* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration
BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.
Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
→ drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.
Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
(TABLE je unconditionally enabled)
API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)
Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
(admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()
CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
(back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)
Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
(can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
(drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated
Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)
Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.
Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): cut 0.27.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
Three new env vars wire the Google OAuth callback to a configurable Workspace prefix and route admin/everyone Workspace groups onto the seeded system rows: AGNES_GOOGLE_GROUP_PREFIX, AGNES_GROUP_ADMIN_EMAIL, AGNES_GROUP_EVERYONE_EMAIL. Login gate redirects users with no prefix-matching group to /login?error=not_in_allowed_group. BREAKING: auto-Everyone membership for new users removed. Admin UI/API are read-only on Google-managed groups. See docs/auth-groups.md.
Follow-up to the RBAC v13 + marketplace work in the parent commit. Addresses
deferred Devin findings, gemini-flagged blockers, and adds three guard rails.
== Schema v14 — FK constraints on user_group_members + resource_grants ==
Adds DuckDB foreign-key constraints so cascade deletes can no longer leave
orphaned member / grant rows pointing at a deleted group_id (which were
relying on application-level cascades up to v13). Migration is RENAME →
CREATE-with-FK → INSERT → DROP, wrapped in BEGIN TRANSACTION so a partial
failure rolls back without leaving the DB at a half-applied schema.
== AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS feature flag (default off) ==
ResourceType.TABLE was shipped in the parent commit as listing-only — admins
can record grants but runtime enforcement still flows through legacy
dataset_permissions. To avoid the misleading-UX surface area, the chip is
hidden from /admin/access and POST /api/admin/grants returns 422 with the
env-var name in detail until the operator opts in. Existing TABLE rows in
resource_grants stay listable + deletable so cleanup is never blocked.
Helpers: is_resource_type_enabled(rt), enabled_resource_types().
== Break-glass admin CLI ==
`da admin break-glass <user>` adds the user to the Admin user_group with
source='system_seed' regardless of RBAC state. Bypasses authentication —
relies on filesystem access to ${DATA_DIR}/state/system.duckdb implying
host-level trust. Recovery path when the operator has locked themselves
out of /admin/access.
== Devin round-2 fixes (deferred on b4ec4c4) ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py — narrow update() guard from blocking any
mutation on system groups to blocking name change only. Description edits
now pass through. Endpoint pre-check stays as defense-in-depth. Prior
behavior surfaced as a misleading 409 'Cannot rename a system group' on
description-only PATCH.
- app/api/access.py:delete_group — wrap cascade DELETEs + repo.delete in
BEGIN TRANSACTION / COMMIT / ROLLBACK. Prevents orphan rows if any
DELETE fails after the user_groups row is gone.
- app/marketplace_server/{packager,router}.py — split compute_etag_for_user()
from build_zip(); router resolves etag first and 304-shorts before any
file read or ZIP_DEFLATED. In-process cachetools.TTLCache (default 120s,
env-tunable via AGNES_MARKETPLACE_ETAG_TTL, set 0 to disable).
invalidate_etag_cache() called by sync to force re-hash on content drift.
== Tests ==
- TestTableGrantsFeatureFlag (4 cases) — endpoint exclude/include, grant
rejection/acceptance under the flag.
- test_v12_to_v13_finalize_rollback_on_failure — destructive: monkeypatches
_seed_system_groups to raise mid-transaction, asserts schema_version stays
at 12, legacy tables intact, new tables empty (rollback fired). Then
restores the real function and asserts the retry succeeds.
- test_update_system_group_description_allowed,
test_update_system_group_same_name_no_op — repo-level coverage of the
narrowed guard.
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.
== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
require_admin — Admin-group god-mode
require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
/admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
`da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
(migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).
== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).
== #81#83#44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
+ path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
sandbox-bypass risk closed).
== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.
== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
(project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
update the path.
== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
from Czech to English for codebase consistency.
Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
Prevents environment variable leaking between tests. All DATA_DIR,
JWT_SECRET_KEY, and SCRIPT_TIMEOUT assignments in fixtures now use
monkeypatch.setenv() which auto-reverts after each test. Removes
manual os.environ.pop() cleanup lines.
