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5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
minasarustamyan
d4ac84dd46
feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + users.role + is_public; v19 migration (#150)
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration

BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.

Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
  → drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
  s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
  test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.

Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
  (TABLE je unconditionally enabled)

API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
  je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
  gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)

Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
  z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
  (admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()

CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
  (back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)

Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
  (can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
  (drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
  tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
  user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
  test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
  a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
  test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
  test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated

Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)

Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.

Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): cut 0.27.0

---------

Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-30 22:02:16 +02:00
ZdenekSrotyr
61f6b8d2d5
feat(ci+tests): deploy safety audit — linting, rollback, smoke tests, 50+ new tests (#120)
Comprehensive deploy safety audit implementing 19 improvements across CI/CD pipeline, test coverage, and source code.

### CI/CD Pipeline
- ruff + mypy added to both release.yml and keboola-deploy.yml (continue-on-error)
- Smoke test added to keboola-deploy.yml (was missing)
- Automatic rollback on smoke test failure in release.yml
- Expanded smoke-test.sh with catalog, admin/tables, marketplace.zip, metrics
- Required status checks via .github/settings.yml
- Dependabot + CODEOWNERS + pre-commit hooks + ruff config

### Source Code
- DB schema version check in /api/health (db_schema: ok/mismatch/unhealthy)
- Config versioning (config_version: 1 in instance.yaml, non-blocking validation)
- BigQuery extractor ATTACH error handling (try/except around INSTALL+ATTACH)
- Post-deploy smoke test script for prod VM validation

### Test Coverage (~50 new tests)
- v13->v14 migration, Email magic link TTL, PAT, Marketplace ZIP/Git,
  Jira webhooks, Hybrid Query BQ, Keboola/BQ extractor failure modes,
  Orchestrator failure modes

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-29 09:18:55 +02:00
ZdenekSrotyr
e9d7af3cce feat(rbac+marketplace): RBAC v13 + Claude Code marketplace + #81/#83/#44 hardening
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.

== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
  internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
  wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
    require_admin                        — Admin-group god-mode
    require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
  Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
  /admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
  `da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
  runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
  (migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).

== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
  RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
  their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
  not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).

== #81 #83 #44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
    0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
  Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
  alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
  of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
  + path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
  sandbox-bypass risk closed).

== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
  shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
  per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
  silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.

== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
  (project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
  replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
  OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
  scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
  update the path.

== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
  from Czech to English for codebase consistency.

Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
2026-04-28 14:25:04 +02:00
Petr Simecek
c25fd41bf7
feat(auth): Google Workspace groups on /profile + tag-triggered Keboola deploy workflow (#56)
* feat(auth): display Google Workspace groups on /profile

- Request cloud-identity.groups.readonly scope in Google OAuth
- Fetch groups via Cloud Identity API after callback; tolerate 4xx
  (non-Workspace tenants) and network errors — never break login
- Store result in Starlette session as google_groups
- Replace /profile redirect with a real profile page rendering
  account details (email, name, role) and the group list; show a
  friendly empty state when no groups are available
- Tests: helper parsing + 403 + exception paths; profile page
  smoke test; updated the old redirect test

* test: remove stale /profile redirect tests

Cherry-pick of Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd ("display Google Workspace groups on
/profile") replaces the /profile redirect with a real profile page —
but only updated one of three tests that expected the old behaviour.

These two tests in test_admin_tokens_ui.py and test_pat.py were left
asserting `/profile → 302 /tokens`, which now returns
`/profile → 302 /login?next=%2Fprofile` for unauth users (the standard
auth guard) or `/profile → 200 HTML` for authenticated users.

Removed both rather than patched — coverage for the new behaviour
already exists in tests/test_auth_providers.py (added by the same
commit). The /tokens render assertions in the deleted test_pat.py case
are redundant with test_admin_tokens_ui.py's own /tokens UI tests.

* fix(auth): Google groups search query needs parent + labels predicates

Cloud Identity Groups Search API returns 400 INVALID_ARGUMENT when the
CEL query lacks the required `parent == 'customers/<id>'` predicate AND
a `'<label>' in labels` membership predicate. Zdeněk's original 4f7e4cd
query had only `member_key_id == '<email>'` — every fetch silently
returned [] and the /profile groups list was always empty.

Fix: build the query with all three required pieces:
  parent == 'customers/my_customer'   (alias = caller's own Workspace
                                       org; no need to look up customer ID)
  member_key_id == '<email>'           (filter to this user's memberships)
  'cloudidentity.googleapis.com/groups.discussion_forum' in labels
                                       (Workspace mailing-list groups —
                                       the common case; security-group
                                       coverage is a follow-up)

Also: log the full error body (not truncated to 200 chars) and the
query string so the next time Google rejects something we can diagnose
in one log line instead of a re-deploy.

Caught when first agnes-dev login completed normally (HTTP 302) but app
log showed `Google groups fetch returned 400 for petr@keboola.com:
{"error":{"code":400,"message":"Request contains an invalid argument."}}`
on the same VM (kids-ai-data-analysis / agnes-dev.keboola.com).

