The subtitle was built by ~-concatenating a Markup operand
(user.email | e) with HTML string literals. Under autoescaping,
Jinja2's markup_join escapes every non-Markup part once it hits a
Markup operand — so the literal <strong> tags became <strong>
and the page showed literal "<strong>...</strong>" text around the
email. The | safe in _page_hero.html was too late to undo it.
Switch to {% set %}...{% endset %} block capture: the literal
<strong> stays HTML while {{ user.email }} is still autoescaped.
Regression test asserts the tags render and a hostile email stays
escaped.
Consolidates the scattered per-analyst pages into /me/activity (usage
analytics) and /me/profile (account hub). /me/stats and /profile/sessions
301-redirect; /profile, /me/debug, /tokens are removed with every internal
link repointed. Includes an XSS fix in the /me/activity page hero, the
user_id-keyed session-lookup alignment, and the v0.54.15 release cut.
Co-developed by @ZdenekSrotyr and @cvrysanek.
* docs(spec): admin observability spec + Activity Center MVP plan
Parent spec (480 lines) + executable plan (2295 lines, 14 TDD tasks).
Covers Activity Center rebuild (/admin/activity), with /admin/sessions
and /admin/feedback deferred to follow-up plans.
Already incorporates reviewer-pass revisions across three angles
(security, production resilience, code architecture):
- _get_db import path corrected to app.auth.dependencies
- Test fixtures aligned with seeded_app / admin_user / get_system_db
- All new audit writes wrapped in try/except + logger.exception
- Filename sanitization on session uploads
- DuckDB DESC index behavior documented; upgrade window flagged
- Migration idempotency + evolved-DB test cases
- reveal_raw + shared-cache multi-worker explicitly deferred
Targets schema v40 (audit_log gains params_before, client_ip,
client_kind, correlation_id + 3 indices).
* feat(db): schema v40 — audit_log gains params_before, client_ip, client_kind, correlation_id + 3 indices
* chore(test): clean up Task 1 — drop unused import, rename stale test
* feat(audit): AuditRepository.log() accepts params_before/client_ip/client_kind/correlation_id
* test(audit): strengthen params_before assertion to round-trip JSON content
* feat(audit): AuditRepository.query() rich filters + keyset cursor pagination
* feat(sync): SyncStateRepository.list_recent() cross-table feed
* feat(audit): POST /api/sync/trigger writes audit_log row
* feat(audit): POST /api/scripts/run-due writes audit_log row
* feat(audit): POST /api/upload/sessions writes audit_log row + sanitizes filename
* feat(audit): GET /api/data/{table_id}/download writes audit_log row
* feat(activity): /api/admin/activity timeline + /health + /sync endpoints
* feat(ui): /admin/activity rebuilt — health pulse, timeline, sync grid; /activity-center → 308 redirect
BREAKING: removed demo executive-pulse / maturity-roadmap content from activity_center.html.
The page now reflects real audit_log + sync_history data.
* feat(ui): admin nav + dashboard widget point at /admin/activity
* feat(activity): recursive-audit suppression for AC read endpoints (60s window per actor+filter)
* feat(activity): emit PostHog events when integration enabled (no-op default)
* fix(audit): move v40 indices out of _SYSTEM_SCHEMA + update test_repositories to unpack query() tuple
_SYSTEM_SCHEMA CREATE INDEX on audit_log(timestamp) failed when migration
tests hand-roll a bare audit_log (id, action) without the timestamp column.
Fix: remove indices from _SYSTEM_SCHEMA; add ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS guards
for timestamp and other pre-v40 columns in _v39_to_v40() so the upgrade path
is safe on any hand-rolled schema; call _v39_to_v40 explicitly in the
fresh-install (current==0) path to restore index creation there.
Also unpack the (rows, next_cursor) tuple from AuditRepository.query() in
the three TestAuditRepository tests that still treated it as a list.
* docs: CHANGELOG entry for Activity Center MVP
* chore: refresh stale module docstring in app/api/activity.py
* feat(cli): agnes admin activity — terminal access to Activity Center (timeline + health + sync)
* fix(db): _v39_to_v40 — add IF NOT EXISTS guard for 'action' column
The v39→v40 ladder step adds defensive ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS for
every audit_log column so a hand-rolled bare audit_log (id only) is
safe through the ladder. 'action' was missing from the guard list,
causing CREATE INDEX idx_audit_action_time to fail on tests that
stub audit_log with only an id column (tests/test_e2e_extract.py::
TestSchemaMigration::test_migration_preserves_and_extends).
Local 6/6 schema tests + the previously-failing CI test pass.
* docs(spec): platform telemetry epic — Boss directive + Activity Monitoring plan rebased onto v40 (stacked on zs/spec-activity-center)
* feat(db): schema v41 — 7 usage_* tables for telemetry (events, summary, rollups, attribution)
* chore(db): tighten v41 — usage_session_summary.session_id NOT NULL + upgrade test asserts all 7 tables
* feat(usage): UsageAttributionRepository — replace/delete/lookup over usage_attribution_* tables
* refactor(marketplace): extract list_inner_skills/agents/commands to src/marketplace_listing.py for reuse
* feat(usage): explode plugin attribution on marketplace sync + store entity write; backfill script
* refactor(marketplace): finish src/marketplace_listing.py extraction — drop duplicate _list_inner_* + _parse_frontmatter from app/api/marketplace.py
* feat(usage): promote attribution helpers to src/usage_attribution_helpers.py; hook update_entity rename + bundle-swap; clarify best-effort semantics
* feat(usage): UsageProcessor real extraction + rollup rebuild + 10 fixture-driven tests
* fix(usage): include tool_id in event hash + executemany + rollup transaction (critical multi-tool-turn drop fix)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(marketplace): popularity stats — invocations_30d + trend + sort=most_used|trending + Most Popular section
* feat(admin): /admin/users/<id> Sessions section — list + single-file + bulk-zip downloads (audit-logged)
* feat(usage): admin export endpoint + CLI — csv/json/parquet streaming, filters, audit-logged
* feat(usage): agnes admin ask — LLM Text-to-SQL over usage_events with SELECT-only validator (audit-logged)
* feat(usage): reprocess + prune endpoints + scheduler daily prune job + CLI
* docs: PLATFORM_SETUP.md operator playbook + HOWTO/ cookbook (5 guides + index)
Adds docs/PLATFORM_SETUP.md as a consolidated operator playbook covering
bootstrap, TLS, marketplaces (curated + flea), scheduler env vars, telemetry
extraction/export/ask/prune, privacy posture, and daily routine.
Adds docs/HOWTO/ with 5 analyst cookbook guides: first query, snapshots for
remote tables, private sessions, feedback + admin ask, and customizing skills.
Existing setup docs (QUICKSTART, DEPLOYMENT, ONBOARDING, HEADLESS_USAGE)
get a one-line cross-reference at the top pointing to PLATFORM_SETUP.md.
* docs(changelog): platform telemetry epic — usage_* foundation + surfaces + admin access + docs
Comprehensive [Unreleased] entry covering: usage_events/session_summary/
tool_daily/plugin_daily tables (v41), attribution lookup tables, backfill
script, marketplace Most Popular + invocation chips + sort, admin Sessions
section, export/ask/reprocess/prune endpoints + CLI mirrors, Activity Center
(v40), PLATFORM_SETUP.md + HOWTO/ docs, and operations notes for v41 upgrade.
* fix(security): block DuckDB read_*/http_*/glob functions in usage_ask validator + symlink escape guard in session zip + clarify mark-private semantics
* fix(admin): parquet export tempfile cleanup on COPY failure + correct processed-first sort on /admin/users/<id>/sessions
* feat(audit): close 8 production audit gaps — query (local/remote/hybrid), catalog/schema/sample, snapshot estimate/create, check-access
* feat(ui): /admin/usage summary dashboard + per-user activity tab on /admin/users/<id>
* fix(audit): cap error messages at 200 chars + audit user_activity reads + recursion guard on usage.summary
* fix(audit): catalog.list audits on error path + clean up deferred json import
* fix(ux): client_kind=cli for PAT auth + timeline empty state + email-instead-of-uuid + nav reorder + help text + loading indicators + ask doc
* feat(observability): unify /admin/activity into single page with saved views
- KPI cards (events, users, error rate, p95) clickable as quick-filters
- Faceted filter dropdowns populated from audit_log in the current window
- Sortable audit table, cursor pagination, per-row JSON side panel
- Saved views (schema v43: user_observability_views) — per-user state
- Top bar: window selector + 30s Live toggle + saved views dropdown
- /admin/scheduler-runs → 308 redirect (source=scheduler filter)
- New endpoints: /api/admin/observability/{facets,kpis,views}
* test: update activity + scheduler-runs tests for unified page
- test_admin_activity_page_renders asserts new structural anchors
- test_admin_scheduler_runs_page_admin_only asserts 308 redirect
* fix(observability): respect [hidden] on modal + side panel
CSS `display: flex` on .obs-modal beat the [hidden] attribute's UA
display:none, so the save-view modal rendered on page load and Cancel
clicks couldn't dismiss it. Gate the modal's flex layout on
:not([hidden]); add the same display:none guard prophylactically to
.obs-panel and .obs-views-panel.
* feat(observability): user enrichment in audit + interactive /admin/usage
Activity:
- /api/admin/activity now joins users for user_email + user_name per row
- User column renders "name (id-prefix)" or "email (id-prefix)" instead
of an opaque truncated UUID; falls back to id when the user record is
missing
Usage:
- /admin/usage rewritten as the same filter/group-by/search pattern as
/admin/activity. Faceted dropdowns (User / Tool / Source / Event type)
populated from usage_events; debounced free-text search across
tool_name / skill_name / subagent_type / command_name
- New endpoints /api/admin/usage/{facets,kpis,query}; the query endpoint
supports group_by in {day, username, tool_name, source, ref_id} with
sort + offset pagination, plus an ungrouped raw-events mode
- 4 KPI cards (events, distinct users, distinct tools, error rate) are
clickable quick-filters; clicking a grouped row applies the bucket as
a filter
- Old static `?window=7d|30d|all` server preload removed; all state is
client-side via since_minutes + group_by + filters in the URL
* fix(observability): clearer labels, all-column sort, drop saved views UI
- Rename page titles: "Activity" → "Server activity", "Usage" → "Tool usage"
with a one-line subtitle on each explaining what the page covers and
linking the other one. The two pages source different data (audit_log
vs usage_events) and the previous labels conflated them.
- Drop the saved-views dropdown + save modal from /admin/activity. The
modal pop-open bug was the trigger; the value wasn't there yet. The
/api/admin/observability/views CRUD + DuckDB table stay in place.
- Rename "Live (30s)" to "Auto-refresh (30s)" with a tooltip clarifying
that it's the re-fetch rate, not the time range. Time range now
labeled "Time range" instead of "Window".
- All audit-table columns are sortable (User, Source, Action, Resource,
Result added); sort is page-local with a Jinja comment explaining the
trade-off. Same for raw usage rows.
- Fix duplicate sort-arrow bug — the literal "▼" in the Time th HTML was
rendering alongside the CSS ::before arrow. Removed the literal; CSS
is the single source of truth.
* feat(observability): global Sessions browser + transcript viewer + CLI
Web:
- /admin/sessions — list every collected session JSONL across all users
with time-range, user, model, errors-only and free-text filters. Default
sort surfaces error-heavy sessions first. KPI cards (sessions, distinct
users, sessions w/ errors, tool error rate) clickable as quick-filters.
- /admin/sessions/<username>/<file> — transcript viewer rendering the
JSONL chronologically: user prompts, assistant text, tool calls (with
JSON input) and tool results (with flattened output). Errors get a red
border + chip and a "Next error" navigation button at the top.
- Admin dropdown gains a "Sessions" link.
API:
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{list,kpis,facets} — filtered cross-user reads
off usage_session_summary
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{username}/{file}/transcript — parses JSONL via
the existing services.session_pipeline.lib, returns chronological events
- GET /api/admin/sessions/{username}/{file}/download — JSONL stream, same
path-safety guards as the per-user endpoint, audit-logged
CLI:
- `agnes admin sessions list [--user X] [--errors] [--since 7d]` — table
output with `!` prefix on rows that hit a tool error
- `agnes admin sessions show <username> <file>` — transcript dump, with
`--errors` to print only the failed tool_result blocks
- `agnes admin sessions download <username> <file> [-o path]`
- `agnes admin sessions kpis` — top-level numbers
* feat(internal): expose telemetry tables to agnes query with row-level RBAC
Three new registered tables backed by system.duckdb, queryable through
the same /api/query plumbing analysts use for Keboola / BigQuery /
local sources:
agnes_sessions → usage_session_summary (filter: username)
agnes_usage → usage_events (filter: username)
agnes_audit → audit_log (filter: user_id)
RBAC is per-row, not per-table: admins see every user's rows; non-admins
see only their own. The filter is built server-side from the auth user
dict; non-admin filter values are regex-validated before SQL interpolation.
Implementation:
- new connector connectors/internal/ with access (filter+exec) + registry
(idempotent table_registry seed at startup)
- /api/query detects internal table refs and short-circuits to a CTE
wrapper that prepends "WITH agnes_x AS (SELECT * FROM <src> WHERE …),
…" then "SELECT * FROM (<user_sql>) AS _q". DuckDB cursor on the
shared system.duckdb handle — opening parallel handles / ATTACH on the
same file is blocked process-wide.
- mixing internal + BQ / registered local tables in one SELECT is
rejected (v1 limitation)
- src.rbac.can_access_table waves internal tables through for all
authenticated users; row scoping is the actual security control
- /api/v2/schema and /api/v2/sample gained internal branches; sample
intentionally skips its cache because rows are RBAC-scoped per caller
- audit row written as action='query.internal' with is_admin flag
Tests: connectors/internal/access — RBAC, filter clause, schema, CTE
wrapper coexistence with user-supplied aggregations, unsafe-username
rejection. 16/16 passing.
Motivating queries this enables:
SELECT tool_name, COUNT(*) FROM agnes_usage
WHERE is_error GROUP BY 1 ORDER BY 2 DESC
-- analyst self-introspection: which tools fail for me?
SELECT user_id, COUNT(*) FROM agnes_audit
WHERE action = 'session.transcript_view' GROUP BY 1
-- admin: who's been looking at whose session transcripts?
* feat(admin): group dropdown into 5 named sections + internal tables in /catalog
Admin dropdown gains section headers so admins can land on the right
page without re-reading the full menu:
Activity Center Server activity / Tool usage / Sessions
Users & Access Users / Groups / Resource access / Tokens
Data Tables
Agent Experience Curated Marketplaces / Flea Submissions /
Agent Setup Prompt / Agent Workspace Prompt
Server Server config
"Agent Experience" frames the curated content + prompts as one cluster
— it's all admin-controlled material that shapes what an analyst's AI
agent encounters. "Configuration" → "Server" since only one item lives
there now.
Renamed the section's first two items:
"Activity" → "Server activity" (matches page H1)
"Usage" → "Tool usage"
Also fixes /catalog visibility of the internal tables (agnes_sessions /
_usage / _audit) for non-admin users: ``app.auth.access.can_access``
short-circuits to True for resource_type='table' + an internal-table id.
Without this, non-admins saw the tables in /api/v2/catalog (which uses
the same RBAC bypass) but not on the /catalog HTML page (which calls
can_access directly, requiring a resource_grants row internal tables
don't have).
CSS for `.app-nav-menu-section`: small caps, muted, non-clickable; first
section trims top padding so the panel doesn't open with an awkward gap.
* refactor(admin): move corporate memory into Admin > Agent Experience
Memory link was the only admin-only entry in the primary nav (gated by
session.user.is_admin). Moves it into the Admin dropdown under Agent
Experience, alongside Curated Marketplaces / Flea Submissions / Prompts
— all admin-curated content that shapes what an analyst's AI agent
encounters.
Renamed the nav label to "Shared Knowledge" to match what the page
actually is (admin-curated organisational knowledge from session
verification, surfaced to agents). URL stays at /corporate-memory; the
route still gates on require_admin per the existing comment.
Side effect: primary nav (Home / Marketplace / Data Packages) is now
uniform for every authenticated user — no conditional admin-only entry.
