agnes-the-ai-analyst/app/auth/access.py
ZdenekSrotyr e9d7af3cce feat(rbac+marketplace): RBAC v13 + Claude Code marketplace + #81/#83/#44 hardening
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.

== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
  internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
  wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
    require_admin                        — Admin-group god-mode
    require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
  Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
  /admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
  `da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
  runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
  (migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).

== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
  RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
  their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
  not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).

== #81 #83 #44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
    0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
  Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
  alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
  of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
  + path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
  sandbox-bypass risk closed).

== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
  shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
  per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
  silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.

== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
  (project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
  replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
  OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
  scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
  update the path.

== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
  from Czech to English for codebase consistency.

Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
2026-04-28 14:25:04 +02:00

197 lines
7 KiB
Python

"""Authorization helpers — group membership and resource grants.
Two layers of access control replace the v9 internal_roles / group_mappings
machinery:
1. **App-level access** is whether the user is in the ``Admin`` group. There
is no hierarchy — ``Admin`` is god mode (short-circuits every grant
check), every other group is just a label binding members to grants.
2. **Resource access** is whether any group the user is in holds a grant on
``(resource_type, resource_id)`` in ``resource_grants``. ``Admin`` group
short-circuits this so admins never need explicit grants.
Two FastAPI dependencies cover the API surface:
- ``require_admin`` — gates app-level mutations (admin UI, user mgmt,
settings, …). 403 unless user is in Admin.
- ``require_resource_access(resource_type, path_template)`` — gates
entity-scoped endpoints. The path_template is a Python format string
resolved against the request's path_params at call time — e.g.
``"{slug}/{plugin_name}"`` becomes the resource_id we look up.
The resolver is intentionally cache-less: every authorization check does one
or two DuckDB queries. DuckDB is in-process, so a per-request DB hit costs
sub-millisecond — the upstream session.internal_roles cache + dual-path
fallback solved a problem we don't have.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from typing import Optional
import duckdb
from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
from app.auth.dependencies import _get_db, get_current_user
from app.resource_types import ResourceType
from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, SYSTEM_EVERYONE_GROUP
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _get_group_id_by_name(name: str, conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection) -> Optional[str]:
"""Look up a group's id by its (unique) name. Returns None if absent —
typically only happens during the very first migration pass before
_seed_system_groups has run, or in mis-seeded test fixtures."""
row = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [name]
).fetchone()
return row[0] if row else None
def _user_group_ids(user_id: str, conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection) -> set[str]:
"""Set of group_ids the user is in. Always includes Everyone.
Membership rows live in ``user_group_members``; Everyone is added
unconditionally so callers don't have to special-case it. If the
Everyone group is missing (impossible in healthy installs but seen in
fresh-test scenarios), the helper logs once and proceeds with the
explicit memberships.
"""
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT group_id FROM user_group_members WHERE user_id = ?",
[user_id],
).fetchall()
group_ids: set[str] = {r[0] for r in rows}
everyone_id = _get_group_id_by_name(SYSTEM_EVERYONE_GROUP, conn)
if everyone_id is not None:
group_ids.add(everyone_id)
return group_ids
def is_user_admin(user_id: str, conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection) -> bool:
"""True iff the user is a member of the Admin system group.
Cheap — one SELECT EXISTS-style check (the inner _user_group_ids does
one fetchall + a name lookup; both are tiny, both indexed).
"""
admin_id = _get_group_id_by_name(SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, conn)
if admin_id is None:
# No Admin group seeded — defensively deny. Fail-closed beats the
# alternative of silently granting elevated access.
logger.warning(
"is_user_admin: Admin group missing in user_groups; denying access"
)
return False
return admin_id in _user_group_ids(user_id, conn)
def can_access(
user_id: str,
resource_type: str,
resource_id: str,
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection,
) -> bool:
"""Generic access check. Admin short-circuits; otherwise group JOIN.
Two SELECTs in the worst case:
1. _user_group_ids — fetch group membership.
2. has_grant on resource_grants for (group_ids, resource_type, resource_id).
"""
group_ids = _user_group_ids(user_id, conn)
admin_id = _get_group_id_by_name(SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, conn)
if admin_id is not None and admin_id in group_ids:
return True
if not group_ids:
return False
placeholders = ",".join(["?"] * len(group_ids))
row = conn.execute(
f"""SELECT 1 FROM resource_grants
WHERE group_id IN ({placeholders})
AND resource_type = ?
AND resource_id = ?
LIMIT 1""",
[*group_ids, resource_type, resource_id],
).fetchone()
return row is not None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# FastAPI dependencies
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def require_admin(
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
) -> dict:
"""Dependency: require user is in the Admin group. Raises 403 otherwise.
Replaces the v9 ``require_role(Role.ADMIN)`` and
``require_internal_role("core.admin")`` thin wrappers. Same calling
convention as before — endpoints write ``Depends(require_admin)`` (no
parens) and receive the user dict.
"""
if not is_user_admin(user["id"], conn):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail="Admin access required",
)
return user
def require_resource_access(
resource_type: ResourceType,
path_template: str,
):
"""Dependency factory: require access to ``resource_type`` at the path
derived from ``path_template`` formatted with the request's path_params.
Example::
@router.get("/marketplace/{slug}/plugins/{name}/install")
async def install_plugin(
slug: str, name: str,
user = Depends(require_resource_access(
ResourceType.MARKETPLACE_PLUGIN, "{slug}/{name}",
)),
): ...
Admin short-circuits — admins never need explicit grants. Non-admins
raise 403 with the resolved path in the detail so the client knows what
they failed against.
"""
async def dep(
request: Request,
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
) -> dict:
try:
resource_id = path_template.format(**request.path_params)
except KeyError as e:
# Path template references a param the route doesn't expose —
# programmer error, fail loud.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
detail=(
f"require_resource_access: path_template "
f"{path_template!r} references missing path_param {e}"
),
)
if not can_access(user["id"], resource_type.value, resource_id, conn):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=(
f"Access denied to {resource_type.value} "
f"{resource_id!r}"
),
)
return user
return dep