Reference: https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest/v1/groups/search

* feat(web): add Profile link to user dropdown menu

The /profile page (Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd cherry-pick) renders a real profile
view including Google Workspace groups, but had no entry point in the
UI — users could only reach it by typing the URL manually. Add a
"Profile" menu item between the user header (email + role) and
"My tokens" so the page is discoverable.

Side effect: cleaned up the leftover `or _path.startswith('/profile')`
condition on the "My tokens" active class, which dated from the old
/profile → /tokens redirect (removed in c789617). Now each menu item
owns its own active state.

* fix: profile-link tests + .env quoting for CADDY_TLS

Two issues caught by Keboola's first agnes-dev deploy + agnes-auto-upgrade
cron run:

1. tests/test_web_ui.py — two negative assertions ("href=/profile" NOT in
   body) date from when /profile was a redirect-only stub. Now /profile
   is a real page (groups display) AND has a dropdown menu link, so the
   negative assertions flip to positive. Same for ">Profile<" text in
   the non-admin nav test.

2. startup-script.sh.tpl — CADDY_TLS line must be QUOTED in .env, because
   agnes-auto-upgrade.sh sources .env via `set -a; . .env; set +a` and
   bash treats `KEY=value with spaces` as `KEY=value` followed by `with`
   and `spaces` exec attempts. Symptom: cron log spam
   `/opt/agnes/.env: line 14: petr@keboola.com: command not found`,
   the cron exits non-zero, and no auto-upgrade ever happens. Caddy
   itself reads the value fine because docker-compose env_file=.env
   parses key=value properly without shell-evaluating the rest.

   Fix: emit `CADDY_TLS="tls <email>"` instead of `CADDY_TLS=tls <email>`.
   Both the cron source and docker-compose env_file accept the quoted
   form; cron stops failing.

* fix(auth): use searchTransitiveGroups + security label for non-admin user

Three bugs in the original cherry-pick + my prior fix attempt, all caught
by a stdlib probe script (scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py) run
locally with a Playground-issued OAuth token:

1. Wrong endpoint. `groups:search` is the admin "find groups in org"
   endpoint and 400s for non-admin users regardless of query. Switched
   to `groups/-/memberships:searchTransitiveGroups` which is the
   user-perspective "what groups am I in" endpoint.

2. Wrong label. Querying with `cloudidentity.googleapis.com/groups.discussion_forum`
   returns 403 "Insufficient permissions to retrieve memberships" even
   on the new endpoint — Workspace policy denies non-admin reads of
   discussion-forum groups. Switching to `groups.security` returns 200
   with the actual membership list. Empirically every Workspace group
   at Keboola carries BOTH labels, so the security filter sees the full
   set anyway. Confirmed with the probe script.

3. Wrong response shape. `searchTransitiveGroups` returns
   {"memberships": [...]}, not {"groups": [...]}. Parser updated
   accordingly.

Also adds scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py — stdlib-only standalone
probe that hits 6 candidate endpoints with a user OAuth token. Saved a
deploy cycle (~10 min) per query iteration; future API-syntax debugging
should start there.

Verified end-to-end: petr@keboola.com login on agnes-dev returns 5
groups (LIC-1PASSWORD, ROLE_ATLASSIAN_*, etc.) via the probe; once
deployed, the same will populate session["google_groups"] and render
on /profile.

* test(auth): update Google groups parser fixture to match searchTransitiveGroups shape

Mock payload was `{"groups": [...]}` (the shape `groups:search` returns).
After switching to `groups/-/memberships:searchTransitiveGroups` in the
prior commit, the actual response is `{"memberships": [...]}` and the
parser iterates that key. Test now mirrors the real shape.

The per-item structure (groupKey.id + displayName) is unchanged, so the
expected output dict stays the same: [{"id": "...", "name": "..."}].

* docs(auth): add docs/auth-groups.md — Google Workspace groups runbook

Captures the non-obvious bits: the GCP-side setup checklist (Cloud
Identity API + scope on consent screen + Internal user type), the
`security` vs `discussion_forum` label trap (the latter 403s for
non-admins, the former 200s — one of those is a 4-iteration debug
session and shouldn't have to be repeated), where groups are stored
(session, not DB) and how to refresh (re-login), plus how to use the
probe script for future API-syntax issues.

Deliberately stops short of explaining "what is Cloud Identity" or
"what is OAuth scope" — those belong in Google's own docs, not ours.

* docs(claude): document release workflows + module versioning + recreate trick

New "Release & deploy workflows" section in CLAUDE.md covers what didn't
exist anywhere in the repo before:

- Distinction between release.yml (auto-build per push) vs the new
  keboola-deploy.yml (tag-triggered, explicit deploy only) — plus when
  to use which (per-developer convenience vs shared dev VM safety)
- Module versioning (infra-vX.Y.Z) and the bump-after-merge dance
- The lifecycle.ignore_changes [metadata_startup_script] gotcha and how
  to force a recreate via workflow_dispatch's recreate_targets input

All generic — no customer hostnames, project IDs, IPs. Customer-specific
deploy steps belong in the consuming infra repo's README.

