fix(security): XSS hardening for setup banner + cleanup unused imports

- Add _sanitize_banner_html() to src/setup_banner.py: strips <script>/
  <iframe> blocks, on* event-handler attributes, and javascript:/data:
  URI schemes post-render (I-2). Defense-in-depth — /setup is partly
  anonymous so malformed admin content must not execute in visitors'
  browsers.
- Apply sanitizer in render_setup_banner() before returning rendered HTML.
- Add 3 unit tests: test_render_strips_script_tags,
  test_render_strips_event_handlers, test_render_strips_javascript_uri.
- Drop unused Optional import from src/repositories/welcome_template.py
  and src/repositories/setup_banner.py (M-6).

src/repositories/setup_banner.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Repository for the per-instance setup-page banner override (singleton row)."""
 
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Optional
+from typing import Any
 
 import duckdb
 

src/repositories/welcome_template.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """Repository for the per-instance welcome-prompt override (singleton row)."""
 
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Optional
+from typing import Any
 
 import duckdb
 

src/setup_banner.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ data classification), not for analyst-side content.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
+import re
 from datetime import date, datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any, Optional
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
@@ -20,6 +21,38 @@ from src.repositories.setup_banner import SetupBannerRepository
 
 _logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
+# Patterns used by _sanitize_banner_html.
+_RE_SCRIPT = re.compile(r"<\s*script[\s\S]*?(?:</\s*script\s*>|$)", re.IGNORECASE)
+_RE_IFRAME = re.compile(r"<\s*iframe[\s\S]*?(?:</\s*iframe\s*>|$)", re.IGNORECASE)
+_RE_ON_ATTR = re.compile(r'\s+on\w+\s*=\s*(?:"[^"]*"|\'[^\']*\'|[^\s>]*)', re.IGNORECASE)
+_RE_JS_URI = re.compile(
+    r'((?:href|src)\s*=\s*["\'])(?:javascript|data):[^"\']*(["\'])',
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+
+
+def _sanitize_banner_html(html: str) -> str:
+    """Strip the most dangerous markup patterns from rendered banner HTML.
+
+    Threat model: admins are trusted to author banner content, but mistakes
+    happen (copy-paste from untrusted sources, accidental script inclusion).
+    This is defense-in-depth, NOT a full XSS defense — for that, render
+    markdown only or add a strict Content-Security-Policy. The whitelist of
+    bad patterns is intentionally narrow so legitimate admin HTML is not
+    mangled.
+
+    What is stripped:
+    - ``<script>...</script>`` blocks (case-insensitive, including unclosed).
+    - ``<iframe>...</iframe>`` blocks.
+    - ``on*=`` event-handler attributes (e.g. onclick, onload, onerror).
+    - ``javascript:`` and ``data:`` URI schemes in href/src attributes.
+    """
+    html = _RE_SCRIPT.sub("", html)
+    html = _RE_IFRAME.sub("", html)
+    html = _RE_ON_ATTR.sub("", html)
+    html = _RE_JS_URI.sub(lambda m: m.group(1) + "#" + m.group(2), html)
+    return html
+
 
 def build_setup_banner_context(
     *,
@@ -76,7 +109,8 @@ def render_setup_banner(
     env = Environment(undefined=StrictUndefined, autoescape=True)
     try:
         template = env.from_string(source)
-        return template.render(**build_setup_banner_context(user=user, server_url=server_url))
+        rendered = template.render(**build_setup_banner_context(user=user, server_url=server_url))
+        return _sanitize_banner_html(rendered)
     except TemplateError:
         _logger.warning(
             "setup_banner render failed; returning empty banner. "

tests/test_setup_banner_render.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import pytest
 
 from src.db import _ensure_schema
 from src.repositories.setup_banner import SetupBannerRepository
-from src.setup_banner import build_setup_banner_context, render_setup_banner
+from src.setup_banner import _sanitize_banner_html, build_setup_banner_context, render_setup_banner
 
 
 @pytest.fixture
@@ -78,3 +78,44 @@ def test_autoescape_escapes_html_entities(conn):
     )
     # hostname won't contain < > but the render must succeed without injection
     assert out != ""
+
+
+# ── Sanitizer unit tests ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def test_render_strips_script_tags(conn):
+    """render_setup_banner must remove <script> blocks from the output."""
+    SetupBannerRepository(conn).set(
+        '<p>Hello</p><script>alert(1)</script>',
+        updated_by="admin@example.com",
+    )
+    out = render_setup_banner(conn, user=_user(), server_url="https://example.com")
+    assert "<script>" not in out
+    assert "alert" not in out
+    # Safe content preserved
+    assert "Hello" in out
+
+
+def test_render_strips_event_handlers(conn):
+    """render_setup_banner must strip on* event-handler attributes."""
+    SetupBannerRepository(conn).set(
+        '<button onclick="evil()">Click me</button>',
+        updated_by="admin@example.com",
+    )
+    out = render_setup_banner(conn, user=_user(), server_url="https://example.com")
+    assert "onclick" not in out
+    assert "evil" not in out
+    # Button text preserved
+    assert "Click me" in out
+
+
+def test_render_strips_javascript_uri(conn):
+    """render_setup_banner must strip javascript: URI schemes from href/src."""
+    SetupBannerRepository(conn).set(
+        '<a href="javascript:evil()">link</a>',
+        updated_by="admin@example.com",
+    )
+    out = render_setup_banner(conn, user=_user(), server_url="https://example.com")
+    assert "javascript:" not in out
+    assert "evil" not in out
+    # Link text preserved
+    assert "link" in out