agnes-the-ai-analyst/docker-compose.yml
ZdenekSrotyr 5f6bb7a4b2
fix(security+ops) + release(0.12.1): #82 #85 #87 hardening + cut 0.12.1 (#104)
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture

Security and operational hardening across three issue groups:

- M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun)
- C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile)
- M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler
- M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server)
- M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING)
- M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs

- C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download
- M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename

- C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response
- C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible)
- M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint)
- M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch)

Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90)

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety

Review fixes:
- Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was
  missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints
- Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex
- M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with
  warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after
  successful token consumption
- Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak

Address Devin Review findings on PR #104:

1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution +
   ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only
   matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like
   `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the
   hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against
   ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast.

2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`,
   `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old
   format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call
   /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback
   to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured).

3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open
   NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to
   prevent FD leaks until GC.

Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local,
multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split

Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104:

1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download
   endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow
   dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders
   contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots
   and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \)
   and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs.

2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health
   checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints
   (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed)
   and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint
   with a PAT.

Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening

* fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up)

Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify
got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but
password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using
read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset
token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write-
wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker
would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the
asymmetry was a polish gap.

Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write
unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then
SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears
the marker and applies the password change.

New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in
tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two
ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same
token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with
'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both
POSTs got 302 (race confirmed).

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 19:57:30 +02:00

151 lines
3.8 KiB
YAML

services:
app:
build: .
# --proxy-headers + --forwarded-allow-ips make uvicorn honor the
# X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host headers any reverse proxy (Caddy,
# nginx, Cloudflare Tunnel) sets. Without it, request.url_for() emits
# http://localhost:8000/... even when the user is on https://, which
# breaks OAuth callbacks (redirect_uri_mismatch). Belt-and-suspenders —
# FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=* in .env does the same via env var.
command: uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips='*'
ports:
- "8000:8000"
volumes:
- data:/data
- ./config:/app/config:ro
# - ./custom-connectors:/app/connectors/custom:ro # Tier A: AI-generated connectors
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:8000/api/health"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
restart: unless-stopped
mem_limit: 4g
mem_reservation: 1g
cpus: 2.0
# One-shot: run extractor then rebuild orchestrator views
extract:
build: .
command: >
sh -c "python -m connectors.keboola.extractor &&
python -c 'from src.orchestrator import SyncOrchestrator; print(SyncOrchestrator().rebuild())'"
volumes:
- data:/data
- ./config:/app/config:ro
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
profiles:
- extract
scheduler:
build: .
command: python -m services.scheduler
volumes:
- data:/data
- ./config:/app/config:ro
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
- API_URL=http://app:8000
- SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL=${SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL:-}
depends_on:
app:
condition: service_healthy
restart: unless-stopped
mem_limit: 2g
cpus: 1.0
telegram-bot:
build: .
command: python -m services.telegram_bot
volumes:
- data:/data
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
depends_on:
- app
profiles:
- full
restart: unless-stopped
ws-gateway:
build: .
command: python -m services.ws_gateway
volumes:
- data:/data
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
depends_on:
- app
profiles:
- full
restart: unless-stopped
corporate-memory:
build: .
command: python -m services.corporate_memory
volumes:
- data:/data
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
depends_on:
- app
profiles:
- full
restart: unless-stopped
session-collector:
build: .
command: python -m services.session_collector
volumes:
- data:/data
env_file: .env
environment:
- DATA_DIR=/data
depends_on:
- app
profiles:
- full
restart: unless-stopped
# TLS reverse proxy. Corporate-CA certs mounted from /data/state/certs
# (managed by scripts/ops/agnes-tls-rotate.sh on the VM). For local
# development without certs, run without --profile tls and hit :8000
# directly.
caddy:
image: caddy:2-alpine
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- /data/state/certs:/certs:ro
- caddy_data:/data
- caddy_config:/config
environment:
- DOMAIN=${DOMAIN:-localhost}
# Passes through whatever the operator set in .env. Caddyfile uses
# {$CADDY_TLS:tls /certs/fullchain.pem /certs/privkey.pem} so:
# - unset → cert-file mode (corp PKI rotated by tls-rotate.sh)
# - "tls <email>" → Let's Encrypt auto-issue
# - "tls internal" → Caddy-managed self-signed
- CADDY_TLS
depends_on:
app:
condition: service_healthy
restart: unless-stopped
profiles:
- tls
volumes:
data:
caddy_data:
caddy_config: