* security(auth): per-IP rate limit on auth endpoints + generalize last-admin guard Closes #45 and #151. #45 — every auth endpoint was unthrottled (login, magic-link, token, bootstrap), leaving us open to password brute-force and SMTP email-bombing. Wires slowapi (new dep) into the middleware chain with per-route limits: 10/min on login + token, 5/min on send-link, 3/min on bootstrap. Returns 429 with Retry-After: 60 once exceeded. Per-IP key respects the leftmost X-Forwarded-For hop (Caddy in front of the app strips client-supplied XFF). Operator escape hatch: AGNES_AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED=0. Test suite disables the limiter via autouse conftest fixture so existing auth tests that hammer endpoints in tight loops are unaffected. #151 — DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/memberships/{group_id} and the mirror DELETE /api/admin/groups/{group_id}/members/{user_id} only guarded against self-removal as last admin. Generalizes to refuse removing anyone from the seeded Admin group when they are the only remaining active admin (mirrors the existing count_admins(active_only=True) <= 1 check on delete_user / update_user). Recovery from zero admins requires direct DB access, so this closes a path where a scheduler/bootstrap actor that bypasses normal admin checks could otherwise empty the group. * security(auth): throttle remaining email-bombing + token-confirm endpoints Address code-review gap on PR #165 — the first commit covered /send-link but missed two endpoints with the IDENTICAL email-bombing surface: - POST /auth/password/reset — sends reset mail, anti-enum response - POST /auth/password/setup/request — sends setup mail, anti-enum response Both now share the 5/min limit with /send-link. Also add 10/min to the token-confirm surfaces — high-entropy tokens but partial leaks via logs / referer have surfaced before, and unbounded guess rate would let an attacker exhaust the keyspace adjacent to a leaked prefix: - POST /auth/email/verify - GET /auth/email/verify — closes the click-through bypass - POST /auth/password/reset/confirm - POST /auth/password/setup/confirm Doc fix: rate_limit.py module docstring + CHANGELOG entry no longer claim "disable without a redeploy" (misleading). The Limiter constructor freezes `enabled` from env at import time, matching every other Agnes env knob — operators set the flag and bounce the container. Tests: 4 new cases in test_auth_rate_limit.py covering /reset, /setup/request, /reset/confirm, GET /verify. Full suite: 2583 passed, 32 skipped, 0 failed. * security(auth): throttle JSON /auth/password/setup — closes form-throttle bypass Second code-review pass on PR #165 caught a fifth gap: POST /auth/password/setup (JSON variant, kept for backward compat) consumes the same setup_token as the web form /setup/confirm but was unthrottled — an attacker brute-forcing the token just switches from the form path to the JSON path and resumes at unbounded RPS. Apply the same 10/min limit and signature shape used on /setup/confirm. Also extend CHANGELOG note about the JSON-variant bypass for future operators reading the security entry. Test: 1 new case (test_password_setup_json_rate_limited_after_10_requests), 9 rate-limit tests + 28 password-flow tests + 41 auth-provider tests pass, no regressions. * chore(release): cut 0.30.1 — auth security hardening (rate limit + last-admin guard)
533 lines
20 KiB
Python
533 lines
20 KiB
Python
"""Password auth provider for FastAPI."""
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import logging
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import os
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import secrets
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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from urllib.parse import quote
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Form, HTTPException, Request
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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import duckdb
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from argon2 import PasswordHasher
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from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.auth.access import is_user_admin
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from app.auth.dependencies import _get_db, is_local_dev_mode
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from app.auth.rate_limit import limiter as _rate_limiter
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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def _role_label(user: dict, conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection) -> str:
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"""Display label for the response payload only — `admin` for Admin
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group members, `user` otherwise. Authorization at runtime checks
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`is_user_admin` directly; this label is purely cosmetic for the
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response shape."""
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return "admin" if is_user_admin(user["id"], conn) else "user"
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth/password", tags=["auth"])
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RESET_TOKEN_TTL = timedelta(hours=24)
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SETUP_TOKEN_TTL = timedelta(days=7)
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MIN_PASSWORD_LEN = 8
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def _audit(user_id: str, action: str, result: str | None = None) -> None:
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"""Fire-and-forget audit log entry. Swallows all errors."""
