agnes-the-ai-analyst/app/api/tokens.py
minasarustamyan d4ac84dd46
feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150)
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00

197 lines
7.5 KiB
Python

"""Personal access token endpoints (#12)."""
import hashlib
import secrets
import uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
from typing import Optional, List
import duckdb
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
from pydantic import BaseModel
from app.auth.access import require_admin
from app.auth.dependencies import require_session_token, get_current_user, _get_db
from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth/tokens", tags=["tokens"])
admin_router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth/admin/tokens", tags=["tokens-admin"])
class CreateTokenRequest(BaseModel):
name: str
expires_in_days: Optional[int] = 90 # null = no expiry
class CreateTokenResponse(BaseModel):
id: str
name: str
prefix: str
token: str # raw token — returned exactly once
expires_at: Optional[str]
created_at: str
class TokenListItem(BaseModel):
id: str
name: str
prefix: str
created_at: str
expires_at: Optional[str]
last_used_at: Optional[str]
revoked_at: Optional[str]
class AdminTokenItem(TokenListItem):
"""Admin list row: adds owner identity + last IP for incident response."""
user_id: str
user_email: Optional[str] = None
last_used_ip: Optional[str] = None
def _audit(conn, actor: str, action: str, target: str, params=None):
try:
AuditRepository(conn).log(user_id=actor, action=action,
resource=f"token:{target}", params=params)
except Exception:
pass
def _row_to_item(row: dict) -> TokenListItem:
return TokenListItem(
id=row["id"], name=row["name"], prefix=row["prefix"],
created_at=str(row.get("created_at") or ""),
expires_at=str(row["expires_at"]) if row.get("expires_at") else None,
last_used_at=str(row["last_used_at"]) if row.get("last_used_at") else None,
revoked_at=str(row["revoked_at"]) if row.get("revoked_at") else None,
)
def _row_to_admin_item(row: dict) -> AdminTokenItem:
return AdminTokenItem(
id=row["id"], name=row["name"], prefix=row["prefix"],
created_at=str(row.get("created_at") or ""),
expires_at=str(row["expires_at"]) if row.get("expires_at") else None,
last_used_at=str(row["last_used_at"]) if row.get("last_used_at") else None,
revoked_at=str(row["revoked_at"]) if row.get("revoked_at") else None,
user_id=row.get("user_id") or "",
user_email=row.get("user_email"),
last_used_ip=row.get("last_used_ip"),
)
@router.post("", response_model=CreateTokenResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_token(
payload: CreateTokenRequest,
user: dict = Depends(require_session_token),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
if not payload.name.strip():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="name is required")
if payload.expires_in_days is not None and payload.expires_in_days <= 0:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="expires_in_days must be a positive integer")
# Cap at 10 years — larger values overflow datetime.max during the
# `datetime.now(utc) + timedelta(days=...)` addition and surface as an
# unhandled OverflowError → 500. 10y is well past any legitimate PAT
# lifetime (the no-expiry path below uses ~100y and doesn't compute
# expires_at on the datetime object).
if payload.expires_in_days is not None and payload.expires_in_days > 3650:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="expires_in_days must not exceed 3650 (10 years)")
repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
token_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
expires_at: Optional[datetime] = None
expires_delta: Optional[timedelta] = None
omit_exp = payload.expires_in_days is None
if payload.expires_in_days is not None:
expires_delta = timedelta(days=payload.expires_in_days)
expires_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + expires_delta
# else: "no expiry" — DB stores expires_at=NULL and the JWT carries no
# `exp` claim. The authoritative expiry check lives in
# app/auth/dependencies.py (via the DB row).
# Build the JWT that embeds jti=token_id and typ=pat
jwt_token = create_access_token(
user_id=user["id"], email=user["email"],
token_id=token_id, typ="pat",
expires_delta=expires_delta, omit_exp=omit_exp,
)
# Prefix: first 8 chars of the jti (UUID) — uniquely identifies the token in UI
# without exposing JWT headers (which all start with "eyJhbGci…" and are useless
# for identification). The JWT itself is returned ONCE in the response body.
prefix = token_id.replace("-", "")[:8]
# token_hash = sha256(raw JWT). Used in verify_token as defense-in-depth.
token_hash = hashlib.sha256(jwt_token.encode()).hexdigest()
repo.create(
id=token_id, user_id=user["id"], name=payload.name.strip(),
token_hash=token_hash, prefix=prefix, expires_at=expires_at,
)
_audit(conn, user["id"], "token.create", token_id, {"name": payload.name})
return CreateTokenResponse(
id=token_id, name=payload.name.strip(), prefix=prefix,
token=jwt_token, # returned EXACTLY ONCE; never retrievable again
expires_at=str(expires_at) if expires_at else None,
created_at=str(datetime.now(timezone.utc)),
)
@router.get("", response_model=List[TokenListItem])
async def list_tokens(
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
# PATs may list their owner's own tokens — required by the documented
# `da auth token list` CLI flow (HEADLESS_USAGE.md). Only `create_token`
# is session-only (to block PAT-spawning-PAT chains).
rows = AccessTokenRepository(conn).list_for_user(user["id"])
return [_row_to_item(r) for r in rows]
@router.get("/{token_id}", response_model=TokenListItem)
async def get_token(
token_id: str,
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
row = AccessTokenRepository(conn).get_by_id(token_id)
if not row or row["user_id"] != user["id"]:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Token not found")
return _row_to_item(row)
@router.delete("/{token_id}", status_code=204)
async def revoke_token(
token_id: str,
user: dict = Depends(get_current_user),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
row = repo.get_by_id(token_id)
if not row or row["user_id"] != user["id"]:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Token not found")
repo.revoke(token_id)
_audit(conn, user["id"], "token.revoke", token_id)
# Admin — list & revoke tokens across users (for incident response)
@admin_router.get("", response_model=List[AdminTokenItem])
async def admin_list_tokens(
user: dict = Depends(require_admin),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
return [_row_to_admin_item(r) for r in AccessTokenRepository(conn).list_all_with_user()]
@admin_router.delete("/{token_id}", status_code=204)
async def admin_revoke_token(
token_id: str,
user: dict = Depends(require_admin),
conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection = Depends(_get_db),
):
repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
row = repo.get_by_id(token_id)
if not row:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Token not found")
repo.revoke(token_id)
_audit(conn, user["id"], "token.admin_revoke", token_id, {"owner_id": row["user_id"]})