agnes-the-ai-analyst/app/main.py
ZdenekSrotyr 5f6bb7a4b2
fix(security+ops) + release(0.12.1): #82 #85 #87 hardening + cut 0.12.1 (#104)
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture

Security and operational hardening across three issue groups:

- M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun)
- C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile)
- M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler
- M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server)
- M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING)
- M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs

- C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download
- M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename

- C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response
- C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible)
- M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
- M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch)

Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90)

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety

Review fixes:
- Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was
  missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints
- Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex
- M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with
  warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after
  successful token consumption
- Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak

Address Devin Review findings on PR #104:

1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution +
   ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only
   matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like
   `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the
   hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against
   ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast.

2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`,
   `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old
   format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call
   /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback
   to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured).

3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open
   NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to
   prevent FD leaks until GC.

Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local,
multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split

Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104:

1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download
   endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow
   dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders
   contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots
   and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \)
   and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs.

2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health
   checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints
   (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed)
   and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint
   with a PAT.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening

* fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up)

Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify
got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but
password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using
read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset
token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write-
wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker
would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the
asymmetry was a polish gap.

Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write
unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then
SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears
the marker and applies the password change.

New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in
tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two
ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same
token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with
'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both
POSTs got 302 (race confirmed).

