* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
129 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
129 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Upload endpoints — sessions, artifacts, CLAUDE.local.md."""
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import hashlib
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import shutil
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import tempfile
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import uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from pathlib import Path
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, UploadFile, File
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user
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from app.utils import get_data_dir as _get_data_dir
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/upload", tags=["upload"])
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MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE = 50 * 1024 * 1024 # 50 MB
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_CHUNK_SIZE = 64 * 1024 # 64 KB read chunks for streaming size check
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async def _stream_to_temp(file: UploadFile) -> tuple[tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile, int]:
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"""Stream-upload with cumulative size check. Returns (tempfile, size).
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Aborts once total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE — avoids buffering the entire
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body in memory before the size cap rejects it (OOM prevention).
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"""
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tmp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False, suffix=".tmp")
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total = 0
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try:
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while True:
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chunk = await file.read(_CHUNK_SIZE)
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if not chunk:
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break
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total += len(chunk)
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if total > MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE:
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tmp.close()
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Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=413,
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detail=f"File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_SIZE // 1024 // 1024}MB)",
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)
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tmp.write(chunk)
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tmp.flush()
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except HTTPException:
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raise
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except Exception:
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tmp.close()
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Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise
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tmp.seek(0)
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return tmp, total
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@router.post("/sessions")
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async def upload_session(
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file: UploadFile = File(...),
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user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Upload a Claude session transcript (JSONL)."""
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user_id = user["id"]
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sessions_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_sessions" / user_id
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sessions_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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raw_name = file.filename or f"session_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}.jsonl"
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filename = Path(raw_name).name # Strips directory traversal components
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if not filename or filename.startswith("."):
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filename = f"upload_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
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target = sessions_dir / filename
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tmp, size = await _stream_to_temp(file)
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try:
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tmp.close()
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shutil.move(tmp.name, str(target))
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except Exception:
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Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise
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return {"status": "ok", "filename": filename, "size": size}
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@router.post("/artifacts")
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async def upload_artifact(
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file: UploadFile = File(...),
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user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Upload an artifact (HTML report, PNG chart, etc.)."""
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user_id = user["id"]
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artifacts_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_artifacts" / user_id
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artifacts_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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raw_name = file.filename or f"artifact_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
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filename = Path(raw_name).name # Strips directory traversal components
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if not filename or filename.startswith("."):
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filename = f"upload_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
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target = artifacts_dir / filename
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tmp, size = await _stream_to_temp(file)
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try:
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tmp.close()
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shutil.move(tmp.name, str(target))
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except Exception:
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Path(tmp.name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise
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return {"status": "ok", "filename": filename, "size": size}
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class LocalMdRequest(BaseModel):
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content: str
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@router.post("/local-md")
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async def upload_local_md(
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request: LocalMdRequest,
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user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
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):
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"""Upload CLAUDE.local.md content for corporate memory processing."""
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user_email = user["email"]
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md_dir = _get_data_dir() / "user_local_md"
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md_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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# Hashed filename — stable per user, no charset surprises from email
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safe_name = hashlib.sha256(user_email.encode()).hexdigest()[:24] + ".md"
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target = md_dir / safe_name
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target.write_text(request.content, encoding="utf-8")
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return {
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"status": "ok",
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"user": user_email,
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"size": len(request.content),
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}
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