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try:
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
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audit_conn = get_system_db()
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AuditRepository(audit_conn).log(
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user_id=user_id,
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action=action,
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resource="auth",
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result=result,
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)
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audit_conn.close()
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except Exception:
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pass # Audit failure must not block auth
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class PasswordLoginRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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password: str
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class PasswordSetupRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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token: str
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password: str
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def is_available() -> bool:
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return True # Always available
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def _has_email_transport() -> bool:
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return bool(os.environ.get("SMTP_HOST") or os.environ.get("SENDGRID_API_KEY"))
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def _cookie_secure() -> bool:
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# Secure cookie only over HTTPS (DOMAIN env set = production with TLS)
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return os.environ.get("DOMAIN", "") != ""
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def _set_login_cookie(response, user_id: str, email: str) -> None:
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token = create_access_token(user_id, email)
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response.set_cookie(
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key="access_token", value=token,
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httponly=True, max_age=86400, samesite="lax",
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secure=_cookie_secure(),
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)
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def _base_url(request: Request) -> str:
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explicit = os.environ.get("SERVER_URL")
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if explicit:
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return explicit.rstrip("/")
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return str(request.base_url).rstrip("/")
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def build_reset_url(request: Request, email: str, token: str) -> str:
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return f"{_base_url(request)}/auth/password/reset?email={quote(email, safe='')}&token={token}"
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def build_setup_url(request: Request, email: str, token: str) -> str:
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return f"{_base_url(request)}/auth/password/setup?email={quote(email, safe='')}&token={token}"
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def _token_is_fresh(created, ttl: timedelta) -> bool:
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if not created:
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return False
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if isinstance(created, str):
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try:
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created = datetime.fromisoformat(created)
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except ValueError:
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return False
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# DuckDB returns TIMESTAMP as offset-naive; we stored it as UTC, so assume UTC.
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if created.tzinfo is None:
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created = created.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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return (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - created) <= ttl
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def _render_message(request: Request, title: str, message: str, status_code: int = 200):
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from app.web.router import templates, _build_context
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ctx = _build_context(request, page_title=title, page_message=message)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(request, "_message.html", ctx, status_code=status_code)
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def _render_reset_form(request: Request, email: str, token: str, error: str = ""):
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from app.web.router import templates, _build_context
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ctx = _build_context(request, email=email, token=token, error=error)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(request, "password_reset.html", ctx)
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def _render_setup_form(request: Request, email: str, token: str, name: str = "", error: str = ""):
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from app.web.router import templates, _build_context
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ctx = _build_context(request, email=email, token=token, name=name, error=error)
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return templates.TemplateResponse(request, "password_setup.html", ctx)
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def _send_mail(to_email: str, subject: str, body_text: str) -> bool:
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"""Send a plaintext email via SendGrid or SMTP. Returns True on success."""
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try:
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sendgrid_key = os.environ.get("SENDGRID_API_KEY")
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if sendgrid_key:
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import sendgrid
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from sendgrid.helpers.mail import Mail
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sg = sendgrid.SendGridAPIClient(api_key=sendgrid_key)
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msg = Mail(
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from_email=os.environ.get("EMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS", "noreply@example.com"),
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to_emails=to_email,
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subject=subject,
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plain_text_content=body_text,
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)
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sg.send(msg)
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return True
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smtp_host = os.environ.get("SMTP_HOST")
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if smtp_host:
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import smtplib
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from email.mime.text import MIMEText
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msg = MIMEText(body_text)
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msg["Subject"] = subject
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msg["From"] = os.environ.get("SMTP_FROM", "noreply@example.com")
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msg["To"] = to_email
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with smtplib.SMTP(smtp_host, int(os.environ.get("SMTP_PORT", "587"))) as s:
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if os.environ.get("SMTP_USE_TLS", "true").lower() == "true":
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s.starttls()
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smtp_user = os.environ.get("SMTP_USER")
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if smtp_user:
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s.login(smtp_user, os.environ.get("SMTP_PASSWORD", ""))
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s.send_message(msg)
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return True
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Failed to send mail to %s", to_email)
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return False
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def send_reset_email(request: Request, email: str, token: str) -> bool:
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"""Deliver a password-reset link. In LOCAL_DEV_MODE logs the link as well."""
