Devin Review on PR #188 (15:53Z): the renamed [0.36.0] section had
two separate ### Added blocks and two separate ### Changed blocks,
which violates Keep-a-Changelog grouping (and CLAUDE.md's explicit
'group by section' rule). Merged each set into a single ordered
block: Added, Changed, Fixed. No content removed; only reflowed.
Renames the [Unreleased] section to [0.36.0] in CHANGELOG, adds the
top-level summary, drops a fresh empty [Unreleased] above, and bumps
pyproject from 0.35.1.
Also fixes the third Devin Review finding on this PR: the CLI
ReadTimeout message hardcoded QUERY_TIMEOUT_S (300s) so a 30s-default
call (agnes catalog, agnes auth, …) reported a wait window that
didn't match reality. _translate_transport_error now takes the actual
httpx timeout from the calling helper; the BQ-job advisory only
appears for calls where the timeout was set ≥ 60s.
🚩 /api/v2/catalog still async def while now calling sync stat()
`/api/v2/catalog` was left as `async def` when the rest of Tier 1 was
converted, on the assumption it was lightweight. The new
`_materialized_size_hint` populator added in this PR calls
`Path.stat()` / `Path.exists()` for every visible row to bucket the
parquet size — on a local FS that's microseconds, but on a
network-mounted DATA_DIR (NFS / CIFS / GCS-FUSE) those syscalls
can block the event loop. Convert to plain `def` so FastAPI
auto-offloads to the thread pool, mirroring /api/query etc.
🔴 stream_download translates HTTPStatusError as generic transport error
`response.raise_for_status()` inside the retry loop raises
`httpx.HTTPStatusError` on 4xx/5xx. After retries exhaust, the new
`isinstance(last_exc, httpx.HTTPError)` check at line 219 was eating
the status code: HTTPStatusError is a subclass of HTTPError, so the
generic transport translation produced "Unexpected error: HTTPStatusError"
instead of the informative "Client error '401 Unauthorized' for url …"
that callers expect. Fix: short-circuit HTTPStatusError before the
HTTPError branch — it re-raises verbatim so the caller's status-code
handling + the rich server error body (e.g. 401 expired token, 403
cross_project_forbidden) reach the analyst.
api_get / api_post / api_delete / api_patch don't have the same bug:
httpx Client.get/etc. don't raise HTTPStatusError unless the caller
explicitly calls .raise_for_status(), and our wrappers don't.
Only stream_download does, hence the targeted fix there.
Three first-try-failure-surface fixes from Pavel's #185 trace + the
template guidance question, all under PR #188's umbrella so they land
together with the file_server / parallel pull / Tier 1 work.
1. CLI clean-error wrapper — new AgnesTransportError raised by the
api_*/stream_download helpers when httpx times out / drops /
refuses, plus a top-level Typer wrapper (cli/main.py) that prints
one-line "Error: …" + actionable hint and exits non-zero. Full
traceback goes to ~/.config/agnes/last-error.log for support
forwarding. Unhandled Exceptions are caught at the same boundary
so no Python traceback ever leaks to the analyst's terminal.
Pavel's #185 Phase 3B: a 30-frame httpx traceback from a slow BQ
--remote query made it look like a CLI bug. Now: clean message +
hint pointing at `agnes snapshot create` / partition-column
guidance.
Entry point in pyproject.toml flipped from `cli.main:app` →
`cli.main:_run_with_clean_errors` so the wrapper actually runs
under the installed `agnes` binary.
2. agnes init / agnes pull --skip-materialize + progress bar.
--skip-materialize omits query_mode='materialized' rows from the
download set so a first init doesn't spend 44 minutes silently
pulling a single 6 GB parquet (Pavel's #185 Phase 1). Rich-driven
per-file progress bar with label/bytes/rate/ETA renders to stderr
when not --quiet and not --json. Aggregates across the parallel
ThreadPoolExecutor workers added earlier in this PR.
3. config/claude_md_template.txt: explicit one-line snippet pointing
at `agnes catalog --json | jq '.tables[] | select(.id=="<id>")'`
for per-table descriptions + restated invariant: "the description
field on each catalog row is the authoritative business-rules
text — re-read live, never copy into this file." Resolves the
regression-or-feature debate between Pavel (wants annotations)
and the user feedback that landed in the prior commit (don't
embed table-specific content; tables change). Catalog command
stays the source of truth.
Five hottest BQ-touching endpoints were `async def` but invoked synchronous
DuckDB / BQ-extension calls inside the body. Under uvicorn's single event
loop that meant a single heavy `agnes query --remote` (waiting up to
~200 s for BQ's jobs.query) froze EVERY other request — /api/health,
dashboard, auth, even another query — for the full BQ wait. Operators
saw "VM idle, app frozen" during PR #188's testing.
Convert to plain `def` so FastAPI auto-offloads the body to the anyio
thread pool. Event loop stays free for non-BQ requests.
- app/api/query.py:execute_query
- app/api/v2_scan.py:scan_estimate_endpoint, scan_endpoint
- app/api/v2_sample.py:sample
- app/api/v2_schema.py:schema
Audit: 0 `await` statements in any converted handler (verified file-by-
file), so the rename is safe. Tests in tests/test_v2_*.py called the
handlers via `asyncio.run(...)` which now fails on a non-coroutine return;
swapped for direct calls (asyncio.run( -> ( ) — keeps paren balance).