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 19:57:30 +02:00

382 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""FastAPI main application — unified server for web UI + API."""
# Silence authlib's internal forward-compat note. Authlib emits an
# AuthlibDeprecationWarning from its own _joserfc_helpers when our
# `from authlib.integrations.starlette_client import OAuth` import
# touches `authlib.jose` paths. The warning is upstream-internal — it's
# telling authlib to migrate to joserfc before its 2.0; it's not
# actionable on our side until either authlib ships the fix or we
# rewrite OAuth handling on top of joserfc directly. Filtering here
# (before authlib gets imported transitively) keeps `make local-dev`
# stdout clean without hiding warnings from any other package.
import warnings as _warnings
try:
from authlib.deprecate import AuthlibDeprecationWarning as _AuthlibDepr
_warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", category=_AuthlibDepr)
except ImportError:
# authlib too old / class moved — fall back to message-based match
# so the filter still keeps startup clean.
_warnings.filterwarnings(
"ignore",
message=r"authlib\.jose module is deprecated.*",
)
import logging
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError
from importlib.metadata import version as _pkg_version
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import quote
import os
def _app_version() -> str:
"""Product version for FastAPI title / OpenAPI schema.
Single source of truth is `pyproject.toml` `[project].version`; we read
it back via `importlib.metadata` at runtime so `/docs`, `/openapi.json`,
`/api/version`, `/cli/latest`, and `da --version` can never drift.
"""
try:
return _pkg_version("agnes-the-ai-analyst")
except PackageNotFoundError:
return "dev"
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from starlette.exceptions import HTTPException as StarletteHTTPException
from starlette.middleware.gzip import GZipMiddleware
from starlette.middleware.sessions import SessionMiddleware
from starlette.types import ASGIApp, Receive, Scope, Send
class _SelectiveGZipMiddleware:
"""GZipMiddleware wrapper that skips a set of path prefixes.
Parquet-serving endpoints send responses that are already columnar-
compressed (parquet's internal codec) and — for /api/data — can reach
hundreds of MB. Gzipping them on the way out costs CPU and latency with
no meaningful size reduction. Skip those paths; every other endpoint
(JSON manifests, HTML previews, install.sh) still gets compressed.
"""
def __init__(self, app: ASGIApp, minimum_size: int = 1024, skip_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ()) -> None:
self._raw = app
self._gzip = GZipMiddleware(app, minimum_size=minimum_size)
self._skip_prefixes = skip_prefixes
async def __call__(self, scope: Scope, receive: Receive, send: Send) -> None:
if scope.get("type") == "http":
path = scope.get("path", "")
if any(path.startswith(p) for p in self._skip_prefixes):
await self._raw(scope, receive, send)
return
await self._gzip(scope, receive, send)
from app.auth.router import router as auth_router
from app.api.health import router as health_router
from app.api.sync import router as sync_router
from app.api.data import router as data_router
from app.api.query import router as query_router
from app.api.users import router as users_router
from app.api.memory import router as memory_router
from app.api.upload import router as upload_router
from app.api.scripts import router as scripts_router
from app.api.settings import router as settings_router
from app.api.catalog import router as catalog_router
from app.api.telegram import router as telegram_router
from app.api.access import router as access_router, me_router as me_access_router
from app.api.admin import router as admin_router
from app.api.permissions import router as permissions_router
from app.api.access_requests import router as access_requests_router
from app.api.jira_webhooks import router as jira_webhooks_router
from app.api.metrics import router as metrics_router
from app.api.metadata import router as metadata_router
from app.api.query_hybrid import router as query_hybrid_router
from app.api.cli_artifacts import router as cli_artifacts_router
from app.api.tokens import router as tokens_router, admin_router as tokens_admin_router
from app.api.marketplaces import router as marketplaces_router
from app.marketplace_server.router import router as marketplace_server_router
from app.marketplace_server.git_router import make_git_wsgi_app
from app.web.router import router as web_router
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app):
# Issue #81 Group A — log the effective remote_attach allowlist at
# startup so an operator's typo in AGNES_REMOTE_ATTACH_EXTENSIONS
# (which REPLACES, not extends, the default) is visible.
try:
from src.orchestrator_security import log_effective_policy
log_effective_policy()
except Exception:
pass # never block startup on a logging convenience
yield
from src.db import close_system_db
close_system_db()
def create_app() -> FastAPI:
app = FastAPI(
title="AI Data Analyst",
description="Data distribution platform for AI analytical systems",
version=_app_version(),
lifespan=lifespan,
)
# Compress JSON / HTML responses on the wire. Parquet downloads are
# excluded — they're already columnar-compressed and re-gzipping them
# just burns CPU with no size win. minimum_size=1024 keeps tiny
# responses uncompressed too (cheaper than the header overhead).
app.add_middleware(
_SelectiveGZipMiddleware,
minimum_size=1024,
skip_prefixes=(
"/api/data/",
"/cli/wheel/",
"/cli/download",
"/marketplace.git", # git smart-HTTP is self-chunked; double-gzip bloats
),
)
# Session middleware (required for OAuth state)
from app.secrets import get_session_secret
session_secret = get_session_secret()
if len(session_secret) < 32:
# Same gate JWT applies (app/auth/jwt.py:_get_secret_key) — keeps the
# two HMAC surfaces consistent. session_internal_roles + google_groups
# are trusted off the cookie signature; a weak SESSION_SECRET means
# those gates are weak too.
import warnings as _warnings
_warnings.warn(
f"SESSION_SECRET is {len(session_secret)} chars — minimum 32 recommended",
UserWarning, stacklevel=2,
)
app.add_middleware(SessionMiddleware, secret_key=session_secret)
# CORS for CLI and external clients
cors_origins = os.environ.get("CORS_ORIGINS", "http://localhost:3000,http://localhost:8000").split(",")
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=[o.strip() for o in cors_origins],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# Load .env_overlay (persisted by /api/admin/configure)
_overlay = Path(os.environ.get("DATA_DIR", "./data")) / "state" / ".env_overlay"
if _overlay.exists():
for line in _overlay.read_text().splitlines():
if "=" in line and not line.startswith("#"):
k, v = line.split("=", 1)
os.environ.setdefault(k.strip(), v.strip())
# Load instance config on startup
try:
from app.instance_config import load_instance_config
load_instance_config()
logger.info("Instance config loaded")
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Could not load instance config: {e}")
# Startup banner
from src.db import SCHEMA_VERSION
logger.info(
"Agnes %s | channel: %s | schema v%s",
os.environ.get("AGNES_VERSION", "dev"),
os.environ.get("RELEASE_CHANNEL", "dev"),
SCHEMA_VERSION,
)
