This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.
== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
require_admin — Admin-group god-mode
require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
/admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
`da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
(migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).
== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).
== #81 #83 #44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
+ path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
sandbox-bypass risk closed).
== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.
== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
(project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
update the path.
== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
from Czech to English for codebase consistency.
Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
701 lines
25 KiB
Python
701 lines
25 KiB
Python
"""Tests for #12 — personal access tokens (PAT)."""
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import os
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import tempfile
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import pytest
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@pytest.fixture
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def fresh_db(monkeypatch):
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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monkeypatch.setenv("DATA_DIR", tmp)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TESTING", "1")
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monkeypatch.setenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY", "test-jwt-secret-key-minimum-32-chars!!")
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yield tmp
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def test_schema_v6_creates_pat_table(fresh_db):
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from src.db import get_system_db, get_schema_version, close_system_db
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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cols = conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(personal_access_tokens)").fetchall()
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col_names = [c[1] for c in cols]
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for expected in ("id", "user_id", "name", "token_hash", "prefix",
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"scopes", "created_at", "expires_at", "last_used_at", "revoked_at"):
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assert expected in col_names
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assert get_schema_version(conn) >= 6
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_schema_v7_adds_last_used_ip_column(fresh_db):
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"""Schema v7: personal_access_tokens has last_used_ip column."""
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from src.db import get_system_db, get_schema_version, close_system_db
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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cols = conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(personal_access_tokens)").fetchall()
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col_names = [c[1] for c in cols]
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assert "last_used_ip" in col_names
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assert get_schema_version(conn) >= 7
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_access_token_repo_create_and_lookup(fresh_db):
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
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token_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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raw = "abcdefgh" + "x" * 32
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repo.create(
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id=token_id,
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user_id="u1",
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name="laptop",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=raw[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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row = repo.get_by_id(token_id)
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assert row is not None
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assert row["name"] == "laptop"
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assert row["prefix"] == "abcdefgh"
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assert row["revoked_at"] is None
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rows = repo.list_for_user("u1")
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assert len(rows) == 1
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repo.revoke(token_id)
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assert repo.get_by_id(token_id)["revoked_at"] is not None
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_access_token_repo_mark_used(fresh_db):
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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repo.create(id=tid, user_id="u1", name="x",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(b"r").hexdigest(), prefix="rrrrrrrr")
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assert repo.get_by_id(tid)["last_used_at"] is None
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repo.mark_used(tid)
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assert repo.get_by_id(tid)["last_used_at"] is not None
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_pat_token_carries_typ_claim(fresh_db):
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token, verify_token
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token = create_access_token(
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user_id="u1", email="u@test", role="analyst",
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token_id="deadbeef-1234", typ="pat",
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)
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payload = verify_token(token)
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assert payload["typ"] == "pat"
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assert payload["jti"] == "deadbeef-1234"
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def test_session_token_defaults_typ(fresh_db):
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token, verify_token
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token = create_access_token(user_id="u1", email="u@test", role="analyst")
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payload = verify_token(token)
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# Default typ is "session".
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assert payload.get("typ") == "session"
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def test_revoked_pat_is_rejected(fresh_db, monkeypatch):
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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token_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
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raw = "secretXX" + "a" * 32
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=token_id, user_id=uid, name="ci",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=raw[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=30),
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)
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jwt_token = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin", token_id=token_id, typ="pat",
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)
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# Revoke
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).revoke(token_id)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/users",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {jwt_token}", "Accept": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_expired_pat_is_rejected_from_db(fresh_db):
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"""A PAT with a past expires_at in DB is rejected even if JWT exp is in future."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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# Past-dated expiry in DB
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=tid, user_id=uid, name="stale",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(b"whatever").hexdigest(), prefix=tid.replace("-","")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=1),
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)
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# JWT with much longer TTL so signature-level `exp` would pass
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pat = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin",
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token_id=tid, typ="pat",
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expires_delta=timedelta(days=365),
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/users",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}", "Accept": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_create_pat_returns_raw_once(fresh_db):
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import uuid
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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sess_token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin") # typ=session
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.post(
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"/auth/tokens",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
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json={"name": "laptop", "expires_in_days": 30},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 201
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data = resp.json()
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assert data["name"] == "laptop"
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assert "token" in data and data["token"] # raw token returned exactly once
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# Listing returns prefix, never raw.
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# Prefix is derived from the token id (jti), not the JWT string, to avoid
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# all tokens having the useless "eyJhbGci" JWT-header prefix.
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list_resp = client.get(
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"/auth/tokens", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
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)
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assert list_resp.status_code == 200
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rows = list_resp.json()
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assert len(rows) == 1
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assert "token" not in rows[0]
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assert rows[0]["prefix"] == data["prefix"]
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assert len(rows[0]["prefix"]) == 8
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assert not data["prefix"].startswith("eyJ") # regression: not the JWT header
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def test_pat_cannot_create_pat(fresh_db):
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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# Create the JWT first so we can store its sha256 as token_hash (otherwise
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# the defense-in-depth check in get_current_user would reject it with 401
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# before require_session_token ever runs).
