agnes-the-ai-analyst/tests/test_admin_tokens_ui.py
ZdenekSrotyr e9d7af3cce feat(rbac+marketplace): RBAC v13 + Claude Code marketplace + #81/#83/#44 hardening
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.

== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
  internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
  wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
    require_admin                        — Admin-group god-mode
    require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
  Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
  /admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
  `da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
  runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
  (migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).

== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
  RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
  their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
  not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).

== #81 #83 #44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
    0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
  Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
  alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
  of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
  + path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
  sandbox-bypass risk closed).

== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
  shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
  per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
  silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.

== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
  (project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
  replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
  OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
  scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
  update the path.

== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
  from Czech to English for codebase consistency.

Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
2026-04-28 14:25:04 +02:00

420 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""Tests for the split /tokens (own) and /admin/tokens (all) UI.
The two routes render distinct templates:
- /tokens → my_tokens.html (any signed-in user, own PATs, create modal)
- /admin/tokens → admin_tokens.html (admin-only, all users, stat strip,
owner search, sort-by-owner)
/profile 302-redirects to /tokens for back-compat.
"""
import hashlib
import tempfile
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
import pytest
@pytest.fixture
def fresh_db(monkeypatch):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", tmp)
monkeypatch.setenv("TESTING", "1")
monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-jwt-secret-key-minimum-32-chars!!")
yield tmp
def _make_user_and_session(conn, email: str, role: str):
"""Create a user and return (uid, session_jwt).
v12: ``role='admin'`` also adds the user to the Admin system group so
``require_admin`` resolves to True.
"""
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email=email, name=email.split("@")[0], role=role)
if role == "admin":
grant_admin(conn, uid)
token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email=email, role=role)
return uid, token
def _make_pat_row(conn, user_id: str, name: str = "ci",
expires_in_days: int = 30, revoked: bool = False,
last_used_ip: str | None = None,
last_used_ago_days: int | None = None):
from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
raw = "r" * 40
exp = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=expires_in_days) if expires_in_days is not None else None
repo.create(
id=tid, user_id=user_id, name=name,
token_hash=hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest(),
prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
expires_at=exp,
)
if last_used_ago_days is not None:
ts = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=last_used_ago_days)
conn.execute(
"UPDATE personal_access_tokens SET last_used_at = ?, last_used_ip = ? WHERE id = ?",
[ts, last_used_ip, tid],
)
if revoked:
repo.revoke(tid)
return tid
# ── /tokens — "My tokens" (own PATs) — every signed-in user ────────────────
def test_non_admin_sees_my_tokens_page(fresh_db):
"""Non-admin GET /tokens: personal body, New-token CTA, create modal."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "user@t", "analyst")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/tokens",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
cookies={"access_token": sess},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
body = resp.text
# Non-admin title + eyebrow
assert "My tokens" in body
assert "Your account" in body
assert "Long-lived tokens for CLI" in body
# Role-awareness marker stays on the page root
assert 'data-is-admin="false"' in body
assert 'data-view="my"' in body
# New-token CTA + create modal are rendered
assert 'id="new-token-btn"' in body
assert 'id="create-modal"' in body
assert 'id="reveal-banner"' in body
# Admin-only stat strip is NOT rendered
assert 'id="tokens-counts"' not in body
assert 'id="count-active"' not in body
# Owner search (admin-only) is NOT rendered
assert 'placeholder="Search by owner email' not in body
# Admin title must not bleed in
assert "Access tokens" not in body
assert "Administration" not in body
def test_admin_sees_my_tokens_on_tokens_path(fresh_db):
"""Admin GET /tokens renders the SAME "My tokens" page as non-admins.
/tokens is always the personal view — admins use /admin/tokens for the
org-wide list."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, admin_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "admin@t", "admin")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/tokens",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
cookies={"access_token": admin_sess},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
body = resp.text
# Personal view markers (same as non-admin)
assert "My tokens" in body
assert "Your account" in body
assert 'id="new-token-btn"' in body
assert 'id="create-modal"' in body
assert 'data-is-admin="false"' in body
# Admin-only UI must NOT show on /tokens, even for an admin
assert 'id="tokens-counts"' not in body
assert "Access tokens" not in body # admin hero title
assert "Administration" not in body
def test_unauthenticated_redirects_from_tokens_page(fresh_db):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from app.main import app
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/tokens",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
follow_redirects=False,
)
assert resp.status_code in (302, 303, 401), resp.text
