agnes-the-ai-analyst/connectors/llm/anthropic_provider.py
Vojtech d6ad08f107
Flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue (#233)
* feat(store): flea-market upload guardrails + soft delete + JOIN-based admin queue

Adds an end-to-end guardrails pipeline for store uploads (manifest +
static-security + LLM review), persists blocked bundles for forensics,
introduces soft-delete (Archive) semantics, consolidates the legacy
/store/{id} surface into /marketplace/flea/{id}, and reworks the admin
queue so lifecycle filters read live entity visibility via LEFT JOIN
rather than a denormalized submission column.

Schema v29 → v35:
  * v29 store_submissions table + store_entities.visibility_status
  * v30 file_size, bundle_sha256, bundle_purged_at on submissions
  * v31 reshape store_submissions (drop legacy unique on entity_id)
  * v32 store_entities.archived_at/by + 'archived' visibility value
  * v33 drop store_submissions.retry_count (unused)
  * v34 ensure idx_store_submissions_entity exists post column-drop
  * v35 broaden visibility_status enum + JOIN architecture cutover

Pipeline (src/store_guardrails/):
  * Inline checks: manifest_check, static_scan, quality_check
  * LLM review configurable haiku|sonnet|opus (default haiku)
  * BackgroundTasks-driven async path with structured-output JSON
  * Per-submitter daily quota (default 50)
  * 30-day TTL purge job (POST /api/admin/run-blocked-purge)
  * Bundle SHA256 + size persisted; sha256 survives purge for forensics

Visibility model:
  * pending | approved | hidden | archived
  * _enforce_visibility returns 404 (no leak) for non-owner non-admin
  * Owner sees own non-approved entries via include_owner_id widening
  * Install refused with 409 entity_not_approved when not approved

Soft-delete (DELETE /api/store/entities/{id}):
  * Default = soft (visibility_status='archived'); existing installs
    keep getting served the bundle so users don't lose the plugin
  * ?hard=true admin-only: drops bundle + cascades user_store_installs
  * Hard-delete preserves entity_id on submission as tombstone so
    audit_log linkage survives for the activity timeline

Admin queue lifecycle (the JOIN refactor):
  * Verdict (store_submissions.status) is immutable forensic record
  * Lifecycle (store_entities.visibility_status) is live state
  * /admin/store/submissions Archived chip translates to
    `e.visibility_status='archived'` via LEFT JOIN — any path that
    flips visibility surfaces in the queue immediately
  * Detail page renders Status (verdict) and Entity lifecycle side by
    side so admins see "approved at review, now archived" at a glance

URL consolidation:
  * /store/{id} deleted (no redirect, stale bookmarks 404)
  * /marketplace/flea/{id} is the canonical detail surface
  * Three in-tree callers (upload-success, my-stack card, store
    listing card) updated to point at the new URL
  * Quarantine banner extracted to _quarantine_banner.html partial,
    self-guarded, included from both flea detail templates
  * Banner JS auto-refreshes when the verdict lands by polling
    /api/marketplace/flea/{id}/detail (visibility_status +
    submission_status — the latter is needed because blocked_llm
    keeps the entity at visibility_status='pending')

Audit log resource format:
  * runner.py emits prefixed `store_submission:{id}` (post-fix)
  * Detail-page timeline query handles three patterns: prefixed
    submission, helper-emitted `store_entity:{sub_id}`, and bare-id
    legacy rows — all surface in the activity timeline

UX fixes:
  * Owner sees Under review / Quarantined / Hidden banner with status
  * Install button gray-disabled (not blue) when non-approved
  * Owner cannot delete quarantined entries (403); admin can
  * Admin queue: filter chips, sortable columns, paging, page-size
  * Auto-refresh queue every 5s while pending rows are visible
  * Store upload page file picker no longer opens twice (label →
    input default action collided with explicit JS handler)

Tests: 168 passed across the guardrails suites (admin submissions,
store API, inline / LLM / purge guardrails, store repositories,
marketplace filter, schema version). New regression coverage
includes: archive surfaces via JOIN even when API path is bypassed;
deleted submission renders activity timeline (tombstone); flea
detail surfaces submission_status only for owner/admin; detail page
renders Entity lifecycle row; audit log resource format covers both
helper and runner paths.

