* security(auth): per-IP rate limit on auth endpoints + generalize last-admin guard Closes #45 and #151. #45 — every auth endpoint was unthrottled (login, magic-link, token, bootstrap), leaving us open to password brute-force and SMTP email-bombing. Wires slowapi (new dep) into the middleware chain with per-route limits: 10/min on login + token, 5/min on send-link, 3/min on bootstrap. Returns 429 with Retry-After: 60 once exceeded. Per-IP key respects the leftmost X-Forwarded-For hop (Caddy in front of the app strips client-supplied XFF). Operator escape hatch: AGNES_AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED=0. Test suite disables the limiter via autouse conftest fixture so existing auth tests that hammer endpoints in tight loops are unaffected. #151 — DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/memberships/{group_id} and the mirror DELETE /api/admin/groups/{group_id}/members/{user_id} only guarded against self-removal as last admin. Generalizes to refuse removing anyone from the seeded Admin group when they are the only remaining active admin (mirrors the existing count_admins(active_only=True) <= 1 check on delete_user / update_user). Recovery from zero admins requires direct DB access, so this closes a path where a scheduler/bootstrap actor that bypasses normal admin checks could otherwise empty the group. * security(auth): throttle remaining email-bombing + token-confirm endpoints Address code-review gap on PR #165 — the first commit covered /send-link but missed two endpoints with the IDENTICAL email-bombing surface: - POST /auth/password/reset — sends reset mail, anti-enum response - POST /auth/password/setup/request — sends setup mail, anti-enum response Both now share the 5/min limit with /send-link. Also add 10/min to the token-confirm surfaces — high-entropy tokens but partial leaks via logs / referer have surfaced before, and unbounded guess rate would let an attacker exhaust the keyspace adjacent to a leaked prefix: - POST /auth/email/verify - GET /auth/email/verify — closes the click-through bypass - POST /auth/password/reset/confirm - POST /auth/password/setup/confirm Doc fix: rate_limit.py module docstring + CHANGELOG entry no longer claim "disable without a redeploy" (misleading). The Limiter constructor freezes `enabled` from env at import time, matching every other Agnes env knob — operators set the flag and bounce the container. Tests: 4 new cases in test_auth_rate_limit.py covering /reset, /setup/request, /reset/confirm, GET /verify. Full suite: 2583 passed, 32 skipped, 0 failed. * security(auth): throttle JSON /auth/password/setup — closes form-throttle bypass Second code-review pass on PR #165 caught a fifth gap: POST /auth/password/setup (JSON variant, kept for backward compat) consumes the same setup_token as the web form /setup/confirm but was unthrottled — an attacker brute-forcing the token just switches from the form path to the JSON path and resumes at unbounded RPS. Apply the same 10/min limit and signature shape used on /setup/confirm. Also extend CHANGELOG note about the JSON-variant bypass for future operators reading the security entry. Test: 1 new case (test_password_setup_json_rate_limited_after_10_requests), 9 rate-limit tests + 28 password-flow tests + 41 auth-provider tests pass, no regressions. * chore(release): cut 0.30.1 — auth security hardening (rate limit + last-admin guard)
395 lines
15 KiB
Python
395 lines
15 KiB
Python
"""Tests for #11 — user management (active flag, safeguards, endpoints)."""
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import os
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import tempfile
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import pytest
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import duckdb
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from src.db import _ensure_schema, get_schema_version
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@pytest.fixture
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def fresh_db(monkeypatch):
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", tmp)
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# Reset cached system DB so we open a brand-new instance in tmp
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from src.db import close_system_db
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close_system_db()
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yield tmp
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close_system_db()
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def test_schema_v5_adds_active_column(fresh_db):
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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cols = conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(users)").fetchall()
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col_names = [c[1] for c in cols]
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assert "active" in col_names
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assert "deactivated_at" in col_names
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assert "deactivated_by" in col_names
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assert get_schema_version(conn) >= 5
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_schema_v5_backfill_keeps_existing_users_active(fresh_db):
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"""Simulate upgrading from v4: insert a user pre-migration, verify active=TRUE afterwards."""
