diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 35f7222..761da94 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ CalVer image tags (`stable-YYYY.MM.N`, `dev-YYYY.MM.N`) are produced for every C
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Fixed
+- **Store guardrails — post-#290 follow-up.** Admin Rescan still writes `status='blocked_inline'` (the only post-v30 producer of that status). Re-add `blocked_inline` to the admin queue's "Needs review" filter chip and to `TERMINAL_BLOCKED_STATUSES` in the bundle-purge job, so a rescan-produced row surfaces in the default operator view and its bundle gets swept by the TTL purge instead of lingering on disk indefinitely. Documents the rescan-only asymmetry inline (chip + purge tuple + new code comments).
+- Stale doc strings referring to the pre-#290 `blocked_inline` quota counter on `app/api/store.py` spam-quota comment, `app/instance_config.py::get_guardrails_blocked_quota_per_day` docstring, and the operator-facing hint in `/admin/server-config` (`blocked_quota_per_day`). All three now correctly describe the narrowed `blocked_llm + review_error` counter that #290 actually shipped.
+
+### Internal
+- Tightened `test_quota_disabled_with_zero` assertion from `r.status_code != 429` to `r.status_code in (200, 201)` so a 500 regression no longer slips through as quota-disabled.
+- New positive test `test_inline_validation_returns_validation_failed_code` covering the `_reject_inline_or_continue` validation branch end-to-end (response code + checks payload shape + no-DB-write contract). Locks the frontend wizard's `detail.checks.{manifest,content,quality}` contract.
+- `_reject_inline_or_continue` now takes `plugin_dir` and lazy-computes `bundle_meta` only on the security branch; the validation branch (the common case for honest submitters) no longer pays for a SHA256 walk over the bundle on every reject.
+- Surface failures to write the `store.upload.security_blocked` audit row via `logger.exception` instead of silently swallowing — that audit row is the only forensic trace of an inline-tier security finding, and a swallowed DB error would have left no record at all.
+
 ## [0.54.9] — 2026-05-13
 
 ### Added
diff --git a/app/api/admin.py b/app/api/admin.py
index f4b1040..3345a12 100644
--- a/app/api/admin.py
+++ b/app/api/admin.py
@@ -772,9 +772,12 @@ _KNOWN_FIELDS: dict[str, dict[str, dict]] = {
             "kind": "int",
             "default": 50,
             "hint": (
-                "Per-submitter cap on `blocked_inline` rows in the "
-                "trailing 24h. Bounds the worst case where a bot loops "
-                "on malformed ZIPs. 0 disables the quota. Default 50."
+                "Per-submitter cap on `blocked_llm` + `review_error` "
+                "rows in the trailing 24h. Bounds the worst case where "
+                "a bot loops on bundles that survive inline checks but "
+                "trip the async LLM reviewer. Inline failures are "
+                "hard-rejected upstream (no row, not counted). 0 "
+                "disables the quota. Default 50."
             ),
         },
         "blocked_bundle_ttl_days": {
diff --git a/app/api/store.py b/app/api/store.py
index af565ff..3dffc51 100644
--- a/app/api/store.py
+++ b/app/api/store.py
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ def _reject_inline_or_continue(
     conn: duckdb.DuckDBPyConnection,
     user: dict,
     inline: InlineResult,
-    bundle_meta: Any,
+    plugin_dir: Path,
     cleanup_paths: List[Path],
     type_: str,
     name: str,
@@ -292,6 +292,12 @@ def _reject_inline_or_continue(
         )
 