Plus AGNES_THREADPOOL_SIZE env var (default 200, was anyio's stock 40)
in app/main.py:lifespan. Set via
anyio.to_thread.current_default_thread_limiter().total_tokens. 200 is
comfortable headroom for <50 concurrent analysts; bump for more.
480/480 impacted tests pass (the 2 remaining errors are a pre-existing
fixture setup issue in test_reader_smoke_matrix.py unrelated to this
change).
Two bugs Devin caught:
1. Caddy `try_files A B C` rewrites the URI to its LAST entry when no
file matches (per Caddy docs). Without an explicit "back to original
URI" fallback, a parquet missing from all three known static paths
would get rewritten to `/jira/data/<id>.parquet`, and the
reverse_proxy below would forward THAT rewritten URI to app:8000 →
404. The PR's documented "missed → falls through to app handler"
promise didn't actually hold for legacy / future connectors. Append
`/api/data/<id>/download` as the final try_files entry so the
reverse_proxy receives the analyst-facing URI.
2. agnes-auto-upgrade.sh's TLS-overlay decision (which checks Caddyfile
existence) ran BEFORE the config re-fetch loop. If a tick's fetch
added a previously-missing Caddyfile, this tick's docker compose
would still omit `--profile tls` until the next 5-min tick — a
window where the recreate uses the wrong overlay set. Move the
COMPOSE_FILES tls extension AFTER the fetch.
Also strip the workspace prompt of table-list / metric-count
enumerations (per user feedback): those are dynamic snapshots that go
stale; replace with explicit "use `agnes catalog` / `agnes schema` /
`agnes describe` to discover" guidance plus a note about
`rough_size_hint` semantics. The Available Datasets `{% for t in tables %}`
loop is gone — analysts use the live CLI instead.
Three concrete changes addressing the "analyst Claude misuses the CLI"
class of bugs (image.png table — issues #3, #5, plus the recurrent
"how big is this table" guesswork):
1. config/claude_md_template.txt — the template agnes init writes to
<workspace>/CLAUDE.md. Surfaces every catalog-row field with a why,
adds a query_mode-based decision tree, explicit --estimate scoping
(snapshot create ONLY — was the #1 first-try error), an agnes fetch
→ agnes snapshot create rename note, and a 6-row failure-mode table
that maps each common error wording to its right next step.
2. app/api/v2_catalog.py — populate rough_size_hint for local +
materialized rows from the on-disk parquet size, bucketed
small/medium/large/very_large. Was hardcoded null with a TODO; AI
couldn't tell "is this 6.8 GB" without a failed --remote round-trip.
3. cli/update_check.py — the [update] banner survived the da→agnes
rename and printed "[update] da X is out of date" on every command,
training analysts to associate the binary with the old name.
Verified by rendering the template against representative contexts
(33/33 tests pass) and running every use case from the original
screenshot through the real CLI against a dev VM.
The download loop in cli/lib/pull.py was strictly serial — N tables took
Σ stream_download(t_i). With the Caddy file_server change in this PR,
the server can now sustain many parallel sendfile transfers without
blocking app workers, so the client-side serialization became the new
bottleneck.
Switch to ThreadPoolExecutor capped by AGNES_PULL_PARALLELISM (default 4,
set 1 to restore pre-PR serial). 4 matches typical home-broadband
saturation without over-subscribing the analyst's NIC. Drops to serial
when len(to_download) <= 1 to avoid executor overhead in the common
single-table case.
Per-table error semantics preserved via (tid, entry, err) tuple — a
failure on one parquet doesn't abort the rest of the batch.
Verified end-to-end against a dev VM with the new Caddy file_server
deployed: 2-table pull through agnes CLI works under the new concurrency.
Sibling change to the Caddy file_server PR (#182). Without this,
existing long-uptime VMs would pull the new agnes image on auto-upgrade
but keep their stale Caddyfile + docker-compose.yml — leaving the
file_server route + the data:/srv:ro mount inert. Confirmed live
2026-05-05 when the file_server change merged in main but stayed
unreachable on a running dev VM until /opt/agnes/* was scp'd by hand.
agnes-auto-upgrade.sh now hashes the bind-mounted config files
(Caddyfile + every docker-compose overlay) on every 5 min tick and
triggers a `docker compose up -d` recreation when the hash drifts
— same trigger path as an image-digest change. Fail-soft via the
.new-then-mv pattern: a curl 404 / network blip leaves the existing
file untouched.
Self-update at the bottom of the script: re-fetch
/usr/local/bin/agnes-auto-upgrade.sh itself so the very fix that
watches config files lands on running VMs without a manual ssh-and-
curl cycle. Otherwise we'd have a self-perpetuating "old script
problem" — the watch-config logic never propagating to the VMs that
need it.
Operators no longer need to ssh + scp Caddyfile/compose changes.
A single analyst's multi-GB `agnes pull` held the only uvicorn worker
for the duration of the stream, starving UI / /api/health / every other
API endpoint. Container flipped to `unhealthy`. Triggered while a
6.8 GB `order_economics` pull was in-flight on prod 2026-05-05.
Caddy now intercepts `GET /api/data/{table_id}/download` and serves
the parquet directly via sendfile from the data volume (mounted r-o
at /srv inside the caddy container). RBAC enforced by `forward_auth`
to a new lightweight `GET /api/data/{table_id}/check-access` endpoint
(returns 204 / 403) — the bulk transfer never reaches uvicorn.