* ui: rename admin entries to Curated Knowledge / Init Prompt / Workspace Prompt
- "Shared Knowledge" → "Curated Knowledge" (parallel with "Curated
Marketplaces" in the same Agent Experience section; "curated" tells
the admin what they do there — review + approve)
- "Agent Setup Prompt" → "Init Prompt" (matches the `agnes init` flow
it actually drives)
- "Agent Workspace Prompt" → "Workspace Prompt" (the "Agent" prefix
was redundant — every item in the section is agent-facing)
Renames page titles + H1s on /admin/agent-prompt and
/admin/workspace-prompt to match.
* refactor: rename Usage → Telemetry across user-facing surfaces
External surfaces all switch; internal Python module / file names and the
physical DB tables (usage_events, usage_session_summary, usage_tool_daily,
usage_plugin_daily) stay — renaming them would force a schema migration
+ a redo of the LLM Text-to-SQL prompt for no analyst-visible win.
Changes:
- Admin dropdown: "Tool usage" → "Telemetry"
- Page H1 / <title>: same
- URL: /admin/usage → /admin/telemetry; old URL 308-redirects
- API prefix: /api/admin/usage/* → /api/admin/telemetry/*
- CLI: primary command `agnes admin telemetry …`; `agnes admin usage` kept
as a deprecated alias so existing operator scripts keep working
- Internal data-source table id: agnes_usage → agnes_telemetry. The
registry seed now evicts any stale internal-source row whose id no
longer matches INTERNAL_TABLES, so the old `agnes_usage` row is
removed from table_registry on next app boot
- All tests + JS endpoint paths updated
* test(rbac): include auto-appended internal tables in expectations
get_accessible_tables now appends agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry /
agnes_audit to every authenticated user's accessible-tables list so the
internal data source shows up in /catalog. The two existing rbac tests
asserted hardcoded list shapes that pre-dated the change.
Rewritten to assert "granted tables + the canonical internal-table set"
instead of literal lists, so the test stays correct if the internal
table roster changes again later.
* ui: visual dividers between admin-dropdown sections
Adds a 1px top border + 6px top margin to every section header except
the first, so the five named groups (Activity Center, Users & Access,
Data, Agent Experience, Server) read as visually separated clusters.
The header itself stays small-caps + muted as before — the border is
additive.
* ui(memory): match obs-topbar visual on /corporate-memory
The Curated Knowledge page (linked from the admin dropdown's Agent
Experience section) opened straight into the stats bar — no title,
no subtitle, no shared chrome with the other admin pages. Adds an
obs-topbar-style header at the top of .container-memory:
- H1 "Curated Knowledge"
- subtitle explaining what the page is + how AI agents pull from it
The `.ck-*` class set duplicates the inline obs-* styles from
/admin/activity etc. for this one page; promoting the obs-* class set
to style-custom.css for shared reuse is the obvious next step (4 pages
already inline the same CSS), tracked as a follow-up.
Page <title> also renamed from "Corporate Memory" → "Curated Knowledge".
* ui(tables): list Agnes internal tables in /admin/tables + group in /catalog
/admin/tables previously rendered three per-source-type listings
(BQ / Keboola / Jira) and dropped any row whose source_type didn't
match — so the agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry / agnes_audit rows
seeded into table_registry were invisible. Adds a fourth read-only
section "Agnes internal tables" that filters source_type === 'internal'
and renders the same registry-table layout the other sections use,
with two changes:
- no Register button (these rows are seeded on every app boot from
connectors/internal/registry.py)
- Edit + Delete actions hidden (any change would be reverted on the
next start). Manage access stays so admins can still inspect.
Mode badge picks up a new mode-internal CSS class (teal accent) so the
display doesn't lie and call it "local".
In /catalog, internal tables now group under an "agnes" accordion
section (bucket="agnes" on seed) instead of falling into the catch-all
"default". Single source of truth for which tables exist; admins find
them where they expect.
* ui(tables): Agnes internal as a 4th tab next to BQ/Keboola/Jira
Previous iteration mounted the internal-table listing as a separate
standalone card under the tab strip. Reshapes it to a proper
tab-content section so admins switch between data sources via one
consistent nav (BigQuery / Keboola / Jira / Agnes internal).
- New tab button "Agnes internal" in the tab-nav.
- The listing card becomes <section id="tab-content-internal"
class="tab-content">; switchTab() already routes by id so no JS
change beyond extending the hash allowlist for direct #internal
links.
- Tab content keeps the read-only treatment from the previous commit
(no Register button, no Edit / Delete in renderRegistryListing).
* ui: rename Curated Knowledge → Curated Memory
Settles the naming back on "Curated Memory" — parallel structure with
"Curated Marketplaces" in the same Agent Experience section, and zero
rename ripple: URL (/corporate-memory), API (/api/memory/*), CLI
(agnes admin memory), and Python modules all stay on "memory" so the
admin label finally lines up with the underlying surfaces.
The "Curated" prefix still tells admins what they do on the page
(review pending → approve / mandate / reject) and reads as a sibling
of "Curated Marketplaces" right next to it in the dropdown.
Touches: admin dropdown label, page <title>, page H1. DB tables stay
on knowledge_* (already the canonical naming for the data shape).
* ui: rename "Server activity" → "Audit log"
"Audit log" is what the page actually is — server-side audit_log table
rendered with KPI cards + filter bar + sortable table. The "Server
activity" label confused the term with Claude Code session telemetry
(Telemetry page) and didn't make the source/concept clear.
Touches:
- Admin dropdown nav label
- /admin/activity page H1 + subtitle
- /admin/telemetry subtitle cross-link
- test_activity_api page-renders assertion
URL (/admin/activity) and API (/api/admin/activity/*) stay — the
"activity" name has stuck at the route layer for a year; rerouting
those would churn dashboards/bookmarks for zero analyst-visible win.
* ui(admin-nav): gray band on each section header for clearer separation
Previous iteration used a 1px top border between section labels — the
labels still blended into the items above/below at a glance. Switches
to a light gray background band per section header, extended edge-to-
edge inside the panel via negative horizontal margins. Bolder
font-weight (700) reinforces the separation; bumping the font color
isn't needed because the band itself does the work.
First section's header tucks into the panel's top border-radius so the
band reaches the corners without a gap.
* ui(catalog): rename internal-table category to "Agnes Internal"
`bucket` is what /catalog renders as the accordion category header
verbatim — "agnes" lowercase didn't read as a real category name and
got confused with a system identifier. Bumps to "Agnes Internal".
Seed re-applies on every app boot so existing rows pick up the new
bucket value via `ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE`.
* ui(catalog): split Agnes Internal into its own card on /catalog
Previously the three internal tables landed inside the "Core Business
Data" card under an "Agnes Internal" accordion alongside Keboola / BQ
buckets — readers conflated system telemetry with business datasets,
and the data_stats header counter ("3 tables · ~X rows total") only
ever counted synced rows so internal tables looked invisible.
Split the catalog page into two cards:
- Core Business Data: only non-internal source_types (Keboola, BQ,
Jira). Accordions group by bucket as before. Stats counter reflects
this card's tables.
- Agnes Internal: a dedicated card with its own visual treatment
(teal accent matching the mode-internal badge in /admin/tables).
Flat list (no accordion — only 3 rows, never grows here), each
row carries the canonical `agnes query` snippet. Read-only — no
profiler click, no In-stack toggle, no sync metadata.
Route adds `internal_card` context object; template renders the new
card only when it's non-None.
* fix(rbac): hide internal tables from /admin/access + drop "my" framing
Two related cleanups for the Agnes-internal tables:
1. /admin/access (resource grants) no longer lists them. The
`can_access` check has a hardcoded internal-table bypass — security
is row-level (per-request view filter), so a table-grain
`resource_grants` row would do nothing. Surfacing them in the UI
let admins set up grants that silently no-op. Filter at the
`_table_blocks` projection so the UI tree never sees them.
2. Display names drop the analyst-perspective "my" framing:
"Agnes — my sessions" → "Agnes sessions"
"Agnes — my telemetry events" → "Agnes telemetry events"
"Agnes — my audit log" → "Agnes audit log"
The "my" only makes sense from the querying analyst's seat
(`SELECT … FROM agnes_sessions` returns *their* rows); on /admin/*
pages where admin sees / configures them across users, the
pronoun was misleading. Description text now spells out the
row-level RBAC contract explicitly.
Display names update via TableRegistryRepository.register's ON CONFLICT
UPDATE on next app boot; no manual cleanup needed.
* ui: subtitle notes about agnes_* tables on each Activity Center page
The recursive observability story — Agnes serves its own audit /
telemetry / session data through the same `agnes query` plumbing
analysts use for business data — wasn't surfaced anywhere on the
admin pages that show that data. Three pages get a one-liner with
the canonical `agnes query` snippet + the RBAC contract (analysts
see their own rows, admin sees all):
- /admin/activity (Audit log) → agnes_audit
- /admin/telemetry (Tool usage) → agnes_telemetry
- /admin/sessions → agnes_sessions
Sets up the discovery moment for admins: they're reading the page,
they see "you can query this from Claude Code", they remember it
when an analyst asks "how do I find my own failed tool calls?".
* ui(tables): explain "Show log" empty-state on /admin/tables
Cache warmup log <pre> renders with a dark background and is only
populated by the SSE stream during a Re-warm all run. Opening the
page cold + clicking Show log just revealed a black bar with no
context — admins couldn't tell what they were looking at.
Adds an inline paragraph above the <pre> explaining what the log is,
the row format, when it fills in, and where to find the historical
audit trail (/admin/activity). The actual <pre> stays empty until
SSE events arrive, but the surrounding copy carries the meaning.
* ui(tables): auto-open cache-warmup log on Re-warm all click
A Re-warm all run takes ~24s per remote BQ row. With the <details>
collapsed by default, operators saw the button disable, watched a
quiet ~24s pass, and assumed nothing had happened — the streaming
log was hidden behind a closed disclosure.
Two small JS tweaks:
- cacheWarmupRun() opens the details on click, so streamed lines
appear without an extra interaction
- cacheWarmupOnStart() hides the inline hint paragraph the moment
real log content lands, so the dark log block isn't competing
with redundant context
Hint paragraph also clarifies that only `query_mode='remote'` BQ
rows are warmed — operators with only materialized/internal tables
would see total=0 and the page would "do nothing" by spec.
* ui: trim Agnes internal copy across surfaces
Descriptions had grown to explain the extraction pipeline ("parsed
out of session JSONLs"), the underlying table ("Backed by
usage_session_summary"), the RBAC mechanic ("row-level RBAC at query
time — analysts see their own; admin sees all"), and the SQL snippet.
Every implementation detail meant another rewrite on the next iter.
Strips to one stable line per surface: what the data is, plus
"Also available locally for analysis". Mechanics live in code +
docs; the page copy says what the user needs to know.
Touched:
- connectors/internal/access.py: INTERNAL_TABLES descriptions
- activity_center.html / admin_usage.html / admin_sessions.html
subtitles
- catalog.html Agnes Internal card description + row strip
- admin_tables.html "Agnes internal" tab hint
* fix(internal): is_user_admin arity bugs + + saved-view payload cap
Round-1 code review (PR #278) caught two blocking bugs and three nits.
Blocking — both `is_user_admin(user)` (single dict arg) calls raised
TypeError. is_user_admin signature is `(user_id, conn)`. Affected:
- app/api/query.py:_run_internal_query — every POST /api/query that
references agnes_sessions / agnes_telemetry / agnes_audit blew up
with a 500. The headline analyst-facing feature of this PR was
unusable through the API.
- app/api/v2_sample.py — same shape; `GET /api/v2/sample/agnes_*`
returned 500.
Both fixed to call `is_user_admin(user.get("id"), conn)`. Added two
FastAPI-level tests in test_internal_data_source.py that go through
the TestClient — the existing unit tests on `execute_internal_query`
and `build_filter_clause` skipped the request-handler layer where the
bugs lived, which is why this landed.
Nits also closed:
- connectors/internal/access.py: `+` allowed in _USERNAME_RE /
_USER_ID_RE so RFC 5321 email local-parts (alice+test@x) resolve
correctly without hitting InternalAccessError.
- app/api/observability.py: saved-view payload capped at 64 KiB to
prevent an admin from bloating system.duckdb with a malformed save.
* fix(security): close non-admin data-leak via underlying-table refs
PR #278 R2 review surfaced a non-admin-exploitable bypass: SQL whose
string literal contains 'agnes_sessions' routed into the privileged
internal-query path, then queried the underlying physical table
(usage_session_summary / usage_events / audit_log) directly, escaping
the CTE wrapper's row filter. Two reinforcing defenses:
1. find_internal_refs() now strips single-quoted string literals
before scanning for alias names — a literal alone no longer
routes the request into the privileged code path.
2. execute_internal_query() rejects non-admin SQL that references
the underlying physical tables (usage_*, audit_log). The CTE
wrapper only scopes the agnes_* aliases; a direct FROM on the
base table — or a shadowing inner WITH that still has to read
the base table — bypasses RBAC. Block before execution with an
actionable error pointing to the agnes_* alias. Admins are
unaffected (god-mode short-circuit on the filter clause).
3. tests/test_internal_data_source.py — three new negative tests
covering literal-only matches, direct-table refs, and CTE
shadow attempts.
Also tightens usage_ask.py's SELECT-only validator: pragma_table_info,
pragma_storage_info, pragma_database_*, and duckdb_tables / columns /
views / indexes / schemas are reflection functions that leak metadata
the analyst question shouldn't reach. \bPRAGMA\b in _FORBIDDEN never
matched the function-call form (word-boundary between `A` and `_`).
* fix(security): dynamic denylist for non-admin internal queries
R3 review (PR #278) caught a wider data-leak than R2: the underlying-
physical-table guard listed only the 7 usage_* + audit_log tables,
but system.duckdb has 30+ other sensitive tables — users (emails +
ids), personal_access_tokens, resource_grants, user_groups,
user_observability_views, store_*, marketplace_*, knowledge_*, etc.
A non-admin SQL like
SELECT * FROM agnes_sessions
UNION ALL SELECT email, id, … FROM users LIMIT 1
would leak every user's row.
Replaces the hardcoded denylist with a **dynamic allowlist** —
non-admin SQL may reference ONLY the registered agnes_* aliases.
Every other table in `information_schema.tables` (main schema) is
rejected. Future migrations that add a new sensitive table are
automatically covered without re-editing this module.
Also strips SQL comments (`/* */` and `--`) before the identifier
scan so a comment-wrapped table name (`/**/users/**/`) can't slip
past the regex.
Four new negative tests pin: `users`, `personal_access_tokens`,
block-comment wrap, line-comment wrap.
Plus: per-user view-count cap (100) on /api/admin/observability/views
so an admin can't fill system.duckdb with thousands of saved views.
* release: 0.54.0 — Activity Center + Telemetry + Sessions + internal datasource
Cuts the work shipped across this PR (Activity Center build, recursive
internal data source) into a versioned release. Bumps pyproject.toml
to 0.54.0; renames the top of CHANGELOG.md from [Unreleased] to
[0.54.0] — 2026-05-12 with a header summary; opens a fresh
[Unreleased] section for the next round.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- instance.brand (env AGNES_INSTANCE_BRAND, default "Agnes") +
instance.workspace_dir replace hard-coded "Agnes" / "~/Agnes" across
/home, /setup, /setup-advanced, /login, /install, /me/debug, and the
Claude Code clipboard setup script. Terraform-friendly env override;
defaults preserve existing Agnes branding.
- Explicit "create workspace folder" step on /home (OS-tabbed mkdir+cd)
+ same step baked into the clipboard script as step 2. Drops the
implicit assumption that `agnes init --workspace .` lands in a
sensibly-cd'd shell.
- Final "Restart Claude Code" step in the setup script (unconditional,
between connectors and Confirm) so freshly-installed plugins, MCP
servers, and SessionStart hooks load on the next Claude Code session.
- Asana reverted from hosted Remote MCP back to PAT + raw REST against
app.asana.com/api/1.0. MCP envelope shape consumed ~5x tokens per
call; the PAT path lets the agent read flat REST fields. Existing
MCP registration is detected and the user is asked whether to remove
it (default Y, with benefits listed: token cost, no third-party hop,
no OAuth refresh dance, deterministic envelope shape).
- Atlassian connector instructs picking the longest API-token expiry
(today "1 year") to cut re-mint friction. No public query-parameter
hook exists on id.atlassian.com to pre-select expiry, so the prompt
documents the manual click and acknowledges that limitation.