# LOCAL_DEV_MODE: bypass authentication for local development. DO NOT enable in prod.
# When on, every protected route auto-logs in as a seeded admin user (default dev@localhost).
from app.auth.dependencies import (
is_local_dev_mode, get_local_dev_email, get_local_dev_groups,
)
if is_local_dev_mode():
logger.warning("=" * 60)
logger.warning("LOCAL_DEV_MODE is ON — authentication is bypassed.")
logger.warning("All requests auto-authenticate as: %s", get_local_dev_email())
# Validate + report LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS at startup so a malformed JSON
# value gets surfaced loudly here instead of silently warning on the
# first authenticated request. Empty when unset is fine — just say so.
raw_groups_env = os.environ.get("LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS", "").strip()
mocked_groups = get_local_dev_groups()
if raw_groups_env and not mocked_groups:
logger.warning(
"LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS is set but produced no valid groups — "
"check the WARNING above for the parse error.",
)
elif mocked_groups:
logger.warning(
"LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS: mocking %d group(s) into session: %s",
len(mocked_groups),
", ".join(g["id"] for g in mocked_groups),
)
else:
logger.warning("LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS is unset — session.google_groups will be empty.")
logger.warning("NEVER enable this in a deployment reachable from the internet.")
logger.warning("=" * 60)
# Seed admin user (SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL) and add them to the Admin user_group.
# Optional SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD lets the seeded user sign in immediately
# without going through bootstrap; never overwritten if already set.
# The Admin/Everyone user_groups themselves are seeded inside
# _ensure_schema (src.db._seed_system_groups), so this hook only has to
# handle membership for the seed admin.
seed_email = os.environ.get("SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL") or (get_local_dev_email() if is_local_dev_mode() else None)
if seed_email:
try:
from src.db import SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP, get_system_db
from src.repositories.user_group_members import UserGroupMembersRepository
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
conn = get_system_db()
repo = UserRepository(conn)
seed_password = os.environ.get("SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD") or None
password_hash = None
if seed_password:
from argon2 import PasswordHasher
password_hash = PasswordHasher().hash(seed_password)
existing = repo.get_by_email(seed_email)
if not existing:
import uuid
user_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
repo.create(
id=user_id,
email=seed_email,
name="Admin",
role="admin",
password_hash=password_hash,
)
logger.info("Seeded admin user: %s (password=%s)", seed_email, "yes" if password_hash else "no")
else:
user_id = existing["id"]
if password_hash and not existing.get("password_hash"):
repo.update(id=user_id, password_hash=password_hash)
logger.info("Set password on existing seed admin: %s", seed_email)
# Make sure the seed admin is actually in the Admin group — this
# is what gives them admin access in v12. Idempotent.
admin_group = conn.execute(
"SELECT id FROM user_groups WHERE name = ?", [SYSTEM_ADMIN_GROUP],
).fetchone()
if admin_group:
UserGroupMembersRepository(conn).add_member(
user_id=user_id,
group_id=admin_group[0],
source="system_seed",
added_by="app.main:seed_admin",
)
conn.close()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(f"Could not seed admin: {e}")
# C8: Warn when no user has a password_hash — bootstrap endpoint is open.
# This is intentional UX (operator can claim seed admin), but the open
# window should be visible in startup logs so it's not forgotten.
if not is_local_dev_mode():
try:
from src.db import get_system_db
from src.repositories.users import UserRepository
conn = get_system_db()
repo = UserRepository(conn)
all_users = repo.list_all()
has_password = any(u.get("password_hash") for u in all_users)
if not has_password:
logger.warning(
"No user has a password set — /auth/bootstrap is reachable. "
"Claim the seed admin (or set SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD) to close this window."
)
conn.close()
except Exception:
pass # never block startup on a logging convenience
# Static files
static_dir = Path(__file__).parent / "web" / "static"
if static_dir.exists():
app.mount("/static", StaticFiles(directory=str(static_dir)), name="static")
# Auth providers (conditional registration)
from app.auth.providers.google import router as google_auth_router, is_available as google_available
from app.auth.providers.password import router as password_auth_router
from app.auth.providers.email import router as email_auth_router, is_available as email_available
# API routers
app.include_router(auth_router)
app.include_router(google_auth_router)
app.include_router(password_auth_router)
app.include_router(email_auth_router) # Always register, check availability per-request
app.include_router(health_router)
app.include_router(sync_router)
app.include_router(data_router)
app.include_router(query_router)
app.include_router(users_router)
app.include_router(memory_router)
app.include_router(upload_router)
app.include_router(scripts_router)
app.include_router(settings_router)
app.include_router(catalog_router)
app.include_router(telegram_router)
app.include_router(admin_router)
app.include_router(access_router)
app.include_router(me_access_router)
app.include_router(permissions_router)
app.include_router(access_requests_router)
app.include_router(jira_webhooks_router)
app.include_router(metrics_router)
app.include_router(metadata_router)
app.include_router(query_hybrid_router)
app.include_router(cli_artifacts_router)
app.include_router(tokens_router)
app.include_router(tokens_admin_router)
app.include_router(marketplaces_router)
app.include_router(marketplace_server_router)
# Git smart-HTTP endpoint for Claude Code: /marketplace.git/*
# WSGI → ASGI bridge (dulwich is WSGI-native; FastAPI is ASGI).
from a2wsgi import WSGIMiddleware
app.mount("/marketplace.git", WSGIMiddleware(make_git_wsgi_app()))
# Web UI router (must be last — has catch-all routes)
app.include_router(web_router)
# Paths served as API responses (JSON / ZIP / git smart-HTTP) — never
# redirect a 401 here to the HTML login page; clients expect the raw 401.
_API_PATH_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
"/api/",
"/auth/",
"/marketplace.zip",
"/marketplace.git",
"/marketplace/",
)
@app.exception_handler(StarletteHTTPException)
async def _html_auth_redirect_handler(request, exc: StarletteHTTPException):
"""Redirect unauthenticated HTML page loads (GET) to /login.
Only GET requests outside the API prefixes are redirected — that
targets browser navigations to HTML pages. POSTs, API prefixes, and
non-401 errors fall through to Starlette's default JSON response so
JSON clients (including `/auth/tokens` for PAT CRUD and
`/marketplace.zip` consumed by Claude Code) keep their existing
contract.
"""
if (
exc.status_code == 401
and request.method == "GET"
and not request.url.path.startswith(_API_PATH_PREFIXES)
):
next_param = quote(request.url.path, safe="")
return RedirectResponse(url=f"/login?next={next_param}", status_code=302)
from fastapi.exception_handlers import http_exception_handler
return await http_exception_handler(request, exc)
return app
app = create_app()