Path discovery via `try_files` over the known extract.duckdb v2 source
subdirs. Anything not at a static path falls through to the existing
app handler so legacy `src_data/parquet` and future connectors still
work without a Caddyfile change. Non-Caddy deployments are unchanged.
Stage 1 (multi-worker uvicorn) was considered but blocked by the
single-writer DuckDB lock on system.duckdb — workers > 1 would crash
at startup on "Could not set lock on file", the same race that pushed
the scheduler from in-process writes to HTTP-via-app. Multi-reader
workers + single-writer coordination is out of scope for this PR.
Devin Review on PR #181: caught that the original PR plumbed the new
SET into the orchestrator's _remote_attach (rebuild path), the BqAccess
factory (materialize path), and the standalone extractor — but missed
the actual primary `agnes query --remote` request path: every read-only
analytics-DB connection runs `_reattach_remote_extensions` in `src/db.py`
on open, and that LOAD bigquery + ATTACH cycle was unconfigured.
Without this commit, the very flow the PR was meant to fix — analyst
queries hitting BQ views > 90s — would still 400 with the same Binder
Error / Job ID wording, because the runtime LOAD bigquery happens here
not in the orchestrator's rebuild path.
Apply apply_bq_session_settings(conn) right after the BQ secret is
created and before ATTACH, mirroring what every other PR site does.
DuckDB BigQuery extension defaults `bq_query_timeout_ms` to 90 s, which
is too tight for analyst-scale queries against view-backed BQ datasets.
`agnes query --remote` HTTP 400'd with `Binder Error: Query execution
exceeded the timeout. Job ID: ...` whenever the underlying BQ job ran
longer than 90 s, even though the job itself was healthy.
Add `data_source.bigquery.query_timeout_ms` (default 600 000 ms = 10 min,
sentinel 0 falls through to the extension default). Applied via
`SET bq_query_timeout_ms` after every `LOAD bigquery` on every BQ-touching
DuckDB session: orchestrator's `_remote_attach` ATTACH path, BqAccess
session factory, and the standalone extractor. Configurable via
`/admin/server-config` UI.
Fail-soft: extension versions that don't recognise the setting silently
keep the default rather than poisoning the session.
* fix(keboola): per-table fallback to legacy Storage-API client
The DuckDB Keboola extension's per-table COPY fails with
`Schema '..."in.c-..."' does not exist or not authorized` on
projects whose Snowflake backend doesn't expose bucket schemas
to the storage-token-derived QueryService role
(keboola/duckdb-extension#17). ATTACH itself succeeds, so the
existing extension-level fallback in `_try_attach_extension`
never triggers — the table is just marked failed.
- Promote `kbcstorage>=0.9.0` from optional to core dep so the
legacy client import in `_extract_via_legacy` doesn't crash
default installs with `ModuleNotFoundError`.
- Wrap `_extract_via_extension` in a per-table try/except so a
scan failure retries via `_extract_via_legacy` instead of
recording `tables_failed` and moving on.
Slower than the extension path, but produces correct parquets
on affected projects while the upstream extension fix lands.
* test(keboola): cover per-table extension→legacy fallback
Two existing tests mocked _extract_via_extension to throw and asserted
the original message survived in result["errors"]. With per-table
fallback, the new flow retries via _extract_via_legacy — which on the
mock URLs would throw a different (404 / DNS-fail) error, replacing the
asserted message.
- Mock _extract_via_legacy alongside _extract_via_extension in
test_network_timeout_during_extraction +
test_partial_failure_continues +
test_all_tables_fail_returns_full_failure_stats so the assertion
observes the final propagated error from the fallback chain.
- Add test_extension_per_table_failure_falls_back_to_legacy that
exercises the new behavior directly: extension scan fails with the
QueryService schema-not-authorized message
(keboola/duckdb-extension#17), legacy succeeds, parquet ends up
queryable.
Patch release bundling the only Unreleased change: bump httpx client
timeout for agnes query --remote from 30s to 300s (configurable via
AGNES_QUERY_TIMEOUT). Renames CHANGELOG [Unreleased] section to
[0.35.1] and bumps pyproject version to match.
The httpx client behind 'agnes query --remote' used the default 30s
timeout, killing every BigQuery SELECT that took longer than half a
minute — i.e. most non-trivial remote queries.
cli/client.py now exposes QUERY_TIMEOUT_S (default 300s, override via
AGNES_QUERY_TIMEOUT) and propagates a kw-only 'timeout' through
api_get/post/delete/patch. _query_remote passes QUERY_TIMEOUT_S so only
the long-running /api/query path gets the bump; every other CLI call
keeps the 30s default.
Server-side has no read deadline on /api/query, so the client cap was
the sole bottleneck.
Backup-orchestration commands were split across two namespaces (pull in
agnes store, push in agnes admin store), which broke the operator
mental model — pull/push are a paired operation and should sit
together.
Move pull + info into agnes admin store so all bulk operations share
one help screen. Add agnes store mine as the user-facing equivalent —
calls the same /api/store/bundle.zip endpoint with ?owner=me, which
the server resolves to the caller's user_id. Authors can archive
their own uploads without admin role; whole-Store bulk reads stay
admin-flavored as a discoverability hint.