Also: cross-reference docs/auth-groups.md from the Authentication
section so future Claude sessions find the Workspace-groups runbook
without grepping.

---------

Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
2026-04-26 00:56:44 +02:00
ZdenekSrotyr
d2c76cb221
User management + PAT + CLI distribution + HTML auth redirect (#9 #10 #11 #12) (#28)
* fix: redirect unauthenticated HTML routes to /login (#10)

* docs(plan): user mgmt + PAT + CLI distribution implementation plan (#9 #10 #11 #12)

* build(docker): produce wheel artifact for /cli/download (#9)

* feat(db): schema v5 — users.active + deactivated_at/by (#11)

* feat(api): /cli/download wheel + /cli/install.sh with baked server URL (#9)

* feat(users): repository supports active flag + count_admins (#11)

* feat(ui): /install page with per-deployment install instructions (#9)

* feat(api): user PATCH/reset-password/set-password/activate/deactivate (#11)

* fix(cli): da login prompts for password and sends it in body (#9)

* test(api): safeguard tests for self-deactivate and last admin (#11)

* feat(auth): reject requests from deactivated users (#11)

* fixup(#10): propagate next through /login buttons + lock down sanitizer tests

* feat(cli): da admin set-role/activate/deactivate/reset-password/set-password (#11)

* feat(ui): /admin/users management page (#11)

* feat(db): schema v6 — personal_access_tokens (#12)

* feat(users): access_tokens repository (#12)

* feat(auth): JWT carries typ (session|pat) and explicit jti (#12)

* feat(auth): reject revoked/expired PATs; update last_used_at (#12)

* feat(api): /auth/tokens CRUD + admin revoke; session-only guard (#12)

* feat(cli): da auth token create/list/revoke (#12)

* feat(ui): /profile page with PAT create/list/revoke (#12)

* docs: PAT usage and session/PAT TTL clarification (#12)

* feat(auth): PAT first-use-from-new-IP audit + last_used_ip (schema v7) (#12)

Closes remaining acceptance gap from issue #12: audit_log entry on first use
of a PAT from an IP that differs from the recorded last_used_ip.

- schema v7: personal_access_tokens.last_used_ip column
- AccessTokenRepository.mark_used now stores the client IP
- get_current_user extracts client IP (X-Forwarded-For first hop, fallback
  to request.client.host) and emits a token.first_use_new_ip audit when the
  IP changes on a subsequent use (not the very first use)
- tests: new-ip audit, same-ip no-op, first-ever-use no-op, schema v7 column

* fix: address Devin review findings on PR #28

- app/main.py: exclude /auth/* from HTML redirect handler so JSON
  endpoints under /auth/ (PAT CRUD used by `da auth token` CLI) keep
  their 401 JSON contract (Devin #1, bug)
- app/api/tokens.py: reject expires_in_days <= 0 explicitly; use
  `is not None` so 0 no longer silently creates a non-expiring token
  (Devin #2)
- app/api/users.py: validate role against Role enum in create_user
  to match update_user and prevent 500 on role-protected requests
  later (Devin #3)
- app/web/templates/admin_users.html: escape user-supplied strings
  before innerHTML; move onclick handlers to addEventListener via
  data attributes so emails with quotes / HTML no longer break the UI
  or enable stored XSS (Devin #4)
- app/auth/router.py, app/auth/providers/{password,google}.py:
  reject deactivated users at login instead of issuing a JWT that
  would then fail on the next request — removes the confusing
  redirect loop (Devin #5)
- CLAUDE.md: document schema v7 instead of stale v4 (Devin #6)
- tests/test_web_ui.py: regression test for the /auth/* JSON 401

* feat(web): add /profile and /admin/users links to dashboard nav

* feat(web): point setup banner at /install page

* chore(web): drop unused setup_instructions context

* fix: address Devin review round 2 on PR #28

- app/api/tokens.py: when expires_in_days is None (the "never" option),
  use a ~100-year JWT expiry so the token doesn't silently die in 24h
  via the session-default fallback in create_access_token. The real
  expiry enforcement stays in verify_token's DB-level check (Devin 🔴)
- app/web/templates/profile.html: escape t.name and other user-supplied
  strings via esc() helper before innerHTML, same pattern as
  admin_users.html. Move revoke onclick to data-attribute +
  addEventListener (Devin 🟡)
- app/api/cli_artifacts.py: use `mktemp -d` with X's at end of template
  for GNU/BSD portability, place wheel inside the temp dir and
  clean up with rm -rf (Devin 🚩)

* feat(web): redesign /install page; make curl one-liner primary, collapse manual

Rebuild the public /install page using the dashboard visual language
(shared header, card layout, gradient hero, design tokens from
style-custom.css). The page is now anchored on the one-liner install
path: curl -fsSL <server>/cli/install.sh | bash is rendered as the
primary, prominent step 1, while the old manual wheel-download flow
is tucked behind a closed-by-default <details> block for users in
restricted/offline environments.

