": TestClient(app), "admin_token": admin_token}
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def test_health_requires_auth(webhook_client):
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"""GET /webhooks/jira/health returns 401 without credentials (ADV-002)."""
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resp = webhook_client["client"].get("/webhooks/jira/health")
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_health(webhook_client):
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"""GET /webhooks/jira/health returns 200 for admin; jira_domain not exposed."""
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {webhook_client['admin_token']}"}
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resp = webhook_client["client"].get("/webhooks/jira/health", headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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body = resp.json()
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assert body["status"] == "ok"
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assert "webhook_secret_set" in body
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assert "jira_domain" not in body
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def test_missing_signature_401(webhook_client):
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"""POST without signature header returns 401."""
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payload = json.dumps({"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated", "issue": {"key": "TEST-1"}}).encode()
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post("/webhooks/jira", content=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_invalid_signature_401(webhook_client):
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"""POST with wrong signature returns 401."""
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payload = json.dumps({"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated", "issue": {"key": "TEST-1"}}).encode()
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": "sha256=badhex",
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_valid_signature_accepted(webhook_client):
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"""POST with correct HMAC-SHA256 passes signature check (not 401)."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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payload = json.dumps({"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated", "issue": {"key": "TEST-1"}}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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# Mock process_webhook_event so the test only checks HMAC validation,
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# not the full Jira API flow (which requires a real Jira connection).
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
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mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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def test_empty_payload_400(webhook_client):
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"""POST with empty body and valid signature returns 400."""
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payload = b""
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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def test_unconfigured_secret_returns_503(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Issue #83: missing JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET must fail-closed (no fall-through to 200)."""
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data_dir = tmp_path / "data"
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data_dir.mkdir()
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(data_dir / "issues").mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", str(data_dir))
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monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-jwt-secret")
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monkeypatch.delenv("JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setenv("JIRA_DATA_DIR", str(data_dir))
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from connectors.jira import service as svc
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monkeypatch.setattr(svc.Config, "JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET", "")
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monkeypatch.setattr(svc.Config, "JIRA_DATA_DIR", data_dir)
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svc._jira_service = None
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from app.main import create_app
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client = TestClient(create_app())
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payload = json.dumps({"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated", "issue": {"key": "TEST-1"}}).encode()
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resp = client.post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 503
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assert "secret" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"bad_key",
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[
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"../../etc/passwd",
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"../foo",
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"TEST-1/../../../bar",
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"TEST-1\x00.json",
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"TEST-1\r\n", # CRLF injection
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"test-1", # lowercase project — Jira keys are uppercase
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"TEST", # missing -<num>
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"TEST-", # missing num
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"-1", # missing project
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"", # empty
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"A" * 100 + "-1", # absurd length
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"ABC_DEF-1", # underscore — not allowed in real Jira
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"А-1", # Cyrillic А (looks like Latin A)
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],
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)
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def test_path_traversal_in_issue_key_rejected(webhook_client, bad_key):
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"""Issue #83: malformed issue keys must be rejected with 400, not used in paths."""
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": bad_key},
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400, f"key {bad_key!r} should have been rejected, got {resp.status_code}"
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def test_null_issue_field_does_not_crash(webhook_client):
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"""Issue #83 round-5: a payload with `issue: null` (not just missing)
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used to raise AttributeError on `issue.get('key')` → unhandled 500.
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The handler now normalises None to {} and falls through to the
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400 'Malformed or missing issue key' response."""
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": None,
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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assert "issue key" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_valid_issue_key_accepted(webhook_client):
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"""Sanity: a well-formed issue key still passes validation."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "PROJ-42"},
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
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mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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def test_webhook_event_path_traversal_sanitized(webhook_client, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Issue #83: `webhookEvent` is attacker-controlled and was used to build
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the webhook log filename. A payload with `../../tmp/pwn` for `webhookEvent`
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must NOT escape the WEBHOOK_LOG_DIR; the file (if written at all) lands
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under WEBHOOK_LOG_DIR with the traversal characters sanitized."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import app.api.jira_webhooks as wh
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log_dir = tmp_path / "webhook_log"
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log_dir.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setattr(wh, "WEBHOOK_LOG_DIR", log_dir)
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "../../tmp/pwn",
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"issue": {"key": "TEST-1"},
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
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mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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# No file landed outside log_dir.
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parent = log_dir.parent
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assert not (parent / "tmp" / "pwn.json").exists(), "path traversal succeeded"
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# Either nothing was written (refused), or file is under log_dir with
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# traversal chars replaced by underscores.