Server: 3-line addition to export_bundle handles owner='me' as a
magic alias for the caller. No new endpoint.
Tests updated: pull/info expectations move from agnes store to
agnes admin store; new tests cover agnes store mine and the
?owner=me server resolution. 69/69 store tests green locally.
Adds whole-Store backup/restore primitives so an external CI/CD job can
mirror the Store to a git repo (and restore back from one).
REST:
- GET /api/store/bundle.zip — deterministic ZIP of all (filtered) Store
entities. Layout: manifest.json + entities/<id>/{plugin,assets}/.
Manifest carries owner_email for cross-instance restore. Auth: any
authenticated user (Store is community-open).
- POST /api/store/import-bundle — admin-only restore. Modes
merge|replace|skip; owner resolution by email with stub-disabled-user
fallback when the email is unknown on the target instance.
CLI:
- agnes store update <id> [--description X] [--zip PATH] ... — in-place
edit (server PUT permits owner OR admin per F4). Closes the missing
edit affordance for analysts who want to fix a typo or push a new
ZIP without losing install_count.
- agnes store pull [-o store.zip] [--unpack DIR] — download the bundle.
--unpack streams + extracts so an external git-backup workflow can
drop the tree straight into a repo and `git add .`.
- agnes store info [--json] — counts + size summary.
- agnes admin store push <zip-or-dir> [--mode ...] — admin-only restore.
Auto-zips a directory client-side so a working-tree → server
round-trip is one command.
cli/v2_client.py gains api_get_stream helper for binary downloads.
Tests: 5 new server tests (bundle shape + filters + round-trip + stub
user creation + skip mode + admin-only gate) + 11 new CLI tests
(update, pull/unpack, info, admin push). 66/66 store-related tests
green locally.
The previous gather used `sorted(glob, key=lambda p: p.stat().st_mtime)`.
A transient OSError (race with delete, permission flicker, EBADF on a
weird filesystem) on any single file raised through the lambda and 500-ed
the whole page.
Reworked: stat each path under try/except into a (path, stat) list, sort
the already-statted entries. Bad files drop silently from the listing.
Regression test test_profile_sessions_page_tolerates_stat_failures
patches Path.stat to raise on one of two files, asserts the page returns
200 with the good row rendered and the bad row dropped.
Devin flagged that run_session_collector still had the same audit-skip
gap I fixed in run_verification_detector and run_corporate_memory in
the previous two rounds — a PermissionError walking /home, an OSError
on /data/user_sessions mkdir, or any other unhandled exception from
collector.run() would skip the audit_log row and only show in docker
logs.
Same try/except + unhandled_error pattern as the sibling endpoints.
All three LLM-pipeline run-* endpoints now record their failures the
same way; /admin/scheduler-runs sees them. Regression test in
tests/test_admin_run_endpoints.py::TestRunSessionCollector::test_unhandled_exception_still_audits.
User feedback during e2e of #179: the listing page is nice but I want
to grab the raw jsonl and look at what's inside.
Adds GET /profile/sessions/<filename>:
- Auth via get_current_user (owner-only).
- Path safety: rejects "/", "\", "..", leading ".", and any non-".jsonl"
filename. The served path resolves under
${DATA_DIR}/user_sessions/<caller.id>/; if resolution escapes that
base directory, returns 404 (never 403, so existence of other users'
files isn't leaked).
- FileResponse with Content-Disposition: attachment.
UI: Download button per row in profile_sessions.html.
Tests in test_web_ui.py: path-traversal / nested / dotfile / non-jsonl
all 404 for owner; unauthenticated 302/401/403; authenticated owner
gets 200 + correct Content-Disposition.
Devin flagged that run_corporate_memory still had the same audit-skip
gap I just fixed in run_verification_detector — if collect_all() throws
anything other than the already-translated ValueError (DuckDB lock,
network blip, unexpected SDK error), the audit_log row was never
written and /admin/scheduler-runs missed the failure.
Same try/except + unhandled_error pattern as the verification_detector
fix from 4c4dfee8. Regression test in
tests/test_admin_run_endpoints.py::TestRunCorporateMemory::test_unhandled_exception_still_audits.
Three changes addressing user feedback during e2e test of #179 + Devin Review on e86dd5ed.
1) /profile/sessions — new self-service user page in the user menu.
Lists all session jsonls the caller uploaded via `agnes push` joined
against session_extraction_state. Each row shows uploaded_at, file
size, status badge (pending/processed/extracted), processed_at, and
items_extracted. The page docstring + help text explicitly call out
that items_extracted=0 means the verification detector ran fine but
the LLM found no claims to track — that's the documented "no items"
outcome, not a broken pipeline. Closes the gap surfaced during the
e2e test of #176 where a user could see their sessions on disk and
process them through the LLM but had no UI to inspect what happened.
2) run_verification_detector audits unhandled exceptions (Devin #1).
If detector.run() threw anything other than the already-translated
ValueError, the audit_log row was never written. The endpoint now
wraps detector.run in try/except, records the exception in
audit_params["unhandled_error"], then re-raises as 500 after audit.
The /admin/scheduler-runs page surfaces the failure row with the
error type + message.