Information architecture:
  hero (server URL + version)
  -> step 1: quick install (one-liner, big Copy button)
  -> step 2: create PAT on /profile + export DA_TOKEN / da auth whoami
  -> step 3: Claude Code / MCP via ~/.config/da/token.json
  -> collapsed "Manual install" details for download-wheel flow
  -> footer link to docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md

Every shell snippet has a vanilla-JS "Copy" button that confirms
visually ("Copied!" for 1.5s) and falls back to textarea+execCommand
on non-secure contexts. No new dependencies, no bundler.

The route now also pulls an optional user so the header shows the
same nav (Dashboard / Profile / Logout) as dashboard.html when a
session exists, while staying fully public when signed out.

* fix(cli): use real wheel filename in install.sh (broken pip/uv install)

The installer wrote the downloaded wheel as agnes_cli.whl, which lacks a
PEP-427 version component — both pip and uv tool install reject it and
abort the one-liner.

Use curl -OJ so Content-Disposition determines the on-disk filename, then
resolve it via glob. Install an EXIT trap to remove the tmpdir even when
install fails.

* fix(web): correct manual install wheel glob and add PEP 668 / PATH hints

- Wheel glob is agnes_the_ai_analyst-*.whl (not agnes-*.whl) — the old
  pattern never matched the real artefact name from the build.
- Add — or — separator between uv tool install and pip install.
- Warn that pip install --user is blocked on macOS Homebrew / modern
  Debian (PEP 668) and recommend uv tool install as the default path.
- Both flows now show the ~/.local/bin PATH hint so a fresh shell can
  find the da binary after install.

* fix(web): consistent session.user reference in install header

The avatar-letter fallback inside {% if session.user %} was reading
user.name / user.email directly, but the route dependency can pass
user=None — those references resolved to an empty FlexDict and produced
an empty avatar circle. Read everything through session.user to match
the guard and the dashboard pattern.

* fix(web): point headless usage link at GitHub source

/docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md 404s — no static route serves repo docs. Point
the footer link at the rendered markdown on GitHub instead of adding a
dedicated docs serving route just for one file.

* feat(web): /install hero size, anon sign-in banner, step 2 copy polish

- Bump hero h1 from 26px to 30px to match dashboard primary scale.
- Anonymous visitors see a small sign-in banner above Step 2 (creating
  a token requires auth; without the banner the flow appears stuck).
- Add an 'After generating your token' section label inside Step 2 so
  the /profile CTA button no longer looks wedged mid-sentence between
  adjacent paragraphs.

* chore(web): /install a11y + version pill polish

- aria-live='polite' on copy buttons so screen readers announce the
  'Copied!' state change.
- Replace redundant INSTANCE_NAME eyebrow (already in the header logo)
  with 'Getting started'.
- Hide the version pill when AGNES_VERSION is unset/'dev' — avoids the
  misleading 'vdev' label in local/unbuilt runs.
- Manual summary focus-visible outline-offset +2px (was -2px which
  clipped inside the card), and mark the chevron as decorative.

* fix(web): use session.user in dashboard avatar fallback

Inside {% if session.user %} guard, the avatar fallback referenced
(user.name or user.email). If user is None the block crashes when
the profile picture is absent. Align with the guard variable.

* fix: address Devin review round 3 on PR #28

- app/api/users.py: stop auto-sending email from reset_password. The
  magic-link sender would deliver a "Login Link" that — when clicked —
  consumes the reset_token via verify_magic_link and logs the user in
  WITHOUT prompting for a new password. Admins now share the raw
  reset_token from the API response manually, or use set-password
  directly. email_sent is always False. Documented inline. (Devin 🟡)
- app/api/cli_artifacts.py: harden /cli/install.sh generation against
  shell injection via Host header or AGNES_VERSION. base_url is
  validated against a strict scheme+host+port regex; version against
  an alnum + dot/dash/underscore allowlist. Both values are also
  piped through shlex.quote() as defense in depth. (Devin 🟡)

The shared users.reset_token column between magic-link and password-
reset flows (Devin 🚩) remains an architectural gap; splitting into
separate columns needs schema v8 and is tracked for a follow-up PR.

* docs, chore(grpn): manual-deploy helpers + hackathon deploy learnings

Adds scripts/grpn/ — Makefile + agnes-auto-upgrade.sh + README for
operating Agnes on GRPN's existing foundryai-development VM when the
full Terraform flow is blocked by org policies:

- iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation (org constraint) forbids SA
  JSON keys, so GCP_SA_KEY-based CI is unavailable
- No projectIamAdmin delegation → bootstrap-gcp.sh can't grant roles
- Secret Manager IAM bindings require setIamPolicy which editor lacks

Helper targets: deploy, deploy-tag, recreate, restart, stop, start,
status, version, logs, ps, env, ssh, tunnel, open, bootstrap-admin,
set-data-source, install-cron, uninstall-cron.

docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-22-grpn-deploy-learnings.md — running
log of all org-policy constraints hit during the hackathon deploy,
with workarounds and derived follow-ups (WIF support, external_ip
variable, customer onboarding IAM checklist).