- Uniform ✅ / ❌ per-connector marker contract (Asana, GWS, Atlassian)
for the Confirm summary to grep. Each connector now ends with a
Claude-driven end-to-end test that uses Claude Code's own bash to
exercise the stored credential and prints
"✅ <Connector> integration verified — ..." (or the failure variant).
* fix(cta): fall back to textarea+execCommand when Clipboard API rejects
The "Setup a new Claude Code" CTA fetches /auth/tokens, parses the JSON
response, renders the setup script, THEN calls
`navigator.clipboard.writeText()`. Modern browsers (Safari, Firefox, and
Chrome on stricter configurations) reject `writeText` with
NotAllowedError when transient user activation has been consumed by an
intervening `await` — which is exactly the case here. Users perceived
this as "the browser blocked the copy" and got the manual-paste fallback
modal even though the textarea + `document.execCommand('copy')` path
WOULD have worked synchronously without needing fresh user activation.
`copyToClipboard` now:
- prefers the modern Clipboard API (unchanged for the happy path)
- on writeText rejection, falls back to `copyViaTextarea` instead of
surfacing the rejection to the caller's catch block.
`copyViaTextarea` is the previously-inline textarea fallback factored
out into a named helper, with two small hardening touches:
- `readonly` + `tabindex=-1` so the hidden textarea doesn't steal
focus or pop the virtual keyboard on mobile.
- explicit `setSelectionRange(0, text.length)` to belt-and-braces the
selection on iOS Safari (where `.select()` alone sometimes selects
zero chars on touch-focused textareas).
Only the CTA button needed this — the Step-1 install-command and the
connector-copy buttons all call `writeText` synchronously inside the
click handler (no awaits in between), so they keep their existing
user-gesture context and didn't hit the same rejection. No template
changes there.
* refactor(home): fold Atlassian MCP registration into connectors block
The standalone "Register the Atlassian MCP server" step (was step 6 in
the unified setup script) moves INTO the Atlassian connector's prompt
body so all Atlassian-related setup lives in one logical group. Same
intent that #247 carried for connectors, applied one level deeper:
the hosted Remote MCP registration is part of "set up Atlassian", not
its own ungrouped step.
What changed:
- `app/web/connector_prompts.py` — the Atlassian prompt's step 5
replaces the speculative "Register the on-demand Atlassian MCP under
.claude/mcp/atlassian" line with the actual hosted Remote MCP
registration: `claude mcp add --transport sse atlassian
https://mcp.atlassian.com/v1/sse || true`. The `|| true` keeps re-runs
idempotent and the body explains the OAuth-on-first-use contract.
Both /home's Atlassian tile and the inlined setup-script Atlassian
sub-block emit this line — single source of truth holds.
- `app/web/setup_instructions.py` — `_mcp_servers_block` deleted; the
`mcp_servers` step is removed from `_step_numbers`; resolve_lines no
longer calls it.
- Renumbering: install (1), init (2), catalog (3), preflight (4),
marketplace (5), diagnose (6), connectors (7), confirm (8). Was:
6 = mcp_servers, 7 = diagnose, 8 = connectors, 9 = confirm.
- `tests/test_setup_instructions.py` — Confirm step 9→8, Connect 8→7,
diagnose 7→6, mcp_servers references dropped.
`test_step_numbering_with_connectors_step` now asserts
`"mcp_servers" not in steps`. Stray-Confirm assertion lists shift
by one position.
- `tests/test_setup_page_unified.py` + `tests/test_web_ui.py` — same
step-number shifts in the rendered /setup preview assertions.
The `claude mcp add` line is still the Atlassian Remote-MCP path that
the 2026-05-10 init-report Fix C added — only its position in the
flow changes. /home Atlassian tile copying continues to install the
MCP too (the prompt body the tile pastes contains the same line).
112 tests pass.
* feat(atlassian): operator-overrideable base URL via AGNES_ATLASSIAN_BASE_URL
Adds an env var / YAML key the operator (Terraform module, customer-VM
template, OSS instance.yaml) can set to bake the Atlassian Cloud site
root into the connector prompt — so end users don't have to guess /
paste their org's `https://<myorg>.atlassian.net`.
When set, the Atlassian connector prompt (rendered on both /home tile
and inlined into the setup-script step 7 Atlassian sub-block) replaces
step 1's "Ask me for my Atlassian Cloud site URL and email" with a
one-line note that the URL is already provisioned by the operator and
asks only for the email. Step 4's helper-script body has the
`BASE_URL='<the site URL I gave you>'` placeholder substituted with
the literal value. When unset (empty), the existing "ask the user"
flow remains — no regression for OSS instances.
Resolution + normalization in `get_atlassian_base_url()`:
- env `AGNES_ATLASSIAN_BASE_URL` > yaml `instance.atlassian.base_url` > ""
- strips trailing slash + trailing `/wiki` so the canonical value is
the bare site root. Matches the per-user helper script's
normalization at storage time (atlassian_prompt step 4 guard 2), so
the literal baked in by the operator stays consistent with what the
user's helper script would have computed from their input.
Plumbing:
- `app/instance_config.py`: new `get_atlassian_base_url()` resolver.
- `app/web/connector_prompts.py`:
- `atlassian_prompt(*, base_url: str = "")` — string-replace two
explicit placeholder phrases when base_url is truthy; otherwise
return the prompt unchanged.
- `all_connector_prompts(..., atlassian_base_url: str = "")` —
forwards the kwarg.
- `app/web/router.py` (`_build_context`): reads
`get_atlassian_base_url()` and passes it through to
`all_connector_prompts(...)` so both the /home tile context AND the
inlined-script `resolve_lines(...)` call use the same value.
- `src/welcome_template.py` (`compute_default_agent_prompt`): same
threading via the existing import-on-demand path.
Tests (`tests/test_home_route_resolution.py`):
- `get_atlassian_base_url` resolver: default empty, env override,
trailing-slash strip, trailing-`/wiki` strip.
- `atlassian_prompt(base_url=...)`: literal URL baked in, ask-step
removed, placeholder replaced, operator-baked-in copy appears.
- `atlassian_prompt(base_url="")`: existing ask-the-user flow
unchanged.
- `all_connector_prompts(atlassian_base_url=...)`: kwarg threads
through to the rendered atlassian prompt.
135 tests pass.
* feat(asana): register hosted Asana Remote MCP in connector prompt
The Asana connector prompt only stored a PAT in the OS keychain + ran
a curl verify against /api/1.0/users/me. That set Claude Code up for
direct `curl` calls but didn't actually wire Asana into Claude's tool
list — so the user couldn't ask Claude to "find my open Asana tasks"
and have it work. Symmetric oversight to the Atlassian connector's
original speculative `.claude/mcp/atlassian` line that this branch
already replaced with `claude mcp add --transport sse atlassian
https://mcp.atlassian.com/v1/sse`.
Adds a new step 5 that registers Asana's hosted Remote MCP:
claude mcp add --transport http asana https://mcp.asana.com/mcp || true
This is the V2 endpoint (streamable HTTP transport, launched February
2026). The V1 SSE endpoint at https://mcp.asana.com/sse was deprecated
2026-05-11 (today) and must NOT be used — calling it out explicitly
in the prompt body so a future operator who finds an old reference
doesn't paste the dead URL. OAuth is handled by Claude Code at first
use, same model as the Atlassian MCP step.
The PAT stored in step 3 stays for direct `curl` calls (precheck +
ad-hoc scripts) — the MCP path uses its own OAuth grant, not the PAT.
Old step 5 (revoke instructions) renumbers to step 6 and adds the
`claude mcp remove asana` cleanup hint.
Same single-source-of-truth invariant holds: /home Asana tile + the
inlined Asana sub-block in the setup script (step 7 connectors) both
emit identical text from `asana_prompt()`.
71 tests pass.
* feat(asana): drive MCP OAuth login + end-to-end validation post-register
`claude mcp add --transport http asana ...` only registers the
server in Claude Code's local config — it does NOT trigger OAuth.
The browser tab opens the first time any `mcp__asana__*` tool gets
invoked. So the previous step 5 left a user looking at a "registered"
MCP that, in practice, hadn't authed yet and would fail on first
real use. Same blind spot Atlassian's prompt also has, but Asana was
the one called out in the latest review pass.
Adds a new step 6 between MCP registration (step 5) and the revoke
instructions (now step 7):
a. Tell the user verbatim what's about to happen — a low-impact
read through the MCP will pop the OAuth browser tab; sign in
with the same account whose PAT they stored in step 3 and
approve. Frames the OAuth as one-time so users don't wait
for it on every later call.
b. Drive an actual MCP read. Don't prescribe the exact tool name
because the Asana MCP's exposed surface (`mcp__asana__*`) is
versioned upstream and we don't want to pin to a name that
gets renamed. Instead: tell Claude to pick the lightest read
from its surfaced tool list (users-me / list-workspaces /
equivalent). Document the recovery path when Claude Code
times out waiting for the OAuth tool use: `claude mcp list`
to confirm registration before retrying.
c. Print a single one-line proof that combines wiring + auth:
"Asana MCP connected as <name> — <N> workspace(s) visible."
Explicit anti-echo callout for tokens, task content, comments.
On failure, surface the exact Claude-Code error and stop —
no silent pass.
d. Sanity-check that the MCP OAuth identity and the PAT identity
reference the same Asana account. Easy mistake to make when
the user has multiple Asana accounts — flag only on mismatch,
keep quiet when they match. Recovery: `claude mcp remove asana
&& claude logout asana` then redo step 5.
Step 7 (revoke) absorbs both the keychain delete + the
`claude logout asana` line so users have a single place to undo
everything.
43 tests pass.
* fix(init): clear stale CA env vars on Windows before any TLS handshake
Reported by the 2026-05-11 Windows test pass: after `agnes init` the
gws connector failed with `UnknownIssuer` TLS errors because
`SSL_CERT_FILE` and `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE` were still set in Windows
User scope pointing at `C:\Users\localadmin\.config\agnes\ca-bundle.pem`
— a file that did not exist on the test host. Past Agnes installs
(the setup-prompt trust block + older bootstrap helpers) write those
pointers when they materialize a combined Agnes-CA bundle; when the
bundle file later disappears (re-init on a new VM, machine swap, the
~/.agnes dir wiped), the pointers go stale and every native Windows
TLS handshake fails before Agnes itself runs. SSL_CERT_FILE in
particular REPLACES (not appends to) the trust store, so a stale
pointer is silently catastrophic.
`agnes init` now clears stale pointers in two layers before the first
server roundtrip:
1. Current-process env (os.environ) — what the immediately-following
`api_get` to /api/catalog/tables actually reads. Without this, init
itself blows up before it gets to step 2.
2. Windows User-scope env via PowerShell
`[Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable(name, $null, 'User')` — what
every future shell + every native tool (gws, claude.exe, pip, uv)
inherits. The 2026-05-11 reporter expected this exact cleanup
("init was supposed to clear these but they persisted").
The cleanup is best-effort and conservative:
- Only deletes a var when its value points at a path that does NOT
exist on disk. Intentional operator config (e.g. SSL_CERT_FILE
pointing at a corp certifi bundle) stays put.
- PowerShell missing / restricted execution policy / WSL-without-pwsh:
swallowed silently. The current-process leg still runs, which
unblocks init even on hosts where the User-scope leg cannot fire.
Tests (`tests/test_init_ca_cleanup.py`, 6 cases):
- Stale pointers → removed from process env.
- Real-path pointers → preserved.
- Non-Windows hosts: PowerShell is not invoked.
- Windows hosts: PowerShell IS invoked with a script that checks
all three vars + uses Test-Path + SetEnvironmentVariable.
- PowerShell FileNotFoundError: cleanup swallows it, does not raise.
- `_is_windows_host()` reflects sys.platform.
* refactor(asana): MCP-first flow — drop PAT storage, precheck via `claude mcp list`
The Asana hosted MCP at https://mcp.asana.com/mcp authenticates via
OAuth (Claude Code holds the grant; browser tab pops on first tool
use). The earlier prompt walked the user through creating + keychain-
storing an Asana Personal Access Token AND registering the MCP — two
parallel auth surfaces for one connector. Once the MCP works, the PAT
has no consumer: the precheck/verify steps that used `curl
$BASE/api/1.0/users/me` are just redundant proof that Asana itself is
reachable, which the OAuth handshake already establishes.
Removed:
- Step 0 keychain probe + curl verify against /users/me with PAT.
- Step 1 open developer-console / create PAT.
- Step 2 click "+ New access token", warn shown-ONCE.
- Step 3 helper-script for keychain-storage (per-OS bodies: macOS
`security add-generic-password`, Linux `secret-tool store`, Windows
`cmdkey /generic`).
- Step 4 PAT-side `users/me` verify.
- Step 5's split that kept the PAT around for direct curl scripts.
- Step 6d's "MCP vs PAT identity sanity check" — there is no PAT
anymore, nothing to mismatch against.
New flow (3 steps total):
- Step 0 precheck: `claude mcp list | grep ^asana` — if found, the
server is registered AND Claude Code is holding its OAuth grant
(otherwise prior failure would have removed it); print
"Asana MCP already registered — skipping setup" and stop. Tells the
user the explicit reset command (`claude mcp remove asana && claude
logout asana`) so a re-register stays one paste.
- Step 1: `claude mcp add --transport http asana
https://mcp.asana.com/mcp` — no `|| true` because step 0 should have
caught the "already exists" case. Step explains the V2-vs-V1
endpoint distinction (V1 SSE deprecated 2026-05-11) and the
abort-clean recovery if the precheck somehow missed the existing
server.
- Step 2: same OAuth + low-impact-read validation pattern as before.
- Step 3: revoke instructions (mcp remove + logout + Asana-side app
revoke at app.asana.com/Settings → Apps).
Both surfaces (the /home Asana tile and the inlined Asana sub-block
in the setup script's step 7) emit the new text from the same
asana_prompt() — single-source-of-truth invariant intact.
77 tests pass.
* Setup-prompt + bootstrap fixes from David's 2026-05-10 init report
Three issues from clean-machine bootstrap evidence:
1. `agnes refresh-marketplace --bootstrap` failed to recover when the
local clone existed but Claude Code's marketplace registry had lost
the `agnes` entry. Bootstrap path now parses
`claude plugin marketplace list`, re-runs
`claude plugin marketplace add ~/.agnes/marketplace` when missing,
and treats `add` failures as fatal (was warn-and-continue, root cause
of the cascade into "Marketplace 'agnes' not found" plugin install
errors).
2. Setup prompt now always emits the marketplace-registration block,
even when the operator has zero plugin grants. Pre-wires the
SessionStart hook so future admin grants land automatically without
re-running setup. Block copy adapts: empty list shows
"no plugins granted yet", populated list shows "install plugins".
3. Setup prompt registers the Atlassian Remote MCP server unattended
(`claude mcp add --transport sse atlassian
https://mcp.atlassian.com/v1/sse`). Hosted Remote MCP, OAuth handled
automatically by Claude Code on first use. Asana / GWS stay on the
/home connector cards (PAT/keychain flows don't fit unattended
bootstrap).
Confirm step nudges the user toward the /home connector cards for the
PAT-flow services. CLAUDE.md template renames the marketplace section
to "Agnes Marketplace" and documents that all plugins are addressed as
`<plugin>@agnes` regardless of upstream slug.
Layout: Confirm shifts from step 6/8 to step 9 across all variants
(preflight, marketplace, MCP all unconditional). Tests updated.
* Link Claude license options from /home install pane
Step-1 Claude install on /home pointed users to OAuth without
explaining what to do if they don't have a Pro/Max subscription. Add
a one-line follow-up link to the plan-tier section on /setup-advanced
(new `#claude-plan` anchor) so first-time users discover the
subscription tiers rather than bouncing on the OAuth screen.
* Add idempotent + no-TLS-bypass guardrails to /home connector prompts
The Asana / Google Workspace / Atlassian connector prompts on /home
already shipped a precheck step that short-circuits when the service
is already wired, but they didn't carry the same idempotency +
surface-errors-verbatim + don't-disable-TLS-verification guardrails
the bash bootstrap prompt has. Add a one-paragraph 'Ground rules'
block at the top of each prompt so a connector failure doesn't
tempt the model into bypass workarounds, matching the same posture
David's 2026-05-10 init report flagged for the bash flow.