3) SCHEDULER_AUDIT_ACTIONS list corrected (Devin #2). Previous list
had "marketplaces_sync_all" (wrong — actual is "marketplace.sync_all")
plus "data_refresh" and "scripts_run_due" which app/api/sync.py and
app/api/scripts.py don't write to audit_log. Fixed to the four
actually-logged strings; comment points at the missing audit calls
as a follow-up.
Tests: tests/test_web_ui.py adds TestAdminRoleGuards::test_profile_sessions_page_no_admin_required and tightens test_admin_scheduler_runs_page_admin_only to assert the correct marketplace.sync_all string.
create_entity + update_entity created the `scratch` temp dir inside one
try/finally but cleaned it up in a separate one. Validation HTTPExceptions
raised by _safe_zip_extract (zip_unsafe_path, zip_too_large_uncompressed)
or the BadZipFile→422 conversion exited the first scope, and the second
finally was never entered → temp dir leaked on every failed upload.
Devin flagged this on the F2 commit. The leak pre-existed (zip_unsafe_path
was the original vector); F2 added zip_too_large_uncompressed to the same
broken cleanup path. Fixed by collapsing scratch creation + cleanup into
one outer try/finally that covers both extraction AND metadata/bake; the
inner try/except/finally still handles BadZipFile→422 + tmp file cleanup.
Same restructure in update_entity. Regression test
`test_scratch_dir_cleaned_up_after_failed_extraction` triggers a
zip_unsafe_path 422 and asserts tmp/agnes_store_* contains no leaked
dirs.
Three independent reviews of PR #180 surfaced four real defects in the new
Store / my-ai-stack surface. CHANGELOG entries detail each; one-liners:
- F1 video_url XSS: any authenticated user could upload a Store entity
with `video_url=javascript:...` and pop XSS in any viewer's session via
the `<a href=...>` "Watch video" link in store_detail.html. Jinja2
autoescape doesn't block URI schemes inside attribute values. Fixed by
scheme-validating to http(s) only on create + update; 400 invalid_video_url.
- F2 ZIP decompression bomb: _safe_zip_extract checked path-traversal but
not declared file_size totals — a 50 MB compressed upload at 1:1000
ratio decompresses to 50 GB and DOS the host disk. Fixed by summing
zinfo.file_size across infolist() and refusing > 200 MB before
extractall touches disk. 413 zip_too_large_uncompressed.
- F4 admin authz parity: PUT /api/store/entities/{id} was owner-only while
DELETE allowed owner OR admin; the store-detail page hid Edit/Delete
buttons from admin even though DELETE was permitted. Fixed by allowing
admin on PUT and passing is_admin to the template; gate is now
is_owner OR is_admin everywhere.
- F5 cross-owner suffix collision: sanitize_username is many-to-one
(alice.smith / alice_smith both → alice-smith). Two such users uploading
entities with the same display name produced identical
`<name>-by-<username>` suffixes, silently colliding in the served
agnes-store-bundle on-disk paths AND the manifest catalog (Claude Code
dedupes by plugin.json `name`). Fixed by enforcing global uniqueness on
the suffixed value at create_entity; 409 conflict_global_suffix.
F3 (ZIP symlink members) was investigated and confirmed to be a
false-positive — Python's stdlib ZipFile.extractall does not honor
symlink mode bits, so no exploit exists.
9 new regression tests in tests/test_store_api.py::TestStoreSecurityFixes
covering all four. Test run locally: 60/60 store-related tests pass.
E2E test on a real BQ deploy showed every verification-extraction call
fails with HTTP 400 invalid_request_error: "output_config.format.schema:
For 'object' type, 'additionalProperties' must be explicitly set to false".
The Anthropic structured-output API now requires the field on every object
node in the json_schema. Fix: connectors/llm/anthropic_provider.py wraps
the caller-supplied schema through a recursive _strict_json_schema()
walker that adds the field where missing (preserving any explicit
override), then passes the strict variant to the API. Six unit tests in
TestStrictJsonSchema pin the recursion across nested objects, array items,
and the no-mutation invariant.
Adds /admin/scheduler-runs — a read-only admin page that surfaces the
last 200 audit-log entries from scheduler-driven actions. New
AuditRepository.query_actions(actions, limit) helper, new admin nav
entry. Failed scheduler ticks (HTTP 401, network errors) don't reach
the audit_log; the page calls that out with a hint to set
SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN if no rows show up.
The PR's #176 fail-fast change made collect_all() raise ValueError when
neither an ai: block nor ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/LLM_API_KEY was available.
verification_detector's CLI was updated to handle it; corporate_memory's
CLI was missed and crashed with an unhandled traceback.
services/corporate_memory/collector.py:main() now wraps the collect_all
call in try/except ValueError, prints a one-line actionable message
to stderr, and returns rc=1.
Regression test:
test_llm_connector.py::TestCorporateMemoryCollector::test_main_returns_1_on_no_ai_config_instead_of_traceback.
run_session_collector called collector.main() which did argparse.parse_args()
on uvicorn's sys.argv (['app.main:app', '--host', ...]) → sys.exit(2) →
SystemExit(2), which inherits from BaseException, escapes FastAPI handlers,
and propagates through the thread pool. Every scheduler tick that fired the
endpoint either 500-ed or risked killing the uvicorn worker.
services/session_collector/collector.py now exposes run(dry_run, verbose)
that returns (rc, stats); main() is a thin CLI shim that parses argv and
delegates. The admin endpoint calls run() directly and audit-logs the
per-run stats (users_processed, files_copied, files_skipped) instead of
just the rc. Three regression tests in TestRunHelper.