Not a replacement for the TF flow — stopgap until WIF lands.

* fix(web): make header logos clickable links to home

* feat(web): one-click "Setup a new Claude Code" button

Adds a single-button flow on the dashboard and /install page that
generates a fresh personal access token via POST /auth/tokens and
copies a complete, paste-ready setup script (server URL, token,
install/verify commands) to the clipboard. Falls back to a modal
textarea when the clipboard is blocked; redirects to /login on 401;
surfaces backend errors inline.

- dashboard.html: replaces the top "Set up your local environment"
  anchor with a real button wired to setupNewClaude(). Removes the
  duplicate bottom setup banner to keep a single entry point.
- install.html: for signed-in users, Step 1 leads with the one-click
  button and demotes the curl one-liner into a collapsible "Or run
  manually" aside. Anonymous visitors still see the curl flow plus a
  sign-in hint.
- No new deps. Vanilla JS. Token lives in memory/clipboard only —
  never rendered into persistent DOM.

* feat(cli): add "da auth import-token" for non-interactive PAT login

Writes a provided JWT into ~/.config/da/token.json using the canonical
{access_token, email, role} shape expected by save_token(). Decodes the
token locally to pull email/role claims, verifies it against the server
via GET /api/catalog/tables, and refuses to overwrite an existing token
file if the server returns 401. --email / --role overrides exist for
tokens missing those claims; --skip-verify bypasses the server round-trip
for offline / CI scenarios.

* test(cli): cover da auth import-token success + 401 + claim-fallback paths

Three new tests in TestAuthImportToken:
- valid JWT + 200 -> canonical token.json written
- 401 from /api/catalog/tables -> exit 1, existing token file untouched
- JWT without email/role claims -> refused without overrides, accepted
  with --email / --role flags

* feat(web): update one-click Claude setup instructions — explicit uv install, import-token, skills question

Replaces the fragile `cat > token.json <<EOF` clipboard payload with an
explicit, auditable sequence:

  1. `curl -fsSL /cli/download` + `uv tool install --force` (no opaque
     `curl | bash`).
  2. `da auth import-token --token ...` instead of hand-written JSON.
  3. Explicit PATH persistence for zsh/bash.
  4. A required question to the user about whether to copy the bundled
     skills into ~/.claude/skills/agnes/ or pull them on-demand via
     `da skills show`.
  5. A final confirmation step with whoami + version output.

Factored both pages to include a shared partial
(app/web/templates/_claude_setup_instructions.jinja) so dashboard.html
and install.html can never drift apart again. {server_url} and {token}
stay as runtime placeholders substituted by renderSetupInstructions().

* feat(ui): modernize /admin/users + unify header nav across pages

- New shared partial app/web/templates/_app_header.html — single source
  of truth for the top navigation. Used by base.html and dashboard.html
  (which doesn't extend base.html). Active page highlighted via
  request.url.path. Admin "Users" link gated by session.user.role.
- style-custom.css: add .app-header / .app-nav-link / .app-btn-logout /
  .app-avatar styles (mirrors dashboard's previous inline copy under
  app-* prefix). Mobile-friendly fallback at <720px.
- base.html: include the new partial so every page extending base
  (admin_users, profile, login_email, error, …) gets the same chrome
  the dashboard has.
- dashboard.html: replace its inline <header class="header"> markup
  with the shared partial. Inline .header CSS left in place as
  harmless dead code (separate cleanup PR).
- admin_users.html: rewritten with avatars, role pills (color-coded
  per role), toggle switch for active, search/filter input, toast
  notifications, modal dialogs replacing alert/confirm/prompt,
  one-click copy for the reset token, empty / loading states.
  All XSS-safe via the existing esc() helper + data-attribute
  event delegation.
- tests/test_web_ui.py: smoke test that /admin/users renders the new
  shared header chrome and the modernized markup.

* feat(api): serve CLI wheel at /cli/agnes.whl for direct uv install

uv tool install inspects the URL path suffix to recognise a wheel, so
/cli/download (which has no .whl suffix) cannot be installed directly.
Expose a stable /cli/agnes.whl alias over the same wheel lookup so users
can run: uv tool install --force https://<server>/cli/agnes.whl

* test(cli): cover da auth import-token --server persisting to config.yaml

The server persistence was already implemented in the import-token command
(save_config({server}) call) but not covered by tests. Add an explicit test
so the one-step setup contract — single import-token call writes both token
and server — cannot regress.

* feat(web): simpler Claude setup — single uv install URL, single import-token call

User feedback: the prior clipboard payload repeated the server URL and
token across multiple steps (curl + tmpfile + install + rm + separate
seed-config + import-token). Collapse to:

 1. uv tool install --force {server_url}/cli/agnes.whl  (single URL, direct)
 2. da auth import-token --token ... --server ...        (one call, persists both)
 3. da auth whoami
 4. skills (ask user first)
 5. confirm

uv accepts HTTPS URLs that end in .whl and installs them directly, so
the tmpfile dance is unnecessary. import-token --server already persists
the server to config.yaml, so no separate printf > config.yaml step.