* skip Source: lines in marketplace registry detector
`claude plugin marketplace list` prints a `Source: <local path>` line
under each registered marketplace; the local clone almost always lives
under a path containing the marketplace name itself
(`~/.agnes/marketplace`). A naive \\bagnes\\b match over the full
stdout therefore false-positives whenever ANY unrelated marketplace
sits under `~/.agnes-…/` or similar. Filter Source: lines out before
matching so the recovery path actually re-adds when needed instead of
silently falling through to a broken `marketplace update agnes`.
Adds regression test covering the substring-only case.
* drop customer-specific tokens from CHANGELOG entries
Per CLAUDE.md vendor-agnostic OSS rule ("nothing customer-specific
... in changelogs"):
- "agnes-vrysanek.groupondev.com" -> "a private-CA Agnes deployment"
- "Groupon Marketplace / groupon-marketplace" -> "<Org> Marketplace /
<org>-marketplace" (placeholder example)
- Removed "David flagged" attribution language; init-report context
stays intact, just stripped of the named host + brand
---------
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
* Extract session pipeline framework, refactor verification, add UsageProcessor skeleton
Pluggable framework under services/session_pipeline/ (contract + lib + per-processor
runner) so multiple processors can read /data/user_sessions/<key>/*.jsonl on their
own cadence with full failure isolation. Verification flow becomes the first plugin;
a no-op UsageProcessor reserves the second slot pending a separate brainstorm on
extraction logic + storage shape.
Schema v28→v29: rename session_extraction_state → session_processor_state with
composite PK (processor_name, session_file). Existing rows copied over with
processor_name='verification'; legacy table dropped. Migration is idempotent and
no-ops the copy step on fresh installs that came up at the new schema.
Endpoint: /api/admin/run-verification-detector replaced by parametrized
/api/admin/run-session-processor?processor=<name>. Audit action format follows.
Scheduler JOBS: verification-detector entry split into session-processor:verification
+ session-processor:usage. SCHEDULER_VERIFICATION_DETECTOR_INTERVAL retained for
operator compatibility (drives both cadence and health-check grace window);
SCHEDULER_USAGE_PROCESSOR_INTERVAL added.
* Address PR #232 review: scan dead branch + per-processor lock
- `SessionProcessorStateRepository.scan_unprocessed_for` dead else: both
branches surfaced every jsonl, the SELECT was unused, runner MD5-rehashed
every stable session per tick. Replaced with an mtime precheck — stable
sessions (mtime <= processed_at) are filtered at scan; modified files
still surface for the runner's authoritative `file_hash` invalidation.
Naive-local comparison matches the existing health-check idiom (DuckDB
TIMESTAMP strips tz on storage).
- Per-processor advisory lock around `_run_processor` in
`/api/admin/run-session-processor`. Scheduler tick + manual admin POST
could otherwise both run, both call create_evidence on overlapping
detections, and accumulate duplicate verification_evidence rows (the
dedup short-circuit only covers create+contradiction, not evidence per
ADR Decision 3). Non-blocking acquire → 409 Conflict on concurrent
invocation; release in finally so a runner exception doesn't wedge the
processor.
Tests: two new scan unit tests (mtime filter + post-mark mtime bump), 409
endpoint test, lock-released-on-exception test. Two existing tests updated
for the new "filtered at scan" stat shape (previously asserted skipped == 1,
now scanned == 0).
* Address PR #232 review #2: parallel scheduler tick + last_run on terminal state
Two pre-existing scaffold bugs in services/scheduler/__main__.py amplified
by adding more session-pipeline jobs:
1. Serial for-loop over jobs with synchronous httpx.post(timeout=900) — a
10-minute verification run blocked every other job (data-refresh,
health-check, usage, corporate-memory) for the whole window. The PR's
stated isolation guarantee held inside the runner but broke at the
scheduler dispatch layer.
2. last_run advanced only when _call_api returned True. Permanent-failure
jobs hot-looped on every tick (30s) instead of cadence (15min).
Fix: ThreadPoolExecutor.submit per due job + per-job in_flight set so a
long-running job can't be re-launched on subsequent ticks. last_run
advances unconditionally in finally; errors still surface via _call_api
logging + audit_log on the receiving side.
_run_job extracted to module-level for unit testing. New tests:
- TestRunJobBookkeeping: advances on success / failure / unhandled raise
- TestRunLoopParallelism: in_flight protection prevents duplicate
launches across ticks for a single slow job
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
The previous gather used `sorted(glob, key=lambda p: p.stat().st_mtime)`.
A transient OSError (race with delete, permission flicker, EBADF on a
weird filesystem) on any single file raised through the lambda and 500-ed
the whole page.
Reworked: stat each path under try/except into a (path, stat) list, sort
the already-statted entries. Bad files drop silently from the listing.
Regression test test_profile_sessions_page_tolerates_stat_failures
patches Path.stat to raise on one of two files, asserts the page returns
200 with the good row rendered and the bad row dropped.
User feedback during e2e of #179: the listing page is nice but I want
to grab the raw jsonl and look at what's inside.
Adds GET /profile/sessions/<filename>:
- Auth via get_current_user (owner-only).
- Path safety: rejects "/", "\", "..", leading ".", and any non-".jsonl"
filename. The served path resolves under
${DATA_DIR}/user_sessions/<caller.id>/; if resolution escapes that
base directory, returns 404 (never 403, so existence of other users'
files isn't leaked).
- FileResponse with Content-Disposition: attachment.
UI: Download button per row in profile_sessions.html.
Tests in test_web_ui.py: path-traversal / nested / dotfile / non-jsonl
all 404 for owner; unauthenticated 302/401/403; authenticated owner
gets 200 + correct Content-Disposition.
Three changes addressing user feedback during e2e test of #179 + Devin Review on e86dd5ed.
1) /profile/sessions — new self-service user page in the user menu.
Lists all session jsonls the caller uploaded via `agnes push` joined
against session_extraction_state. Each row shows uploaded_at, file
size, status badge (pending/processed/extracted), processed_at, and
items_extracted. The page docstring + help text explicitly call out
that items_extracted=0 means the verification detector ran fine but
the LLM found no claims to track — that's the documented "no items"
outcome, not a broken pipeline. Closes the gap surfaced during the
e2e test of #176 where a user could see their sessions on disk and
process them through the LLM but had no UI to inspect what happened.
2) run_verification_detector audits unhandled exceptions (Devin #1).
If detector.run() threw anything other than the already-translated
ValueError, the audit_log row was never written. The endpoint now
wraps detector.run in try/except, records the exception in
audit_params["unhandled_error"], then re-raises as 500 after audit.
The /admin/scheduler-runs page surfaces the failure row with the
error type + message.
3) SCHEDULER_AUDIT_ACTIONS list corrected (Devin #2). Previous list
had "marketplaces_sync_all" (wrong — actual is "marketplace.sync_all")
plus "data_refresh" and "scripts_run_due" which app/api/sync.py and
app/api/scripts.py don't write to audit_log. Fixed to the four
actually-logged strings; comment points at the missing audit calls
as a follow-up.
Tests: tests/test_web_ui.py adds TestAdminRoleGuards::test_profile_sessions_page_no_admin_required and tightens test_admin_scheduler_runs_page_admin_only to assert the correct marketplace.sync_all string.
E2E test on a real BQ deploy showed every verification-extraction call
fails with HTTP 400 invalid_request_error: "output_config.format.schema:
For 'object' type, 'additionalProperties' must be explicitly set to false".
The Anthropic structured-output API now requires the field on every object
node in the json_schema. Fix: connectors/llm/anthropic_provider.py wraps
the caller-supplied schema through a recursive _strict_json_schema()
walker that adds the field where missing (preserving any explicit
override), then passes the strict variant to the API. Six unit tests in
TestStrictJsonSchema pin the recursion across nested objects, array items,
and the no-mutation invariant.
Adds /admin/scheduler-runs — a read-only admin page that surfaces the
last 200 audit-log entries from scheduler-driven actions. New
AuditRepository.query_actions(actions, limit) helper, new admin nav
entry. Failed scheduler ticks (HTTP 401, network errors) don't reach
the audit_log; the page calls that out with a hint to set
SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN if no rows show up.
The `/setup` route no longer accepts `?role=analyst|admin`. The route
signature drops the `Literal[...] = Query(...)` parameter and the
silent admin-downgrade block (`if role == "admin" and not is_admin:
role = "analyst"`). The `role` ctx variable threaded into install.html
also goes away — Task 6 cleans up the template's role-tile UI and the
JS PAT-mint ternary.
`?role=` is silently ignored by FastAPI for unknown query params, so
existing bookmarks (none in production — the param was added in this
PR and never shipped) just degrade to the unified layout. No
RedirectResponse shim needed.
Tests: drop the entire `tests/test_setup_page_roles.py` file (eight
role-branching tests that no longer apply) and add
`tests/test_setup_page_unified.py` with three tests:
- `test_setup_page_renders_unified_layout`
- `test_setup_page_ignores_role_query_param`
- `test_setup_page_renders_marketplace_for_user_with_grants`
- `test_install_legacy_path_redirects_to_setup`
Also replace the role-aware `test_install_preview_*` tests in
test_web_ui.py with unified-layout assertions.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-04-unified-setup-prompt.md task 5.
Three coupled UX fixes for the analyst-onboarding flow:
1. Dashboard "Setup a new Claude Code" CTA was rendering admin paste
prompt for everyone (analysts couldn't actually execute the marketplace
plugin install / skills setup steps). render_agent_prompt_banner now
picks role based on user.is_admin — analysts get the analyst flow.
2. /setup default role changed from admin to analyst. Most visitors are
analysts; admin layout is opt-in via the admin tile or ?role=admin.
3. Admin tile is admin-only on the role-tile nav. Non-admins see only
the analyst tile. Server-side: non-admin requesting ?role=admin is
silently downgraded to analyst (otherwise they'd see admin paste
prompt despite no tile).
Tests:
- New: test_setup_page_admin_tile_hidden_for_non_admin (anonymous client
can't see "Admin CLI" or role=admin link)
- New: test_setup_page_admin_role_downgraded_for_non_admin (anonymous
?role=admin → analyst layout, no marketplace step in clipboard)
- New: test_install_preview_default_role_is_analyst (admin signing in to
bare /setup gets analyst clipboard by default)
- Renamed: test_setup_page_default_role_is_admin → ..._is_analyst
- Updated: test_setup_page_admin_clipboard_renders_admin_layout uses
FastAPI dependency_overrides to inject admin user (admin layout is
now admin-gated)
- Updated: test_install_preview_visible_for_signed_in_user explicitly
passes ?role=admin to exercise admin layout
Rename the welcome prompt editor from /admin/welcome to /admin/agent-prompt
and update all UI labels to "Agent Setup Prompt". API endpoint URLs are
unchanged (PUT/GET/DELETE /api/admin/welcome-template, GET /api/welcome).
- Nav menu: "Welcome prompt" → "Agent Setup Prompt", href updated
- Page title and h2 updated in admin_welcome.html
- Error message hint in app/api/welcome.py updated to /admin/agent-prompt
- Dashboard: replace inline <details> preview of _claude_setup_instructions
with a simple link to /setup (Task C)
- docs/welcome-template.md renamed to docs/agent-setup-prompt.md; internal
references to /admin/welcome updated
- OpenAPI snapshot path updated
- Tests updated to reflect new route and removed inline preview
- Add GET /setup serving install.html (CLI + Claude Code setup page)
- Add GET /install → 301 redirect to /setup for backwards compat
- Move first-time setup wizard from /setup to /first-time-setup
- Update nav link: href=/setup, label 'Setup local agent', active on both /setup and /install paths
- Update page <title> to 'Setup local agent — …'
- Update /dashboard and /setup comment in _claude_setup_instructions.jinja
- Update tests and OpenAPI snapshot accordingly
* feat(rbac): drop dataset_permissions + access_requests + users.role + is_public; v19 migration
BREAKING. Sjednocení datové RBAC vrstvy do per-group resource_grants modelu.
Před PR byla legacy data RBAC vrstva (dataset_permissions + is_public bypass)
de-facto neaktivní — is_public neměl API/UI/CLI surface, default true znamenal
že can_access_table vždycky bypassl. Dnes každý non-admin přístup vyžaduje
explicitní resource_grants(group, "table", id) řádek.
Schema v18 → v19 (src/db.py:_v18_to_v19_finalize):
- DROP TABLE dataset_permissions, access_requests
- DROP COLUMN users.role (NULL artifact since v13)
- DROP COLUMN table_registry.is_public
- Drops přes table-rebuild idiom (rename → create new → INSERT … SELECT
→ drop old) kvůli DuckDB ALTER DROP COLUMN limitacím na tabulkách
s historic FK constraints. INSERT picks intersection sloupců, takže
test fixtures s minimal pre-v19 schemou migrate cleanly.
Runtime:
- src/rbac.py:can_access_table → deleguje na app.auth.access.can_access
- DatasetPermissionRepository, AccessRequestRepository smazány
- AGNES_ENABLE_TABLE_GRANTS env-gate v app/resource_types.py odstraněn
(TABLE je unconditionally enabled)
API drop:
- app/api/permissions.py, app/api/access_requests.py celé soubory
- /admin/permissions web route + admin_permissions.html
- "Request Access" modal v catalog.html + locked-row UI
- ~10 if user.get("role") != "admin" checků nahrazeno (admin shortcut
je uvnitř can_access_table)
- /api/settings: drop permissions field z GET; PUT /api/settings/dataset
gate přepnut na can_access(user_id, "table", dataset, conn)
Auth:
- app/auth/jwt.py:create_access_token: drop role parametr (claim zmizí
z nově vydávaných JWT; staré tokeny zůstávají valid, claim ignored)
- app/api/users.py: drop role z CreateUserRequest / UpdateUserRequest
(admin promotion = explicit add to Admin group via memberships API)
- src/repositories/users.py: drop role z create() / update()
CLI:
- da admin set-role smazán → hard-fail s replacement command
- da admin add-user --role flag pryč
- da auth import-token --role flag pryč
- da auth whoami: drop "Role:" výpis
- cli/config.py:save_token: role parametr now optional, no longer written
(back-compat se starými token.json soubory zachována — pole se ignoruje)
Tests:
- DELETE: test_permissions.py, test_permissions_api.py, test_access_requests_api.py
- REWRITE: test_access_control.py (resource_grants flow), test_rbac.py
(can_access_table over resource_grants), test_journey_rbac.py
(drop access-request flow), test_resource_types.py (drop env-gate
tests, drop is_public from helpers), test_v2_*.py (drop role-based
user dicts in favor of id-based + Admin group membership),
test_settings_api.py (no permissions field, can_access gate)
- TRIVIAL: ~30 souborů — drop role="admin" arg z UserRepository.create
a 3rd positional role z create_access_token
- NEW: test_v18_to_v19 migration test (test_db.py),
test_can_access_table_no_implicit_public (test_rbac.py),
test_admin_set_role_returns_hardfail (test_cli_admin.py)
- OpenAPI snapshot regenerated
Docs:
- CHANGELOG: BREAKING entry pod [Unreleased]
- CLAUDE.md: schema v18 → v19
- docs/architecture.md: schema table + RBAC sekce přepsána
- docs/auth-google-oauth.md: admin promotion přes da admin break-glass
- cli/skills/security.md: kompletně přepsáno na group-based model
- docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md: smazáno (TODO splněn)
Test results: 2363 passed, 19 failed. Zbývající failures jsou pre-existing
Windows-specific issues (fcntl, charset) nesouvisející s tímto PR —
ověřeno git stash pop.
Plan: ~/.claude/plans/floofy-coalescing-parnas.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(release): cut 0.27.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Minas Arustamyan <arustamyan.minas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
Issue #108 Milestone 1. Adds BigQuery table registration via /admin/tables UI and `da admin register-table` CLI without hand-editing table_registry. POST /api/admin/register-table/precheck for round-trip validation. --dry-run flag on CLI. Audit-log entries on register/update/unregister. PUT /api/admin/registry/{id} now preserves registered_at (closes#130).
This squashes 13 commits from ma/staging plus a small docstring translation
into a single coherent unit. Three workstreams.
== RBAC v13 redesign ==
- Drops core.viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin hierarchy and the
internal_roles / group_mappings / user_role_grants / plugin_access tables.
- Replaced by user_group_members + resource_grants. Atomic v12→v13 backfill
wrapped in BEGIN/COMMIT; ROLLBACK leaves schema_version at 12 for retry.