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link = build_reset_url(request, email, token)
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if is_local_dev_mode():
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logger.warning("=" * 60)
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logger.warning("Password reset link for %s (LOCAL_DEV_MODE):", email)
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logger.warning(" %s", link)
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logger.warning("=" * 60)
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if not _has_email_transport():
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return False
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return _send_mail(email, "Reset your password", f"Click to reset your password: {link}")
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def send_setup_email(request: Request, email: str, token: str) -> bool:
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link = build_setup_url(request, email, token)
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if is_local_dev_mode():
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logger.warning("=" * 60)
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logger.warning("Account setup link for %s (LOCAL_DEV_MODE):", email)
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logger.warning(" %s", link)
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logger.warning("=" * 60)
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if not _has_email_transport():
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return False
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return _send_mail(email, "Set up your account", f"Click to set up your password: {link}")
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# ---- Existing flows ----
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@router.post("/login")
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@_rate_limiter.limit("10/minute")
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async def password_login(
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request: Request,
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body: PasswordLoginRequest,
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Login with email + password."""
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(body.email)
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if not user or not user.get("password_hash"):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid email or password")
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if not bool(user.get("active", True)):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Account deactivated")
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try:
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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ph.verify(user["password_hash"], body.password)
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except VerifyMismatchError:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid email or password")
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Unexpected error during password verification")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
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role_label = _role_label(user, conn)
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token = create_access_token(user["id"], user["email"])
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return {"access_token": token, "token_type": "bearer", "email": user["email"], "role": role_label}
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@router.post("/login/web")
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@_rate_limiter.limit("10/minute")
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async def password_login_web(
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request: Request,
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email: str = Form(...),
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password: str = Form(""),
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next: str = Form(""),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Web form login — sets cookie and redirects to `next` (or /dashboard)."""
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(email)
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if not user or not user.get("password_hash"):
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password?error=invalid", status_code=302)
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if not bool(user.get("active", True)):
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password?error=deactivated", status_code=302)
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try:
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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ph.verify(user["password_hash"], password)
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except VerifyMismatchError:
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# M9: audit failed form-login attempts (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
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_audit(user["id"], "login_failed", result="invalid_password")
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password?error=invalid", status_code=302)
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Unexpected error during web password verification for %s", email)
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password?err=auth_internal", status_code=302)
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target = next if (next.startswith("/") and not next.startswith("//")) else "/dashboard"
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response = RedirectResponse(url=target, status_code=302)
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_set_login_cookie(response, user["id"], user["email"])
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return response
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# ---- JSON programmatic setup (backward compat — used by existing tests) ----
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@router.post("/setup")
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@_rate_limiter.limit("10/minute")
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async def password_setup(
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request: Request,
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request_body: PasswordSetupRequest,
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Set initial password using setup token (JSON API).
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Rate limited 10/min per IP — same throttle as the form sibling
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``/setup/confirm``. Without this, the new web-form throttle is
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bypassable: an attacker brute-forcing the ``setup_token`` just
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switches to this JSON path and resumes at unbounded RPS.
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"""
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(request_body.email)
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if not user:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
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if user.get("setup_token") != request_body.token:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid setup token")
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if not _token_is_fresh(user.get("setup_token_created"), SETUP_TOKEN_TTL):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Setup token has expired")
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if not bool(user.get("active", True)):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Account deactivated")
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if len(request_body.password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LEN:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LEN} characters")
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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hashed = ph.hash(request_body.password)
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repo.update(id=user["id"], password_hash=hashed, setup_token=None, setup_token_created=None)
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token = create_access_token(user["id"], user["email"])
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return {"access_token": token, "token_type": "bearer", "message": "Password set successfully"}
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# ---- Web flow: password RESET ----
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@router.get("/reset", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def reset_page(
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request: Request,
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email: str = "",
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token: str = "",
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):
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"""Render the 'set new password' form when arriving via reset link."""