* fix(tests): update admin users heading assertion after template rename

The admin_users.html template now uses <h2 class="users-title">Users</h2>
instead of <h2>User management</h2>. Update the assertion to match.

* feat(ui): unify header across remaining 7 standalone pages

These 7 pages render their own full <html> and don't extend base.html,
so the previous unification commit only covered base + dashboard. Each
had its own ad-hoc <header> markup with inconsistent classes
(.top-header / .header / .page-header), inconsistent nav-link sets,
and inconsistent avatar/email styling.

Replace each inline <header>...</header> block with the shared
{% include '_app_header.html' %} so /activity-center, /admin/permissions,
/admin/tables, /catalog, /corporate-memory, /corporate-memory/admin,
and /install all show the same chrome (Dashboard / Install CLI /
Profile / Users / email + avatar / Logout) with the active page
highlighted via request.url.path.

Old inline header CSS (.header, .top-header, .page-header, .nav-link,
etc.) is left in place as harmless dead code; it can be cleaned up in
a follow-up sweep.

* feat(web): add readable preview of Claude setup payload on dashboard + /install

Move the line-by-line setup instructions into app/web/setup_instructions.py
as the single source of truth, then render them in two modes from the
existing _claude_setup_instructions.jinja partial:

- preview_mode=True  → visible, read-only <pre><code> block with the real
  server URL and a clearly-styled placeholder token (never a real one).
- preview_mode=False → the JS SETUP_INSTRUCTIONS_TEMPLATE used by the
  one-click flow (unchanged behaviour).

Both /dashboard (env-setup-cta card) and /install (Step 1 card) now show
the preview directly under the 'Setup a new Claude Code' button so users
can see exactly what will land in their clipboard before they click.

* feat(web): update setup instructions — `da diagnose` step, explicit section titles

Rework the Claude Code setup payload to:

- Give every numbered step an unambiguous verb header ("1) Install the CLI",
  "2) Log in", "3) Verify the login", "4) Run diagnostics", "5) Skills (ask
  the user first)", "6) Confirm").
- Add step 4 `da diagnose` as the post-login health check. The CLI already
  ships this command (cli/commands/diagnose.py); it prints "Overall:
  healthy" and a list of green checks that map cleanly to next actions.
- Ask the skills copy-vs-on-demand question verbatim so Claude Code always
  prompts the user the same way.
- Replace the terse "Confirm" line with a 4-bullet summary (version,
  whoami, skills choice, diagnose status) so the return message is
  structured and comparable across setups.

* chore(web): remove stale MCP card from /install (no MCP server today)

The 'Use with Claude Code / MCP' card (Step 3 on /install) referenced an
MCP integration Agnes does not ship. Remove the whole card. The one-click
'Setup a new Claude Code' flow in Step 1 already covers the long-lived
client use case and is less confusing than dangling persistence tips for
a non-existent integration.

* feat(api): include user_email + last_used_ip + user_id in admin tokens list response

Adds AdminTokenItem response model (superset of TokenListItem) and
AccessTokenRepository.list_all_with_user() joining personal_access_tokens
with users to denormalize user_email. Needed for /admin/tokens UI where
admins triage tokens across all users.

* feat(web): /admin/tokens page — list, filter, search, revoke across all users

Adds a new admin-only page with client-side filtering (status, user email,
last-used window), column sorting, counts bar (active/revoked/expired),
and an inline revoke action. Mirrors the /admin/users visual language.

* feat(web): add Tokens nav link for admins + deep-link from admin/users row

Admin-only nav entry to /admin/tokens, and a per-row Tokens button on
/admin/users that prefills the token page's user filter via ?user=<email>.

* test(admin): cover /admin/tokens rendering, filter state, non-admin denial, revoke

Verifies admin can render the page (title + JS hooks present), a non-admin
is blocked, unauthenticated users are redirected, the admin list response
includes user_email / user_id / last_used_ip, and admin can revoke another
user's token.

* feat(web): modern redesign of /admin/tokens — hero, stat strip, refined table, responsive cards, a11y

* feat(web): ditch the table — /admin/tokens as a card stack, modern GitHub-style list

Replaces the table-based layout with a stack of self-contained token cards
inside a <ul role=list>. Each card is a flex row: avatar + name/meta on the
left, last-used block in the middle, status pill + outlined 'Revoke' button
on the right. Status and sort controls are pill-shaped toggle chips; user
email search has an inline search icon. No <table>/<tr>/<th>/<td> anywhere.
Responsive below 720px (card stacks vertically) and 480px (stat chips 2x2).
Preserves filter IDs (flt-status, flt-user, flt-last-used) and data-revoke
for existing tests.