- Two authorization primitives in app.auth.access:
require_admin — Admin-group god-mode
require_resource_access(rt, "{path}") — entity-scoped grants
Single DB lookup per request; no session cache; no implies BFS.
- /admin/access UI (single page) replaces /admin/role-mapping +
/admin/plugin-access. CLI `da admin group/grant *` replaces
`da admin role/mapping/grant-role/revoke-role/effective-roles`.
- ResourceType.TABLE listing-only — admins can record table grants,
runtime enforcement still flows through legacy dataset_permissions
(migration plan in docs/TODO-rbac-data-enforcement.md).
== Claude Code marketplace ==
- Aggregated /marketplace.zip + /marketplace.git/* (PAT-gated,
RBAC-filtered, content-addressed cache via dulwich).
- Admin god-mode dropped on the marketplace surface — admins curate
their own view via grants like everyone else.
- Bare-repo cache materializes per RBAC-filtered ETag; stale entries
not pruned in this iteration (disclaimed in git_backend.py docstring).
== #81#83#44 security/ops hardening ==
- #81 Group A — orchestrator ATTACH allow-listing (extension/url/alias).
- #81 Group B — Keboola extractor 3-state exit codes:
0 success / 1 total fail / 2 PARTIAL fail
Sync API logs PARTIAL FAILURE alert on exit 2. Operators with binary
alerting must teach it the new partial signal.
- #81 Group C — schema v10 view_ownership; rejects silent overwrite
of a prior connector's view name on collision.
- #81 Group D — extractor-side identifier validation.
- #83 — Jira webhook fail-closed when JIRA_WEBHOOK_SECRET unset
+ path-traversal fix.
- #44 — entire /api/scripts/* surface is admin-only (planted-script +
sandbox-bypass risk closed).
== Web UI polish + deploy fix ==
- /admin/access: live grant-count badges (no stale snapshot revert),
shared-header CSS link added to /catalog and /admin/{tables,permissions},
per-resource-type colored stripes.
- docker-compose.host-mount.yml: bind,rbind so dual-disk hosts don't
silently shadow sub-mounts and write state to the wrong disk.
== OSS vendor-neutralization (waves 1+2) ==
- scripts/grpn/ → scripts/ops/. Customer-specific identifiers
(project IDs, internal hostnames, dev/prod VM IPs, brand names)
replaced with placeholders across code, docs, Terraform, Caddyfile,
OAuth probe, and planning docs. Downstream infra repos that copied
scripts/grpn/agnes-tls-rotate.sh or agnes-auto-upgrade.sh must
update the path.
== Translation ==
- src/repositories/user_groups.py::ensure_system docstring translated
from Czech to English for codebase consistency.
Co-authored-by: Mina Rustamyan <mina@keboola.com>
* feat(auth): v9 schema — unified role management foundation (WIP)
Tasks 1-5, 10 of the role-management-complete plan. Foundation only,
follow-up commits add REST API, CLI, UI, and tests.
Schema v9:
- user_role_grants table: direct user → internal_role mapping
(complementary to group_mappings). Drives PAT/headless auth and
persists across sessions. Source field tracks 'direct' vs auto-seed.
- internal_roles.implies (JSON): transitive role hierarchy. core.admin
implies core.km_admin → core.analyst → core.viewer. Resolver does BFS
expand at lookup time.
- internal_roles.is_core (BOOL): distinguishes seeded core.* hierarchy
from module-registered roles. UI renders them differently.
- v8→v9 migration: ADD COLUMN, CREATE TABLE, _seed_core_roles +
_backfill_users_role_to_grants, then NULL legacy users.role values.
DuckDB FK constraint blocks DROP COLUMN — sloupec zůstává jako
deprecated artifact (UserRepository ignoruje), fyzický drop deferred.
Resolver:
- Regex extended to allow dotted namespace (core.admin,
context_engineering.admin), max 64 chars total.
- expand_implies(role_keys, conn): BFS over implies JSON column.
- resolve_internal_roles signature gains optional user_id parameter;
unions group-mapping resolution with user_role_grants direct grants
before implies expansion.
require_internal_role:
- Two-path resolution: session cache (OAuth) → DB grants (PAT/headless
fallback). PAT clients now legitimately satisfy gates without the
OAuth round-trip, fixing the v8 limitation where every PAT-callable
admin endpoint needed require_role(Role.ADMIN) instead of
require_internal_role(...).
Backward-compat:
- require_role(Role.X) and require_admin become thin wrappers over
require_internal_role(f"core.{role}"). Implies hierarchy preserves the
legacy "at least this level" semantics automatically — no per-level
comparison code needed.
- src/rbac.py helpers (is_admin, has_role, get_user_role,
set_user_role, can_access_table, get_accessible_tables) all read from
the resolver via _get_internal_role_keys.
- UserRepository.create() and update() now mirror role changes into
user_role_grants via _grant_core_role helper. Preserves API while
making the new table the source of truth.
- UserRepository.delete() pre-deletes user_role_grants rows
(FK cascade — DuckDB doesn't auto-cascade).
- count_admins() reads user_role_grants ⨝ internal_roles instead of the
now-NULL users.role column.
First consumer:
- app/api/admin.py module-level docstring documents the v9 pattern for
future module authors. Existing require_role(Role.ADMIN) callsites
flow through the wrapper; no behavior change for OAuth callers, and
PAT callers gain access via direct grants.
Tests: full suite green (1396 passed, 6 skipped). Existing tests
exercise the new pathway transparently because UserRepository.create
auto-grants. New test_pat_caller_with_direct_grant_passes pins the
PAT-aware contract.
Schema: v9 (was v8). pyproject.toml + CHANGELOG bump deferred to the
final PR-prep commit.
* feat(auth): role management complete — REST API + CLI + UI + docs (v0.11.4)
Sjednocuje legacy users.role enum s v8 internal-roles foundation pod jeden
model s implies hierarchií, dodává admin UI + REST API + CLI pro správu
group mappings i přímých user grants, a dělá require_internal_role
PAT-aware tak, aby admin endpointy fungovaly uniformly napříč OAuth
i headless callery.
REST API (app/api/role_management.py, +496 LOC):
- 8 endpointů pod /api/admin: internal-roles list, group-mappings CRUD,
users/{id}/role-grants CRUD, users/{id}/effective-roles debug.
- Všechny gated require_internal_role("core.admin"). Audit-log na každé
mutaci (role_mapping.created/deleted, role_grant.created/deleted).
- Last-admin protection: refuse to delete the final core.admin grant
(mirrors users.py:count_admins protection).
- Nový UserRoleGrantsRepository v src/repositories/user_role_grants.py.
CLI (cli/commands/admin.py extension, +258 LOC):
- da admin role list / show <key>
- da admin mapping list / create <group-id> <role-key> / delete <id>
- da admin grant-role <email> <role-key>
- da admin revoke-role <email> <role-key>
- da admin effective-roles <email>
- Všechno přes typer + PAT auth, --json flag, response-shape tolerantní.
UI (admin_role_mapping.html + admin_user_detail.html + nav + user list):
- Nová stránka /admin/role-mapping: internal_roles read-only table +
group_mappings table with create/delete forms.
- Nová stránka /admin/users/{id}: core role single-select + capabilities
multi-checkbox + effective-roles debug (direct + group + expanded).
- Existing user list dostává "Detail" link na novou stránku.
- Nav link na /admin/role-mapping.
Tests: +85 nových testů přes 4 nové soubory:
- test_schema_v9_migration.py (8) — fresh install + v8→v9 backfill +
legacy column NULL semantics + unknown-role fallback + invariants.
- test_api_role_management.py (33) — všech 8 endpointů, happy + error
paths, audit-log assertions, last-admin protection.
- test_cli_admin_role.py (25 + 1 conditional) — typer subcommands,
text + json output, PAT integration smoke.
- test_admin_role_mapping_ui.py (9) + test_admin_user_capabilities_ui.py (10)
— page rendering, auth gating, form contracts, JS hooks.
Full suite: 1482 passed, 6 skipped (was 1396 → +86, žádné regrese).
Docs:
- docs/internal-roles.md kompletní rewrite — odstranil "no UI yet",
přidal hierarchy diagram, dual-path resolution, dotted-namespace
convention, admin workflow přes UI/CLI/REST, refresh semantics
for group mappings vs direct grants, migration notes.
- CLAUDE.md schema v8 → v9.
- CHANGELOG.md [0.11.4] s BREAKING marker pro users.role NULL
semantics + complete Added/Changed/Removed/Internal sekce.
- pyproject.toml: 0.11.3 → 0.11.4.
Sequencing: po mergi tohoto PR Pabu rebasuje pabu/local-dev (PR #72)
na main, jeho schema migrations se posouvají z v9/v10/v11 na v10/v11/v12.
Implementation breakdown:
- Sequential (já): foundation tasks — schema v9, resolver, PAT-aware
require_internal_role, backward-compat wrappers, rbac refactor,
UserRepository auto-grant.
- Parallel sub-agents (3 worktrees, ~10 min): REST API, CLI, UI.
- Sequential (já): integrace, docs/CHANGELOG/version, schema tests,
fullsuite verification.
* fix(auth): address Devin review on PR #73 — three regressions
Three concrete bugs caught in Devin's PR review, all fixed in this commit.
1. **users.role hydration on read** (the big one):
v8→v9 migration NULLs users.role for every existing user, but a long
tail of read sites still inspect user["role"] directly:
- app/web/templates/_app_header.html:15 — admin nav gate
- app/web/templates/_app_header.html:36-37 — role badge in dropdown
- app/web/router.py:319-321 — UserInfo.is_admin/is_analyst/is_privileged
- app/web/router.py:489 — corporate memory is_km_admin
- app/api/catalog.py:54 — admin "see all tables" bypass
- app/api/sync.py:215 — admin "see all sync states" bypass
Without a fix, every existing admin loses the entire admin nav (and
API admin bypasses) immediately after upgrade — a serious regression.
Fix: new helper _hydrate_legacy_role() in app/auth/dependencies.py
maps the highest-level core.* grant back into user["role"] as the
legacy enum string. Called from get_current_user() on both auth paths
(LOCAL_DEV_MODE + JWT/PAT). Idempotent — skips when role is already
populated. Net effect: every pre-v9 callsite keeps working transparently
for both OAuth and PAT callers, with one extra DB round-trip per
authenticated request (same cost as the existing PAT-aware
require_internal_role fallback).
3 regression tests in tests/test_schema_v9_migration.py:
- test_hydration_recovers_role_from_user_role_grants
- test_hydration_returns_highest_grant (multi-grant → highest wins)
- test_hydration_falls_back_to_viewer_when_no_grants (safe fallback)
2. **CLI effective-roles TypeError**:
API returns direct/group as List[Dict] (RoleGrantResponse-shaped),
but the CLI did ', '.join(direct) which raises TypeError on dicts.
Tests masked it because mocks used bare string lists. Replaced
raw .join() with a _names() helper that extracts role_key from
each item, falling back to str() for legacy mock shapes.
3. **UI template field-name mismatch**:
admin_user_detail.html JS reads data.groups but the API serializes
the field as group (singular, per EffectiveRolesResponse pydantic).
Currently benign because the API always returns group:[], but the
field would silently disappear once the group-derived view is wired
up. Added data.group as the primary lookup, kept the legacy aliases
for shape-drift tolerance.
Full suite: 1485 passed (was 1482, +3 hydration tests), 6 skipped, no
regressions.
* fix(auth): Devin review #2 + UX self-service + RBAC docs rename
Three threads landed in one commit because they share the same
auth/role surface and CHANGELOG entry.
Devin review #73 second round (2 actionable findings):
- _hydrate_legacy_role no longer short-circuits on truthy users.role.
The role-management endpoints (POST/DELETE /api/admin/users/{id}/
role-grants + the changeCoreRole UI flow) only mutate
user_role_grants — they don't update the legacy column. The early
return trusted that stale value, so a user downgraded via the new
REST/UI kept role="admin" in their dict on subsequent requests,
which fooled _is_admin_user_dict (src/rbac.py) and the catalog/sync
admin-bypass short-circuits into retaining elevated table access
even though require_internal_role correctly denied the API gates.
Always re-resolves now, making user_role_grants the single source
of truth on every authenticated request. Cost: one DB round-trip
per request — same as the existing PAT-aware fallback. Pinned by
test_hydration_ignores_stale_legacy_role_after_grant_revoke.
- Dev-bypass (app/auth/dependencies.py) and OAuth callback
(app/auth/providers/google.py) now pass user_id to
resolve_internal_roles so direct grants land in
session["internal_roles"] alongside group-mapped roles. Pre-fix,
every admin-gated request fell through to the per-request DB
fallback inside require_internal_role and the dev-bypass log line
read "resolved 0 internal role(s)" for an obviously-admin user.
test_session_internal_roles_populated updated to assert union.
User-visible UX (also addresses local-test feedback):
- HTTP 500 on /admin/users post-v8→v9 migration — UserResponse.role
is required str, but legacy users.role was NULL-ed by the
migration. _to_response in app/api/users.py now routes every dict
through _hydrate_legacy_role; same fix lifts the silent no-op of
last-admin protection in update_user/delete_user (the role-equality
short-circuits would skip the count_admins guard for migrated
admins). Three regression tests under TestAPIUsersPostMigration.
- /profile is now a real self-service detail page for *every*
signed-in user (not just admins). Three new server-side sections:
Effective roles (resolver output as chip cloud), Direct grants
(rows in user_role_grants with source label), Roles via groups
(which Cloud Identity / dev group grants which role for the
current user). Non-admins finally see *why* a feature is or isn't
accessible. Admins additionally see a deep-link to
/admin/users/{id} for editing their own grants.
- /admin/role-mapping group-id picker. New "Known groups" panel
above the create form: clickable chips for the calling admin's
own session.google_groups (tagged "your group") merged with
external_group_ids already used in existing mappings (tagged
"already mapped"). Click a chip → fills the form. Empty-state
copy points operators at LOCAL_DEV_GROUPS / Google sign-in
instead of leaving them to guess Cloud Identity opaque IDs from
memory.
Operational fixes:
- Scheduler log-noise: every cron tick produced a
POST /auth/token 401 because the auto-fetch fallback called the
endpoint with just an email (no password) and silently fell
through. Removed the broken path entirely. Operators set
SCHEDULER_API_TOKEN (long-lived PAT) in production; in
LOCAL_DEV_MODE the dev-bypass auto-authenticates the un-tokenized
request, so jobs continue to work.
Docs:
- docs/internal-roles.md → docs/RBAC.md (git mv preserves history).
Standard industry term, more discoverable for engineers grepping
for RBAC in a new repo. Restructured: Quickstart-by-role
(operator / end-user / module author), step-by-step
Module-author workflow with code examples (register key, gate
endpoint, declare implies, write contract test), naming pitfalls,
refresh semantics. CLAUDE.md gets a new
"Extensibility → RBAC" section pointing contributors at the doc
before they add gated endpoints. Cross-refs in app/api/admin.py
+ tests/test_role_resolver.py updated.
Tests: 293 in the auth/role/scheduler/UI test set passed, 0 regressions.
* fix(auth): Devin review #3 — login flows + RBAC docs
Two new findings on commit 7d1c048, both real and addressed.
Finding 1 (BUG, HTTP 500): every auth login flow loaded users via
UserRepository.get_by_email and passed user["role"] straight to
create_access_token, Pydantic response models, and _set_login_cookie
without going through _hydrate_legacy_role. Post-v9 the legacy column
is NULL for migrated users, and TokenResponse.role is a required str —
so POST /auth/token raised ValidationError → HTTP 500 for any v8-admin
trying to log in via password. Same root cause produced non-crashing
but semantically wrong JWTs (role: null) from Google OAuth, password
web flows, and email magic-link verification.
Fix: hydrate inline in every login flow before reading user["role"]:
- app/auth/router.py — POST /auth/token (the crash site)
- app/auth/providers/google.py — OAuth callback (was just stale JWT)
- app/auth/providers/password.py — 5 flows: JSON login, web login,
JSON setup, web reset confirm, web setup confirm
- app/auth/providers/email.py — centralized in _consume_token,
covers both /verify endpoints
New regression class TestAuthLoginFlowsPostMigration pins both the
no-crash and the correct-role contracts for all four legacy levels
(viewer/analyst/km_admin/admin) on POST /auth/token.