     if inline.static_security.get("status") != "pass":
+        # Lazy-compute bundle_meta only on the security branch. The
+        # validation branch returned above without needing the hash,
+        # so callers don't pay for compute_bundle_meta when manifest /
+        # content checks fail (the common case for honest submitters).
+        from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
+        bundle_meta = compute_bundle_meta(plugin_dir)
         findings = inline.static_security.get("findings") or []
         try:
             AuditRepository(conn).log(
@@ -311,7 +317,16 @@ def _reject_inline_or_continue(
                 result="blocked",
             )
         except Exception:
-            pass
+            # The security_blocked audit row is the ONLY forensic
+            # trace of this attempt (no DB submission row by design),
+            # so a swallowed failure here loses the signal entirely.
+            # Surface it in logs even though we keep raising the 422
+            # so the submitter still sees the same response.
+            logger.exception(
+                "Failed to write store.upload.security_blocked "
+                "audit_log entry (context=%s sha256=%s)",
+                context, bundle_meta.sha256,
+            )
         for p in cleanup_paths:
             shutil.rmtree(p, ignore_errors=True)
         raise HTTPException(
@@ -1157,8 +1172,10 @@ async def create_entity(
     # queue with noise. Cap rejected uploads per submitter per 24h;
     # operator can disable by setting the knob to 0.
     #
-    # #9 widening: counts blocked_inline + blocked_llm + review_error so
-    # a submitter triggering only LLM-blocked verdicts is bounded too.
+    # Counter narrows to blocked_llm + review_error — inline failures
+    # are hard-rejected upstream and never create rows. HTTP-level
+    # slowapi limits + the `store.upload.security_blocked` audit trail
+    # cover the inline-tier abuse path.
     #
     # Race note (#5, deferred): two parallel uploads from the same
     # submitter can both pass the SELECT before either INSERT — the cap
@@ -1259,8 +1276,6 @@ async def create_entity(
         # hard-rejected — no entity row, no submission row, no bundle on
         # disk. Quarantine + admin rescan apply ONLY to the async LLM
         # path (see runner.run_llm_review). See docs/STORE_GUARDRAILS.md.
-        from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
-        bundle_meta = compute_bundle_meta(plugin_dir)
         inline = run_inline_checks(
             plugin_dir, type_=type, description=final_description,
         )
@@ -1268,12 +1283,18 @@ async def create_entity(
             conn=conn,
             user=user,
             inline=inline,
-            bundle_meta=bundle_meta,
+            plugin_dir=plugin_dir,
             cleanup_paths=[_entity_dir(entity_id)],
             type_=type,
             name=final_name,
             context="create",
         )
+        # Compute meta after the reject gate so honest submitters whose
+        # bundles fail validation never pay for the SHA256 walk; this
+        # path only fires once we know the bundle is going to be
+        # persisted (as a submission row).
+        from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
+        bundle_meta = compute_bundle_meta(plugin_dir)
         subs_repo = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn)
 
         guardrails_on = get_guardrails_enabled()
@@ -1509,8 +1530,6 @@ async def update_entity(
                 description=description if description is not None
                             else entity.get("description"),
             )
-            from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
-            staging_meta = compute_bundle_meta(staging_plugin)
             # Hard-reject on inline failure. _reject_inline_or_continue
             # cleans the staged version dir (no live state to roll back —
             # the live ``plugin/`` tree was never touched) and raises 422
@@ -1520,7 +1539,7 @@ async def update_entity(
                 conn=conn,
                 user=user,
                 inline=inline_after_update,
-                bundle_meta=staging_meta,
+                plugin_dir=staging_plugin,
                 cleanup_paths=[version_root],
                 type_=entity["type"],
                 name=entity["name"],
@@ -1843,8 +1862,6 @@ async def restore_version(
         type_=entity["type"],
         description=entity.get("description"),
     )
-    from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
-    target_meta = compute_bundle_meta(target_plugin)
     # Hard-reject on inline failure. Wipe the staged version dir
     # entirely — live tree untouched, no entity/submission row to
     # create. The submitter sees the structured 422 and either fixes
@@ -1853,7 +1870,7 @@ async def restore_version(
         conn=conn,
         user=user,
         inline=inline,
-        bundle_meta=target_meta,
+        plugin_dir=target_plugin,
         cleanup_paths=[target_root],
         type_=entity["type"],
         name=entity["name"],
@@ -1864,6 +1881,8 @@ async def restore_version(
     # the PUT edit path: existing installers keep getting the prior
     # approved version through the LLM review window. Promotion (live
     # swap + version_no/version/file_size bump) waits on LLM approval.
+    from src.store_guardrails.bundle_meta import compute_bundle_meta
+    target_meta = compute_bundle_meta(target_plugin)
     guardrails_on = get_guardrails_enabled()
     subs_repo = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn)
     sub_id = subs_repo.create(
diff --git a/app/instance_config.py b/app/instance_config.py
index 84aa9b8..207523e 100644
--- a/app/instance_config.py
+++ b/app/instance_config.py
@@ -432,12 +432,16 @@ def get_guardrails_review_model() -> str:
 
 
 def get_guardrails_blocked_quota_per_day() -> int:
-    """Per-submitter cap on `blocked_inline` rows in the trailing 24h.
+    """Per-submitter cap on `blocked_llm` + `review_error` rows in the
+    trailing 24h.
 