* feat(web): add /tokens (role-aware) — single page for both user PAT CRUD and admin overview

- Rename admin_tokens.html -> tokens.html with a new is_admin context flag.
- New route GET /tokens: renders the same card-stack UI for everyone.
  * Admins: loads /auth/admin/tokens, shows owner column + stat strip, keeps
    the owner-email search box and sort-by-owner chip.
  * Non-admins: loads /auth/tokens (own tokens only), hides owner column +
    stat chips, adds a 'New token' CTA in the hero that opens a modal
    (name + expires_in_days) calling POST /auth/tokens. The raw token is
    revealed once in a dismissable banner and cleared from the DOM on Hide.
- GET /admin/tokens now 302-redirects to /tokens, preserving query string
  (so the /admin/users deep-link ?user=foo still works).

* feat(web): /tokens full-bleed layout to match dashboard width

The hero, toolbar, and card list used to sit inside base.html's .container
(max-width 800px). Break out with negative horizontal margins so the page
spans the viewport like /dashboard does, capped at 1440px for readability
on very wide screens with a 24px gutter on each side.

- No change to base.html itself. The override is scoped to .tokens-page.
- body { overflow-x: hidden; } guards against rare horizontal scrollbars.
- < 808px viewport: reset to natural flow (mobile already narrower).
- ≥ 1488px viewport: cap to 1440px and re-center.

* chore(web): remove /profile template + nav link (redirect /profile -> /tokens)

The old /profile PAT CRUD page is now redundant — the modern /tokens page
covers both user and admin flows. Delete the template; the router's
/profile handler already 302-redirects to /tokens.

Nav cleanup:
- Remove the 'Profile' link.
- Show a single 'Tokens' link to every signed-in user (previously only
  admins saw it).
- Active-state matches /tokens, /admin/tokens, and /profile so the
  highlight survives the redirect chain.

/install CTA now points at /tokens instead of /profile.

* test: cover /tokens for admin + non-admin flows, /profile redirect, nav update

tests/test_admin_tokens_ui.py
- Point admin rendering test at /tokens directly and tighten assertions
  (admin-only stat strip + owner search, non-admin CTA absent).
- Add test_non_admin_can_render_tokens_page: personal body, New-token CTA,
  create-modal, reveal banner; stat strip + owner search absent.
- Add test_admin_tokens_redirects_to_tokens: 302 to /tokens, query string
  (?user=...) preserved for the /admin/users deep-link.
- Add test_profile_redirects_to_tokens: 302 to /tokens.
- Add test_non_admin_can_create_pat_via_tokens_page_api: exercises the
  POST /auth/tokens call that the non-admin create-modal submits.

tests/test_pat.py
- test_profile_page_renders -> test_profile_page_redirects_to_tokens:
  assert the 302 + that /tokens lands on the unified non-admin body.

tests/test_web_ui.py
- admin_users nav assertion: 'Tokens' link present, 'Profile' link absent.
- Add test_nav_shows_tokens_link_for_non_admin: non-admins see the same
  'Tokens' link (previously only admins did).
- Add test_profile_redirects_to_tokens back-compat check.

* feat(web): collapse 'What Claude Code will receive' by default

The preview block on /dashboard and /install now uses <details>/<summary>
so it is hidden by default. Click the chevron/title to expand and review
the clipboard payload. Markup stays in the DOM so existing tests that
assert on content continue to pass.

* fix(web): /tokens width — override .container to 1280px like dashboard

The negative-margin full-bleed trick was fragile and pushed content past
the right edge on deployed viewports. Replace with a simple max-width
override of base.html's .container on this page only, matching
/dashboard's 1280px center-column layout.

* feat(web): split role-aware /tokens into my_tokens.html + admin_tokens.html

* feat(web): router — separate handlers for /tokens (own) and /admin/tokens (all)

* feat(web): nav — show Tokens for all, add All tokens for admins

* test: cover split token pages (own vs all) + admin access gating

* feat(web): move 'My tokens' into a user dropdown menu

Replaces the separate Tokens/email/Logout nav trio with a rounded
avatar trigger that opens a dropdown containing the user's email,
role, a 'My tokens' link, and Logout. Admin-only 'All tokens' stays
as a top-level nav item since it's an admin function, not a personal
one. Click-outside and Escape close the panel; chevron rotates on
open.

* fix(api): allow PATs to list/get/revoke their own tokens (CLI flow)

The documented 'da auth token list/revoke' CLI flow in
docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md uses a PAT, but the previous dependency
(require_session_token) returned 403. Only create_token must be
session-only to prevent PAT-spawning-PAT chains; listing and
revoking your own tokens is safe with a PAT.

* fix(api): cap expires_in_days at 3650 to avoid datetime overflow (500 to 400)

Values above ~11 million days overflowed datetime.max in
datetime.now(utc) + timedelta(days=...) and surfaced as an
unhandled OverflowError → 500. Cap at 10 years with a clear
400 instead; the no-expiry code path is unaffected.

* fix(api): relax _SAFE_URL_RE to allow path prefixes, underscores, and IPv6

The previous regex rejected legitimate reverse-proxy base_url values
(https://host/agnes/), underscores in Docker Compose hostnames, and
IPv6 literals (http://[::1]:8000). Widen the charset and allow an
optional trailing path. shlex.quote continues to provide
defense-in-depth against any metacharacter that slips through.