* fix(store-guardrails): PR #233 follow-up — prompt injection, atomic PUT, BG race, schema, reaper, sort whitelist

Addresses 9 of the 23 findings from the PR #233 review (spec at
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-09-pr233-guardrails-fixes-spec.md).
Merge-gate items #1-#6 plus high-value mediums #7, #9-#12, #23.
Architectural items (#8 enum split, #14 factory) and pure
maintainability (#15-#22) deferred to follow-ups.

Security:
* #1 prompt injection — SYSTEM_PROMPT now passed via the SDK's
  dedicated system= parameter; bundle wrapped in <bundle>...</bundle>
  sentinels declared data-only by the system prompt; literal
  sentinel strings in user content are escaped so an adversarial
  README can't forge a close tag.
* #6 static scan honesty — module docstring + admin copy + docs
  declare static scan as signal not gate; .md/.txt/.rst/.html/.json/
  .yaml/.yml/.toml skipped to avoid false positives on prose.
  AST mode for Python deferred (separate flag, FP comparison work).

Correctness:
* #2 PUT atomicity — bundles bake into plugin.staging-<rand>/
  alongside live, atomic-rename on success; failed checks leave
  live tree byte-for-byte intact.
* #3 BG-task race — set_visibility_if_pending guards verdict flips
  to the (pending, hidden) review window; admin archives during
  review survive; skipped flips audit-logged.
* #4 v35 NOT NULL/DEFAULT — schema v35→v36 re-applies them on
  store_entities.visibility_status. CHECK constraint enforced
  application-side (DuckDB ADD CHECK on existing column unsupported).
* #7 stuck-review reaper — reap_stuck_llm_reviews flips pending_llm
  rows older than guardrails.stuck_review_grace_seconds (default
  1800) to review_error. Scheduler runs every 15 min via new
  /api/admin/run-reap-stuck-reviews. Set knob to 0 to disable.
* #9 quota counter — count_blocked_for_submitter_since now counts
  blocked_inline + blocked_llm + review_error so a submitter
  triggering only LLM-blocked verdicts is bounded.
* #10 missing risk_level — surfaces as review_error with
  error='missing_risk_level' instead of silently defaulting to
  'medium' (which looked like a model-decided block).
* #11 archived_at clear — set_visibility nulls archived_at +
  archived_by when transitioning out of 'archived' so a future
  read doesn't show stale archive forensics on an approved row.

Maintainability:
* #12 FSM doc comment — accurate insert/transition/lifecycle
  description in src/db.py near store_submissions schema.
* #23 sort-key whitelist — admin queue rejects unknown sort keys
  with 400 invalid_sort_key; substring-replace footgun removed.

Deferred (separate PRs):
* #5 quota race — proper fix requires asyncio.Lock spanning the
  full pipeline; threading.Lock blocks event loop, DuckDB MVCC
  doesn't help. API-level slowapi bounds worst case for now.
* #6 part 3 (AST static scan), #8 (enum split), #13 (import
  bundle docs), #14 (factory consolidation), #15-#22 (maint).

Tests:
* New: tests/test_store_guardrails_prompt_injection.py (corpus +
  trust-boundary invariants), tests/test_store_put_atomic.py,
  tests/test_store_guardrails_reaper.py.
* Extended: test_store_guardrails_llm.py (system param, missing
  risk_level, BG race), test_admin_store_submissions.py (quota
  counter widening, sort whitelist 400), test_store_repositories.py
  (un-archive metadata clear), test_db_schema_version.py (v36).
* Full suite: 3738 passed; 17 pre-existing baseline failures
  unchanged (db migration tests, cli binary rename, catalog export,
  user mgmt v5 backfill — confirmed by stash + rerun on clean tree).
2026-05-09 17:32:53 +04:00