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if not email or not token:
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return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password", status_code=302)
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return _render_reset_form(request, email=email, token=token)
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@router.post("/reset")
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@_rate_limiter.limit("5/minute")
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async def reset_request(
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request: Request,
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email: str = Form(""),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Request a password-reset link. Anti-enumeration: same response regardless.
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Rate limited at the same 5/min as ``/auth/email/send-link`` — the
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attack surface is identical (single IP rotates random recipient
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addresses, anti-enumeration response shape masks which addresses
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landed, attacker burns SMTP / SendGrid quota + spams real users).
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"""
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# Match the rest of the codebase's case-sensitive lookup (password_login,
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# email magic-link, admin create). Lowercasing here would silently fail
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# for mixed-case emails the admin stored as-is.
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email = (email or "").strip()
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if email:
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(email)
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if user and bool(user.get("active", True)):
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token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
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repo.update(
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id=user["id"],
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reset_token=token,
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reset_token_created=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
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)
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send_reset_email(request, email, token)
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return _render_message(
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request,
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title="Check your email",
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message="If an account exists for that email, a password-reset link has been sent. "
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"The link is valid for 24 hours.",
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)
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@router.post("/reset/confirm")
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@_rate_limiter.limit("10/minute")
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async def reset_confirm(
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request: Request,
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email: str = Form(...),
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token: str = Form(...),
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password: str = Form(...),
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confirm_password: str = Form(...),
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Submit a new password using a reset token.
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Rate limited 10/min per IP to slow brute-force guessing of the 32-byte
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URL-safe ``reset_token`` — the token is high-entropy but logs / proxy
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referer leaks have surfaced partial tokens before, and there's no
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reason to allow unbounded attempts.
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"""
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if password != confirm_password:
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return _render_reset_form(request, email=email, token=token, error="Passwords do not match.")
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if len(password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LEN:
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return _render_reset_form(
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request, email=email, token=token,
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error=f"Password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LEN} characters.",
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)
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# Atomic compare-and-swap to consume the reset token. Mirrors the
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# magic-link CAS in app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token (issue
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# #82/M10) — without it, two concurrent POSTs with the same valid token
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# could both succeed in setting different new passwords. Lower
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# severity than the magic-link race (attacker would need the reset
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# token AND to race the legitimate user) but closes the asymmetry.
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cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - RESET_TOKEN_TTL
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consume_id = f"CONSUMED:{secrets.token_hex(16)}"
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try:
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conn.execute(
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"UPDATE users SET reset_token = ?, reset_token_created = NULL "
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"WHERE email = ? AND reset_token = ? AND reset_token_created IS NOT NULL "
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"AND reset_token_created >= ? AND active = TRUE",
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[consume_id, email, token, cutoff],
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)
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except Exception as exc:
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err = str(exc).lower()
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if "conflict" in err or "transaction" in err:
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return _render_reset_form(request, email=email, token=token, error="Invalid or expired reset link.")
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raise
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# Verify OUR marker won the race. A concurrent winner will have a
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# different consume_id (or NULL if they already cleared it).
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row = conn.execute(
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"SELECT reset_token FROM users WHERE email = ?",
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[email],
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).fetchone()
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if not row or row[0] != consume_id:
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# Could be: token never matched, expired, account deactivated, or
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# the race was lost. Single error keeps the UX simple and avoids
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# leaking which condition tripped.
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return _render_reset_form(request, email=email, token=token, error="Invalid or expired reset link.")
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# Won the race — fetch the user (we need id/email for the response)
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# and apply the password change. Clearing the marker happens as part
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# of the same UPDATE.
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(email)
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if not user:
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return _render_reset_form(request, email=email, token=token, error="Invalid or expired reset link.")
