* fix(api): harden API surface before Swagger — 9 findings from issue #336 ADV-001: POST /api/sync/table-subscriptions now checks can_access() per table entry, matching the gate already on POST /api/sync/settings. ADV-002: GET /webhooks/jira/health gated behind require_admin; jira_domain removed from response to prevent anonymous info disclosure. ADV-003: GET /api/version no longer exposes commit_sha or schema_version. ADV-005: /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json now require a valid session via custom FastAPI routes (docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None). ADV-006: /cli/ and /webhooks/ added to _API_PATH_PREFIXES so future auth-gated routes there return JSON 401 not an HTML redirect. ADV-007: GET /api/catalog/tables wired to CatalogTablesResponse model. ADV-008: TableSubscriptionUpdate.tables capped at max_length=500. ADV-009: GET /api/users and GET /auth/admin/tokens accept limit/offset (default 1000, max 10000); repositories updated accordingly. Tests: 11 new regression tests in TestApiHardening336; test_jira_webhooks fixture updated with seeded admin user; OpenAPI snapshot regenerated. * fix(test): update test_journey_jira health check to use admin auth after ADV-002 gate * fix(security): close /auth/bootstrap auth-bypass + BREAKING markers on ADV-002/003/005 Reviewer-flagged regression introduced by ADV-009's pagination on UserRepository.list_all(): the silent default LIMIT 1000 broke the bootstrap check at app/auth/router.py and the startup no-password warning at app/main.py — both call list_all() with no args and depend on exhaustive enumeration. On an instance with >1000 users where no password-holder lands in the email-sorted first page, [u for u in list_all() if u.get('password_hash')] becomes empty → bootstrap re-opens → an unauthenticated caller can claim admin via /auth/bootstrap. Real auth-bypass on a security-sensitive boot path. Fix: - src/repositories/users.py: list_all() restored to no-arg, returns EVERY row (no LIMIT). Comment explicitly warns against re-adding pagination here. API-surface pagination moved to a new list_paginated(limit, offset) method with its own docstring. - app/api/users.py: GET /api/users now calls list_paginated(). Existing query-param validation (limit <= 10000) preserved. Regression guards in tests/test_security.py::TestApiHardening336: - test_users_list_all_returns_every_row_no_silent_limit asserts list_all() takes no params other than self (via inspect.signature) so a future cleanup can't accidentally re-add limit/offset. - test_users_list_paginated_is_separate_method asserts the paginated variant is a distinct method, not an overload. CHANGELOG: added **BREAKING** markers per CLAUDE.md release discipline to three pre-existing ADV bullets that are observable breaking changes for external consumers: - ADV-002 (webhook health going from anonymous to admin-only) - ADV-003 (/api/version dropping commit_sha + schema_version) - ADV-005 (/docs, /redoc, /openapi.json going from anonymous to session-required) * release: 0.54.25 — API hardening before Swagger (ADV-001..009) + bootstrap-bypass regression fix --------- Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
131 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
131 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
"""J5 — Jira webhook journey tests.
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Tests the Jira webhook endpoint: valid HMAC signature accepted, invalid
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signature rejected, missing signature handled, and basic health check.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import pytest
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from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
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def _make_signature(payload: bytes, secret: str) -> str:
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"""Generate a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature for a payload."""
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sig = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), payload, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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return f"sha256={sig}"
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SAMPLE_JIRA_EVENT = {
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"webhookEvent": "jira:issue_updated",
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"issue": {
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"key": "PROJ-123",
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"fields": {
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"summary": "Test issue",
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"status": {"name": "In Progress"},
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},
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},
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}
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@pytest.mark.journey
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class TestJiraWebhookJourney:
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def test_webhook_health_check(self, seeded_app):
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"""Jira webhook health endpoint is accessible to admins."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeded_app['admin_token']}"}
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resp = c.get("/webhooks/jira/health", headers=headers)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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body = resp.json()
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assert "status" in body
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assert body["status"] == "ok"
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assert "jira_domain" not in body
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def test_webhook_with_no_secret_configured_refused(self, seeded_app):
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"""Issue #83: when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set, webhook is REFUSED
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with 503 (was previously fail-open — accepted unauthenticated). The
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rename of this test from `_accepted` → `_refused` documents the
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contract change."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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payload = json.dumps(SAMPLE_JIRA_EVENT).encode()
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.Config") as mock_cfg:
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mock_cfg.JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET = ""
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mock_cfg.JIRA_DATA_DIR = MagicMock()
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resp = c.post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 503
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assert "secret" in resp.json()["detail"].lower()
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def test_webhook_with_valid_hmac_signature(self, seeded_app):
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"""POST with valid HMAC-SHA256 signature is accepted."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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secret = "test-jira-secret-xyz"
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payload = json.dumps(SAMPLE_JIRA_EVENT).encode()
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signature = _make_signature(payload, secret)
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mock_service = MagicMock()
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mock_service.is_configured.return_value = True
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mock_service.process_webhook_event.return_value = True
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.Config") as mock_cfg, \
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patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.get_jira_service", return_value=mock_service), \
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patch("app.api.jira_webhooks._log_webhook_event"):
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mock_cfg.JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET = secret
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mock_cfg.JIRA_DATA_DIR = MagicMock()
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resp = c.post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": signature,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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body = resp.json()
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assert body["status"] == "ok"
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assert body["event"] == "jira:issue_updated"
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def test_webhook_with_invalid_signature_rejected(self, seeded_app):
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"""POST with wrong signature returns 401."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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secret = "real-secret"
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payload = json.dumps(SAMPLE_JIRA_EVENT).encode()
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bad_signature = "sha256=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.Config") as mock_cfg:
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mock_cfg.JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET = secret
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mock_cfg.JIRA_DATA_DIR = MagicMock()
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resp = c.post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=payload,
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headers={
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"Content-Type": "application/json",
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"X-Hub-Signature-256": bad_signature,
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},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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assert "Invalid signature" in resp.json()["detail"]
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def test_webhook_empty_payload_rejected(self, seeded_app):
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"""Empty body returns 400 (the secret-configured path; the
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no-secret path returns 503 — see test_webhook_with_no_secret_configured_refused)."""
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c = seeded_app["client"]
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with patch("app.api.jira_webhooks.Config") as mock_cfg, \
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patch("app.api.jira_webhooks._verify_signature", return_value=True):
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mock_cfg.JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET = "test-secret-not-empty"
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resp = c.post(
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"/webhooks/jira",
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content=b"",
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headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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