     Defaults to 50. Set to 0 in instance.yaml to disable the quota
-    entirely (useful for trusted single-tenant deployments). Bounds the
-    worst case where a bot loops on malformed ZIPs and fills disk +
-    the admin queue with noise.
+    entirely (useful for trusted single-tenant deployments). Bounds
+    the worst case where a bot loops on bundles that pass inline
+    checks but trip the async LLM reviewer. Inline failures are
+    hard-rejected upstream (no row created) and not counted here;
+    HTTP-level rate limiting + the
+    ``store.upload.security_blocked`` audit trail cover that path.
     """
     val = get_value("guardrails", "blocked_quota_per_day", default=50)
     try:
diff --git a/app/web/templates/admin_store_submissions.html b/app/web/templates/admin_store_submissions.html
index ce79b9b..dc11c65 100644
--- a/app/web/templates/admin_store_submissions.html
+++ b/app/web/templates/admin_store_submissions.html
@@ -225,11 +225,15 @@
     <a href="/admin/store/submissions{% if _common %}?{{ _common[:-1] }}{% endif %}" class="{{ 'active' if not status_filter else '' }}">All</a>
     {% set _pending = "pending_llm,pending_inline" %}
     <a href="/admin/store/submissions?{{ _common }}status={{ _pending }}" class="{{ 'active' if status_filter == _pending else '' }}">Pending</a>
-    {# 'blocked_inline' deliberately omitted — inline failures are now
-       hard-rejected upstream (no submission row created). Legacy
-       blocked_inline rows from instances that ran the v30 contract
-       remain reachable via the 'All' tab. #}
-    {% set _needs = "blocked_llm,review_error" %}
+    {# Inline failures on the upload path are hard-rejected and create
+       no rows — the only producer of `blocked_inline` post-v30 is the
+       admin Rescan flow, which re-runs inline checks against an
+       already-quarantined bundle. Include it here so an admin who
+       triggers a rescan sees the result in their default queue
+       instead of having to scroll to 'All'. Legacy `blocked_inline`
+       rows from pre-v30 instances also surface here, which is fine —
+       same actionable state. #}
+    {% set _needs = "blocked_inline,blocked_llm,review_error" %}
     <a href="/admin/store/submissions?{{ _common }}status={{ _needs }}" class="{{ 'active' if status_filter == _needs else '' }}">Needs review</a>
     <a href="/admin/store/submissions?{{ _common }}status=approved" class="{{ 'active' if status_filter == 'approved' else '' }}">Approved</a>
     <a href="/admin/store/submissions?{{ _common }}status=overridden" class="{{ 'active' if status_filter == 'overridden' else '' }}">Overridden</a>
diff --git a/src/store_guardrails/purge.py b/src/store_guardrails/purge.py
index 23bc263..7e95243 100644
--- a/src/store_guardrails/purge.py
+++ b/src/store_guardrails/purge.py
@@ -31,12 +31,15 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 # `approved` (live entity, never purge), `overridden` (admin already
 # decided to publish), and `pending_*` (still in review).
 #
-# `blocked_inline` was removed when inline failures became hard-rejects
-# (no submission row, no bundle persisted). Legacy `blocked_inline` rows
-# from pre-cutover instances stay on disk indefinitely; reachable via
-# audit_log lookups but no longer swept here. Re-add to the tuple if a
-# one-shot legacy-cleanup pass is wanted.
+# Inline-tier failures on the upload path are hard-rejected and never
+# create rows here. The only writer of `blocked_inline` post-v30 is
+# `admin_rescan_store_submission` — an admin-initiated rescan that
+# re-fails inline produces a `blocked_inline` row pointing at the
+# already-quarantined bundle. Sweeping these here matches operator
+# expectation: an admin Rescan should not cause a previously-purged
+# bundle to outlive its TTL just because the verdict changed.
 TERMINAL_BLOCKED_STATUSES = (
+    "blocked_inline",
     "blocked_llm",
     "review_error",
 )
diff --git a/tests/test_admin_store_submissions.py b/tests/test_admin_store_submissions.py
index 5be7413..98cb713 100644
--- a/tests/test_admin_store_submissions.py
+++ b/tests/test_admin_store_submissions.py
@@ -269,6 +269,63 @@ class TestAdminListing:
         assert params.get("bundle_sha256")
         assert params.get("submitter_email") == "spammer@x.com"
 