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pat = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin", token_id=tid, typ="pat")
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=tid, user_id=uid, name="x",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.post(
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"/auth/tokens",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}"},
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json={"name": "bad", "expires_in_days": 30},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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# NOTE: test_profile_page_redirects_to_tokens removed — /profile no longer
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# redirects to /tokens; it renders a real profile page including Google
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# Workspace groups (cherry-pick of Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd). The /tokens render
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# checks (My tokens title, new-token-btn) survive in the test_admin_tokens_ui
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# suite.
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def test_pat_first_use_from_new_ip_audits(fresh_db):
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"""Using a PAT from a different IP than last time emits an audit entry."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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pat = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin", token_id=tid, typ="pat",
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expires_delta=timedelta(days=90),
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)
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repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
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repo.create(
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id=tid, user_id=uid, name="ci",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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# Simulate a prior use from 1.1.1.1 so the upcoming call is a "new IP".
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repo.mark_used(tid, ip="1.1.1.1")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/users",
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headers={
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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"X-Forwarded-For": "2.2.2.2",
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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rows = conn.execute(
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"SELECT params FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'token.first_use_new_ip' AND user_id = ?",
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[uid],
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).fetchall()
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assert len(rows) == 1, f"expected 1 audit row, got {len(rows)}"
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params = rows[0][0]
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# params is stored as JSON text; check the IP appears
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assert "2.2.2.2" in str(params)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_pat_same_ip_does_not_audit(fresh_db):
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"""Using a PAT from the same IP as last time does NOT emit an audit entry."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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pat = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin", token_id=tid, typ="pat",
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expires_delta=timedelta(days=90),
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)
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repo = AccessTokenRepository(conn)
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repo.create(
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id=tid, user_id=uid, name="ci",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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repo.mark_used(tid, ip="3.3.3.3")
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/users",
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headers={
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}",
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"Accept": "application/json",
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"X-Forwarded-For": "3.3.3.3",
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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count = conn.execute(
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"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'token.first_use_new_ip' AND user_id = ?",
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[uid],
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).fetchone()[0]
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assert count == 0
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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def test_pat_can_list_own_tokens(fresh_db):
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"""A PAT must be allowed to list its owner's tokens — `da auth token list`
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CLI flow. Previously this returned 403 because require_session_token
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blocked all PATs uniformly."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="analyst")
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tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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pat = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="analyst", token_id=tid, typ="pat",
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expires_delta=timedelta(days=90),
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)
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=tid, user_id=uid, name="laptop",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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|
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get(
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"/auth/tokens",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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rows = resp.json()
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assert any(r["id"] == tid for r in rows)
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|
|
|
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def test_pat_can_revoke_own_token(fresh_db):
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"""A PAT must be allowed to revoke its owner's own tokens —
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`da auth token revoke` CLI flow."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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import hashlib, uuid
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from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
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from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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from app.main import app
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|
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="analyst")
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# Token A — the PAT used to authenticate this call.
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tid_a = str(uuid.uuid4())
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pat_a = create_access_token(
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user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="analyst", token_id=tid_a, typ="pat",
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expires_delta=timedelta(days=90),
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)
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=tid_a, user_id=uid, name="primary",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat_a.encode()).hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid_a.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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# Token B — the one we'll revoke with A.
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tid_b = str(uuid.uuid4())
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AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
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id=tid_b, user_id=uid, name="old-ci",
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token_hash=hashlib.sha256(b"whatever").hexdigest(),
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prefix=tid_b.replace("-", "")[:8],
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expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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)
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finally:
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conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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|
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.delete(
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f"/auth/tokens/{tid_b}",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat_a}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 204, resp.text
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# Confirm B is now revoked.
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conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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row = AccessTokenRepository(conn).get_by_id(tid_b)
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assert row["revoked_at"] is not None
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finally:
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|
conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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|
|
|
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def test_create_token_rejects_expires_in_days_above_cap(fresh_db):
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"""expires_in_days > 3650 must return 400 (not 500 via datetime overflow)."""
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|
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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|
import uuid
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|
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
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|
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
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|
from app.main import app
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|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
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try:
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uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
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from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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grant_admin(conn, uid)
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sess_token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin")
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finally:
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|
conn.close()
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close_system_db()
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|
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client = TestClient(app)
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# Just above the cap — must be 400, not 500.
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resp = client.post(
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"/auth/tokens",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
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json={"name": "laptop", "expires_in_days": 3651},
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|
)
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|
assert resp.status_code == 400, resp.text
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|
assert "3650" in resp.text
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|
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|
# Huge value that would previously overflow datetime.max — still 400.
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|
resp = client.post(
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"/auth/tokens",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
|
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json={"name": "laptop", "expires_in_days": 10_000_000_000},
|
|
)
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assert resp.status_code == 400, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_first_ever_use_does_not_audit(fresh_db):
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|
"""The first-ever use of a PAT (no prior last_used_at) does NOT emit an audit entry."""