* fix(web): /login/email and Google OAuth propagate next_path

Previously, /login/email silently dropped the ?next=<path> query
param so the hidden form field rendered empty and login always
landed on /dashboard. Google's button was hard-coded to
/auth/google/login, ignoring next entirely.

- /login page now appends ?next to the Google button URL
- /login/email reads + sanitizes next, passes as template context
- google_login stashes sanitized next_path in session['login_next']
- google_callback pops + re-sanitizes and redirects there

Sanitization factored into app/auth/_common.safe_next_path.

* fix(auth): differentiate argon2 VerifyMismatchError from internal errors in web login

The previous except (VerifyMismatchError, Exception) collapsed both
cases into the generic 'invalid credentials' redirect, silently
hiding corrupted-hash / library errors from ops. Split the two:
bad password still gets ?error=invalid; anything else logs via
logger.exception and redirects with ?err=auth_internal so ops have
a visible signal and users don't retry forever against a broken
password_hash column.

* docs: correct CLAUDE.md table name (personal_access_tokens)

v7 note referenced 'access_tokens.last_used_ip' but the real table
is personal_access_tokens (as mentioned two tokens earlier in the
same bullet). Same-file consistency fix.

* chore(web): clarify admin user-reset UI — encourage Set password over the unused reset_token

POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password stores and returns a token
but no endpoint consumes it — the magic-link sender would log the
user in without prompting for a new password, defeating the reset.
- Drop the 'Reset' row action from admin_users so admins aren't
  pointed at a dead end.
- Rewrite the reveal-modal copy to tell admins to use Set password
  and explicitly note that the magic-link flow isn't available
  for reset tokens in this build.
The API endpoint stays for API-level future use.

* test: cover PAT CLI flow, expires_in_days overflow, proxy base_url, next propagation

- tests/test_pat.py: PAT can list own tokens (200, was 403);
  PAT can revoke own tokens (204); create_token returns 400 for
  expires_in_days > 3650 (was 500 via datetime overflow).
- tests/test_cli_artifacts.py: _SAFE_URL_RE accepts reverse-proxy
  path prefixes, underscores, and IPv6 literals; end-to-end check
  of cli_install_script with a stubbed base_url that includes
  a path prefix (Agnes behind /agnes/).
- tests/test_web_ui.py: /login propagates ?next to the Google
  button URL; /login/email renders next in the hidden form field
  and strips hostile values; unit coverage of safe_next_path.

* fix(security): use \Z instead of $ in URL/version allowlists (trailing-\n bypass)

Python regex `$` also matches just before a trailing newline, so a Host
header or AGNES_VERSION value like "good.example.com\n$(rm -rf /)"
would slip past the allowlist. `\Z` anchors to strict end-of-string.

shlex.quote downstream remains as defense-in-depth, but the allowlist
is now the tight gate it claims to be.

* fix(auth): PAT with null expiry omits JWT exp claim (DB is the source of truth)

Previously a PAT created with `expires_in_days=null` (user-requested
"never expires") set the DB `expires_at` to NULL (correct) but still
baked a ~100y `exp` claim into the JWT. That is misleading: the PAT
silently did expire eventually, despite the UI and API promising
"no expiry".

`create_access_token` now accepts `omit_exp=True` to skip the `exp`
claim entirely. `app/api/tokens.py` passes that when `expires_in_days
is None`. The authoritative expiry check lives in
`app/auth/dependencies.py`, which reads `expires_at` from the DB row —
unchanged. PyJWT accepts claim-less JWTs indefinitely.

* test: cover trailing-newline regex bypass + no-exp JWT for unbounded PAT

- test_safe_url_re_rejects_trailing_newline_bypass: asserts both
  `_SAFE_URL_RE` and `_SAFE_VERSION_RE` reject values with a trailing
  `\n` (previously accepted because Python `$` matches before `\n`).
- test_pat_null_expiry_jwt_has_no_exp_claim: POST /auth/tokens with
  `expires_in_days=null`, decode the returned JWT, assert `exp` is
  absent while `typ=pat`, `sub`, and `jti` are still present.
- test_pat_with_null_expiry_is_accepted_by_verify_token: verify_token
  round-trips a claim-less JWT without ExpiredSignatureError.
- test_pat_null_expiry_end_to_end_allows_authenticated_request: use
  the null-expiry PAT against /auth/tokens and confirm it authenticates.

* docs(auth): document X-Forwarded-For trust model in _client_ip

Deployment runs behind Caddy which strips incoming X-Forwarded-For
and sets its own, so the leftmost hop is trustworthy. Clarify that
the stored last_used_ip is audit-only and never used for access
control — if the app is ever exposed directly, this value becomes
client-settable.

* docs: /profile → /tokens in install.sh next-steps, CLI error, HEADLESS_USAGE, security skill

After splitting PAT management to /tokens (with /profile as a back-compat
302), stale references remained in user-facing text. Update them to the
canonical /tokens URL so shell scripts, CLI error hints, docs, and the
bundled security skill are all consistent.
2026-04-22 14:24:28 +02:00