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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repo.update(
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|
id=user["id"],
|
|
password_hash=ph.hash(password),
|
|
reset_token=None,
|
|
reset_token_created=None,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
response = RedirectResponse(url="/login/password?msg=password_reset", status_code=302)
|
|
_set_login_cookie(response, user["id"], user["email"])
|
|
return response
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---- Web flow: initial SETUP ----
|
|
|
|
@router.get("/setup", response_class=HTMLResponse)
|
|
async def setup_page(
|
|
request: Request,
|
|
email: str = "",
|
|
token: str = "",
|
|
):
|
|
"""Render the initial 'set password + name' form when arriving via invite link.
|
|
|
|
Note: we render the form based on URL params only, without a DB lookup, so
|
|
the response is identical for valid and invalid email/token combinations
|
|
(anti-enumeration). Token validity is checked at POST /setup/confirm."""
|
|
if not email or not token:
|
|
return RedirectResponse(url="/login/password", status_code=302)
|
|
return _render_setup_form(request, email=email, token=token)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("/setup/request")
|
|
@_rate_limiter.limit("5/minute")
|
|
async def setup_request(
|
|
request: Request,
|
|
email: str = Form(""),
|
|
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
|
|
):
|
|
"""Self-service 'Request Access' — emails a setup link if user is pre-approved and unset.
|
|
|
|
Same 5/min rate limit as ``/auth/password/reset`` and ``/send-link``
|
|
— same email-bombing surface (anti-enumeration response, sends mail
|
|
on each request).
|
|
"""
|
|
# Match the rest of the codebase's case-sensitive lookup (password_login,
|
|
# email magic-link, admin create). Lowercasing here would silently fail
|
|
# for mixed-case emails the admin stored as-is.
|
|
email = (email or "").strip()
|
|
if email:
|
|
repo = UserRepository(conn)
|
|
user = repo.get_by_email(email)
|
|
# Only issue setup token if user exists, has no password yet, and is active.
|
|
if user and not user.get("password_hash") and bool(user.get("active", True)):
|
|
token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
|
|
repo.update(
|
|
id=user["id"],
|
|
setup_token=token,
|
|
setup_token_created=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
|
|
)
|
|
send_setup_email(request, email, token)
|
|
return _render_message(
|
|
request,
|
|
title="Check your email",
|
|
message="If your account is pre-approved, a setup link has been sent to your email. "
|
|
"Ask an administrator if you do not receive it.",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@router.post("/setup/confirm")
|
|
@_rate_limiter.limit("10/minute")
|
|
async def setup_confirm(
|
|
request: Request,
|
|
email: str = Form(...),
|
|
token: str = Form(...),
|
|
password: str = Form(...),
|
|
confirm_password: str = Form(...),
|
|
name: str = Form(""),
|
|
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
|
|
):
|
|
"""Web form: complete initial password setup via setup token.
|
|
|
|
Rate limited 10/min per IP — same rationale as ``/reset/confirm``:
|
|
high-entropy ``setup_token`` should still not be brute-forceable at
|
|
unbounded RPS in case a partial token leaks via logs / referer.
|
|
"""
|
|
if password != confirm_password:
|
|
return _render_setup_form(request, email=email, token=token, name=name, error="Passwords do not match.")
|
|
if len(password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LEN:
|
|
return _render_setup_form(
|
|
request, email=email, token=token, name=name,
|
|
error=f"Password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LEN} characters.",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
repo = UserRepository(conn)
|
|
user = repo.get_by_email(email)
|
|
if not user or user.get("setup_token") != token:
|
|
return _render_setup_form(request, email=email, token=token, name=name, error="Invalid or expired setup link.")
|
|
if not _token_is_fresh(user.get("setup_token_created"), SETUP_TOKEN_TTL):
|
|
return _render_setup_form(request, email=email, token=token, name=name, error="Setup link has expired. Ask an administrator for a new one.")
|
|
if not bool(user.get("active", True)):
|
|
return _render_setup_form(request, email=email, token=token, name=name, error="This account is deactivated.")
|
|
|
|
ph = PasswordHasher()
|
|
updates: dict = dict(
|
|
password_hash=ph.hash(password),
|
|
setup_token=None,
|
|
setup_token_created=None,
|
|
)
|
|
if name.strip():
|
|
updates["name"] = name.strip()
|
|
repo.update(id=user["id"], **updates)
|
|
|
|
response = RedirectResponse(url="/dashboard", status_code=302)
|
|
_set_login_cookie(response, user["id"], user["email"])
|
|
return response
|