Finding 2 (DOCS): docs/RBAC.md showed register_internal_role() being
called with implies=[...], but the function signature is (key, *,
display_name, description, owner_module). A module author copying the
example would TypeError at import time. The implies field on
internal_roles IS honored at runtime by expand_implies, but the
registry-side write path (register_internal_role + InternalRoleSpec +
sync_registered_roles_to_db) doesn't exist yet — implies is currently
seeded only for the core.* hierarchy via _seed_core_roles in src/db.py.
Rewrote the Implies hierarchy and Module-author workflow sections to
document what's actually supported in 0.11.4 and what a future change
would need to add. The "for cross-module hierarchies, register each
level + grant both" pattern works today.
Tests: 322 in the auth/role/scheduler/UI/password test set passed,
0 regressions.
* fix(db): _seed_core_roles actually runs on every connect (Devin review #4)
Devin flagged that the docstring on `_seed_core_roles` promised per-connect
execution as a safety net for accidental DELETEs and in-code seed changes,
but the only call sites lived inside `if current < SCHEMA_VERSION:` — so
once a DB was on v9 the function never ran again, and the docstring lied.
Picked option (b) from the review (actually call it on every startup) over
option (a) (fix the docstring) because the safety net is genuinely useful:
- recovery from accidental admin DELETE on internal_roles,
- in-code _CORE_ROLES_SEED tweaks (display_name/description/implies)
ship without a manual SQL deploy,
- fresh installs and migrations stop needing their own seed call sites.
Tail call gated by `get_schema_version(conn) <= SCHEMA_VERSION` so the
future-version-is-noop rollback contract still holds — a v9 binary won't
touch a DB that's been upgraded past v9.
Test coverage: new TestSeedCoreRolesSafetyNet class (3 tests) pins the
three contracts — deleted row re-seeds, mutated display_name re-syncs
from in-code seed, applied_at on schema_version doesn't churn on
already-current DBs. Existing TestMigrationSafety::test_future_version_is_noop
still passes (verified against the gating logic).
* feat(auth): display Google Workspace groups on /profile
- Request cloud-identity.groups.readonly scope in Google OAuth
- Fetch groups via Cloud Identity API after callback; tolerate 4xx
(non-Workspace tenants) and network errors — never break login
- Store result in Starlette session as google_groups
- Replace /profile redirect with a real profile page rendering
account details (email, name, role) and the group list; show a
friendly empty state when no groups are available
- Tests: helper parsing + 403 + exception paths; profile page
smoke test; updated the old redirect test
* test: remove stale /profile redirect tests
Cherry-pick of Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd ("display Google Workspace groups on
/profile") replaces the /profile redirect with a real profile page —
but only updated one of three tests that expected the old behaviour.
These two tests in test_admin_tokens_ui.py and test_pat.py were left
asserting `/profile → 302 /tokens`, which now returns
`/profile → 302 /login?next=%2Fprofile` for unauth users (the standard
auth guard) or `/profile → 200 HTML` for authenticated users.
Removed both rather than patched — coverage for the new behaviour
already exists in tests/test_auth_providers.py (added by the same
commit). The /tokens render assertions in the deleted test_pat.py case
are redundant with test_admin_tokens_ui.py's own /tokens UI tests.
* fix(auth): Google groups search query needs parent + labels predicates
Cloud Identity Groups Search API returns 400 INVALID_ARGUMENT when the
CEL query lacks the required `parent == 'customers/<id>'` predicate AND
a `'<label>' in labels` membership predicate. Zdeněk's original 4f7e4cd
query had only `member_key_id == '<email>'` — every fetch silently
returned [] and the /profile groups list was always empty.
Fix: build the query with all three required pieces:
parent == 'customers/my_customer' (alias = caller's own Workspace
org; no need to look up customer ID)
member_key_id == '<email>' (filter to this user's memberships)
'cloudidentity.googleapis.com/groups.discussion_forum' in labels
(Workspace mailing-list groups —
the common case; security-group
coverage is a follow-up)
Also: log the full error body (not truncated to 200 chars) and the
query string so the next time Google rejects something we can diagnose
in one log line instead of a re-deploy.
Caught when first agnes-dev login completed normally (HTTP 302) but app
log showed `Google groups fetch returned 400 for petr@keboola.com:
{"error":{"code":400,"message":"Request contains an invalid argument."}}`
on the same VM (kids-ai-data-analysis / agnes-dev.keboola.com).
Reference: https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest/v1/groups/search
* feat(web): add Profile link to user dropdown menu
The /profile page (Zdeněk's 4f7e4cd cherry-pick) renders a real profile
view including Google Workspace groups, but had no entry point in the
UI — users could only reach it by typing the URL manually. Add a
"Profile" menu item between the user header (email + role) and
"My tokens" so the page is discoverable.
Side effect: cleaned up the leftover `or _path.startswith('/profile')`
condition on the "My tokens" active class, which dated from the old
/profile → /tokens redirect (removed in c789617). Now each menu item
owns its own active state.
* fix: profile-link tests + .env quoting for CADDY_TLS
Two issues caught by Keboola's first agnes-dev deploy + agnes-auto-upgrade
cron run:
1. tests/test_web_ui.py — two negative assertions ("href=/profile" NOT in
body) date from when /profile was a redirect-only stub. Now /profile
is a real page (groups display) AND has a dropdown menu link, so the
negative assertions flip to positive. Same for ">Profile<" text in
the non-admin nav test.
2. startup-script.sh.tpl — CADDY_TLS line must be QUOTED in .env, because
agnes-auto-upgrade.sh sources .env via `set -a; . .env; set +a` and
bash treats `KEY=value with spaces` as `KEY=value` followed by `with`
and `spaces` exec attempts. Symptom: cron log spam
`/opt/agnes/.env: line 14: petr@keboola.com: command not found`,
the cron exits non-zero, and no auto-upgrade ever happens. Caddy
itself reads the value fine because docker-compose env_file=.env
parses key=value properly without shell-evaluating the rest.
Fix: emit `CADDY_TLS="tls <email>"` instead of `CADDY_TLS=tls <email>`.
Both the cron source and docker-compose env_file accept the quoted
form; cron stops failing.
* fix(auth): use searchTransitiveGroups + security label for non-admin user
Three bugs in the original cherry-pick + my prior fix attempt, all caught
by a stdlib probe script (scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py) run
locally with a Playground-issued OAuth token:
1. Wrong endpoint. `groups:search` is the admin "find groups in org"
endpoint and 400s for non-admin users regardless of query. Switched
to `groups/-/memberships:searchTransitiveGroups` which is the
user-perspective "what groups am I in" endpoint.
2. Wrong label. Querying with `cloudidentity.googleapis.com/groups.discussion_forum`
returns 403 "Insufficient permissions to retrieve memberships" even
on the new endpoint — Workspace policy denies non-admin reads of
discussion-forum groups. Switching to `groups.security` returns 200
with the actual membership list. Empirically every Workspace group
at Keboola carries BOTH labels, so the security filter sees the full
set anyway. Confirmed with the probe script.
3. Wrong response shape. `searchTransitiveGroups` returns
{"memberships": [...]}, not {"groups": [...]}. Parser updated
accordingly.
Also adds scripts/debug/probe_google_groups.py — stdlib-only standalone
probe that hits 6 candidate endpoints with a user OAuth token. Saved a
deploy cycle (~10 min) per query iteration; future API-syntax debugging
should start there.
Verified end-to-end: petr@keboola.com login on agnes-dev returns 5
groups (LIC-1PASSWORD, ROLE_ATLASSIAN_*, etc.) via the probe; once
deployed, the same will populate session["google_groups"] and render
on /profile.
* test(auth): update Google groups parser fixture to match searchTransitiveGroups shape
Mock payload was `{"groups": [...]}` (the shape `groups:search` returns).
After switching to `groups/-/memberships:searchTransitiveGroups` in the
prior commit, the actual response is `{"memberships": [...]}` and the
parser iterates that key. Test now mirrors the real shape.
The per-item structure (groupKey.id + displayName) is unchanged, so the
expected output dict stays the same: [{"id": "...", "name": "..."}].
* docs(auth): add docs/auth-groups.md — Google Workspace groups runbook
Captures the non-obvious bits: the GCP-side setup checklist (Cloud
Identity API + scope on consent screen + Internal user type), the
`security` vs `discussion_forum` label trap (the latter 403s for
non-admins, the former 200s — one of those is a 4-iteration debug
session and shouldn't have to be repeated), where groups are stored
(session, not DB) and how to refresh (re-login), plus how to use the
probe script for future API-syntax issues.
Deliberately stops short of explaining "what is Cloud Identity" or
"what is OAuth scope" — those belong in Google's own docs, not ours.
* docs(claude): document release workflows + module versioning + recreate trick
New "Release & deploy workflows" section in CLAUDE.md covers what didn't
exist anywhere in the repo before:
- Distinction between release.yml (auto-build per push) vs the new
keboola-deploy.yml (tag-triggered, explicit deploy only) — plus when
to use which (per-developer convenience vs shared dev VM safety)
- Module versioning (infra-vX.Y.Z) and the bump-after-merge dance
- The lifecycle.ignore_changes [metadata_startup_script] gotcha and how
to force a recreate via workflow_dispatch's recreate_targets input
All generic — no customer hostnames, project IDs, IPs. Customer-specific
deploy steps belong in the consuming infra repo's README.
Also: cross-reference docs/auth-groups.md from the Authentication
section so future Claude sessions find the Workspace-groups runbook
without grepping.
---------
Co-authored-by: ZdenekSrotyr <zdenek.srotyr@keboola.com>
* fix(cli): versioned wheel URL in setup instructions; drop broken /cli/agnes.whl alias (#36)
* fix(cli): inline PEP 427 wheel filename in setup instructions
`uv tool install <server>/cli/agnes.whl` fails with
error: The wheel filename "agnes.whl" is invalid: Must have a version
because uv validates the filename in the URL path *before* fetching — so
the server-side Content-Disposition header (which has the real versioned
filename) is never consulted, and an HTTP redirect does not help either:
uv resolves the filename from the initial URL.
Fix the root cause by inlining the real PEP 427 filename into the setup
snippet the dashboard copies to the clipboard. The wheel filename is
resolved server-side via `_find_wheel()` and substituted into the lines
returned from `setup_instructions.resolve_lines()`, so both the read-only
HTML preview and the JS clipboard renderer get byte-identical output.
Also added `/cli/wheel/{filename}` to serve wheels at their PEP 427 path,
and kept `/cli/agnes.whl` as a 302 redirect for manual/legacy callers —
though that redirect alone is NOT sufficient for `uv tool install` (uv
validates before following redirects) and is there only as defense-in-depth.
Verified locally:
- `uv tool install <server>/cli/wheel/agnes_the_ai_analyst-2.0.0-py3-none-any.whl` succeeds
- `/install` HTML now renders the versioned URL; `/cli/agnes.whl` no longer appears in the rendered snippet
* fix(cli): remove /cli/agnes.whl alias entirely — it only confused users
The bareword alias was never actually usable:
- `uv tool install <server>/cli/agnes.whl` fails at filename validation
before any HTTP fetch, so neither the Content-Disposition header nor a
302 redirect rescued it.
- The 302-to-versioned-path fallback left a visibly "working" URL in
browser / curl -L contexts, which is exactly how the original bug got
reported in the first place ("the URL loads, why doesn't install work?").
Remove the endpoint and scrub all remaining references. The only CLI wheel
URL is now `/cli/wheel/{filename}` with the real PEP 427 filename, which
the setup-instructions template already generates server-side.
Existing tests that referenced /cli/agnes.whl become negative tests
("must not appear") so we don't regress.
* feat(cli): --version flag; sync --dry-run + progress indicator (#38)
* feat(cli): add --version / -V flag
Prints `da <version>` from package metadata (importlib.metadata). Falls
back to "unknown" when the package is not installed (e.g. running from a
source checkout without `uv pip install -e .`), instead of crashing.
Eager typer callback, so `da --version` exits before subcommand
resolution and does not require any auth/config.
* feat(cli): da sync --dry-run + X/N progress indicator
--dry-run reports what would be downloaded/uploaded without hitting the
API or writing local state. Supports the full flag set (--table, --json,
--upload-only); JSON shape is {"dry_run": true, "would_download": [...],
"summary": {...}}.
Progress bar now shows "[X/N] Downloading <table>..." with a Rich
BarColumn + TaskProgressColumn + TimeElapsedColumn instead of a bare
spinner — makes long syncs visible.
* feat(cli): durable sync + server gzip + auto-update check (#41)
* fix(sync): atomic writes + manifest hash verification + retry on transient errors
Three durability hooks around stream_download and the sync command:
1. Atomic writes. stream_download now streams into `<target>.tmp` and
calls os.replace() on success, so the real target file never exists
in a half-written state. On failure the tmp is unlinked — no cleanup
leftovers, no guard needed at read time.
2. Retry with backoff. Transient errors (ConnectError, ReadError,
WriteError, RemoteProtocolError, TimeoutException, 5xx) are retried
up to 3× with 0.3s / 1s / 3s backoff. 4xx (auth, 404) surfaces
immediately — retrying those is pointless.
3. Manifest-hash verification. After download, sync.py computes MD5 of
the target (same 8KiB chunking as app/api/sync.py:_file_hash) and
compares against `server_tables[tid]["hash"]`. Mismatch ⇒ unlink,
record error, skip state commit. The PAR1 structural check survives
as a fallback for legacy manifests without a hash.
Also makes _rebuild_duckdb_views tolerant: single broken parquet is
skipped with a stderr warning instead of killing the whole rebuild.
Supersedes #40 — this commit is a strict super-set (hash check + PAR1
fallback + atomic write + retry). #40 can be closed without merging.
* perf(server): enable GZipMiddleware for JSON / HTML responses
GZipMiddleware at minimum_size=1024 shaves bandwidth on manifest-style
JSON endpoints (/api/sync/manifest, /api/version, …) and the /install
HTML preview. Parquet file downloads are already columnar-compressed so
the middleware sees limited benefit there — but it doesn't hurt, httpx
on the client side decompresses transparently.
Placed after session middleware so gzip wraps the session-Set-Cookie
response too, and before CORSMiddleware so compression is applied to
both cross-origin and same-origin responses.
* feat(cli): auto-check for newer CLI version on startup
Server side
- GET /cli/latest returns {version, wheel_filename, download_url_path}
for whatever wheel is currently in AGNES_CLI_DIST_DIR. Public,
cacheable, no secrets — consumed by the CLI auto-update probe.
Client side
- New cli/update_check.py: reads /cli/latest with a 3s timeout, caches
the result in $DA_CONFIG_DIR/update_check.json for 24h. Cache is
invalidated when the installed version changes (e.g. after a fresh
`uv tool install`) so stale "you're behind" warnings don't linger.
- Root typer callback fires the probe before subcommand dispatch; any
failure is swallowed so a bad network never blocks a working command.
- Outdated → one-line stderr warning:
[update] da 2.0.0 is out of date — latest on this server is 2.1.0.
Upgrade: uv tool install --force <server>/cli/wheel/<…>.whl
- Disable with DA_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1.
* fix(pr-review): None-guard the upgrade line + skip gzip on parquet paths
Two follow-ups from Devin review on #41.
1. format_outdated_notice(UpdateInfo(download_url=None)) emitted literal
"uv tool install --force None" — copy-pasting that fails. Drop the
upgrade snippet when the URL is absent and keep only the version line.
2. GZipMiddleware compressed everything over 1024 bytes, including the
parquet FileResponses served by /api/data/{tid}/download,
/cli/wheel/{name}, and /cli/download. Parquet is already columnar-
compressed — gzip there is pure CPU + latency with no size win, and
/api/data bodies can reach hundreds of MB. Wrap GZipMiddleware in a
small _SelectiveGZipMiddleware that skips those path prefixes and
delegates the rest to the stock middleware. JSON / HTML endpoints
(manifest, /install, /api/version, …) still get compressed.
* release: bump to 2.1.0 — unify AGNES_VERSION with pyproject.toml version (#42)
Before: two independent version systems. pyproject.toml carried semver
(2.0.0 → wheel filename → `da --version`) while release.yml injected
CalVer into AGNES_VERSION (e.g. 2026.04.155 → /api/version). Users saw
different strings in the CLI vs. the /install page, and the CLI auto-
update check couldn't tell "new deploy, same package version" apart
from "new package version".
