Three independent reviews of PR #180 surfaced four real defects in the new
Store / my-ai-stack surface. CHANGELOG entries detail each; one-liners:
- F1 video_url XSS: any authenticated user could upload a Store entity
with `video_url=javascript:...` and pop XSS in any viewer's session via
the `<a href=...>` "Watch video" link in store_detail.html. Jinja2
autoescape doesn't block URI schemes inside attribute values. Fixed by
scheme-validating to http(s) only on create + update; 400 invalid_video_url.
- F2 ZIP decompression bomb: _safe_zip_extract checked path-traversal but
not declared file_size totals — a 50 MB compressed upload at 1:1000
ratio decompresses to 50 GB and DOS the host disk. Fixed by summing
zinfo.file_size across infolist() and refusing > 200 MB before
extractall touches disk. 413 zip_too_large_uncompressed.
- F4 admin authz parity: PUT /api/store/entities/{id} was owner-only while
DELETE allowed owner OR admin; the store-detail page hid Edit/Delete
buttons from admin even though DELETE was permitted. Fixed by allowing
admin on PUT and passing is_admin to the template; gate is now
is_owner OR is_admin everywhere.
- F5 cross-owner suffix collision: sanitize_username is many-to-one
(alice.smith / alice_smith both → alice-smith). Two such users uploading
entities with the same display name produced identical
`<name>-by-<username>` suffixes, silently colliding in the served
agnes-store-bundle on-disk paths AND the manifest catalog (Claude Code
dedupes by plugin.json `name`). Fixed by enforcing global uniqueness on
the suffixed value at create_entity; 409 conflict_global_suffix.
F3 (ZIP symlink members) was investigated and confirmed to be a
false-positive — Python's stdlib ZipFile.extractall does not honor
symlink mode bits, so no exploit exists.
9 new regression tests in tests/test_store_api.py::TestStoreSecurityFixes
covering all four. Test run locally: 60/60 store-related tests pass.
fd3c76d21b