Closes Devin Review finding on app/api/admin.py:2819 (#179).
The 0.35.0 entry's 'two paths to a working LLM pipeline' wording was
defensible only after the #179 review fixes — on the initial cut, the
seeded-overlay path was dead code (consumers imported the static-only
loader; even when they didn't, env refs in the overlay weren't resolved).
Updated Defect 5's bullet to spell out what was broken and what
shipped, and added a new bullet for the scheduler-cadence env-var fix.
Added the two new test modules under Internal.
Devin NOTABLE: SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL was already
read by app/api/health.py to compute the staleness grace window, but
the actual scheduler cadence was hardcoded to 'every 15m'. The env
var name implied it controlled the cadence — it didn't. An operator
throttling the detector via the env was silently ignored by the
scheduler while the health grace silently widened.
Wired the env var into both ends. Same pattern applied to the other
two LLM-pipeline jobs:
- SCHEDULER_SESSION_COLLECTOR_INTERVAL (default 600s = 10m)
- SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL (default 900s = 15m)
- SCHEDULER_CORPORATE_MEMORY_INTERVAL (default 1020s = 17m)
Defaults preserve the existing 10m / 15m / 17m coprime offset so the
three jobs don't fire on the same tick.
build_jobs() now reads all three through _read_positive_int (matching
the existing pattern for data-refresh / health-check / script-runner)
and feeds them to _seconds_to_schedule. The smallest-interval check
includes the new variables so an operator can't accidentally set a
tick larger than any LLM cadence.
New tests in tests/test_scheduler.py:
- TestLLMPipelineCadenceEnvVars: env override changes the schedule
string at scheduler-init time, with parametrized invalid-value
rejection.
- TestVerificationDetectorGraceFollowsCadence: pinning the
single-source-of-truth contract — same env var moves both the
scheduler cadence and the health-check grace.
Devin BUG: /api/admin/configure seeds an ai: block to the writable
overlay at DATA_DIR/state/instance.yaml, but the three LLM consumers
imported from config.loader.load_instance_config — which reads the
static config dir only. Even if they had read the overlay, the loader
ran yaml.safe_load directly without passing through _resolve_env_refs,
so '${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}' would have stayed a literal placeholder. The
pipeline appeared to work because the factory falls back to the env
var directly, but the overlay path itself was dead code.
Two fixes, both required:
1. Switched the three LLM consumers to app.instance_config.load_instance_config:
- services/corporate_memory/collector.py:collect_all
- services/verification_detector/__main__.py:main
- app/api/admin.py:run_verification_detector
2. app/instance_config.py runs the loaded overlay through
config.loader._resolve_env_refs *before* the deep-merge, so
'${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}' resolves at config-load time.
New regression suite tests/test_instance_config_overlay.py pins:
- env-ref resolution against the overlay (resolved when env set,
empty when env missing — never the literal placeholder)
- deep-merge still preserves static-only sections
- the three consumers reach app.instance_config (inspected via
inspect.getsource so a future refactor that reverts the import
fails the test)
- end-to-end: a seeded overlay + ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env reaches the
factory with a resolved api_key
The PR rewrote collect_all() to call the new
create_extractor_from_env_or_config() helper, but the existing tests
still mocked the old direct create_extractor() symbol and the old
silent-skip-on-missing-config behavior. Five tests in
TestCorporateMemoryCollector and one in TestCollectorExtractorIntegration
were red on the PR branch.
Changes:
- Tests now mock connectors.llm.create_extractor_from_env_or_config
(the symbol the collector imports lazily).
- Renamed test_collect_all_no_ai_config_skips ->
test_collect_all_no_ai_config_or_env_raises and
test_collector_handles_invalid_config -> test_collector_raises_on_invalid_config.
Both assert pytest.raises(ValueError) — the explicit fail-fast
semantics defect 5 of #176 was supposed to enforce.
- collect_all() no longer swallows the factory's ValueError into
stats["errors"]; it propagates so the scheduler / admin endpoint
surface the actionable misconfiguration message instead of
pretending the run was a no-op.
- /api/admin/run-corporate-memory translates the propagated ValueError
into a 500 with the factory's message, matching
/api/admin/run-verification-detector.
Per CLAUDE.md vendor-agnostic OSS guidance — replace the real
groupon.com email used as a sanitize_username() example with a
placeholder (alice_smith@example.com).
`compute_default_agent_prompt` (which renders the install commands in
the setup prompt's marketplace block) was calling
`resolve_allowed_plugins` — the admin-only feed that predates the
v25 Store/opt-out layer. Result: a user with 2 opted-out curated
plugins + 2 Store skills saw the original 4 admin grants in the
install list (including the opted-out ones, with cross-marketplace
duplicates), and no `agnes-store-bundle` install line for the skills.
Now we call `resolve_user_marketplace` — the same resolver that
`/marketplace.zip` + `/marketplace.git/` serve from. The install
commands now match the served catalog exactly: admin grants minus the
user's opt-outs, plus the `agnes-store-bundle` synth plugin (which
wraps every installed Store skill + agent into one plugin entry) and
any standalone Store plugin uploads.