+    def test_inline_validation_returns_validation_failed_code(self, web_client):
+        """A bundle that survives pre-bake but fails ``content_check``
+        (description too short) goes through ``_reject_inline_or_continue``
+        and is rejected with the new two-tier response: 422,
+        ``detail.code == 'validation_failed'``, populated
+        ``detail.checks`` shape, NO submission row, NO entity row,
+        and NO audit_log entry (validation-tier failures are
+        operator-fixable, not forensically interesting).
+
+        Distinct from ``test_validation_failure_creates_no_audit_trail``
+        below which exercises the pre-bake ``zip_missing_skill_md`` path
+        — that one fails before inline checks ever run.
+        """
+        from src.repositories.audit import AuditRepository
+        from src.repositories.store_submissions import StoreSubmissionsRepository
+
+        # Valid skill layout — pre-bake parses frontmatter, layout
+        # check passes. But description is < 60 chars → content_check
+        # fires inside run_inline_checks → _reject_inline_or_continue
+        # returns validation_failed.
+        buf = io.BytesIO()
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, "w") as zf:
+            zf.writestr(
+                "tiny/SKILL.md",
+                "---\nname: tiny\ndescription: too short\n---\n\n"
+                + ("Body text. " * 50),
+            )
+        short_desc_zip = buf.getvalue()
+
+        user_id, user_cookies = _create_user(web_client, "shortdesc@x.com")
+        r = web_client.post(
+            "/api/store/entities",
+            files={"file": ("s.zip", short_desc_zip, "application/zip")},
+            data={"type": "skill"}, cookies=user_cookies,
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 422, r.text
+        detail = r.json()["detail"]
+        assert detail["code"] == "validation_failed", detail
+        # Frontend wizard (humanizeError in store_upload.html) reads
+        # detail.checks.{manifest,content,quality} — lock the shape.
+        assert set(detail["checks"].keys()) == {"manifest", "content", "quality"}
+        assert detail["checks"]["content"]["status"] != "pass"
+
+        # Validation-tier failures must not produce DB rows or audit entries.
+        conn = get_system_db()
+        items, _total = StoreSubmissionsRepository(conn).list_for_admin(
+            submitter_id=user_id,
+        )
+        assert items == []
+        rows, _cursor = AuditRepository(conn).query(
+            user_id=user_id, action_prefix="store.upload.", limit=10,
+        )
+        conn.close()
+        assert rows == [], (
+            "validation-tier rejection must not write audit_log entries"
+        )
+
     def test_validation_failure_creates_no_audit_trail(self, web_client):
         """A bundle that fails manifest validation (missing SKILL.md) is
         a fixable user error — no submission row, no entity row, and
@@ -897,9 +954,10 @@ class TestQuota:
         )
         # Clean upload — passes inline guardrails. With ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
         # absent in tests the guardrail pipeline auto-disables so the
-        # entity lands at ``approved`` (201). Anything other than 429 is
-        # the quota-disabled outcome we care about.
-        assert r.status_code != 429, r.text
+        # entity lands at ``approved`` (201). Assert the success codes
+        # explicitly so a 500 from an unrelated regression doesn't
+        # masquerade as quota-disabled.
+        assert r.status_code in (200, 201), r.text
 
     def test_quota_counter_includes_blocked_llm_and_review_error(self, web_client):
         """The counter narrows to ``blocked_llm`` + ``review_error`` —