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import uuid
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import duckdb as _duckdb
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from pathlib import Path
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# 1. Create a v4-era DB by hand.
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db_dir = Path(fresh_db) / "state"
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db_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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db_path = db_dir / "system.duckdb"
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conn = _duckdb.connect(str(db_path))
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try:
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conn.execute("CREATE TABLE schema_version (version INTEGER NOT NULL, applied_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT current_timestamp)")
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conn.execute("INSERT INTO schema_version (version) VALUES (4)")
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conn.execute("""CREATE TABLE users (
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id VARCHAR PRIMARY KEY, email VARCHAR UNIQUE NOT NULL,
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name VARCHAR, role VARCHAR DEFAULT 'analyst',
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password_hash VARCHAR, setup_token VARCHAR,
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setup_token_created TIMESTAMP, reset_token VARCHAR,
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reset_token_created TIMESTAMP,
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created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT current_timestamp, updated_at TIMESTAMP)""")
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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conn.execute("INSERT INTO users (id, email, name, role) VALUES (?, 'pre@v4', 'Pre', 'admin')", [uid])
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finally:
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conn.close()
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# 2. Now let the app open it — schema should migrate to v5 and backfill active=TRUE.
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db, get_schema_version
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close_system_db()
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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assert get_schema_version(conn) >= 5
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row = conn.execute("SELECT email, active FROM users WHERE email = 'pre@v4'").fetchone()
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assert row is not None
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assert row[1] is True
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_repository_update_accepts_active(fresh_db):
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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repo.create(id=uid, email="a@b.c", name="A")
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repo.update(id=uid, active=False, deactivated_by="admin-uuid")
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row = repo.get_by_id(uid)
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assert row["active"] is False
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assert row["deactivated_by"] == "admin-uuid"
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_repository_count_admins(fresh_db):
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"""v12: count_admins counts users in the Admin system group, not users.role."""
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import uuid
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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assert repo.count_admins() == 0
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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admin_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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repo.create(id=admin_id, email="a@b.c", name="A")
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UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(admin_id, admin_gid, source="system_seed")
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repo.create(id=str(uuid.uuid4()), email="b@b.c", name="B")
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assert repo.count_admins() == 1
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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@pytest.fixture
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def app_client(fresh_db, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setenv("TESTING", "1")
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monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-jwt-secret-key-minimum-32-chars!!")
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from app.main import app
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return TestClient(app)
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def _seed_admin(fresh_db):
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"""Create an admin user (in Admin user_group) and return (id, bearer_token)."""
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import uuid
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
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from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="admin@test", name="Admin")
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(uid, admin_gid, source="system_seed")
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token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="admin@test")
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return uid, token
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finally:
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conn.close()
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def test_patch_user_updates_role(app_client, fresh_db):
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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target_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=target_id, email="x@test", name="X")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.patch(
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f"/api/users/{target_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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json={"role": "analyst", "name": "X2"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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data = resp.json()
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# v12: role response is admin/user based on Admin group membership.
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# Patching role="analyst" is a no-op for the admin group → still "user".
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assert data["role"] == "user"
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assert data["name"] == "X2"
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def test_cannot_self_deactivate(app_client, fresh_db):
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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resp = app_client.patch(
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f"/api/users/{admin_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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json={"active": False},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 409
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assert "yourself" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_cannot_delete_last_admin(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""Deleting the sole active admin must 409.
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Note: the endpoint checks self-delete first, which also triggers 409 here,
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so we accept either "yourself" or "last" wording — the point is the
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safeguard blocks deletion of the only admin."""
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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# Create a non-admin so we have ≥2 users, but admin is still the only admin.
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resp = app_client.post(
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"/api/users",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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json={"email": "x@test", "name": "X", "role": "viewer"},
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)
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x_id = resp.json()["id"]
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# Try deleting the admin.
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resp = app_client.delete(
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f"/api/users/{admin_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 409
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detail = resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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assert "last" in detail or "yourself" in detail
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def test_deactivated_user_cannot_authenticate(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""A deactivated user's old JWT must be rejected."""