Dedup by `manifest_name` because two upstream marketplaces shipping a
plugin with the same name collide in the synth marketplace.json by
design (CLAUDE.md "Same-named plugins ... collide in the catalog by
design"). A duplicate `claude plugin install <name>@agnes` would be a
no-op anyway, so it's just visual noise to keep emitting both.
`_read_agnes_ca_pem()` decides whether the served fullchain.pem needs
trust-bootstrapping in the rendered setup prompt. Pre-fix it only
checked the leaf's *immediate* issuer against `certifi`'s trust store.
For Let's Encrypt that's the intermediate (R13), which `certifi` does
not ship — only roots are in trust stores. So a publicly-trusted LE
chain still tripped the "needs bootstrap" path and the setup prompt
emitted a step-0 TLS trust block + clone-fallback marketplace block
that no client actually needs (Bun-compiled `claude.exe`, system git,
Python via certifi all validate the chain through the bundled ISRG
Root X1).
Now we walk every cert in the fullchain (leaf + intermediates) and
return None the first time any cert's issuer is in the certifi trust
store — that captures the standard "leaf signed by intermediate signed
by publicly-trusted root" shape. Trusted subjects are read once into
a set for O(1) lookup. Self-signed (leaf.issuer == leaf.subject) and
private-CA chains (no chain link's issuer in certifi) keep their
previous "return PEM" behavior, so deployments that genuinely need
the bootstrap still get it.
Validated end-to-end against the live VM at
agnes-marustamyan.groupondev.com (LE R13 → ISRG Root X1):
- Let's Encrypt fullchain → has_ca=False (was True)
- Self-signed cert → has_ca=True
- Corporate-CA chain (private root) → has_ca=True
- Missing fullchain.pem → has_ca=False
Past migration finalize steps RENAME / DROP COLUMN / ALTER on the
`users` table (e.g. _v12_to_v13_finalize, _v13_to_v14_finalize,
_v17_to_v18_finalize, the v5 backfill). DuckDB rejects an ALTER on a
table that any other table references via FOREIGN KEY, so the new
store_entities / user_store_installs / user_plugin_optouts entries —
which the self-heal pass writes to _SYSTEM_SCHEMA before the migration
ladder runs — broke 6 legacy-migration tests with:
Cannot alter entry "users" because there are entries that depend on it
Pre-existing convention (see personal_access_tokens at v6) is to omit
FK constraints to `users` and validate user existence at the app
layer. Sync the three v25 tables with that convention. Same edit in
both _SYSTEM_SCHEMA and _V24_TO_V25_MIGRATIONS so fresh installs and
upgraded installs land in the same shape.
App-level cascade behavior is unchanged: store entity DELETE explicitly
deletes user_store_installs rows in app/api/store.py, and the admin
grant-deletion hook explicitly deletes user_plugin_optouts rows for the
plugin. The dropped FK constraints were defense-in-depth, not the only
guard.
Adds a community-driven Store where any authenticated user uploads
skills/agents/plugins as ZIPs, plus /my-ai-stack as the per-user
composition view. The served Claude Code marketplace is now:
(admin_granted ∖ opt_outs) ∪ store_installs
Skill + agent installs are merged into a single `agnes-store-bundle`
plugin in the served marketplace; type=plugin uploads stay standalone.
Names are suffixed with `-by-<owner-username>` at upload time so two
owners can use the same display name without colliding in Claude Code's
flat skill/agent namespace.
Schema v23 → v24 adds three tables:
- store_entities — community-uploaded skills/agents/plugins
- user_store_installs — what each user has chosen to install
- user_plugin_optouts — opt-out overlay on top of admin grants
Admin grant-delete drops every user's opt-out for that plugin so
re-grant resets cleanly to enabled (no sticky personal preference).
UI:
- /store — e-commerce-style listing with type/category/owner
filters, search, pagination, owner-aware [Install]
buttons, clickable cards
- /store/new — 2-step upload wizard with drag & drop, preview
validation (POST /api/store/entities/preview), docs
multi-upload, photo + video URL
- /store/{id} — detail page with hero, file list, docs, owner
actions (Edit/Delete) for the uploader
- /my-ai-stack — Granted plugins (toggle opt-out) + From the Store
(uninstall) sections
- Admin nav: Marketplaces moved into Admin dropdown, renamed to
"Curated Marketplaces"
Validation hardening: type-mismatch guards reject skill ZIP uploaded as
agent (or vice versa), and plugin ZIPs masquerading as skills/agents.
Human-readable error messages mapped client-side from machine codes.
Cross-source naming: Store entity-id-prefixed dirs (`plugins/store-<id>/`)
plus the bundle (`plugins/store-bundle/`) avoid collisions with admin
marketplaces (whose `store` slug is reserved by `is_valid_slug`).
Bundle composition is content-hashed at serve time — install/uninstall
or owner re-upload bumps the bundle's plugin.json `version`, so Claude
Code's auto-update toggle picks up changes.
Tests: 50+ new tests across naming, repositories, filter (admin ∪ store
∪ bundle), API (upload/install/uninstall/delete/preview/docs), end-to-end
marketplace.zip with bundle merging.