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|
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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|
import hashlib, uuid
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|
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
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|
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
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|
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
|
|
from src.repositories.access_tokens import AccessTokenRepository
|
|
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
|
|
from app.main import app
|
|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
|
|
from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
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|
grant_admin(conn, uid)
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|
tid = str(uuid.uuid4())
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|
pat = create_access_token(
|
|
user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin", token_id=tid, typ="pat",
|
|
expires_delta=timedelta(days=90),
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|
)
|
|
AccessTokenRepository(conn).create(
|
|
id=tid, user_id=uid, name="ci",
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|
token_hash=hashlib.sha256(pat.encode()).hexdigest(),
|
|
prefix=tid.replace("-", "")[:8],
|
|
expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(days=90),
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|
)
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|
# No mark_used call → first-ever use
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
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|
close_system_db()
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|
|
|
client = TestClient(app)
|
|
resp = client.get(
|
|
"/api/users",
|
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headers={
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"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}",
|
|
"Accept": "application/json",
|
|
"X-Forwarded-For": "4.4.4.4",
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|
},
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|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
count = conn.execute(
|
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"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM audit_log WHERE action = 'token.first_use_new_ip' AND user_id = ?",
|
|
[uid],
|
|
).fetchone()[0]
|
|
assert count == 0
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|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
close_system_db()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_null_expiry_jwt_has_no_exp_claim(fresh_db):
|
|
"""PAT with `expires_in_days=null` (user-requested "never") must not
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|
carry an `exp` claim at all — the DB `expires_at=NULL` is the source
|
|
of truth. The previous ~100y `exp` claim was a misleading silent expiry."""
|
|
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
|
|
import uuid
|
|
import jwt as pyjwt
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
|
|
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
|
|
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
|
|
from app.main import app
|
|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
|
|
from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
|
|
grant_admin(conn, uid)
|
|
sess_token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin")
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
close_system_db()
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(app)
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/auth/tokens",
|
|
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
|
|
json={"name": "forever", "expires_in_days": None},
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
|
|
raw_pat = resp.json()["token"]
|
|
# Decode without signature verification — we're inspecting claims only.
|
|
claims = pyjwt.decode(raw_pat, options={"verify_signature": False})
|
|
assert "exp" not in claims, f"expected no exp claim, got: {claims.get('exp')}"
|
|
# But the other PAT claims are still present.
|
|
assert claims.get("typ") == "pat"
|
|
assert claims.get("sub") == uid
|
|
assert "jti" in claims
|
|
|
|
# DB row mirrors this: expires_at is NULL.
|
|
assert resp.json()["expires_at"] is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_with_null_expiry_is_accepted_by_verify_token(fresh_db):
|
|
"""A claim-less JWT (no `exp`) must round-trip through verify_token without
|
|
raising ExpiredSignatureError and without falling back to a wall-clock
|
|
cap. The DB-level expiry check in dependencies.py remains authoritative."""
|
|
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token, verify_token
|
|
|
|
raw = create_access_token(
|
|
user_id="u-1", email="u@t", role="admin",
|
|
token_id="tid-1", typ="pat", omit_exp=True,
|
|
)
|
|
payload = verify_token(raw)
|
|
assert payload is not None
|
|
assert "exp" not in payload
|
|
assert payload["typ"] == "pat"
|
|
assert payload["jti"] == "tid-1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_pat_null_expiry_end_to_end_allows_authenticated_request(fresh_db):
|
|
"""Create a PAT with `expires_in_days=null`, then use it to call an
|
|
authenticated endpoint. Previously relied on the 36500-day `exp`;
|
|
now relies on the DB row. Regression guard for the switch."""
|
|
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
|
|
import uuid
|
|
from src.db import get_system_db, close_system_db
|
|
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
|
|
from app.auth.jwt import create_access_token
|
|
from app.main import app
|
|
|
|
conn = get_system_db()
|
|
try:
|
|
uid = str(uuid.uuid4())
|
|
UserRepository(conn).create(id=uid, email="u@t", name="U", role="admin")
|
|
from tests.helpers.auth import grant_admin
|
|
grant_admin(conn, uid)
|
|
sess_token = create_access_token(user_id=uid, email="u@t", role="admin")
|
|
finally:
|
|
conn.close()
|
|
close_system_db()
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(app)
|
|
created = client.post(
|
|
"/auth/tokens",
|
|
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {sess_token}"},
|
|
json={"name": "forever", "expires_in_days": None},
|
|
)
|
|
assert created.status_code == 201, created.text
|
|
pat = created.json()["token"]
|
|
|
|
# Use the PAT to list tokens (any authenticated endpoint).
|
|
listed = client.get("/auth/tokens", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {pat}"})
|
|
assert listed.status_code == 200, listed.text
|
|
assert any(row["name"] == "forever" for row in listed.json())
|