186 lines
6.7 KiB
Python

"""Anthropic provider for structured JSON extraction.
Uses the Anthropic API with native structured output (json_schema)
for reliable JSON extraction. Includes retry logic for transient errors.
"""
import json
import logging
import time
import anthropic
from .exceptions import (
LLMAuthError,
LLMFormatError,
LLMRateLimitError,
LLMRefusalError,
LLMTimeoutError,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Retry configuration
MAX_RETRIES = 3
INITIAL_BACKOFF_SECONDS = 2
BACKOFF_MULTIPLIER = 2
def _strict_json_schema(schema):
"""Return a copy of the schema with additionalProperties=False on every object type.
The Anthropic structured-output API rejects schemas where a `{"type": "object"}` node
omits `additionalProperties` (HTTP 400 invalid_request_error). We walk the schema
recursively and force the field where missing.
"""
if isinstance(schema, dict):
out = {k: _strict_json_schema(v) for k, v in schema.items()}
if out.get("type") == "object" and "additionalProperties" not in out:
out["additionalProperties"] = False
return out
if isinstance(schema, list):
return [_strict_json_schema(item) for item in schema]
return schema
class AnthropicExtractor:
"""Structured JSON extractor using the Anthropic API.
Uses output_config with json_schema format for structured output.
Retries transient errors (rate limit, timeout, connection) with
exponential backoff.
"""
def __init__(self, api_key: str, model: str) -> None:
"""Initialize the Anthropic extractor.
Args:
api_key: Anthropic API key.
model: Model identifier (e.g., "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001").
"""
self._client = anthropic.Anthropic(api_key=api_key)
self._model = model
def extract_json(
self,
prompt: str,
max_tokens: int,
json_schema: dict,
schema_name: str,
system: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Extract structured JSON using the Anthropic API.
Args:
prompt: User-content prompt sent to the model.
max_tokens: Maximum tokens in the response.
json_schema: JSON Schema that the response must conform to.
schema_name: Human-readable name for the schema.
system: Optional system prompt — keeps trust boundary intact
when the user content contains untrusted data (e.g.
files uploaded by third parties). When the caller passes
a system prompt here, the prompt-injection threat model
relies on the SDK's separate ``system=`` parameter so a
crafted user payload can't override the rules.
Returns:
Parsed JSON dictionary conforming to the provided schema.
Raises:
LLMAuthError: Invalid API key.
LLMRateLimitError: Rate limited after all retries.
LLMTimeoutError: Timeout/connection error after all retries.
LLMFormatError: Response is not valid JSON.
LLMRefusalError: Model refused to respond.
"""
last_exception: Exception | None = None
for attempt in range(1, MAX_RETRIES + 1):
try:
return self._attempt_extraction(
prompt, max_tokens, json_schema, schema_name, attempt,
system=system,
)
except LLMAuthError:
raise
except LLMRefusalError:
raise
except (LLMRateLimitError, LLMTimeoutError) as e:
last_exception = e
if attempt < MAX_RETRIES:
delay = INITIAL_BACKOFF_SECONDS * (BACKOFF_MULTIPLIER ** (attempt - 1))
logger.warning(
"Transient error on attempt %d/%d for model %s, "
"retrying in %ds: %s",
attempt, MAX_RETRIES, self._model, delay,
type(e).__name__,
)
time.sleep(delay)
raise last_exception # type: ignore[misc]
def _attempt_extraction(
self,
prompt: str,
max_tokens: int,
json_schema: dict,
schema_name: str,
attempt: int,
system: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Single extraction attempt against the Anthropic API."""
logger.info(
"Anthropic extraction attempt %d/%d, model=%s, schema=%s",
attempt, MAX_RETRIES, self._model, schema_name,
)
from src.observability import trace_generation
try:
with trace_generation(provider="anthropic", model=self._model) as _trace:
_trace.set_input(prompt)
create_kwargs = {
"model": self._model,
"max_tokens": max_tokens,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}],
"output_config": {
"format": {
"type": "json_schema",
"schema": _strict_json_schema(json_schema),
},
},
}
if system:
create_kwargs["system"] = system
response = self._client.messages.create(**create_kwargs)
_trace.set_output_from_anthropic(response)
except anthropic.AuthenticationError as e:
raise LLMAuthError("Anthropic authentication failed (check API key)") from e
except anthropic.RateLimitError as e:
raise LLMRateLimitError("Anthropic rate limited") from e
except (anthropic.APITimeoutError, anthropic.APIConnectionError) as e:
raise LLMTimeoutError(
f"Anthropic connection error ({type(e).__name__})"
) from e
# Check for truncation - raise and let outer retry loop handle it
if response.stop_reason == "max_tokens":
raise LLMFormatError(
f"Response truncated (max_tokens) for schema {schema_name}"
)
# Check for refusal
if response.stop_reason == "end_turn" and not response.content:
raise LLMRefusalError(
f"Model refused to generate response for schema {schema_name}"
)
# Parse JSON from response
try:
text = response.content[0].text
return json.loads(text)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, IndexError, AttributeError) as e:
raise LLMFormatError(
f"Failed to parse Anthropic response as JSON for "
f"schema {schema_name} ({type(e).__name__})"
) from e