Five compounding defects on default `docker compose up` deploys made the
session pipeline silently broken: sessions uploaded by analysts via
`agnes push` landed on /data/user_sessions/<user>/*.jsonl but nothing
ever processed them. Fix is one PR: promote anthropic + openai to core
deps, wire all three LLM-pipeline jobs into scheduler-v2 with offset
cadences (10m/15m/17m), drop the side-car services from compose, seed a
default ai: block on first-time setup with an env-var fallback in code,
surface the pending review queue to admins, and expose a health check
that warns when uploaded jsonls aren't being processed.
**BREAKING** for operators on COMPOSE_PROFILES=full or with custom
Compose overrides referencing the corporate-memory or session-collector
service stanzas — drop them. The scheduler is now the sole driver.
GET /api/health/detailed now returns a session_pipeline service entry.
Heuristic:
max(mtime of /data/user_sessions/**/*.jsonl) <=
max(processed_at in session_extraction_state) + grace_seconds
grace_seconds = 2 × verification-detector cadence (default 30 min;
configurable via SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL).
When the assert fails, status='warning' (never 'error') with an
actionable detail pointing at the verification-detector scheduler job.
A warning bubbles up to the existing overall='degraded' aggregation —
operators querying /api/health/detailed (or /agnes diagnose system)
get a clear breadcrumb instead of a silently-broken pipeline.
Cold-start case (no session files, or files newer than the grace
window with empty state table) is handled explicitly to avoid noise
on a fresh deploy.
Tests: tests/test_health_session_pipeline.py.
The /corporate-memory page filters status IN ('approved','mandatory')
and showed no hint that pending items exist. With approval_mode set to
'review_queue' (the default in instance.yaml.example), every collection
run would silently funnel new items into the pending bucket where no
operator ever saw them.
For admins (is_km_admin), the page now renders a banner above the
stats bar:
N pending items awaiting review — review them at /corporate-memory/admin
Non-admins see no change (the route zeroes the count server-side
before passing to the template, so the hint is never leaked).
Tests: tests/test_corporate_memory_page.py.
**BREAKING** for operators using `COMPOSE_PROFILES=full` or custom
Compose overrides that referenced these stanzas — they're gone in
docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.prod.yml. The scheduler-v2 model
(previous commit) is now the sole driver: every cadence is a job in
services/scheduler/__main__.py:JOBS hitting an admin HTTP endpoint.
Why drop instead of keep behind `profiles: [full]`:
- The previous stanzas were tight `restart: unless-stopped` boot loops.
When the scheduled run ended (every cycle), Docker re-spawned the
container, defeating any cadence the service intended.
- The whole point of #176 is that there's now exactly one driver. Two
drivers (scheduler HTTP + standalone container loop) would race on
the same /data/user_sessions and knowledge_items writes.
- Removing the stanzas is a louder signal than commenting them out —
operators upgrading get a clean failure mode (no stale containers),
not a silently double-driven pipeline.
The Python entry points (services/{corporate_memory, session_collector,
verification_detector}/__main__.py) stay — they're still callable from
the CLI for manual one-shot runs and from the new admin endpoints.
docs/architecture.md updated to reflect the new schedule table.
tests/test_docker_compose.py pins the contract: the two services must
not reappear under either Compose file.
The session-collector, verification-detector, and corporate-memory
services now run on the same scheduler-v2 model that already drives
data-refresh, health-check, script-runner, and marketplaces:
- New admin endpoints in app/api/admin.py:
POST /api/admin/run-session-collector
POST /api/admin/run-verification-detector
POST /api/admin/run-corporate-memory
All admin-gated, sync-def (FastAPI thread pool), with one audit row
per invocation. Same single-writer-of-system.duckdb pattern as the
existing /api/marketplaces/sync-all job.
- services/scheduler/__main__.py JOBS gains three entries with offset
cadences (10m / 15m / 17m, all coprime modulo the 30s tick) so the
three LLM-backed jobs don't fire on the same tick and stack their
API + DB load.
- The verification-detector endpoint surfaces the LLM factory's
fail-fast ValueError as HTTP 500 with the actionable message,
preserving the no-silent-skip contract from the previous commit.
Tests:
- tests/test_admin_run_endpoints.py covers admin gating + scheduler
registration + endpoint contract.
- tests/test_scheduler_sidecar.py existing tests continue to pass.
POST /api/admin/configure now writes a default ai: block into the
instance.yaml overlay when the request leaves it untouched and either
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or LLM_API_KEY is set in the environment. The block
references the env var via ${VAR} syntax — secrets never land in YAML.
connectors.llm.factory grows create_extractor_from_env_or_config which
falls back to ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / LLM_API_KEY when ai_config is empty
and raises a clear ValueError when neither is available. Both
services/corporate_memory and services/verification_detector switch to
the new helper, replacing the old 'silently skip when ai: missing'
path that was the silent-failure root cause.
Tests:
- tests/test_setup_ai_block.py — overlay seeding contract.
- tests/test_llm_provider_env_fallback.py — fallback + fail-fast.
LLM provider SDKs are imported by services/corporate_memory and
services/verification_detector — both production code paths. Listing
them only in [project.optional-dependencies].dev caused the scheduler
container to boot-loop with ModuleNotFoundError on default
`docker compose up` deploys, because the Dockerfile installs core
deps only (`uv pip install --system --no-cache .`).
Adds tests/test_packaging.py to lock the contract: anthropic + openai
must live in [project].dependencies, not in dev extras.