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@test", name="U")
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token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@test")
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UserRepository(conn).update(id=uid, active=False)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.get(
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"/api/users", # any authenticated endpoint
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Accept": "application/json"},
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)
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# Deactivated — must not succeed.
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assert resp.status_code in (401, 403)
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def test_admin_users_page_renders_for_admin(app_client, fresh_db):
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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resp = app_client.get(
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"/admin/users",
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headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
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cookies={"access_token": token},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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assert 'class="users-title">Users' in resp.text
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def test_admin_users_page_denies_non_admin(app_client, fresh_db):
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="a@test", name="A")
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token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="a@test")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.get(
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"/admin/users",
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headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
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cookies={"access_token": token},
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follow_redirects=False,
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)
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# HTML request to admin-only page → 302 (to /login) for non-admin per Phase 0, or 403.
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# Phase 0 is out of scope here so we accept 403 (current behaviour) or 302.
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assert resp.status_code in (302, 403)
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def test_deactivated_admin_rejected_by_active_check(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""Deactivating an admin must cause their token to be rejected as 401 (not succeed)."""
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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# Seed two admins so we can deactivate one without tripping the last-admin rule.
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admin_id, admin_token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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other_uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=other_uid, email="other@test", name="Other")
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other_token = create_access_token(user_id=other_uid, email="other@test")
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# Directly deactivate the "other" admin via repository (bypass safeguard
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# because we already have 2 admins; this is just a state setup).
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UserRepository(conn).update(id=other_uid, active=False)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.get(
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"/api/users",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {other_token}", "Accept": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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assert "deactivated" in resp.json().get("detail", "").lower()
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def test_cannot_remove_last_admin_via_user_memberships(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""v19 #151: DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/memberships/{group_id} must
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refuse to remove the only active admin from the seeded Admin group —
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even when the caller is a different admin (covers the case where
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a second admin was added then the first was deactivated, leaving
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one active admin who could otherwise be demoted to zero)."""
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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# Sole-admin case: try to demote the only admin via the user-keyed
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# memberships endpoint.
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resp = app_client.delete(
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f"/api/admin/users/{admin_id}/memberships/{admin_gid}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 409
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assert "last admin" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_cannot_remove_last_admin_via_group_members(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""v19 #151: DELETE /api/admin/groups/{group_id}/members/{user_id} must
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refuse to demote the only active admin (group-keyed mirror of the
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user-keyed membership endpoint)."""
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.delete(
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f"/api/admin/groups/{admin_gid}/members/{admin_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 409
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assert "last admin" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_can_remove_admin_when_another_active_admin_exists(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""Sanity: with two active admins, demoting one via the membership
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endpoint must succeed — the guard fires only at count_admins <= 1."""
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import uuid
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
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from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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admin_gid = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP]
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).fetchone()[0]
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other_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=other_id, email="other@test", name="Other")
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UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
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other_id, admin_gid, source="admin", added_by="admin@test",
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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resp = app_client.delete(
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f"/api/admin/users/{other_id}/memberships/{admin_gid}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 204
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def test_cannot_deactivate_last_admin(app_client, fresh_db):
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"""v19: try to deactivate the last active admin → 409.
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Admin demotion is now done via group membership (DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/memberships/{group_id}),
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but the deactivate path retains its own last-admin guard.
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"""
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admin_id, token = _seed_admin(fresh_db)
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# Create a second non-admin user.
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resp = app_client.post(
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"/api/users",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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json={"email": "y@test", "name": "Y"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 201
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# Try to deactivate the only active admin → must fail.
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resp = app_client.patch(
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f"/api/users/{admin_id}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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json={"active": False},
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)
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# The endpoint blocks deactivation for the last active admin BEFORE the
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# self-deactivate check (the user IS themselves, but the message says "last
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# active admin"). Either error is acceptable — both signal the constraint.
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assert resp.status_code == 409
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assert (
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"admin" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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or "yourself" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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)
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