5f6bb7a4b2
* fix(security+ops): #82 #85 #87 — auth hardening, API validation, deploy posture Security and operational hardening across three issue groups: - M23: docker-compose.override.yml → docker-compose.dev.yml (BREAKING, prod foot-gun) - C13: Container runs as non-root user 'agnes' (USER directive in Dockerfile) - M21: Docker resource limits (mem_limit, cpus) on app + scheduler - M22: Caddyfile security headers (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, -Server) - M17: /api/health split into minimal (unauth) + /api/health/detailed (auth) (BREAKING) - M26: release.yml restricts build-and-push to main + workflow_dispatch; paths-ignore for docs - C2: table_id traversal validation on /api/data/{table_id}/download - M4: Upload streaming (chunk-read + temp file) instead of full-buffer; /local-md hashed filename - C5: reset_token removed from POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password response - C8: Startup WARNING when no user has password_hash (bootstrap window visible) - M9: Audit log on failed web form login (mirrors /auth/token endpoint) - M10: Atomic magic-link consume via compare-and-swap (CONSUMED: marker + DuckDB conflict catch) Also: SSRF protection on /api/admin/configure (#46), memory stats SQL aggregation (#90) Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF 169.254.x.x + IPv6 multicast; M10 marker cleanup safety Review fixes: - Add 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local, cloud metadata) to SSRF regex — was missing, allowing requests to AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints - Add ff[0-9a-f]{2}: (IPv6 multicast) to SSRF regex - M10: wrap Step 3 (CONSUMED marker cleanup) in try-except with warning log — prevents unhandled exception if DB write fails after successful token consumption - Add test for 169.254.169.254 SSRF rejection Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): SSRF IPv6 bypass, CLI health endpoint, upload FD leak Address Devin Review findings on PR #104: 1. SSRF IPv6 bypass: Replace hostname regex with DNS resolution + ipaddress module checks. The old regex patterns like `fe80:` only matched up to the first colon, missing real IPv6 addresses like `fe80::1`, `fc00::1`, `ff02::1`. The new approach resolves the hostname via getaddrinfo and checks each resulting IP against ipaddress.is_private/is_loopback/is_link_local/is_reserved/is_multicast. 2. CLI commands broken: `da setup test-connection`, `da setup verify`, `da diagnose`, `da status` all called /api/health expecting the old format (status=="healthy", services dict). Now they call /api/health/detailed for service-level checks (with graceful fallback to the minimal endpoint when auth is not configured). 3. Temp file handle leak: _stream_to_temp returns an open NamedTemporaryFile; callers now close it before shutil.move() to prevent FD leaks until GC. Also adds IPv6 SSRF test cases (loopback, link-local, unique-local, multicast) with mocked DNS resolution for test environment independence. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(review): download regex blocks hyphenated IDs; document health split Address Devin Review round-3 findings on PR #104: 1. _SAFE_IDENTIFIER regex blocked hyphenated table IDs: The download endpoint used the strict SQL-identifier regex which does not allow dots or hyphens, but Keboola table IDs like in.c-crm.orders contain both. Switched to _SAFE_QUOTED_IDENTIFIER which allows dots and hyphens while still blocking path-traversal chars (/, .., \) and quote/control characters. Added test for hyphenated/dotted IDs. 2. Documented health endpoint split in DEPLOYMENT.md: Added Health checks & external monitoring section explaining both endpoints (minimal unauth /api/health vs authenticated /api/health/detailed) and how to wire external monitoring tools to the detailed endpoint with a PAT. Generated with [Devin](https://cli.devin.ai/docs) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * release(0.12.1): cut hotfix for snapshot integrity + #82/#85/#87 hardening * fix(security): apply CAS pattern to password reset confirm (#82/M10 follow-up) Devin review on the rebased PR flagged the asymmetry: magic-link verify got the atomic compare-and-swap pattern in the original M10 fix, but password reset confirm at /auth/password/reset/confirm was still using read-validate-clear. Two concurrent POSTs with the same valid reset token could both succeed in setting different new passwords (last-write- wins). Lower severity than the magic-link race because the attacker would need the reset token AND to race the legitimate user, but the asymmetry was a polish gap. Mirrors app/auth/providers/email.py::_consume_token CAS exactly: write unique CONSUMED:<random> marker via UPDATE...WHERE token=old_token, then SELECT to verify our marker won, then proceed. Only the winner clears the marker and applies the password change. New regression test_concurrent_reset_only_one_wins in tests/test_password_flows.py::TestResetConfirm pins the contract: two ThreadPoolExecutor workers + Barrier hit /reset/confirm with the same token; exactly one gets 302 (password applied), the other gets 200 with 'Invalid or expired'. Sanity-checked against the pre-CAS code — both POSTs got 302 (race confirmed). --------- Co-authored-by: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
42 lines
2 KiB
Bash
Executable file
42 lines
2 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# Run Agnes locally with auth bypass + dev-mode magic links.
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#
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# Stacks three compose files:
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# 1. docker-compose.yml — base services
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# 2. docker-compose.dev.yml — hot-reload + source bind mount (dev default)
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# 3. docker-compose.local-dev.yml — LOCAL_DEV_MODE=1, drops .env requirement
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#
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# After startup visit http://localhost:8000 — you'll land on /dashboard
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# logged in as dev@localhost (role=admin). No login screen, no email delivery needed.
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set -euo pipefail
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cd "$(dirname "$0")/.."
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# Ensure docker-compose.yml does not require a .env file. We override env_file in the
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# local-dev overlay, but compose still touches the file path during config validation.
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if [[ ! -f .env ]]; then
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touch .env
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fi
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# Default LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS so /profile and group-aware code see *something* on
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# first boot. Operators can override (LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS='[...]' make local-dev)
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# or disable (LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS= make local-dev). See docs/local-development.md.
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#
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# Indirection through DEFAULT_LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS dodges the parameter-expansion
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# gotcha where a literal `}` inside `${VAR:=default}` closes the expansion
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# early — silently truncating the JSON to the first group and producing an
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# unparseable value. The single-quoted variable holds the JSON intact.
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#
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# `${VAR-DEFAULT}` (no `:`) substitutes only when VAR is *unset*, not when it
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# is set-but-empty. The empty-value path is documented as the "disable" knob —
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# `LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS= make local-dev` must reach the parser as "" so the
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# get_local_dev_groups() short-circuit returns []. The `:-` form would
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# silently substitute the default on empty, breaking that contract.
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DEFAULT_LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS='[{"id":"local-dev-engineers@example.com","name":"Local Dev Engineers"},{"id":"local-dev-admins@example.com","name":"Local Dev Admins"}]'
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export LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS="${LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS-$DEFAULT_LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS}"
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exec docker compose \
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-f docker-compose.yml \
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-f docker-compose.dev.yml \
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-f docker-compose.local-dev.yml \
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up "$@"
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