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written = list(log_dir.glob("*.json"))
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for f in written:
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assert f.is_relative_to(log_dir), f"file {f} escaped log dir"
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assert "/" not in f.name and ".." not in f.name
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Additional HMAC validation + error handling tests
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_valid_hmac_signature_accepted(webhook_client):
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"""Webhook with valid HMAC-SHA256 signature is accepted (200)."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
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mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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def test_invalid_hmac_signature_rejected_401(webhook_client):
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"""Webhook with wrong HMAC signature is rejected with 401."""
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
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}).encode()
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# Sign with the wrong secret
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sig = _sign(payload, "wrong-secret")
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_missing_signature_header_rejected(webhook_client):
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"""Webhook with no signature header at all is rejected with 401."""
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
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}).encode()
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_x_hub_signature_legacy_header_accepted(webhook_client):
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"""X-Hub-Signature (SHA1 legacy) header is also checked."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
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}).encode()
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# The handler falls back to X-Hub-Signature if X-Hub-Signature-256 is absent.
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# _verify_signature strips "sha256=" prefix; for sha1 it strips "sha1=".
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# Since the handler uses hmac.new with sha256, a sha1= prefix will still
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# be checked against sha256 HMAC. This test verifies the fallback header
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# is read at all (the signature won't match sha256, so expect 401).
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature": "sha1=somehex",
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},
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)
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# Legacy header is read but signature won't match → 401
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_malformed_json_payload_handled_gracefully(webhook_client):
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"""Malformed webhook payload (invalid JSON) is handled gracefully with 400."""
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payload = b'this is not json {!><'
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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assert "json" in resp.json()["detail"].lower() or "invalid" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_duplicate_event_processed_twice(webhook_client):
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"""Same Jira event ID sent twice is processed both times (idempotent at
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the service layer, not rejected at the webhook layer)."""
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from unittest.mock import patch
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payload = json.dumps({
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {"key": "DUP-1"},
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}).encode()
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sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
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mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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resp1 = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
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},
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)
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resp2 = webhook_client["client"].post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||
"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# Both requests succeed — deduplication is the service layer's job
|
||
assert resp1.status_code == 200
|
||
assert resp2.status_code == 200
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_signature_without_sha256_prefix(webhook_client):
|
||
"""A raw hex signature without 'sha256=' prefix is also accepted by
|
||
_verify_signature (it strips the prefix if present)."""
|
||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||
import hmac as hmac_mod
|
||
|
||
payload = json.dumps({
|
||
"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
|
||
"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
|
||
}).encode()
|
||
# Compute raw hex without prefix
|
||
mac = hmac_mod.new("test-webhook-secret".encode(), payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
|
||
|
||
with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
|
||
|
||
resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
|
||
"/webhooks/jira",
|
||
content=payload,
|
||
headers={
|
||
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||
"X-Hub-Signature-256": mac, # no sha256= prefix
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_jira_service_not_configured_returns_503(webhook_client):
|
||
"""When Jira service is not configured, webhook returns 503."""
|
||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||
|
||
payload = json.dumps({
|
||
"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
|
||
"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
|
||
}).encode()
|
||
sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
|
||
|
||
with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = False
|
||
|
||
resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
|
||
"/webhooks/jira",
|
||
content=payload,
|
||
headers={
|
||
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||
"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == 503
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_process_webhook_event_failure_returns_500(webhook_client):
|
||
"""When process_webhook_event returns False, the endpoint returns 500."""
|
||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||
|
||
payload = json.dumps({
|
||
"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
|
||
"issue": {"key": "PROJ-1"},
|
||
}).encode()
|
||
sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
|
||
|
||
with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = False
|
||
|
||
resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
|
||
"/webhooks/jira",
|
||
content=payload,
|
||
headers={
|
||
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||
"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == 500
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_issue_key_at_top_level_accepted(webhook_client):
|
||
"""Some Jira event types deliver issue_key at the top level instead of
|
||
issue.key. The handler should accept these."""
|
||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||
|
||
payload = json.dumps({
|
||
"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_deleted",
|
||
"issue_key": "PROJ-99",
|
||
}).encode()
|
||
sig = _sign(payload, "test-webhook-secret")
|
||
|
||
with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service") as mock_svc:
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.is_configured.return_value = True
|
||
mock_svc.return_value.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
|
||
|
||
resp = webhook_client["client"].post(
|
||
"/webhooks/jira",
|
||
content=payload,
|
||
headers={
|
||
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||
"X-Hub-Signature-256": sig,
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|