Make pyproject.toml [project].version the single product-version source
of truth. release.yml extracts it and feeds AGNES_VERSION, so every
surface (/api/version, /api/health, /cli/latest, `da --version`) agrees
on one number. The CalVer tag keeps doing what CalVer is for: release
identity on the git tag and Docker image tag (versioned_tag).
Also wires AGNES_TAG through the build: release.yml → Dockerfile ARG →
env, so /api/version.image_tag finally reports the actual image tag
instead of the "unknown" fallback.
Bump to 2.1.0 to reflect the PRs shipped on ps/wheel-name-fix: durable
sync (atomic writes + manifest MD5 + retry), server GZip, CLI auto-
update probe, setup snippet PEP 427 URL.
* fix(pr-review): directional version compare in is_outdated()
UpdateInfo.is_outdated() used `self.latest != self.installed`, which
fires in both directions. If the server is rolled back or the user
connects to an older deployment, the CLI would warn "out of date"
and — worse — the formatted notice would prompt
uv tool install --force <older-version>.whl
i.e. an unintended downgrade.
Compare with packaging.version.Version (PEP 440 aware, handles pre-
release tags). Fall back to dotted-int tuple compare if packaging is
somehow missing, and return False on unparseable strings — better to
miss an upgrade hint than to silently suggest a downgrade.
Adds 4 test cases: installed older (True), installed newer (False),
10.0.0 vs 2.1.0 lexical-compare trap (correct), unparseable strings
(False).
Addresses Devin review on #43.
* fix(pr-review): read FastAPI app version from package metadata
app/main.py:80 hardcoded `version="2.0.0"` in the FastAPI constructor.
After #42 bumped pyproject.toml to 2.1.0, /api/version, /cli/latest,
and `da --version` all reported 2.1.0 while /openapi.json and the
/docs UI still advertised 2.0.0.
Read `agnes-the-ai-analyst` version via importlib.metadata (same
pattern cli/main.py:_cli_version already uses), with a `"dev"`
fallback when the package is not installed (source checkout). This
way pyproject.toml stays the single source of truth across every
version surface — /openapi.json now tracks the bump automatically.
Adds a dedicated test file to pin this behavior so a future
regression to a hardcoded literal fails at CI.
Addresses second Devin finding on #43.
* fix(pr-review): _fmt_bytes PiB label + negative cache in update_check
Two more follow-ups from Devin review on #43.
1. _fmt_bytes off-by-unit. The old loop exited at TiB but the fallback
labelled PiB, so 1 PiB rendered as "1024.0 PiB". Restructure: put
every unit inside the loop (KiB through EiB) so the division count
always matches the label. Covers up to 1 ZiB cleanly; anything
beyond renders as "<big>.0 EiB" rather than crashing.
2. Negative cache for failed /cli/latest probes. On a corporate
firewall / VPN that silently drops packets, the 3s HTTP timeout
fired on *every* `da` invocation. Writing a `latest=None` cache
entry with a 5-minute TTL caps that at one probe per 5min. Successful
probes still use the 24h TTL. Reading logic branches on whether the
cached `latest` is None.
Adds TestFmtBytes (2 cases: small/medium sizes and the PiB/EiB fallback
regression), plus two TestSync update-check cases covering negative-
cache reuse and TTL expiry.
* fix: redirect unauthenticated HTML routes to /login (#10)
* docs(plan): user mgmt + PAT + CLI distribution implementation plan (#9#10#11#12)
* build(docker): produce wheel artifact for /cli/download (#9)
* feat(db): schema v5 — users.active + deactivated_at/by (#11)
* feat(api): /cli/download wheel + /cli/install.sh with baked server URL (#9)
* feat(users): repository supports active flag + count_admins (#11)
* feat(ui): /install page with per-deployment install instructions (#9)
* feat(api): user PATCH/reset-password/set-password/activate/deactivate (#11)
* fix(cli): da login prompts for password and sends it in body (#9)
* test(api): safeguard tests for self-deactivate and last admin (#11)
* feat(auth): reject requests from deactivated users (#11)
* fixup(#10): propagate next through /login buttons + lock down sanitizer tests
* feat(cli): da admin set-role/activate/deactivate/reset-password/set-password (#11)
* feat(ui): /admin/users management page (#11)
* feat(db): schema v6 — personal_access_tokens (#12)
* feat(users): access_tokens repository (#12)
* feat(auth): JWT carries typ (session|pat) and explicit jti (#12)
* feat(auth): reject revoked/expired PATs; update last_used_at (#12)
* feat(api): /auth/tokens CRUD + admin revoke; session-only guard (#12)
* feat(cli): da auth token create/list/revoke (#12)
* feat(ui): /profile page with PAT create/list/revoke (#12)
* docs: PAT usage and session/PAT TTL clarification (#12)
* feat(auth): PAT first-use-from-new-IP audit + last_used_ip (schema v7) (#12)
Closes remaining acceptance gap from issue #12: audit_log entry on first use
of a PAT from an IP that differs from the recorded last_used_ip.
- schema v7: personal_access_tokens.last_used_ip column
- AccessTokenRepository.mark_used now stores the client IP
- get_current_user extracts client IP (X-Forwarded-For first hop, fallback
to request.client.host) and emits a token.first_use_new_ip audit when the
IP changes on a subsequent use (not the very first use)
- tests: new-ip audit, same-ip no-op, first-ever-use no-op, schema v7 column
* fix: address Devin review findings on PR #28
- app/main.py: exclude /auth/* from HTML redirect handler so JSON
endpoints under /auth/ (PAT CRUD used by `da auth token` CLI) keep
their 401 JSON contract (Devin #1, bug)
- app/api/tokens.py: reject expires_in_days <= 0 explicitly; use
`is not None` so 0 no longer silently creates a non-expiring token
(Devin #2)
- app/api/users.py: validate role against Role enum in create_user
to match update_user and prevent 500 on role-protected requests
later (Devin #3)
- app/web/templates/admin_users.html: escape user-supplied strings
before innerHTML; move onclick handlers to addEventListener via
data attributes so emails with quotes / HTML no longer break the UI
or enable stored XSS (Devin #4)
- app/auth/router.py, app/auth/providers/{password,google}.py:
reject deactivated users at login instead of issuing a JWT that
would then fail on the next request — removes the confusing
redirect loop (Devin #5)
- CLAUDE.md: document schema v7 instead of stale v4 (Devin #6)
- tests/test_web_ui.py: regression test for the /auth/* JSON 401
* feat(web): add /profile and /admin/users links to dashboard nav
* feat(web): point setup banner at /install page
* chore(web): drop unused setup_instructions context
* fix: address Devin review round 2 on PR #28
- app/api/tokens.py: when expires_in_days is None (the "never" option),
use a ~100-year JWT expiry so the token doesn't silently die in 24h
via the session-default fallback in create_access_token. The real
expiry enforcement stays in verify_token's DB-level check (Devin 🔴)
- app/web/templates/profile.html: escape t.name and other user-supplied
strings via esc() helper before innerHTML, same pattern as
admin_users.html. Move revoke onclick to data-attribute +
addEventListener (Devin 🟡)
- app/api/cli_artifacts.py: use `mktemp -d` with X's at end of template
for GNU/BSD portability, place wheel inside the temp dir and
clean up with rm -rf (Devin 🚩)
* feat(web): redesign /install page; make curl one-liner primary, collapse manual
Rebuild the public /install page using the dashboard visual language
(shared header, card layout, gradient hero, design tokens from
style-custom.css). The page is now anchored on the one-liner install
path: curl -fsSL <server>/cli/install.sh | bash is rendered as the
primary, prominent step 1, while the old manual wheel-download flow
is tucked behind a closed-by-default <details> block for users in
restricted/offline environments.
Information architecture:
hero (server URL + version)
-> step 1: quick install (one-liner, big Copy button)
-> step 2: create PAT on /profile + export DA_TOKEN / da auth whoami
-> step 3: Claude Code / MCP via ~/.config/da/token.json
-> collapsed "Manual install" details for download-wheel flow
-> footer link to docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md
Every shell snippet has a vanilla-JS "Copy" button that confirms
visually ("Copied!" for 1.5s) and falls back to textarea+execCommand
on non-secure contexts. No new dependencies, no bundler.
The route now also pulls an optional user so the header shows the
same nav (Dashboard / Profile / Logout) as dashboard.html when a
session exists, while staying fully public when signed out.
* fix(cli): use real wheel filename in install.sh (broken pip/uv install)
The installer wrote the downloaded wheel as agnes_cli.whl, which lacks a
PEP-427 version component — both pip and uv tool install reject it and
abort the one-liner.
Use curl -OJ so Content-Disposition determines the on-disk filename, then
resolve it via glob. Install an EXIT trap to remove the tmpdir even when
install fails.
* fix(web): correct manual install wheel glob and add PEP 668 / PATH hints
- Wheel glob is agnes_the_ai_analyst-*.whl (not agnes-*.whl) — the old
pattern never matched the real artefact name from the build.
- Add — or — separator between uv tool install and pip install.
- Warn that pip install --user is blocked on macOS Homebrew / modern
Debian (PEP 668) and recommend uv tool install as the default path.
- Both flows now show the ~/.local/bin PATH hint so a fresh shell can
find the da binary after install.
* fix(web): consistent session.user reference in install header
The avatar-letter fallback inside {% if session.user %} was reading
user.name / user.email directly, but the route dependency can pass
user=None — those references resolved to an empty FlexDict and produced
an empty avatar circle. Read everything through session.user to match
the guard and the dashboard pattern.
* fix(web): point headless usage link at GitHub source
/docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md 404s — no static route serves repo docs. Point
the footer link at the rendered markdown on GitHub instead of adding a
dedicated docs serving route just for one file.
* feat(web): /install hero size, anon sign-in banner, step 2 copy polish
- Bump hero h1 from 26px to 30px to match dashboard primary scale.
- Anonymous visitors see a small sign-in banner above Step 2 (creating
a token requires auth; without the banner the flow appears stuck).
- Add an 'After generating your token' section label inside Step 2 so
the /profile CTA button no longer looks wedged mid-sentence between
adjacent paragraphs.
* chore(web): /install a11y + version pill polish
- aria-live='polite' on copy buttons so screen readers announce the
'Copied!' state change.
- Replace redundant INSTANCE_NAME eyebrow (already in the header logo)
with 'Getting started'.
- Hide the version pill when AGNES_VERSION is unset/'dev' — avoids the
misleading 'vdev' label in local/unbuilt runs.
- Manual summary focus-visible outline-offset +2px (was -2px which
clipped inside the card), and mark the chevron as decorative.
* fix(web): use session.user in dashboard avatar fallback
Inside {% if session.user %} guard, the avatar fallback referenced
(user.name or user.email). If user is None the block crashes when
the profile picture is absent. Align with the guard variable.
* fix: address Devin review round 3 on PR #28
- app/api/users.py: stop auto-sending email from reset_password. The
magic-link sender would deliver a "Login Link" that — when clicked —
consumes the reset_token via verify_magic_link and logs the user in
WITHOUT prompting for a new password. Admins now share the raw
reset_token from the API response manually, or use set-password
directly. email_sent is always False. Documented inline. (Devin 🟡)
- app/api/cli_artifacts.py: harden /cli/install.sh generation against
shell injection via Host header or AGNES_VERSION. base_url is
validated against a strict scheme+host+port regex; version against
an alnum + dot/dash/underscore allowlist. Both values are also
piped through shlex.quote() as defense in depth. (Devin 🟡)
The shared users.reset_token column between magic-link and password-
reset flows (Devin 🚩) remains an architectural gap; splitting into
separate columns needs schema v8 and is tracked for a follow-up PR.
* docs, chore(grpn): manual-deploy helpers + hackathon deploy learnings
Adds scripts/grpn/ — Makefile + agnes-auto-upgrade.sh + README for
operating Agnes on GRPN's existing foundryai-development VM when the
full Terraform flow is blocked by org policies:
- iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation (org constraint) forbids SA
JSON keys, so GCP_SA_KEY-based CI is unavailable
- No projectIamAdmin delegation → bootstrap-gcp.sh can't grant roles
- Secret Manager IAM bindings require setIamPolicy which editor lacks
Helper targets: deploy, deploy-tag, recreate, restart, stop, start,
status, version, logs, ps, env, ssh, tunnel, open, bootstrap-admin,
set-data-source, install-cron, uninstall-cron.
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-22-grpn-deploy-learnings.md — running
log of all org-policy constraints hit during the hackathon deploy,
with workarounds and derived follow-ups (WIF support, external_ip
variable, customer onboarding IAM checklist).
Not a replacement for the TF flow — stopgap until WIF lands.
* fix(web): make header logos clickable links to home
* feat(web): one-click "Setup a new Claude Code" button
Adds a single-button flow on the dashboard and /install page that
generates a fresh personal access token via POST /auth/tokens and
copies a complete, paste-ready setup script (server URL, token,
install/verify commands) to the clipboard. Falls back to a modal
textarea when the clipboard is blocked; redirects to /login on 401;
surfaces backend errors inline.
- dashboard.html: replaces the top "Set up your local environment"
anchor with a real button wired to setupNewClaude(). Removes the
duplicate bottom setup banner to keep a single entry point.
- install.html: for signed-in users, Step 1 leads with the one-click
button and demotes the curl one-liner into a collapsible "Or run
manually" aside. Anonymous visitors still see the curl flow plus a
sign-in hint.
- No new deps. Vanilla JS. Token lives in memory/clipboard only —
never rendered into persistent DOM.
* feat(cli): add "da auth import-token" for non-interactive PAT login
Writes a provided JWT into ~/.config/da/token.json using the canonical
{access_token, email, role} shape expected by save_token(). Decodes the
token locally to pull email/role claims, verifies it against the server
via GET /api/catalog/tables, and refuses to overwrite an existing token
file if the server returns 401. --email / --role overrides exist for
tokens missing those claims; --skip-verify bypasses the server round-trip
for offline / CI scenarios.
* test(cli): cover da auth import-token success + 401 + claim-fallback paths
Three new tests in TestAuthImportToken:
- valid JWT + 200 -> canonical token.json written
- 401 from /api/catalog/tables -> exit 1, existing token file untouched
- JWT without email/role claims -> refused without overrides, accepted
with --email / --role flags
* feat(web): update one-click Claude setup instructions — explicit uv install, import-token, skills question
Replaces the fragile `cat > token.json <<EOF` clipboard payload with an
explicit, auditable sequence:
1. `curl -fsSL /cli/download` + `uv tool install --force` (no opaque
`curl | bash`).
2. `da auth import-token --token ...` instead of hand-written JSON.
3. Explicit PATH persistence for zsh/bash.
4. A required question to the user about whether to copy the bundled
skills into ~/.claude/skills/agnes/ or pull them on-demand via
`da skills show`.
5. A final confirmation step with whoami + version output.
Factored both pages to include a shared partial
(app/web/templates/_claude_setup_instructions.jinja) so dashboard.html
and install.html can never drift apart again. {server_url} and {token}
stay as runtime placeholders substituted by renderSetupInstructions().
* feat(ui): modernize /admin/users + unify header nav across pages
- New shared partial app/web/templates/_app_header.html — single source
of truth for the top navigation. Used by base.html and dashboard.html
(which doesn't extend base.html). Active page highlighted via
request.url.path. Admin "Users" link gated by session.user.role.
- style-custom.css: add .app-header / .app-nav-link / .app-btn-logout /
.app-avatar styles (mirrors dashboard's previous inline copy under
app-* prefix). Mobile-friendly fallback at <720px.
- base.html: include the new partial so every page extending base
(admin_users, profile, login_email, error, …) gets the same chrome
the dashboard has.
- dashboard.html: replace its inline <header class="header"> markup
with the shared partial. Inline .header CSS left in place as
harmless dead code (separate cleanup PR).
- admin_users.html: rewritten with avatars, role pills (color-coded
per role), toggle switch for active, search/filter input, toast
notifications, modal dialogs replacing alert/confirm/prompt,
one-click copy for the reset token, empty / loading states.
All XSS-safe via the existing esc() helper + data-attribute
event delegation.
- tests/test_web_ui.py: smoke test that /admin/users renders the new
shared header chrome and the modernized markup.
* feat(api): serve CLI wheel at /cli/agnes.whl for direct uv install
uv tool install inspects the URL path suffix to recognise a wheel, so
/cli/download (which has no .whl suffix) cannot be installed directly.