# ── /admin/tokens — admin-only list of ALL tokens ──────────────────────────
def test_admin_can_render_admin_tokens_page(fresh_db):
"""Admin GET /admin/tokens: the org-wide list with stat strip + owner
search + sort-by-owner chip."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, admin_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "admin@t", "admin")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/admin/tokens",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
cookies={"access_token": admin_sess},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
body = resp.text
# Admin-specific title + eyebrow + subtitle
assert "Access tokens" in body
assert "Administration" in body
assert "incident response and offboarding" in body
# Role-awareness marker
assert 'data-is-admin="true"' in body
assert 'data-view="admin"' in body
# Filter controls
assert 'id="flt-status"' in body
assert 'id="flt-user"' in body
assert 'id="flt-last-used"' in body
# Stat strip (admin-only)
assert 'id="tokens-counts"' in body
assert 'id="count-active"' in body
assert 'id="count-expiring"' in body
# Sort-by-owner chip is only on admin page
assert 'data-sort-key="user_email"' in body
# Owner search input
assert 'placeholder="Search by owner email' in body
# Revoke hook is in JS template
assert "data-revoke" in body
# Admin page must NOT have the "New token" CTA or create modal
assert 'id="new-token-btn"' not in body
assert 'id="create-modal"' not in body
assert 'id="reveal-banner"' not in body
# Admin page must NOT use the "My tokens" title in its main content.
# (The shared user-menu in the header shows a "My tokens" link for
# every signed-in user — scope the check to the page body only.)
page_start = body.find('class="tokens-page"')
assert page_start != -1, "admin tokens page body marker not found"
assert "My tokens" not in body[page_start:]
def test_non_admin_cannot_access_admin_tokens_page(fresh_db):
"""Non-admin GET /admin/tokens: 403 (or redirect) — admin-only route."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "user@t", "analyst")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/admin/tokens",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
cookies={"access_token": sess},
follow_redirects=False,
)
# require_role(Role.ADMIN) denies with 403 for non-admin
assert resp.status_code in (302, 401, 403), resp.text
def test_admin_tokens_deeplink_preserves_user_query(fresh_db):
"""/admin/users deep-links with ?user=<email>; page should still render
and contain the owner search input (JS pre-fills it)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, admin_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "admin@t", "admin")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/admin/tokens?user=alice%40example.com",
headers={"Accept": "text/html"},
cookies={"access_token": admin_sess},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
# Owner search input is present; JS reads ?user from window.location.
assert 'id="flt-user"' in resp.text
# NOTE: test_profile_redirects_to_tokens removed — /profile no longer
# redirects to /tokens; it renders a real profile page including Google
# Workspace groups (cherry-pick of Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd). Current /profile
# behaviour is covered by tests/test_auth_providers.py.
# ── Admin list API — expanded fields ───────────────────────────────────────
def test_admin_list_includes_user_email_and_last_used_ip(fresh_db):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
admin_uid, admin_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "admin@t", "admin")
other_uid, _ = _make_user_and_session(conn, "victim@t", "analyst")
_make_pat_row(conn, other_uid, name="laptop", last_used_ip="9.9.9.9",
last_used_ago_days=2)
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/auth/admin/tokens",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_sess}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
items = resp.json()
assert len(items) >= 1
row = [r for r in items if r["name"] == "laptop"][0]
assert row["user_id"] == other_uid
assert row["user_email"] == "victim@t"
assert row["last_used_ip"] == "9.9.9.9"
assert row["last_used_at"] # not None
def test_non_admin_cannot_list_admin_tokens(fresh_db):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, analyst_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "u@t", "analyst")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get(
"/auth/admin/tokens",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_sess}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 403
# ── Admin revoke ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_admin_can_revoke_another_users_token(fresh_db):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
admin_uid, admin_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "admin@t", "admin")
other_uid, _ = _make_user_and_session(conn, "victim@t", "analyst")
tid = _make_pat_row(conn, other_uid, name="to-kill")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.delete(
f"/auth/admin/tokens/{tid}",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_sess}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 204
conn = get_system_db()
try:
row = AccessTokenRepository(conn).get_by_id(tid)
assert row is not None
assert row["revoked_at"] is not None
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
def test_non_admin_can_create_pat_via_tokens_page_api(fresh_db):
"""The /tokens create-modal submits POST /auth/tokens (name + expires)."""
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
uid, sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "user@t", "analyst")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/auth/tokens",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess}"},
json={"name": "laptop", "expires_in_days": 30},
)
assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
data = resp.json()
assert data["name"] == "laptop"
assert data["token"] # raw JWT returned exactly once
assert data["prefix"]
# It must be owned by the creator
conn = get_system_db()
try:
row = AccessTokenRepository(conn).get_by_id(data["id"])
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
assert row is not None
assert row["user_id"] == uid
assert row["name"] == "laptop"
def test_non_admin_cannot_admin_revoke(fresh_db):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
from app.main import app
conn = get_system_db()
try:
_, analyst_sess = _make_user_and_session(conn, "u@t", "analyst")
other_uid, _ = _make_user_and_session(conn, "other@t", "analyst")
tid = _make_pat_row(conn, other_uid, name="keep")
finally:
conn.close()
close_system_db()
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.delete(
f"/auth/admin/tokens/{tid}",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {analyst_sess}"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 403