* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
178 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
178 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
"""Auth endpoints — login, token generation, bootstrap."""
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import logging
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import uuid
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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import duckdb
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from argon2 import PasswordHasher
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from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.auth.access import is_user_admin
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from app.auth.dependencies import _get_db
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from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"])
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class TokenRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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password: str = ""
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class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
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access_token: str
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token_type: str = "bearer"
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user_id: str
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email: str
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role: str
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class BootstrapRequest(BaseModel):
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email: str
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name: str = ""
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password: str = ""
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def _audit(user_id: str, action: str, result: str | None = None) -> None:
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"""Fire-and-forget audit log entry. Swallows all errors."""
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try:
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from src.db import get_system_db
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from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
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audit_conn = get_system_db()
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AuditRepository(audit_conn).log(
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user_id=user_id,
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action=action,
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resource="auth",
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result=result,
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)
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audit_conn.close()
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except Exception:
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pass # Audit failure must not block auth
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@router.post("/token", response_model=TokenResponse)
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async def create_token(
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request: TokenRequest,
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Issue a JWT token. Requires password authentication."""
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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user = repo.get_by_email(request.email)
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if not user:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="User not found")
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if not bool(user.get("active", True)):
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_audit(user["id"], "login_failed", result="deactivated")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Account deactivated")
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# If user has password_hash, require and verify it
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if user.get("password_hash"):
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if not request.password:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Password required")
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try:
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ph = PasswordHasher()
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ph.verify(user["password_hash"], request.password)
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except VerifyMismatchError:
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_audit(user["id"], "login_failed", result="invalid_password")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid password")
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except Exception:
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logger.exception("Unexpected error during password verification")
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raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
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else:
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# No password set — must use their auth provider (Google OAuth, magic link)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=401,
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detail="This account uses external authentication. Please log in via your configured provider.",
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)
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role_label = "admin" if is_user_admin(user["id"], conn) else (user.get("role") or "user")
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token = create_access_token(
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user_id=user["id"],
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email=user["email"],
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role=role_label,
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)
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_audit(user["id"], "token_created")
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return TokenResponse(
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access_token=token,
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user_id=user["id"],
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email=user["email"],
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role=role_label,
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)
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@router.post("/bootstrap", response_model=TokenResponse)
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async def bootstrap(
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request: BootstrapRequest,
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conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
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):
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"""Bootstrap the first admin account.
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Allowed when no user has a password_hash yet. This covers:
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(a) No users exist at all.
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(b) Only seed users (created by SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL at startup) exist, which
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have no password and cannot log in — bootstrap lets the operator
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activate them with a password.
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If a user with the given email already exists (e.g. as a seed), this
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endpoint sets its password_hash (or clears it, if no password was supplied —
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useful for OAuth-only flows) and promotes it to admin.
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Deactivates as soon as any user has a password_hash.
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"""
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repo = UserRepository(conn)
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existing = repo.list_all()
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# Bootstrap is locked once anyone has a password set.
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users_with_password = [u for u in existing if u.get("password_hash")]
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if users_with_password:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=403,
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detail="Bootstrap disabled — a user with a password already exists. Use /auth/password/login.",
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)
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password_hash = PasswordHasher().hash(request.password) if request.password else None
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# If a matching user already exists (e.g. seed), update it; else create fresh.
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existing_user = next((u for u in existing if u.get("email") == request.email), None)
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if existing_user:
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user_id = existing_user["id"]
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repo.update(id=user_id, password_hash=password_hash, role="admin")
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_audit(user_id, "bootstrap_activated_seed")
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else:
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user_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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repo.create(
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id=user_id,
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email=request.email,
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name=request.name or request.email.split("@")[0],
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role="admin",
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password_hash=password_hash,
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)
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_audit(user_id, "bootstrap_completed")
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# Promote the bootstrap user to the Admin system group — replaces the v9
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# ``user_role_grants`` write that the old bootstrap path relied on.
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admin_group = conn.execute(
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"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP],
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).fetchone()
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if admin_group:
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UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
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user_id=user_id,
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group_id=admin_group[0],
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source="system_seed",
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added_by="auth.bootstrap",
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)
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token = create_access_token(user_id=user_id, email=request.email, role="admin")
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return TokenResponse(
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access_token=token,
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user_id=user_id,
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email=request.email,
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role="admin",
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)
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