Expose a stable /cli/agnes.whl alias over the same wheel lookup so users
can run: uv tool install --force https://<server>/cli/agnes.whl
* test(cli): cover da auth import-token --server persisting to config.yaml
The server persistence was already implemented in the import-token command
(save_config({server}) call) but not covered by tests. Add an explicit test
so the one-step setup contract — single import-token call writes both token
and server — cannot regress.
* feat(web): simpler Claude setup — single uv install URL, single import-token call
User feedback: the prior clipboard payload repeated the server URL and
token across multiple steps (curl + tmpfile + install + rm + separate
seed-config + import-token). Collapse to:
1. uv tool install --force {server_url}/cli/agnes.whl (single URL, direct)
2. da auth import-token --token ... --server ... (one call, persists both)
3. da auth whoami
4. skills (ask user first)
5. confirm
uv accepts HTTPS URLs that end in .whl and installs them directly, so
the tmpfile dance is unnecessary. import-token --server already persists
the server to config.yaml, so no separate printf > config.yaml step.
* fix(tests): update admin users heading assertion after template rename
The admin_users.html template now uses <h2 class="users-title">Users</h2>
instead of <h2>User management</h2>. Update the assertion to match.
* feat(ui): unify header across remaining 7 standalone pages
These 7 pages render their own full <html> and don't extend base.html,
so the previous unification commit only covered base + dashboard. Each
had its own ad-hoc <header> markup with inconsistent classes
(.top-header / .header / .page-header), inconsistent nav-link sets,
and inconsistent avatar/email styling.
Replace each inline <header>...</header> block with the shared
{% include '_app_header.html' %} so /activity-center, /admin/permissions,
/admin/tables, /catalog, /corporate-memory, /corporate-memory/admin,
and /install all show the same chrome (Dashboard / Install CLI /
Profile / Users / email + avatar / Logout) with the active page
highlighted via request.url.path.
Old inline header CSS (.header, .top-header, .page-header, .nav-link,
etc.) is left in place as harmless dead code; it can be cleaned up in
a follow-up sweep.
* feat(web): add readable preview of Claude setup payload on dashboard + /install
Move the line-by-line setup instructions into app/web/setup_instructions.py
as the single source of truth, then render them in two modes from the
existing _claude_setup_instructions.jinja partial:
- preview_mode=True → visible, read-only <pre><code> block with the real
server URL and a clearly-styled placeholder token (never a real one).
- preview_mode=False → the JS SETUP_INSTRUCTIONS_TEMPLATE used by the
one-click flow (unchanged behaviour).
Both /dashboard (env-setup-cta card) and /install (Step 1 card) now show
the preview directly under the 'Setup a new Claude Code' button so users
can see exactly what will land in their clipboard before they click.
* feat(web): update setup instructions — `da diagnose` step, explicit section titles
Rework the Claude Code setup payload to:
- Give every numbered step an unambiguous verb header ("1) Install the CLI",
"2) Log in", "3) Verify the login", "4) Run diagnostics", "5) Skills (ask
the user first)", "6) Confirm").
- Add step 4 `da diagnose` as the post-login health check. The CLI already
ships this command (cli/commands/diagnose.py); it prints "Overall:
healthy" and a list of green checks that map cleanly to next actions.
- Ask the skills copy-vs-on-demand question verbatim so Claude Code always
prompts the user the same way.
- Replace the terse "Confirm" line with a 4-bullet summary (version,
whoami, skills choice, diagnose status) so the return message is
structured and comparable across setups.
* chore(web): remove stale MCP card from /install (no MCP server today)
The 'Use with Claude Code / MCP' card (Step 3 on /install) referenced an
MCP integration Agnes does not ship. Remove the whole card. The one-click
'Setup a new Claude Code' flow in Step 1 already covers the long-lived
client use case and is less confusing than dangling persistence tips for
a non-existent integration.
* feat(api): include user_email + last_used_ip + user_id in admin tokens list response
Adds AdminTokenItem response model (superset of TokenListItem) and
AccessTokenRepository.list_all_with_user() joining personal_access_tokens
with users to denormalize user_email. Needed for /admin/tokens UI where
admins triage tokens across all users.
* feat(web): /admin/tokens page — list, filter, search, revoke across all users
Adds a new admin-only page with client-side filtering (status, user email,
last-used window), column sorting, counts bar (active/revoked/expired),
and an inline revoke action. Mirrors the /admin/users visual language.
* feat(web): add Tokens nav link for admins + deep-link from admin/users row
Admin-only nav entry to /admin/tokens, and a per-row Tokens button on
/admin/users that prefills the token page's user filter via ?user=<email>.
* test(admin): cover /admin/tokens rendering, filter state, non-admin denial, revoke
Verifies admin can render the page (title + JS hooks present), a non-admin
is blocked, unauthenticated users are redirected, the admin list response
includes user_email / user_id / last_used_ip, and admin can revoke another
user's token.
* feat(web): modern redesign of /admin/tokens — hero, stat strip, refined table, responsive cards, a11y
* feat(web): ditch the table — /admin/tokens as a card stack, modern GitHub-style list
Replaces the table-based layout with a stack of self-contained token cards
inside a <ul role=list>. Each card is a flex row: avatar + name/meta on the
left, last-used block in the middle, status pill + outlined 'Revoke' button
on the right. Status and sort controls are pill-shaped toggle chips; user
email search has an inline search icon. No <table>/<tr>/<th>/<td> anywhere.
Responsive below 720px (card stacks vertically) and 480px (stat chips 2x2).
Preserves filter IDs (flt-status, flt-user, flt-last-used) and data-revoke
for existing tests.
* feat(web): add /tokens (role-aware) — single page for both user PAT CRUD and admin overview
- Rename admin_tokens.html -> tokens.html with a new is_admin context flag.
- New route GET /tokens: renders the same card-stack UI for everyone.
* Admins: loads /auth/admin/tokens, shows owner column + stat strip, keeps
the owner-email search box and sort-by-owner chip.
* Non-admins: loads /auth/tokens (own tokens only), hides owner column +
stat chips, adds a 'New token' CTA in the hero that opens a modal
(name + expires_in_days) calling POST /auth/tokens. The raw token is
revealed once in a dismissable banner and cleared from the DOM on Hide.
- GET /admin/tokens now 302-redirects to /tokens, preserving query string
(so the /admin/users deep-link ?user=foo still works).
* feat(web): /tokens full-bleed layout to match dashboard width
The hero, toolbar, and card list used to sit inside base.html's .container
(max-width 800px). Break out with negative horizontal margins so the page
spans the viewport like /dashboard does, capped at 1440px for readability
on very wide screens with a 24px gutter on each side.
- No change to base.html itself. The override is scoped to .tokens-page.
- body { overflow-x: hidden; } guards against rare horizontal scrollbars.
- < 808px viewport: reset to natural flow (mobile already narrower).
- ≥ 1488px viewport: cap to 1440px and re-center.
* chore(web): remove /profile template + nav link (redirect /profile -> /tokens)
The old /profile PAT CRUD page is now redundant — the modern /tokens page
covers both user and admin flows. Delete the template; the router's
/profile handler already 302-redirects to /tokens.
Nav cleanup:
- Remove the 'Profile' link.
- Show a single 'Tokens' link to every signed-in user (previously only
admins saw it).
- Active-state matches /tokens, /admin/tokens, and /profile so the
highlight survives the redirect chain.
/install CTA now points at /tokens instead of /profile.
* test: cover /tokens for admin + non-admin flows, /profile redirect, nav update
tests/test_admin_tokens_ui.py
- Point admin rendering test at /tokens directly and tighten assertions
(admin-only stat strip + owner search, non-admin CTA absent).
- Add test_non_admin_can_render_tokens_page: personal body, New-token CTA,
create-modal, reveal banner; stat strip + owner search absent.
- Add test_admin_tokens_redirects_to_tokens: 302 to /tokens, query string
(?user=...) preserved for the /admin/users deep-link.
- Add test_profile_redirects_to_tokens: 302 to /tokens.
- Add test_non_admin_can_create_pat_via_tokens_page_api: exercises the
POST /auth/tokens call that the non-admin create-modal submits.
tests/test_pat.py
- test_profile_page_renders -> test_profile_page_redirects_to_tokens:
assert the 302 + that /tokens lands on the unified non-admin body.
tests/test_web_ui.py
- admin_users nav assertion: 'Tokens' link present, 'Profile' link absent.
- Add test_nav_shows_tokens_link_for_non_admin: non-admins see the same
'Tokens' link (previously only admins did).
- Add test_profile_redirects_to_tokens back-compat check.
* feat(web): collapse 'What Claude Code will receive' by default
The preview block on /dashboard and /install now uses <details>/<summary>
so it is hidden by default. Click the chevron/title to expand and review
the clipboard payload. Markup stays in the DOM so existing tests that
assert on content continue to pass.
* fix(web): /tokens width — override .container to 1280px like dashboard
The negative-margin full-bleed trick was fragile and pushed content past
the right edge on deployed viewports. Replace with a simple max-width
override of base.html's .container on this page only, matching
/dashboard's 1280px center-column layout.
* feat(web): split role-aware /tokens into my_tokens.html + admin_tokens.html
* feat(web): router — separate handlers for /tokens (own) and /admin/tokens (all)
* feat(web): nav — show Tokens for all, add All tokens for admins
* test: cover split token pages (own vs all) + admin access gating
* feat(web): move 'My tokens' into a user dropdown menu
Replaces the separate Tokens/email/Logout nav trio with a rounded
avatar trigger that opens a dropdown containing the user's email,
role, a 'My tokens' link, and Logout. Admin-only 'All tokens' stays
as a top-level nav item since it's an admin function, not a personal
one. Click-outside and Escape close the panel; chevron rotates on
open.
* fix(api): allow PATs to list/get/revoke their own tokens (CLI flow)
The documented 'da auth token list/revoke' CLI flow in
docs/HEADLESS_USAGE.md uses a PAT, but the previous dependency
(require_session_token) returned 403. Only create_token must be
session-only to prevent PAT-spawning-PAT chains; listing and
revoking your own tokens is safe with a PAT.
* fix(api): cap expires_in_days at 3650 to avoid datetime overflow (500 to 400)
Values above ~11 million days overflowed datetime.max in
datetime.now(utc) + timedelta(days=...) and surfaced as an
unhandled OverflowError → 500. Cap at 10 years with a clear
400 instead; the no-expiry code path is unaffected.
* fix(api): relax _SAFE_URL_RE to allow path prefixes, underscores, and IPv6
The previous regex rejected legitimate reverse-proxy base_url values
(https://host/agnes/), underscores in Docker Compose hostnames, and
IPv6 literals (http://[::1]:8000). Widen the charset and allow an
optional trailing path. shlex.quote continues to provide
defense-in-depth against any metacharacter that slips through.
* fix(web): /login/email and Google OAuth propagate next_path
Previously, /login/email silently dropped the ?next=<path> query
param so the hidden form field rendered empty and login always
landed on /dashboard. Google's button was hard-coded to
/auth/google/login, ignoring next entirely.
- /login page now appends ?next to the Google button URL
- /login/email reads + sanitizes next, passes as template context
- google_login stashes sanitized next_path in session['login_next']
- google_callback pops + re-sanitizes and redirects there
Sanitization factored into app/auth/_common.safe_next_path.
* fix(auth): differentiate argon2 VerifyMismatchError from internal errors in web login
The previous except (VerifyMismatchError, Exception) collapsed both
cases into the generic 'invalid credentials' redirect, silently
hiding corrupted-hash / library errors from ops. Split the two:
bad password still gets ?error=invalid; anything else logs via
logger.exception and redirects with ?err=auth_internal so ops have
a visible signal and users don't retry forever against a broken
password_hash column.
* docs: correct CLAUDE.md table name (personal_access_tokens)
v7 note referenced 'access_tokens.last_used_ip' but the real table
is personal_access_tokens (as mentioned two tokens earlier in the
same bullet). Same-file consistency fix.
* chore(web): clarify admin user-reset UI — encourage Set password over the unused reset_token
POST /api/users/{id}/reset-password stores and returns a token
but no endpoint consumes it — the magic-link sender would log the
user in without prompting for a new password, defeating the reset.
- Drop the 'Reset' row action from admin_users so admins aren't
pointed at a dead end.
- Rewrite the reveal-modal copy to tell admins to use Set password
and explicitly note that the magic-link flow isn't available
for reset tokens in this build.
The API endpoint stays for API-level future use.
* test: cover PAT CLI flow, expires_in_days overflow, proxy base_url, next propagation
- tests/test_pat.py: PAT can list own tokens (200, was 403);
PAT can revoke own tokens (204); create_token returns 400 for
expires_in_days > 3650 (was 500 via datetime overflow).
- tests/test_cli_artifacts.py: _SAFE_URL_RE accepts reverse-proxy
path prefixes, underscores, and IPv6 literals; end-to-end check
of cli_install_script with a stubbed base_url that includes
a path prefix (Agnes behind /agnes/).
- tests/test_web_ui.py: /login propagates ?next to the Google
button URL; /login/email renders next in the hidden form field
and strips hostile values; unit coverage of safe_next_path.
* fix(security): use \Z instead of $ in URL/version allowlists (trailing-\n bypass)
Python regex `$` also matches just before a trailing newline, so a Host
header or AGNES_VERSION value like "good.example.com\n$(rm -rf /)"
would slip past the allowlist. `\Z` anchors to strict end-of-string.
shlex.quote downstream remains as defense-in-depth, but the allowlist
is now the tight gate it claims to be.
* fix(auth): PAT with null expiry omits JWT exp claim (DB is the source of truth)
Previously a PAT created with `expires_in_days=null` (user-requested
"never expires") set the DB `expires_at` to NULL (correct) but still
baked a ~100y `exp` claim into the JWT. That is misleading: the PAT
silently did expire eventually, despite the UI and API promising
"no expiry".
`create_access_token` now accepts `omit_exp=True` to skip the `exp`
claim entirely. `app/api/tokens.py` passes that when `expires_in_days
is None`. The authoritative expiry check lives in
`app/auth/dependencies.py`, which reads `expires_at` from the DB row —
unchanged. PyJWT accepts claim-less JWTs indefinitely.
* test: cover trailing-newline regex bypass + no-exp JWT for unbounded PAT
- test_safe_url_re_rejects_trailing_newline_bypass: asserts both
`_SAFE_URL_RE` and `_SAFE_VERSION_RE` reject values with a trailing
`\n` (previously accepted because Python `$` matches before `\n`).
- test_pat_null_expiry_jwt_has_no_exp_claim: POST /auth/tokens with
`expires_in_days=null`, decode the returned JWT, assert `exp` is
absent while `typ=pat`, `sub`, and `jti` are still present.
- test_pat_with_null_expiry_is_accepted_by_verify_token: verify_token
round-trips a claim-less JWT without ExpiredSignatureError.
- test_pat_null_expiry_end_to_end_allows_authenticated_request: use
the null-expiry PAT against /auth/tokens and confirm it authenticates.
* docs(auth): document X-Forwarded-For trust model in _client_ip
Deployment runs behind Caddy which strips incoming X-Forwarded-For
and sets its own, so the leftmost hop is trustworthy. Clarify that
the stored last_used_ip is audit-only and never used for access
control — if the app is ever exposed directly, this value becomes
client-settable.
* docs: /profile → /tokens in install.sh next-steps, CLI error, HEADLESS_USAGE, security skill
After splitting PAT management to /tokens (with /profile as a back-compat
302), stale references remained in user-facing text. Update them to the
canonical /tokens URL so shell scripts, CLI error hints, docs, and the
bundled security skill are all consistent.
Add require_role(Role.ADMIN) to /admin/tables and /admin/permissions,
and require_role(Role.KM_ADMIN) to /corporate-memory/admin so that
non-admin users receive 403 instead of being served the page.
Fix admin_cookie test fixture to supply a password_hash (required since
the /auth/token endpoint blocks passwordless requests). Add analyst
fixture and TestAdminRoleGuards tests verifying analysts get 403 and
admins get 200 on the protected routes.
- tests/test_web_ui.py: smoke tests for all authenticated web pages (login, dashboard, catalog, corporate-memory, activity-center, admin/tables, admin/permissions)
- tests/test_jira_service.py: unit tests for extract_init and update_meta in the Jira connector
- tests/test_instance_config.py: verifies get_instance_name() returns a string when config file is absent
- tests/test_orchestrator.py: concurrent rebuild test asserting rebuild succeeds while a read-only connection holds the analytics DB
ZdenekSrotyr